

THE NORTHERN WORLD ●●● BRILL

Power and the City in the Netherlandic World



Edited by

Wayne te Brake and Wim Klooster



THE NORTHERN WORLD ●●● BRILL

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

POWER AND THE CITY IN THE NETHERLANDIC WORLD

THE NORTHERN WORLD

North Europe and the Baltic c. 400-1700 AD
Peoples, Economies and Cultures

EDITORS

BARBARA CRAWFORD (St. Andrews)

DAVID KIRBY (London)

JON-VIDAR SIGURDSSON (Oslo)

INGVILD ØYE (Bergen)

RICHARD W. UNGER (Vancouver)

PRZEMYSŁAW URBANCZYK (Warsaw)

VOLUME 22



POWER AND THE CITY IN THE NETHERLANDIC WORLD

EDITED BY

WAYNE TE BRAKE AND WIM KLOOSTER



BRILL
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2006

On the cover: Amsterdam Maid. Engraved title print in Tobias van Domselaer, *Beschryvinge van Amsterdam, haar eerste beginnelen, oudtheydt, vergrootingen, gebouwen en geschiedenissen tot op den Jare 1665* (Amsterdam: Marcus Willemsz Doornick, 1665). Reproduced by permission of the Gemeentearchief Amsterdam / Municipal Archives Amsterdam.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Society for Netherlandic History (U.S.) International Conference (1st : 2001 : Columbia University)
Power and the city in the Netherlandic world / edited by Wayne Te Brake and Wim Klooster.

p. cm. — (The Northern world, ISSN 1569-1462 ; v. 22)

Rev. papers presented at the 1st International Conference on this theme organized by the Society for Netherlandic History and held at Columbia University in June 2001.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15129-1 (alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 90-04-15129-X (alk. paper)

1. Cities and towns—Netherlands—History—Congresses. 2.

Netherlands—Politics and government—Congresses. 3.

Netherlands—Social conditions—Congresses. 4. Power (Social sciences)—Netherlands—

History—Congresses. I. Te Brake, Wayne Ph. II. Klooster, Wim. III. Title. IV. Series.

HT169.N4S63 2001

307.7609492—dc22

2006043938

ISSN 1569-1462

ISBN-10: 90 04 15129 X

© Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

*Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910
Danvers MA 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.*

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations	vii
Introduction	1
<i>Wayne te Brake and Wim Klooster</i>	
Keynote Address	11
<i>Jan de Vries</i>	
The Rebellions of Southern Low Countries' Towns during the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries	27
<i>Kelly DeVries</i>	
The Distorted Messages of Peace: Controlled and Uncontrolled Reactions to Propaganda in the Burgundian Low Countries during the Fifteenth Century	45
<i>Elodie Lecuppre-Desjardin</i>	
Beggars and Iconoclasts: The Political Culture of Iconoclasm on the Eve of the Revolt of the Netherlands	59
<i>Peter Arnade</i>	
Confessional Cleansing: Why Amsterdam did not join the Revolt (1572–1578)	85
<i>Henk van Nierop</i>	
Power by Construction: Which Cities Where? Problems in Sixteenth Century Timber Supplies, Sawmills, and Labor	103
<i>Elva Kathleen Lyon</i>	
Institutions, Politics, and Economic Policies in Habsburg Holland: The Decline of Gouda's Brewing Industry, 1510–1568	123
<i>Richard Yntema</i>	

Visible Power? Town Halls and Political Values	149
<i>Joop de Jong</i>	
Stories about the Gallows Field: Power and Laughter in Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam	177
<i>Angela Vanhaelen</i>	
The Struggle over the Sabbath in Petrus Stuyvesant's New Amsterdam	205
<i>Joyce D. Goodfriend</i>	
'There is no Service Here but My Service!' Municipal Attempts to Regulate Domestic Servant Behavior in Early Modern Holland	225
<i>Marybeth Carlson</i>	
Notes on Contributors	235
Index	239

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Power by Construction: Which Cities Where? Problems in Sixteenth-Century Timber Supplies, Sawmills, and Labor

Elva Kathleen Lyon

1. In the late sixteenth century Holland was laced with waterways and dotted with inland bodies of water allowing the transport of timber and other materials. By 1630 more industrial mills had been built and operated in the cities along the western edge of Holland than had been constructed in the Zaanstreek (see text).
2. The two sawyers worked together as a “gang” using a “gang saw”. The saw blade was mounted in a wooden frame, a fundamental construction that did not change during mechanization.
3. In this drawing five gang saws are mounted in one saw frame sliding in a guide. The lower edge of the saw frame is connected to a rod. In turn, the rod would be connected to the crankshaft of a vertically mounted water wheel. A ratchet moves the log carriage forward with each stroke of the saw frame. The five blades of this small sawmill do the work of ten men.
4. The basic internal mechanism of a wind-driven sawmill are shown here simplified from more comprehensive drawings by Simon Hart and Peter Spier (see text). The gear from the windshaft (axle) is shown at the top meshing with the gear for the crankshaft. Rods attached to the crankshaft move up and down to raise and lower the saw frames. There are twelve blades attached to the frames in this sawmill allowing it to do the work of twenty-four men.

Visible Power? Town Halls and Political Values

Joop de Jong

1. The town hall of Enkhuizen (1950)
Copyright © Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg
2. The burgomasters’ chamber of the Enkhuizen town hall with paintings by Romeyn de Hooghe (1976)
Copyright © Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg

3. The burgomasters' chamber of the Enkhuizen town hall with paintings by Romeyn de Hooghe (1976)
Copyright © Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg

Stories about the Gallows Field: Power and Laughter in Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam

Angela Vanhaelen

1. *The Career and Life of Jan de Wasser and His Wife* (Amsterdam: H. van der Putte). Copyright © Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.
2. A. van Borssom, *Volewijk*, 1664.
Copyright © Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.
3. Cornelis Anthonisz, *Map of Amsterdam*, 1538. Amsterdams Historisch Museum.
4. *Amsterdam. As it was before the year 1400*. Engraving, between pages 31 and 32 of O. Dapper, *Historische Beschrijving der Stadt Amsterdam* (Amsterdam: Jacob van Meurs, 1663). Leiden University Library. 1223 A 14 'Plate 1'
5. *Amsterdam, with the enlargement of the year 1482*. Engraving, between pages 37 and 38 of O. Dapper, *Historische Beschrijving der Stadt Amsterdam* (Amsterdam: Jacob van Meurs, 1663). Leiden University Library. 1223 A 14 'Plate 2'
6. *A Neat Mapping Out of the Old and New Order of the City of Amsterdam*. Engraving, between pages 49 and 50 of O. Dapper, *Historische Beschrijving der Stadt Amsterdam* (Amsterdam: Jacob van Meurs, 1663). Leiden University Library. 1223 A 14 'Plate 4'
7. *Amsterdam Maid*. Engraved title print in Tobias van Domselaer, *Beschryvinge van Amsterdam, haar eerste beginselen, oudtheydt, vergrootingen, gebouwen en geschiedenissen tot op den Jare 1665* (Amsterdam: Marcus Willemsz Doornick, 1665). Gemeentearchief Amsterdam/Municipal Archives Amsterdam.
8. *The Seventh Pleasure of Marriage*. Engraving illustrating chapter 7 of Hippolytus de Vrye, *De Tien Vermakelikheden des Houweelyks* (Amsterdam: Hieronymous Sweerts, 1683). Leiden University Library. 1120 F 58: 1 Pl VII
9. Jan van Neck, *The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Frederik Ruysch*, 1683. Amsterdams Historisch Museum.



t'Amsterdam, By Marcus Doornik op den Middel-dam.

INTRODUCTION

Wayne te Brake and Wim Klooster

Cities loom large in the history of the Netherlandic world. Through most of the last millennium, the cluster of territories along the North Sea coast from Flanders to East Friesland has been characterized by relatively high levels of urbanization and linked over time by tightly-integrated networks of cities, large and small. Like the cities of northern Italy, at the other end of Europe's 'urban belt,' the cities of the Low Countries are well known as the centers of both economic innovation and cultural effervescence.¹ By extension, the cities of the Low Countries loom large in the history of the European urbanization and the growth of the world economy. From the early rise of the Flemish textile industry, through the commercial and financial dominance of first Antwerp, then Amsterdam, and the early industrialization of the southern cities, to the international prominence of the modern ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp and urban agglomerations like the Randstad, economic activities located within Netherlandic cities and flowing through their urban networks have played a cutting-edge role in the long-term growth of capitalism and successive waves of economic globalization.² Not surprisingly, then, cities and their economic power are perhaps the primary reference points by which we locate the history of the Low Countries within larger historical perspectives, although the cultural dynamism of Netherlandic

¹ On the critical importance of the Low Countries' location within Europe's 'urban belt,' see Karel Davids and Jan Lucassen, eds., *A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in European Perspective* (Cambridge, 1995).

² See, for example, Jan de Vries, *European Urbanization 1500–1800* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), Paul M. Hohenburg and Lyn Hollen Lees, *The Making of Urban Europe, 1000–1950* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*, 3 vols., trans. Siân Reynolds (New York, 1981–84), Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, 3 vols., Studies in Social Discontinuity (New York/San Diego, 1974–89), Jonathan I. Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740* (Oxford, 1989), and Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815* (Cambridge, 1997).

cities, rooted in their economic prominence, undoubtedly comes in a close second.³

If precocious and continuous urbanization, economic integration and cultural production allow historians to situate the cities of the Netherlandic world comfortably at the center of their grand narratives of economic and cultural history, these same characteristics appear to guarantee that the cities of the Netherlandic world fit awkwardly, at best, within the equally grand narratives of political power and state formation in European and world history. To the extent that synthetic accounts of the political history of Europe in the last millennium have focused almost exclusively on territorial and national state formation under the aegis of aggressive princes and bellicose monarchs, the cities of the Netherlandic world have either been ignored altogether or they have played a bit part as the crown jewels of the 'failed' history of Burgundian state formation.⁴ More recent attempts to describe and account for divergent paths of state formation in Europe have at least brought the cities of the Low Countries back into political focus. Charles Tilly, for example, identified a 'capital-intensive' path of state formation within which the cities of the Low Countries and Northern Italy played an exemplary, if transient, role at the cutting edge of European political history.⁵ Yet even in this more nuanced and variegated perspective, capital is theoretically opposed to coercion and, in what Wim Blockmans terms 'voracious states' are set in opposition to 'obstructing cities.'⁶ In the long run, then, where state-makers succeed, cities fail to shield their

³ See, for example, Walter Prevenier and Wim Blockmans, *The Burgundian Netherlands*, trans. Peter King and Yvette Mead (Cambridge, 1986), Simon Schama, *The Embarrassment of Riches. An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (New York, 1987), Michael North, *Art and Commerce in the Dutch Golden Age*, trans. Catherine Hill (New Haven, 1997).

⁴ See, for example, Joseph R. Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (Princeton, N.J., 1970), Charels Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, 1975), Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London, 1979), Richard Bonney, *The European Dynastic States, 1494–1660*, *The Short Oxford History of the Modern World* (Oxford, 1991), and Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1997).

⁵ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990*, *Studies in Social Discontinuity* (Oxford, 1990).

⁶ Wim P. Blockmans, "Voracious States and Obstructing Cities: An Aspect of State Formation in Preindustrial Europe," in *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800*, ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans (Boulder, Col., 1994), 218–250.

capital and preserve their independence; and, vice-versa, where cities concentrate, as they did in the Low Countries, states remain weak or are altogether absent, depending on the operative definition.

In the larger comparative perspectives of European or even world history, then, the cities of the Netherlandic world stand in a very ambiguous relationship to the history of coercive power. Yet this leaves historians of the Netherlandic world with an important challenge: How can we explore empirically the varied dimensions of this ambiguous relationship between cities and coercive power in the history of Netherlandic world? In the general absence of powerful state formations, how was coercive power institutionalized and enacted *within, over, among* and *by* the cities of the Low Countries? These are the important questions that the essays in this volume seek to answer. These essays, now revised and in some instances expanded, were originally presented as part of the First International Conference on the theme of “Power and the City in the Netherlandic World, 1000–2000” organized by the Society for Netherlandic History at Columbia University in June 2001. They focus on the critical late medieval and early modern period, when the cities of the Netherlands most clearly represented the capital-intensive path of European political development, and they examine the institutionalization and enactment of coercive power from a variety of economic, political, and cultural perspectives.

In the opening essay, which served as the keynote address for the conference, Jan de Vries interrogates the three key concepts of this volume: ‘city,’ ‘power,’ and ‘Netherlandic world.’ He makes it clear that none of these terms is self-evident; they all have very diverse meanings. Some scholars, for instance, consider the city a valuable unit of demographic and social analysis, whereas others see the city as merely the stage where broader societal activities take place, while larger entities such as the nation state constitute the critical unit of analysis. De Vries counts nearly 200 historic cities in the Netherlandic world, adding that “for certain purposes it can be enough to study Antwerp and Amsterdam as constituting the urban face of the Netherlands.” Though the general theme of the conference emphasized coercive or political dimensions of power, as an economic historian, De Vries is especially interested in the economic position or functions of the cities of the Low Countries. He reminds us that while the cities of the Netherlandic world did not exercise political power internationally as agents of empire, they did—and still do—concentrate

functions essential to the international and global economy. “When they do this at the highest levels,” Jan de Vries writes, “they appear to the world as tremendously powerful places.”

The remaining essays in this volume, taken together, present us with a much broader, more nuanced understanding of the ambiguous relationship between the cities of the Netherlandic world and the history of coercive political power than the grand narratives of European history would suggest. Building on their original research, the authors individually undertake very diverse explorations of the enactment of political, economic, social and cultural power in, over and among the cities of the Netherlandic world. Thus, these essays do not so much displace the larger history of European state formation and their celebrated protagonists, as they enrich and expand it by introducing us to a much larger cast of characters who enact a much broader set of stories. Despite their diversity, however, these essays present us with a remarkably coherent understanding of the broadest dimensions of coercive power in the Netherlandic world, which will enable scholars, not only of the Netherlandic world, but of Europe and of political power more generally, to move beyond the simple dichotomization of capital-intensive cities and coercion-rich states in the late medieval and early modern formation of the European system of militarily competitive states.

Before introducing this expanded cast of characters and exploring their very diverse stories, however, it is important to explicate the theoretical assumptions that the authors of this volume implicitly share. According to the general definition of power offered by Hans Morgenthau,

Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships, which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement.⁷

⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed. (New York, 1985), 11.

Thus, the exercise of power is always dynamic, interactive and relational, regardless of the setting and the characters involved. It is this dynamic, interactive and relational understanding of power that the authors of this volume share, but what unites them as well is the sense that the exercise of power within, over and among these cities of the Low Countries was always contentious and contested.

Scholars of contentious politics—as opposed to scholars of international politics like Morgenthau—focus our attention on the most fundamental of political relationships: the on-going interaction between those who occupy positions of governmental authority—the rulers of a political domain—and those who are nominally subject to their authority—the subjects or citizens of that domain.⁸ Of course not all interactions involving this fundamental political relationship are contentious. Thus, a formal definition of contentious politics emphasizes several additional considerations: 1) that the interactions are episodic and collective; 2) that they may involve multiple groups of subjects, but that they always include at least one government (or its agents) as one of the actors; and 3) that they involve claim making that impinges on other actors. This kind of boundary delineation deliberately excludes common events like civil marriages and the routine payment of taxes from the realm of contentious politics, but it equally emphatically includes non-elites, outsiders and challengers within the realm of political contention even when formal channels for their inclusion do not exist. Thus, according to Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, contentious politics can be roughly translated as collective political struggle.⁹

As an ensemble, then, the essays in this volume introduce us to the multi-dimensional history of contentious politics in relation to the cities of the Netherlandic world. In keeping with the capaciousness of the concept of contentious politics, these essays present us with a wide variety of unlikely political actors. Marybeth Carlson introduces us, for example, to the anonymous and unruly servant girls whose mobility and lack of institutional connection awakened

⁸ Cf. Michael P. Hanagan, Leslie Page Moch, and Wayne te Brake, eds., *Challenging Authority: The Historical Study of Contentious Politics, Social Movements, Protest, and Contention*, (Minneapolis, 1998), Introduction.

⁹ Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York, 2001), 5.

the fears as well as the regulatory impulses of the urban magistrates of Holland, while Joyce Goodfriend illuminates indirectly the less-than-upright inhabitants of New Amsterdam whose public behavior Peter Stuyvesant sought in vain to channel and improve. Similarly, Angela Vanhaelen focuses our attention on the apparently credulous and undoubtedly inventive inhabitants of old Amsterdam who insisted on telling and retelling their own stories about the mysterious island of Volewijk—unofficial stories that represented it as the source of newborn babies as opposed to the official site of capital punishment of criminal offenders.

This is not to say, of course, that the authors focus exclusively on the stories of non-elite outsiders and challengers or marginalize the very different stories of perennial stars of political history in the Low Countries: the urban magistrates and the princely elites.¹⁰ On the contrary, these political elites play important roles in all of these essays and in some they play dominant, almost exclusive roles. Yet as a whole, this volume puts them in their proper place: that is, within the complex, composite states that characterized late medieval and early modern Europe.¹¹ Richard Yntema's analysis of the brewing industry of Gouda illustrates this especially clearly inasmuch as the brewers of Gouda were faced with two competitive claimants to regulatory authority in the brewing industry, and in the end, the Count of Holland's successful claim—at the obvious expense of Gouda's magistrates—effectively undermined the competitive position of the brewers of Gouda vis-à-vis the brewers of Delft. Similarly, Henk van Nierop analyzes the largely effective political strategies of the Amsterdam political elite in cultivating popular support, prior to 1578, by resisting the influence of religiously dissident (outside) agitators and maintaining their bond of loyalty to their Spanish overlord; and Peter Arnade demonstrates how the leaders of the 'Beggar' coalition—an alliance of mid-level noble and non-noble officials—very deliberately deployed symbolic inversions to appeal for popular

¹⁰ We use the term 'princely' in the generic Machiavellian sense of a political entrepreneur who may or may not make a legitimate claim to royal or high noble titles or status. The term, thus, denotes political actors like the counts of Holland and the princes of Orange as well as the dukes of Burgundy.

¹¹ For a theoretical elaboration of the dynamics of contentious politics within composite states as well as a wide variety of concrete examples, see Wayne te Brake, *Shaping History: Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500–1700* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998), esp. 8–21.

support as well as to cement an implicit coalition with the religiously radical iconoclasts in their escalating conflict with the King of Spain. Each of these cases clearly illustrates the triangular structure of contentious politics within composite states: In the on-going competition between local rulers and territorial rulers, ordinary political subjects were frequently confronted with difficult choices, but by the same token their allegiances and networks of mutual support were very important political assets, which gave them enormous potential as informal or extralegal political actors.

This last point—the vital, though informal, importance of popular allegiance and loyalty—is also clearly evident in two very different situations: in the symbolic, yet very serious, competition, so carefully unraveled by Elodie Lecuppre-Desjardin, between Ghent's inhabitants, in implicit alliance with their municipal leaders, and Duke Philip the Good of Burgundy that was played out in spectacles of light during the celebration of the feast of St. George; and in the images and maxims that, as Joop de Jong demonstrates, the ruling elites of the powerful cities of the Dutch Republic displayed on the façades and in the interior decorations of town halls in order to represent the important themes of political consultation and persuasion, not simple obedience. Even in Kelly DeVries' analysis of the exceedingly violent political interaction between the urban communities of the southern Netherlands and the political entrepreneurs who were consolidating territorial rule within the county of Flanders and prince-bishopric of Liège the implicit alliance between local rulers and their ordinary political subjects helps to explain the tenacity in the face of apparent futility, which animated the urban rebellions. Similarly, in Elva Kathleen Lyon's analysis of the wood industry during and after the Revolt, we see the recurrent theme of local rulers and their political subjects—especially local wood merchants—succeeding or failing in implicit political alliance, depending on whether they were loyal to the King of Spain or not.

Taken together, then, the essays in this volume reveal the many dimensions of the dynamic, interactive and relational exercise of contentious politics in the cities of the Netherlandic world, but arranged more-or-less chronologically they also reconstruct collectively an important story of political change in the Netherlandic world. The first six essays examine the diverse dimensions of political power as it was enacted in the Low Countries prior to and during the Eighty Years' War. Kelly DeVries focuses on the brutal, and apparently

futile, military contests between whole cities and the makers of the Burgundian/Habsburg state in the Low Countries—the quintessential interactions of the grand narratives of state formation—while Elodie Lecuppre-Desjardin and Peter Arnade explore the symbolic contests between those same state-makers and the inhabitants of Ghent, specifically, and the rebellious ‘Beggar’ coalition, more generally. Even in the context of the Dutch Revolt, Henk van Nierop and Elva Kathleen Lyon demonstrate the on-going political delicacy and long-term economic significance, for local rulers and subjects alike, of postures of loyalty or disloyalty vis-à-vis the Habsburg state. In addition, at the intermediate level of the county of Holland, Richard Yntema excavates the contentious political dimensions of the long-term economic decline of Gouda’s brewing industry.

The remaining essays explore the dynamics of the local enactment of urban political power, following the defeat of the Habsburg state, in the United Provinces of the Northern Netherlands (also known as the Dutch Republic) and their colonial dependencies. In this context, Joop de Jong reveals the symbolic and didactic agendas of the Dutch Republic’s urban magistrates who, for both ideological and practical reasons, practiced a far more consultative and interactive iteration of political power than their Habsburg predecessors, while Angela Vanhaelen explicates the subtle, symbolic contest within Amsterdam between official representations and popular representations of the island of Volewijk, which was only gradually resolved in favor of the magistrates. Finally, Joyce Goodfriend and Marybeth Carlson show us how the ‘rulers’ of the new Dutch republican state—the governor of New Amsterdam as well as the magistrates of Holland’s mighty cities, now liberated from the political interference of princely sovereigns—saw their own regulatory efforts in the realm of social behavior tempered primarily by the independence and tenacity of their nominal ‘subjects.’

In the end, then, we return to the story of European state formation, for the essays in this volume collectively, if implicitly, underscore the importance of the Dutch Revolt of the sixteenth century in transforming the structures of coercive power and thus changing the trajectory of the political change in the Netherlandic world. Not merely a holdover of the medieval past, when the power of urban magistrates was always confounded by the competing claims of enterprising princes, the Dutch Republic, which was the initially unintended product of the Revolt, represented a wholly new and unprecedented

formation of state power that was rooted in the sovereign claims of urban magistrates rather than their princely competitors. In consequence, the spaces of contentious politics became far more local and intimate and the fundamentally contentious relationship between rulers and subjects took on very different, far less overtly coercive, social and cultural dimensions. Indeed, in the absence of a consolidating princely state, the formerly heroic and politically radical defenders of urban liberties quickly became the soberly didactic and politically conservative regulators of social and cultural behavior.

A single collection of essays, no matter how richly diverse their subjects and individually perceptive their authors, can hardly claim to have exhausted the subject of how coercive political power was institutionalized and enacted *within, over, among* and *by* the multitude of cities that characterized the Netherlandic world. Still, by exploring empirically the contentiousness of Dutch politics before, during and after the Dutch Revolt, these authors have not only refined the specific questions we need to ask about Dutch political history, but they have allowed us to look beyond the simple dichotomization of capital-rich cities and coercion-rich states and see some of the essential features of a distinctive path of political development that characterized the urban belt of Europe more generally.¹² Indeed, we trust that *Power and the City* demonstrates that the broader and more inclusive exploration that will eventually lead us to new understandings of the place of the Low Countries in the larger history of European politics is already well under way.

¹² Cf. Davids and Lucassen, *A Miracle Mirrored*.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Jan de Vries

This essay interrogates the title of this conference, every element of which presents me with difficulties. Let me begin with cities.

The City

When I undertook to write a book on *European Urbanization*, I had to confront the nettlesome problem of defining ‘the city,’ so I approach it again with more than a bit of reluctance. There are various theoretical definitions in circulation and even more practical definitions, used to circumvent the difficulty of isolating the phenomenon we have in mind when we invoke this ubiquitous yet elusive phenomenon.

These are not only problems for the historian. The contemporary definition of the city is every bit as contested as the historical. The 2000 U.S. Census offers us municipal populations (over 2,500 was the traditional census definition of ‘urban’), standard metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSA), and consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSA). While the first is almost always misleadingly small, the others are often misleadingly expansive. The Netherlands categorizes its municipalities—gemeenten—by the degree of their urbanity: very strongly urban (12), strongly urban (55), moderately urban (94), a little urban (weinig stedelijk—184) and not urban (192). It also identifies urban agglomerations, but these would be hard to compare with American MSAs.

Historically, the issue of urban identity usually revolves around the conflicting claims of legal, functional, and demographic measures. Recently, while paging through the—still handwritten—inventory of the Delft municipal archive I encountered a bundle of documents described as a ‘brievenwisseling tussen Delft en de stad Den Haag’ [correspondence between Delft and the city of The Hague]. A proud Delftenaar had crossed out ‘stad’ before Den Haag, and wrote in the margin ‘Plaats!’ The Hague, until the nineteenth century, was, of course, the largest village of Europe, since it had no urban charter

Table 1: Urbanization of the Netherlands, 1300–2000 (pop. in 000)

	Urban* Population	Total Population	Percent Urban	Urban Δ / Total Δ
1300	34	600**	5.6	40%
1550	312	1,300	24.0	87
1675	878	1,950	45.4	–10
1815	845	2,290	36.9	44
1860	1,290	3,310	39.0	116
2000 a	15,864	15,864	100.0	87
b	12,223	15,864	77.0	66
c	9,512	15,864	60.0	38
d	6,003	15,864	37.8	

* The urban population is all towns of at least 2,500 population through 1860. For 2000 four alternative measures are given: a. all municipalities of at least 2,500; b. all municipalities of at least 20,000; c. all municipalities categorized as ‘very strongly urban,’ ‘strongly urban,’ and ‘moderately urban’; d. all municipalities included in the 21 ‘urban agglomerations’ of at least 100,000 total population.

** The population of what would become the Netherlands is not know, even approximately, for this period. The figure offered here is a rough guess.

Sources: 1300: J.C. Visser, ‘Dichtheid van de bevolking in de laat-middeleeuwse stad,’ *Historisch-geografisch tijdschrift* 3 (1985): 10–21; 1550–1860: Jan de Vries, *European Urbanization* (London, 1984), 65, and sources cited there; 1991: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, *Statistisch Jaarboek 2001* (Den Haag, 2001), 48–50.

and played no role in the city-based governance of the province of Holland.

I could go on with such observations; some colorful, some pedantic. But they do not get us to the heart of the problem with the concept of city. Even if we can say of cities as a Supreme Court justice said of pornography—I can’t define it, but I know it when I see it—there are additional issues to be faced:

Are we concerned with urban or city issues, with the collectivity of urban phenomena or the specifics of particular places? Is it all cities, their functions and interactions, that interest us; the special character of all people residing in urban locations; or is it the activities in leading or exemplary cities? The Netherlands, north and south, contained nearly 200 historic cities (as many as far larger European countries), but for certain purposes it can be enough to study Antwerp and Amsterdam as constituting the urban face of the Netherlands.

Then, there remains the basic question of whether the city is a proper unit of study to begin with. To put it most simply, does a city have a history? Surely, its people have their histories, as do the institutions, firms, movements and other collective phenomena that take place in a city. But does the city as a mega-collectivity add something essential to these histories? Most of us are inclined to answer these questions in the affirmative because of the influence, often very indirect, of the great medievalist Henri Pirenne and the no less great sociologist Max Weber. They saw the western city as a distinctive phenomenon, its distinctiveness lying in its corporate quality and relative autonomy. The medieval western cities that emerged from the ruins of the ancient world possessing the kernel of this political autonomy were well situated to develop institutions suited to the economic and social missions of the new classes that made these settlements their home—the bourgeoisie. Hence, the city was—or was seen by these scholars—like a ship in a feudal sea, an incubator of capitalism. The city—the western city at any rate—is more than the sum of its parts and constitutes a valuable unit of analysis. This position has been held by most historians and by sociologists culminating in the Chicago School.¹

Arrayed against this position is that held by many anthropologists and post-Chicago School urban sociologists: the city is no more than a site for the performance of broader societal activities. What urban determinists see as a distinctive urban mission and an essential urban behavior, these critical social scientists see as the product of more important underlying social identifications. The urban phenomenon is, in fact, no more than a *compositional effect* of the selective nature of recruitment into the urban setting.²

Thus, a common criticism leveled against urban history is that cities are just arbitrary sub-units of the one important context for analysis: the nation state, or, for some, the world system. From this perspective the city is a *powerless* unit of analysis, and urban historians, in their efforts to deny this, commit the sin of *reification*, that is, they

¹ Henri Pirenne, *Medieval Cities, their Origins and the Revival of Trade* (Princeton, N.J. 1925). Idem, *Les villes et les institutions urbaines*, 2 vols. (Bruxelles, 1939). Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (New York, 1968).

² On Determinists and Compositionalists, see: Claude Fischer, *The Urban Experience* (New York, 1976).

confer agency to cities as if these places had personalities and shaped behavior.³

Power

'Power' is also a difficult term. There are many kinds of power, and as many scales—interpersonal, organizational, political, international—on which it can be studied. It happens that I am trained in a discipline, economics, that doesn't have power in its conceptual vocabulary except to discuss special cases, usually failures of the market system. Thus, monopoly confers power. But, in most respects, the study of economic forces—certainly 'powerful' in a generic, descriptive sense—is conducted without reference to the *exercise of power*.

Many readers may find themselves disinclined to muster sympathy for an academic discipline so disabled by its own limitations. Still, I must ask, when contemplating a phrase like 'power and the city,' whether we should think primarily of 1. the exercise of power *within cities*: urban government and institutions, urban elites; 2. the exercise of power *from an urban base*: the city as site of power (a monarch), as a transmitter of power (as nodes in networks of command and control); 3. the power of cities *as such*. This forces us to return to the Weber-Pirenne issue and the academic sin of reification.

All three of these dimensions of urban power make us think, in the first instance, of political power. When economic power, if that is the right word, is at issue, a further question can be asked: do cities, or some cities, *because of their place in the hierarchy of cities*, or their networked relations with other cities, exercise a special power in national or international economic life—a power that is not simply conferred by the state, or by economic elites?

The concept of power also presents difficulties for the student of the Netherlands, even when he or she is not trained as a economist. Power is not the word that first comes to mind when contemplating

³ A critique of urban history along these lines is found in: Philip Abrams, "Towns and economic growth: some theories and problems," in *Towns in Societies: Essays in Economic History and Historical Sociology*, ed. Philip Abrams and E.A. Wrigley (Cambridge, 1978), 9–33.

the institutions of government under the Republic, or of the organization of its possessions and interests overseas under the trading companies. To be sure, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the state assumed the outward forms of conventional nation states and it labored to shape a proper empire abroad. But—in my opinion, at any rate—these efforts lack something: the sinews of power—state power—are missing. Behind the veneer of a self-consciously cultivated nationalism there lived something rather different. At different times and in different places we find patriotism, parochialism, and cosmopolitanism. Whether these are admirable or not, is not the issue here. The issue is simply that these are not the sentiments that accompany the projection and exercise of political power.⁴

Netherlandic World

This brings me, inevitably, to my problem with the third and final element in the theme of this volume: the Netherlandic World. Was there ever such a thing?

The editors may well claim that they had no intention to attribute a special meaning to the term. It recommended itself—inocently—as just a way to allow for discussion of a broad variety of topics having to do, in one way or another, with Dutch themes at home and abroad. But, permit me to take the term seriously for a moment. After all, analogous terms are taken very seriously by the British, who continue to attribute importance to their Commonwealth; the French, whose Francophone union is cultivated in innumerable ways; and the Portuguese, where the term Lusitanian world is used without irony or embarrassment.

The term 'Netherlandic World' is intended to convey some political, cultural, and/or economic influence (power?) that extends beyond the boundaries of a single state. But where can we locate this world? Several historical spheres of Netherlandic influence come to mind:

⁴ See Johan Huizinga, *Patriottisme en nationalisme in de Europeesche geschiedenis tot het einde der 19e eeuw* (Haarlem, 1940). Jan de Vries, "Nederland in de wereld," in Frans Becker et al., eds., *Nederland in de wereld. Het zestiende jaarboek voor het democratisch socialisme* (Amsterdam, 1995), 175–80.

1. *The medieval zone of Burgundian political control and cultural influence that encompasses the modern Benelux, plus French Flanders and Artois.* I will pass over the cultural and religious aspects of this unity to note the Pirenne point that the cities of this zone shared certain characteristics based on the forms of their original charters and the institutions of self government. It could be said that I invoked such a Netherlandic world in my study of the passenger barges, the *trekschuiten*, when I described how a similar technology and organizational form, established by the 1660s a network of regularly scheduled passenger services stretching along a coastal zone from Dunkirk, through Flanders, Holland, Friesland and Groningen, right up to the East Frisian border of modern Germany. From Dunkirk to Emden, the institutions that established and organized this service had a strong family resemblance, despite the decentralized politics of the region.⁵ Whether on the grounds of religion, language, vernacular architecture or urban traditions, the Nord and Pays-de-Calais in France and Cleves, Bentheim, and East Frisia in Germany all arguably have some sort of historical attachment to the modern Dutch and Belgian states. Does this constitute a Netherlandic world?

2. *A seaborne commercial world extending to the ports of the North Sea and, especially, the Baltic.* This was a commercial influence, in the first instance, but went beyond that to the founding of Dutch-style cities (Göteborg, St. Petersburg), the construction of Dutch-style urban areas (Danzig), the influence of language and vocabulary, and the planting of merchant diasporas, and, especially in Sweden, the operation of extensive industrial enterprises. This Netherlandic world, if that is the right term, knit cities together to a dominant Amsterdam, via economic rather than formal political power. And, the political power behind the *pax neerlandica* that persisted for a time was that of a city, Amsterdam, more than of a state. It was a world of cities, held together by cities.

3. *Finally, we come to a Netherlandic world established through the activities of the VOC (Dutch East India Company) and WIC (Dutch West India Company), and whose remains were gathered together into a formal nineteenth-century empire.*

⁵ Jan de Vries, *Barges and Capitalism. Passenger Transportation in the Dutch Economy (1632–1839)* (Utrecht, 1981), 13–17.

Table 2 is a list of 157 overseas settlements established by, or taken over by, the Dutch East and West India Companies at some time during their active lives in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Only a handful of these places were cities with significant European populations. Others were cities with primarily *inlandse* (indigenous) populations, and even more were Company trading stations and forts (factories), with limited urban functions.

Table 2: Complete list of Dutch Overseas Trading Posts between 1600 and 1800

<i>Northeast America</i>	
1. Nieuw-Amsterdam (1625–1664)	25. Fortaleza/Ceara/Siara (1637–1644)
2. Breuckelen (1646)	26. Frederikstad/Paraíba/João Pessoa (1634–54)
3. Rensselaerswijck (1628–1664)	27. Itamaraca—Fort Orange (1630–1654)
4. Beverwyck	28. Schoppe/Schopstad (1633–1645)
5. Wiltwyck	29. Olinda (1630–1649)
6. Swanendael (1631)	30. Sergipe del Rey/São Cristovão (1637–1645)
7. Fort Casimir—Fort Elsenburgh (1651)	31. São Salvador de Bahia (1624)
8. Fort Amstel (1655)	32. Fernando de Noronha Is. (1633–1651) ⁶
9. Fort Christina (1638)	
10. Fort Nassau (1624)	
11. Paulus Hook (1633) & Bergen (1660)	<i>Guiana</i>
12. Fort de Goede Hoop (1633)	33. Essequibo (1624–1796)
13. Fort Bleyenburgh—Swanenburg (1614)	34. Stabroek—Demerary (1750–1796)
	35. Nieuw-Amsterdam—Berbice (1627–1796)
<i>Caribbean Region</i>	36. Paramaribo—Suriname (1667–1975)
14. Willemstad—Curaçao (1634–now)	37. Nieuw-Middelburg—Pomeroon (1689)
15. Tobago (1628–1678)	38. Cayenne Is. (1627–1664)
16. Aruba (1634–now)	
17. Bonaire (1634–now)	<i>South Africa</i>
18. Philipsburg—Sint-Maarten (1631–now)	39. Kaapstad (1652–1806)
19. St. Kruis (St. Croix) (1642)	40. Stellenbosch (1679–1806)
20. Saba (1640–now)	41. Simonstad (1743–1806)
21. St. Eustatius (1632–now)	42. Swellendam (1746–1806)
22. Margarita (Venezuela) (1662)	43. Fort Frederik Hendrik-Mauritius (1638–1710)
<i>Northeast Brazil</i>	44. Spakenburg/Antongil-baai—Madagascar (1642)
23. Mauritsstad & Recife (1630–1654)	
24. São Luis do Maranhão (1641–1644)	

⁶ Mistakenly listed by Van Oers as ‘St. Helena Is.’

Table 2 (*cont.*)

<i>India</i>	82. Djambe (1615)
45. Agra	83. Priaman
46. Patna	
<i>MALABAR COAST</i>	<i>JAVA</i>
47. Ahmadabad	84. Bantam (1598)
48. Cambay	85. Batavia (1619–1949)
49. Baroda	86. Japara/Semarang (1613–1949)
50. Broach/Bharuch	87. Grissee (1613)
51. Soeratte (1616–1759)	88. Surabaya
52. Cochín (1663–1795)	89. Cheribon
53. Vengurla/Wingurla (1637)	
54. Calicovlan (1647)	<i>MOLUCCAS</i>
55. Quilon (1661)	90. Tanimbar Is. (1646)
	91. Ternate (1605–1949)
<i>COROMANDEL COAST</i>	92. Amboina (1605–1949)
56. Pulicat (1610–1795)	93. Banda (1599–1949)
57. Negapatnam (1658–1791)	94. Tidore Is. (1605)
58. Masulipatnam (1610)	95. Aru Is. (1623)
59. Tegenapatam (1608)	96. Gorong Is. (1637)
60. Pondicherry (1693–1699)	97. Batian Is./Bachian (1609)
61. Sadras	98. Matian Is./Makian (1608)
62. Nizampatam (1606)	99. Great Kei Is. (1599)
63. Tuticorin (1599)	100. Ambelau Is.
64. Cocanada/Dautzerom	
65. Bimirpatam	<i>CELEBES</i>
	101. Makassar (1668–1949)
<i>BENGAL</i>	102. Menado (1658)
66. Vizagapatam	103. Bandjermasin (1733)
67. Dacca	104. Pontianak
68. Hooghly (1634)	105. Martupara (1635)
69. Chinchura (1656)	106. Sukadana (1609)
	107. Samoas (1609)
<i>Sri Lanka</i>	<i>OTHER</i>
70. Colombo (1656–1796)	108. Solor Is. (1613)
71. Jaffna (1658–1795)	109. Kupang—Timor (1613)
72. Galle (1640/1–1796)	
73. Trincomalee (1639–1796)	<i>Japan</i>
74. Mannar	110. Deshima (1641)
75. Batticaloa (1638)	111. Firando/Hirado (1609–1641)
76. Negombo (1640)	
77. Matara (1640)	<i>Malakka</i>
78. Kalpitiya (1659)	112. Malakka (1641–1795)
	113. Keidach/Kedah (1643)
<i>Indonesia</i>	114. Patani (1601)
<i>SUMATRA</i>	<i>West Africa</i>
79. Atjeh	115. Goeree/Gorée Is.—Senegal (1617)
80. Padang (1667)	116. Arguin Is.—Senegal (1633)
81. Palembang (1617)	

Table 2 (*cont.*)

117. Elmina/São Jorge da Mina (1637–1872)	<i>Arabia and Persia</i>
118. Agim (1642)	141. Gombrun/Gamron/Bander Abbas (1623–1756)
119. Takoradi (1664)	142. Mocha (1621–1756)
120. Secundi/Sekondi (1656)	143. Basra (1623–1722)
121. Mouree (1612)	144. Hormuz (1622–1756)
122. Cormantin (1665)	145. Isfahan (1623)
123. Fort Crevecoeur/Accra (1612)	146. Aden (1620)
124. Principe Is. (1641)	147. Kareek (1756)
125. São Thomé Is. (1641)	
126. Annobon Is. (1641)	<i>Indo-China</i>
127. São Paulo de Loanda (1641)	148. Arakan—Burma (1610)
128. Benguela—Namibia (1645)	149. Ayuthia—Siam (1604)
129. Portendick/Portudale (1595)	150. Quinam/Annam—Vietnam (1636)
130. Joai (1595)	151. Ceschu/Hanoi—Tonkin (1637)
131. Shama	152. Canton—China (1607)
132. Weida/Whydah	153. Peking—China (1655)
133. Benin	154. Amoy Is.—China (1623)
134. Forcados	
135. Calabar	<i>Formosa (Taiwan)</i>
136. Rio del Rey	155. Fort Zeelandia (1624–1661)
137. Cameroon	156. Provintia (1648–1661)
138. Mayumbe	157. Kelang Is./Keelung (1642–1661)
139. Loango (1610)	
140. Cabinda	

Source: Ron van Oers, *Dutch Town Planning Overseas during VOC and WIC Rule (1600–1800)* (© Walburg Pers, Zutphen, 2000), 25–26.

Did these many nodal points, whether cities or not, constitute a Netherlandic world overseas? In some respects they obviously did, although their long control by the trading companies, the limited scope of Dutch population settlement, and the generally weak impulse to religious and cultural transformation of non-Dutch populations requires of the inquiring scholar a sensitive antenna for ‘things Netherlandic.’

But even when we have identified that Netherlandic world of the trading companies, and of colonial rule thereafter, we must acknowledge that this world always overlapped and interacted with other worlds. Quite apart from the indigenous societies with which every overseas territory of whatever nation had to come to terms, most Dutch colonial outposts were confronted with at least one of the following: 1.) the Portuguese world of Asia, 2.) the Chinese trading networks of Southeast Asia, and 3.) what has come to be called the Atlantic world of the 18th century.

The first operated primarily via women, and put its stamp on the social and cultural life of European and Eurasian life in the colonial cities of the VOC.⁷ The second formed an essential layer of shipping, trade, and management that gave rise to sizeable populations of Chinese in Batavia and other southeast Asian cities. Chinese commercial communities grew in importance under formal colonialism, and continue today as a major force in South East Asia, when the Netherlandic world in the region has come to be of chiefly touristic interest. The third of our 'worlds' refers to a concept favored by scholars of American colonial history—nurtured in part to remove the stamp of Anglocentrism (even worse than Eurocentrism) from their studies. The core insight is that the Atlantic and Caribbean zone in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not composed of several discreet and mutually exclusive empires, sealed off by mercantilist laws and imposing their national institutions and purposes uni-directionally on their new territories. Instead, there was widespread contact among the trading and colonizing powers and negotiation and interaction between them, the settlers, and the native populations.⁸ It is, perhaps, too obviously a model to soothe the post-modern sensibility, yet, for all that, it has much to recommend it. Indeed, I believe it is essential to understanding the historical evolution of the Dutch presence in the New World.

To be sure, the original intentions of the European colonizers in the Americas were most definitely not to establish zones of negotiation, transgression, and adaptation. The character of the Atlantic World, and the constraints it placed on the actors who entered this stage only became evident over time. Thus, the original Dutch architects of empire in the New World acted on visions of colonial politics that we could call distinctively Dutch.⁹ When the WIC wrested parts of Brazil from Portuguese control, they sent engineers and prince Johan-Maurits van Nassau-Siegen to establish a headquarters

⁷ Leonard Blussé, *Strange Company. Chinese settlers, mestizo women, and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (Dordrecht, 1986).

⁸ On the 'Atlantic World' concept see: David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995).

⁹ J. Franklin Jameson, "William Usselinx, founder of the Dutch and Swedish West India Companies," *Papers of the American Historical Association* (London, 1888), 2: 161–382. Catharina Ligtenberg, *Willem Usselinx* (Utrecht, 1914). Henk den Heijer, *De geschiedenis van de WIC* (Zutphen, 1994).

city in the New World that would serve as Batavia was by then (in the 1630s) serving the VOC in Asia. Mauritsstad—modern Recife—was laid out along lines suggested by Simon Stevin, the remarkable engineer-mathematician. The city plan is certainly a physical expression of power. But those behind this and other settlement plans had something beyond military conquest in mind. A new world, redeemed from Spanish corruption, was to be led by a nation itself recently released from this same yoke.

New Amsterdam was also being developed in these years. The WIC did not lavish the same attention on this outpost of its trading lines, but here, too, an interesting polyglot society emerged. Most American colonial historians have been eager apologists for British conquest (since this was simply the inevitable pre-history of the equally inevitable manifest destiny of the United States). Consequently, they have not let a lack of knowledge about New Netherland stand in the way of a condescending dismissal of the colony as badly governed, and populated by a surly, disaffected collection of Atlantic flotsam and jetsam.¹⁰

In fact, New Amsterdam in the years preceding its first conquest was growing into the sort of city the rest of the New World did not yet know. In 1653 New Amsterdam received a town charter, conferred burger rights, and formed a regular town council. According to Donna Merwick, “[i]t was the only seventeenth-century North American city that consciously strove to imitate a European city,”¹¹ with respect to its appropriation of self-governing urban traditions. This self-conscious posture seems to have emerged most fully only when the city’s burghers faced the conquerors from a still agrarian country where the tradition of urban autonomy was conspicuously weak. But such liminal moments are, perhaps, when the distinctive features of a culture are most clearly exposed.

¹⁰ For a critical review of the balderdash that passes for the history of New Netherlands in the United States, see: Jan de Vries, “The Dutch Atlantic Economies,” in Peter Coclanis, ed., *The Atlantic Economy of the Eighteenth Century* (Charleston, S.C., 2004). Jaap Jacobs, *Een zegenrijk gewest. Nieuw-Nederland in de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam, 1999).

¹¹ Donna Merwick, *Possessing Albany, 1630–1710. The Dutch and English Experiences* (Cambridge, 1990), 143. By the 1650s direct company rule was making way for the introduction of Dutch civic governance in New Netherland. The new settlement of Nieuwer-Amstel (modern New Castle, Delaware) was furnished with a charter that foresaw a government of three *burgemeesters*, and five to seven *schepenen* (legal officers) to be drawn from a *vroedschap* of over 20 leading citizens elected by the inhabitants. Jacobs, *Zegenrijk gewest*, 129–130.

Could it be that *Kaapstad* (Capetown) is where the Netherlandic world was best able to develop its urban civilization abroad, without extensive entanglements with numerous other ‘worlds’? Perhaps. But it was a singularly powerless place, and this was so, I would argue, precisely because of the relative absence of those overlapping worlds. It had too few opportunities to exploit the ‘illegitimate power’ of the city and thereby develop functions that went beyond those prescribed for it by the VOC.¹²

This brings me to my final meditation on cities and power in the Netherlandic world: Cities in the Netherlands rarely exercised ‘power’ internationally as part of a Netherlandic world, let alone as agents of a Dutch empire. However, they did, and still try to, attract and cultivate functions essential to the international—or global—economy.¹³ When they do this at the highest levels, they appear to the world as tremendously powerful places. And this happens not simply because cities are the accidental locations of particular people or institutions, it happens because of the site-specific consequences of the positive externalities and spillover effects of economic and cultural activities that are concentrated spatially and that interact to create innovative responses to contemporary challenges.

There is an interesting body of new economic theory that develops the concepts I allude to here: new growth theory, path dependence, and coordination theory. These concepts seek to systematize and theorize something historians have observed over and again: cities—the western city of Weber—cultivate, and try to institutionalize, a usurped power. That is, the city as a political institution has an irregular character. Braudel says of the medieval cities that ‘they had outwitted the territorial state.’ It was the task of what we call the nation state to reintegrate the city into the territorial state, to combine the capital of the city with the coercive power of the territorial ruler to produce a new, hybrid state with both capital and coercion. This is Charles Tilly’s approach to explaining the international convergence of politics toward the nation state in his *Coercion, Capital and European States*.¹⁴

¹² Ad Biewenga, *De Kaap de Goede Hoop. Een Nederlandse vestigingskolonie, 1680–1730* (Amsterdam, 1999).

¹³ Saskia Sassen, *Cities in the World Economy* (Thousand Oaks, CA, 1994), 119–124.

¹⁴ Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism: 15th–18th Century*, I: *The Structures of Everyday Life* (New York, 1979), 510. Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States* (Oxford, 1990).

The specific mix (of capital and coercion) varied from state to state, but Braudel felt he could generalize about the early modern era as follows: "Everywhere in Europe, as soon as the state was firmly established it disciplined the towns with instinctive ruthlessness." Now, clearly, the Netherlands was not this sort of state. The Republic was not a city state, as some historians continue to claim, but one could describe it as a state dominated by 58 cities (as many cities as exercised political authority in the provincial estates), which left substantial scope for urban autonomy.

The geographical area of urban economic activity and the geographical extent of territorial states rarely overlapped precisely. When the state is larger than the economic space organized by cities, as in seventeenth century France, cities are rather easily subordinated. When the reverse is true, as in the Dutch Republic, the power of cities cannot so easily be encompassed and remains substantial. Indeed, the state then depends on the ability of the city to project its power internationally. More generally, economic ties were, from the earliest development of capitalism, international in character. A world economy has always expanded beyond the boundaries of even the largest of European states, and this made the unique institutional and organizational possibilities of cities irreplaceable to the state.¹⁵

Moreover, in order to be eligible for international economic functions at the highest level, the city had to be relatively uninvolved in the direct exercise of state power. This is clear from a quick review of the cities that stood at the head of what Braudel called the *économie-monde Européenne*. This large scale organization of the European economy existed from the late Middle Ages and was, in Braudel's view, always organized by a dominant city.¹⁶

The first economy of sufficient scope to justify the term *économie-monde* was stitched together by Venice in the fifteenth century. Portugal's maritime achievements around 1500 removed Venice from her leadership position, but that role did not then settle on Lisbon. It went instead to Antwerp, which could serve Portuguese trade in a way that Lisbon could not. Antwerp's place in the sun was brief—some 50 years—as it was challenged by others. Genoa assumed the

¹⁵ Edward Whiting Fox, *History in Geographic Perspective. The Other France* (New York, 1971).

¹⁶ Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism, III: Perspectives of the World* (New York, 1982), *passim*.

mantle of leadership around 1550, according to Braudel, only to lose it a generation later.

The leadership of Antwerp and Genoa was undermined by their implication in the territorial power struggles of the Habsburg empire, whose economic interests they served with, perhaps, too much devotion. After a period of crisis and uncertainty in which several cities competed for economic leadership, the mantle passed to Amsterdam, a city with the right combination of independence from princely authority and support of a small, but effective territorial state. The economic leadership of the European economy remained lodged in Amsterdam for a long time, only to pass to London in the late eighteenth century, and, much later still, to New York.

Two characteristics of the cities identified by Braudel as exercising international economic leadership stand out: 1.) with the exception of London, none of these cities was the largest of Europe at the time of its leadership; 2.) again with the exception of London, none was the capital of a substantial territorial state. Antwerp, Amsterdam, and New York were not even the capitals of their provinces.

Whatever it was that made possible the elevation of these cities to the pinnacle of the world economy, it was not sheer size or formal political power. Moreover, whatever was the source of their economic power, it could not be frozen for all time. The claim to economic leadership had to be won and re-won repeatedly.

The world economy's urban structure is not only defined by the cities at the peak. Many other cities played important roles, for merchants, producers, and financiers all had an interest in maintaining the autonomous power of their cities. Their own interests were advanced by the presence of: 1.) cost-reducing urban institutions and infrastructure, such as port facilities, stock and commodity exchanges, banks; 2.) protective and risk-reducing institutions such as law courts, notarial practices, guilds; 3.) privileges, exemptions, and favors acquired by the exercise of municipal power.

Today some of these functions have been assumed by the nation state, in which case what had been urban power is nationalized. Other functions have been assumed by a new phenomenon, the large business enterprise. That is, the urban functions have been privatized. The multinational business organization internalizes market functions (with the aim of securing a more predictable and malleable

business environment) that in a world of small firms were supplied by the cities.

Clearly, the space for the autonomous exercise of urban power is today much reduced from earlier times. Yet, the city remains, often latently, a place of unplanned, illegitimate power. For the greatest world cities this is revealed during times of stress and convulsion in the world economy. When international leadership no longer seems securely held by one city, competitors arise to challenge its place. Such a period of the decentering and recentering of the world economy is always dramatic and risky: the clearest examples are 1580–1620, when Amsterdam assumed the role previously performed by cities implicated in Habsburg policies, and 1920–40, when New York, by default, assumed many of London's international financial responsibilities.

The ironic feature of these spectacles in which national interests are so evidently at stake is that the power of the nation states can be brought to bear on the resolution of these crises only via their access to a city with the requisite characteristics: capital and financial institutions, of course, but also a measure of autonomy sufficient to secure international commercial confidence in the new location and its institutions. The modern Netherlands and Belgium have both sought to equip and position their leading cities for international functions. The infrastructural investments in seaports, airports, highways and railroads are designed to support Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Antwerp in their international roles.¹⁷ The political investments in the European Union and NATO have sought to do the same, perhaps a bit too literally, to Brussels. Such public measures may be necessary, but they are never sufficient. In the past, power in the 'Netherlandic world' emanated most often from cities and the institutions they nurtured and protected; in a future in which the prerogatives of the nation state appear less self-evident than in the past two centuries, economic and cultural power with a specifically Netherlandic stamp will emanate from cities, if it is to exist at all.

¹⁷ Indeed, a recent report in *The Economist* (2 June 2001) describes a new departure in Dutch regional planning that would abandon the long-standing policy of limiting Randstad growth. The planners reasoned that only the creation of an integrated Delta metropolis could fashion a metropolitan center capable of being a leading cosmopolitan center in a global economy.

THE REBELLIONS OF SOUTHERN LOW COUNTRIES' TOWNS DURING THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES

Kelly DeVries

Between 1300 and 1500 there was almost continual warfare throughout all of Europe. The English and the Scots fought, the English and the French fought, the English fought with the Burgundians and the Spanish, and the English fought among themselves (the War of the Roses); the French and the Burgundians fought, the French and the Italians fought, the French and the Germans fought, and the French even fought with the Portuguese; the Burgundians and the Swiss fought, and the Burgundians fought with the Germans; the Germans fought with the Italians, and the Germans fought with themselves; the Italians fought with themselves; the various Iberian kingdoms fought with themselves and against the Muslims; the Danes fought with the Swedes, and both fought with the Norwegians; the Teutonic Knights fought with the Livonians; and everyone tried (vainly) to fight against the Ottoman Turks.¹ But among all of these wars, the ones which were the most prolific and the most difficult to stop were the numerous popular rebellions which plagued Europe during the period.

As Europe began to develop numerous urban areas from 1000 to 1300, the socio-economic traditions upon which medieval governments and militaries had been established necessitated changes. But these changes were slow in coming, if they came at all.² Often the

¹ There are, as of yet, no surveys of European warfare devoted to the history of the last two centuries of the Middle Ages. However, chronologically longer surveys have some value for this period. See Sir Charles W.C. Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages* (London, 1924; rpt. London, 1998), vol. 2; Ferdinand Lot, *L'art militaire et les armées au moyen-âge en Europe et dans le proche orient* (Paris, 1946), vol. 2; Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War*, III: *Medieval Warfare*, trans. W.J. Renfro, Jr. (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1990); and Nicholas Hooper and Matthew Bennett, *The Cambridge Illustrated Atlas of Warfare: The Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1996).

² On the rise of towns, in particular towns of the southern Low Countries, during the Middle Ages, see: Jacques Le Goff, "The Town as an Agent of Civilisation,

townspeople, whose local wealth and power structure would begin to define a new middle class, felt burdened by their lack of political representation and sovereignty, especially when it concerned economic issues. They would rebel, an action which would not necessarily begin with military conflict, but often ended with it. To be certain, the Middle Ages prior to 1300 had seen some popular rebellions, but these most often had been short-lived and violently suppressed, such as those in Laon, Vezelay, and Bruges during the twelfth century. There also seem to have been very few long-term effects to either side in the quashing of these rebellions.³

During the second half of the thirteenth century, as towns continued to grow and to gain new significance among the political units of Europe, popular urban uprisings increased considerably. So too did the military problems associated with their suppression. Areas with the largest urban concentration faced the largest popular rebellions. By the end of the century, the citizens of both Bruges and Laon had again openly rebelled, while citizens in other towns in the southern Low Countries and in towns in northern Italy threatened to break out in similar uprisings.⁴

1200–1500,” in *The Fontana Economic History of Europe: The Middle Ages*, ed. C.M. Cipolla (Glasgow, 1972), 71–106; Henri Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe*, trans. I.E. Clegg (New York, 1937), 39–85; Henri Pirenne, *Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade*, trans. F.D. Halsey (Princeton, N.J., 1969); Henri Pirenne, *Early Democracies in the Low Countries: Urban Society and Political Conflict in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, trans. J.V. Saunders (New York, 1971); Fritz Rörig, *The Medieval Town* (Berkeley, Cal. and Los Angeles, 1967); Adriaan Verhulst, ‘The Origins and Early Development of Medieval Towns in Northern Europe,’ *European History Review* 47 (1994): 362–373; and Adriaan Verhulst, ‘An Aspect of the Question of Continuity between Antiquity and Middle Ages: The Origin of the Flemish Cities between the North Sea and Scheldt,’ *Journal of Medieval History* 3 (1977): 175–205.

³ For a general look at medieval popular uprisings, see Guy Fourquin, *The Anatomy of Popular Rebellions*, trans. A. Chesters (Amsterdam, 1978), although most of his examples come from the post-1300 period. For the military actions involved in quashing these uprisings, see Laurence W. Marvin, “Warfare and the Composition of Armies in France, 1100–1218: An Emphasis on the Common Soldier” (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Illinois, 1997).

⁴ On the Bruges rebellion, see Carlos Wyffels, “Nieuwe gegevens betreffende een XIIIde eeuwse ‘democratische’ stedelijke opstand: de Brugse ‘Moerlemaye’ (1280–81),” *Bulletin de la commission royale d’histoire de Belgique* 132 (1966): 37–142 and Agatha Barodoel, ‘The Urban Uprising at Bruges, 1280–81: Some New Findings about the Rebels and the Partisans,’ *Revue Belge de philologie et d’histoire* 72 (1994): 761–791. On the Laon rebellion, see Jeffrey Denton, ‘The Second Uprising at Laon and its Aftermath, 1295–98,’ *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 72 (1990): 79–92. Other towns which threatened rebellion during the late thirteenth century included Ypres, Douai, and Florence.

But if some of these towns checked their rebellions during the thirteenth century, it seems that nothing could be done to stop the large numbers of popular revolts that occurred throughout Europe during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Keeping with the earlier tradition of these being mostly urban affairs, it was in northern and central Italy, the southern Low Countries, urban France, the Swiss cantons, and the towns of the Hanseatic League where these rebellions were especially prevalent.⁵ At times it must have seemed that there was nothing except for rebellion in some of these regions.

Certainly this was the case for the southern Low Countries, and of the various regions in this larger geographical area, no doubt the county of Flanders and the prince-bishopric of Liège were the most prolifically rebellious. That these rebellions were numerous is well understood by historians, but the problems which they led to within these principalities are not so easily understood. Frequently the political, military, or economic problems of these southern Low Countries during the last two centuries are not even linked with their rebellions, while at other times the focus has been on the political, economic, or military problems brought about by the rebellions alone, without linking the two.⁶ Few, it seems, have determined that the

⁵ See Fourquin, *Anatomy*; Michel Mollat and Philippe Wolff, *Ongles bleus, Jacques et Ciompi: Les révolutions populaires en Europe aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles* (Paris, 1970) (trans. *The Popular Revolutions of the Late Middle Ages*, trans. A.L. Lytton-Sells (London, 1973); and Manuel Jorge Aragoneses, *Los movimientos y luchas sociales en la baja edad media* (Madrid, 1949), for general studies of late medieval popular rebellions. For more specific studies, see: Léon Mirot, *Les insurrections urbaines au début du règne de Charles VI (1380–1383): Leurs causes, leurs conséquences* (1905; rpt. Geneva, 1974); Jean Baerten, "Histoire et sociologie: Les soulèvements populaires aux XIII^{ème} et XIV^{ème} siècles dans l'historiographie française," in: idem, *Divers aspects du moyen âge en occident* (Calais, 1977), 136–157; Gene A. Brucker, "The Ciompi Revolution," in *Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence*, ed. N. Rubenstein (Evanston, Ill., 1968), 314–356; Martha Ellis François, 'Revolts in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: A Spiral Model,' *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 5 (1974): 19–43; André Leguai, 'Les révoltes rurales dans royaume de France, du milieu de XIV^e siècle à la fin du XV^e,' *Moyen Age* 37:4 (1982): 49–76; Rhiman A. Rotz, "Investigating Urban Uprisings with Examples from Hanseatic Towns, 1374–1416," in *Order and Innovation in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honor of Joseph R. Strayer*, ed. W.C. Jordan et al. (Princeton, N.J. 1976), 215–233, 483–494; Rhiman A. Rotz, "Social Struggles' or the Price of Power? German Urban Uprisings in the Late Middle Ages," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte* 76 (1985): 64–95; and Rhiman A. Rotz, 'Urban Uprisings in Germany: Revolutionary or Reformist? The Case of Brunswick, 1374,' *Viator* 4 (1973): 207–223.

⁶ An economic rationale for southern Low Countries' urban rebellion can be found in Henri Pirenne, *Early Democracies in the Low Countries*, and *Histoire de Belgique*, vol. 2: *Du commencement du XIV^e siècle à la mort de Charles le Téméraire* (Bruxelles, 1903),

rebellions, with their increasing punishments to the rebels, led to the increasing decline of the county of Flanders and the prince-bishopric of Liège during the fourteenth and fifteenth and into the sixteenth century.

During this period, the county of Flanders was not only virtually as a whole involved in uprisings from 1302 to 1305, 1323 to 1328, 1339 to 1346, 1379 to 1385, 1432 to 38, 1449 to 1453, and 1487 to 92, but it was also involved in more local rebellions almost yearly. For example, during the reign of one count, Louis de Male, who ruled the county from 1346 to 1384, not only was there the large rebellion of 1379–85, but also several uprisings in all three of the county's large towns—in the town of Ypres in 1359–61, 1367, 1371, and 1377; in Bruges in 1351, 1367, and 1369; and in Ghent in 1359–60—as well as numerous uprisings in several of the smaller towns of the county.⁷ And Louis de Male's reign was by no means an anomaly. Similar chronological lists of rebellions could be constructed for all of the counts who ruled the county of Flanders during these two centuries of the Middle Ages.

Those facing these Flemish rebellions followed only one course in suppressing them: the intercession of a strong and decisive military force. In 1302, after Bruges rebels had killed over 300 French soldiers in their sleep, soldiers sent to put down a small uprising in the town, the French king, Philip IV (the Fair), sent a large military force north to quell the now much larger county-wide rebellion. The result was the battle of Courtrai, and defeat for the French at the hands of the rebels.⁸ It would take two more bloody battles (Arques,

David Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders* (London, 1992) and *The Artevelde of Ghent: The Varieties of Vendetta and the Hero in History* (Ithaca, NY, 1988), and J.F. Verbruggen, 'Vlaamse gemeentelegers tegen Franse ridderlegers in de 14de en 15de eeuw,' *Revue Belge d'histoire militaire* 24 (1981): 359–382. Others have suggested that these revolts were directed by the southern Low Countries' towns against the monarchical centralization of their overlords. See Wim Blockmans and Walter Prevenier, *The Promised Lands: The Low Countries under Burgundian Rule, 1369–1530*, ed. Edward Peters, trans. Elizabeth Fackelman (Philadelphia, 1999), and Wim Blockmans, "Alternatives to Monarchical Centralization: The Great Tradition of Revolt in the Netherlands," in *Republiker und Republikanismus in Europa*, ed. H. Koenigsburger (München, 1988), 145–154.

⁷ See Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, and Richard Vaughan, *Philip the Bold: The Formation of the Burgundian State* (London, 1962), 19–20.

⁸ On this rebellion and the battle of Courtrai, see Kelly DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology* (Woodbridge, 1996), 9–22, and J.F. Verbruggen, *De slag der guldensporen, bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van*

a loss for the French, and Mons-en-Pévèle, a loss for the Flemings) and more than three years before the county of Flanders would be returned to the French kingdom. Before peace was made, in 1305, many had died on both sides, including the leading French and Flemish generals, Robert of Artois and William of Jülich.⁹ Still, the Flemish desire for economic and political self-rule surpassed any violent French reaction to the 1302–05 rebellion, and they rebelled again in 1323–28. The result this time was the battle of Cassel, a French victory.¹⁰ Yet again, the Flemings revolted in 1338, led by the Ghent weaver Jacob van Artevelde. On this occasion, the French could not effectively use military force to put down the Flemish rebellion, as the English, allies of the Flemings, posed a greater threat during those early years of the Hundred Years War. It would not be until 1346, when an uprising of the fullers in Ghent led to Jacob van Artevelde's assassination, that peace and comital leadership would be returned to the county.¹¹ However, thirty-three years later, in 1379, the Flemings rose up again, this time under Philip van Artevelde, the son of the 1338–46 rebel leader. As there was then a lull in the Hundred Years War fighting, the young French king, Charles VI, responded by sending another large army to his northern rebellious county. The result was the battle of Rosebeke, a French victory, fought in 1382; even then, the Ghentenaars, the leaders among the rebels, would hold out against their overlords until 1385.¹² In 1432–34,

Vlaanderens vrijheidsoorlog, 1297–1305 (Antwerpen, 1952) (trans. *The Battle of the Golden Spurs: Courtrai, 11 July 1302*, ed. Kelly DeVries, trans. David Richard Ferguson (Woodbridge, 2002)).

⁹ On the battles of Arques and Mons-en-Pévèle, see DeVries, *Infantry Warfare*, 23–48, and J.F. Verbruggen, *Vlaanderen na de Guldensporenslag* (Brugge, 1991), 35–40, 117–134.

¹⁰ See DeVries, *Infantry Warfare*, 100–111; William H. TeBrake, *A Plague of Insurrection: Popular Politics and Peasant Revolt in Flanders, 1323–1328* (Philadelphia, 1993); and Jacques Sabbe, *Vlaanderen in opstand, 1323–1328: Nikolaas Zannekin, Zeger Janszonne en Willem de Deken* (Brugge, 1992).

¹¹ See Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, II: 93–123; Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, 217–226; Henry Stephen Lucas, *The Low Countries and the Hundred Years' War, 1326–1347* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1929), 240–528; Hans van Werveke, *Jacques van Artevelde* (Brussel, 1943); and Nicholas, *The Van Arteveldes*, 1–71.

¹² See Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, II: 188–200; Nicholas, *The Van Arteveldes*, 172–187; Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, 228–230; Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, 20–24; Marc Boone, *Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen, 1385–1453: Een sociaal-politieke studie van een staatsvormingsproces* (Brussel, 1990), 201–206; Maurice Vandermaesen and Marc Ryckaert, “De Gentse opstand (1379–1385),” in *De Witte Kaproenen: De Gentse opstand (1379–1385) en de geschiedenis van de Brugse Leie*, ed. M. Vandermaesen, M. Ryckaerts, and M. Coornaert (Gent, 1979), 12–16; and Friedrich Mohr, *Die Schlacht bei Rosebeke* (Berlin, 1906).

what began as a small revolt, fueled again by Ghent, was eventually put down relatively peacefully when the solidarity of the leaders of the rebellion, the fullers, broke down,¹³ although, at least chronologically, some Flemings, including the Brugeois, continued to defy the Burgundians with their own uprising until, threatened by violent repercussions, they agreed in 1438 to a peace settlement containing largely symbolic punishments.¹⁴

In 1449–53 the Ghentenaars saw some success in their initial rebellious attacks of Burgundian-allied holdings; however, when duke Philip the Good decided that he had had quite enough of their rebellion, his armies strongly defeated those of the rebels at the brutal battle of Gavere, fought on July 16, 1453.¹⁵ Finally, in 1487–92, the Flemings took on Maximilian of Austria, who had gained the county in marriage with Mary of Burgundy, its successor after the death of her father, duke Charles the Bold, at the battle of Nancy in 1477. Maximilian answered with an ardent and violent campaign of conquest which ultimately put down the rebellion.¹⁶

The towns of the territory of Liège, which started out at the beginning of the fourteenth century as a prince-bishopric aligned with the Holy Roman Empire, but by the beginning of the fifteenth century,

¹³ Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, 326–327; Boone, *Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen*, 216–220; and Richard Vaughan, *Philip the Good: The Apogee of Burgundy* (London, 1970), 326–327.

¹⁴ Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, 328–329; Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 86–92; Boone, *Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen*, 223–224; and Jan Dumolyn, *De Brugse opstand van 1436–1438* (Courtrai-Heule, 1997). ‘At least chronologically’ because these authors do not connect this rebellion with that of Ghent occurring in the same decade. Although the duke of Burgundy, Philip the Good, seemed unaffected by these rebellions, they occurred during a period when the duke decided at the Congress of Arras to switch allegiances from the English to the French in the Hundred Years War. Thus it seems to me that the connection between these rebellions and the duke’s decision deserves further study. For example, the standard history of the Congress, Joyceline Gledhill Dickinson, *The Congress of Arras, 1435: A Study in Medieval Diplomacy* (Oxford, 1955), mentions very little about what was happening in the southern Low Countries during this time.

¹⁵ Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, 329–332; Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 303–333; and Boone, *Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen*, 226–235. On the battle of Gavere see V. Fris, ‘La bataille de Gavre,’ *Handelingen der maatschappij voor geschiedenis en oudheidkunde te Gent* 18 (1910): 185–233, and Luc de Vos, ‘La bataille de Gavere le 23 juillet 1453. La victoire de l’organisation,’ in *XXII. Kongress der Internationalen Kommission für Militärgeschichte*, Acta 22: *Von Crécy bis Mohács. Kriegswesen im späten Mittelalter (1346–1526)* (Wien, 1997), 145–157.

¹⁶ See Wim P. Blockmans, ‘Autocratie ou polyarchie? La lutte pour le pouvoir politique en Flandre de 1482 à 1492, d’après des documents inédits,’ *Bulletin de la commission royal d’histoire de Belgique* 140 (1974): 257–368.

together with the other Low Countries' regions had fallen under the control of the Valois dukes of Burgundy, also rebelled frequently.

Although never completely loyal to their prince-bishops, the Liégeois became particularly rebellious during the reign of prince-bishop Adolph de la Marck (1313–44). To state the obvious, Adolph de la Marck was not a favorite of his subjects. His heavy-handed rule was opposed by almost everyone in the province, and he frequently answered this opposition with military force. Examples are numerous: he violently put down rebellions in Sint-Truiden (1314), Fosse (1318), Huy (1318), Ciney (1321), and Tongeren (1323).¹⁷ Ultimately, in 1328 the towns of Liège, Huy, Tongeren, and Sint-Truiden decided to oppose the prince-bishop; forming a confederation and mustering an army, the towns fought three battles against Adolph: Erbonne (May 27), Waremmes (June 2), and Hoesselt (September 25).¹⁸ Although these battles were by and large inconclusive, the idea of armed rebels opposing his reign frightened the prince-bishop into some constitutional concessions. Eventually, in 1343, Adolph de la Marck repealed his earlier reforms and attempted to restore the conditions that had prevailed before 1328. This might have provoked a new rebellion against the prince-bishop, but before the confederation of towns could again come together, on November 3, 1344, Adolph died.¹⁹ As such, a solution to the problem might have presented itself with the selection of a good new leader, but when the towns found, on February 23, 1345, that their new prince-bishop was to be Englebert de la Marck, the nephew of the object of their previous hatred, they immediately gathered an army and prepared for war.²⁰ Englebert also knew of the feelings of the Liégeois, and he too gathered a force,

¹⁷ Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, II: 16–17, 35–37; G. Kurth, *La cité de Liège au moyen âge*, 3 vols. (Bruxelles, 1910), II: 1–17; Fernand Vercauteren, *Luttes sociales à Liège, XIII^e et XIV^e siècles*, 2nd ed. (Brussels, 1946), 81–85; Fernand Vercauteren, "Het prinsbisdom Luik tot 1316," in *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, vol 2: *De volle middeleeuwen, 925–1305*, ed. J.A. van Houtte et al. (Utrecht, 1950), 350–352; and J. Lejeune, "Het prinsbisdom Luik tot 1390," in *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, vol. 3: *De late middeleeuwen, 1305–1477*, ed. J.A. van Houtte et al. (Utrecht, 1951), 177–178.

¹⁸ Kurth, *Cité de Liège*, II: 31–45; Vercauteren, *Luttes sociales*, 88–89; and Lejeune, "Prinsbisdom Luik," 179–180. The best description of these battles is in Claude Gaier, *Art et organisation militaires dans la principauté de Liège et dans le comté de Looz au moyen âge* (Bruxelles, 1968), 276–285.

¹⁹ Lejeune, "Prinsbisdom Luik," 181–182, and Kurth, *Cité de Liège*, II: 63–69.

²⁰ Lejeune, "Prinsbisdom Luik," 182–183; Kurth, *Cité de Liège*, II: 73–74; and Vercauteren, *Luttes sociales*, 94.

an army composed of some of the greatest knights in the Holy Roman Empire. The mustering of these two forces took time, and it was not until July 18, 1346 that they faced each other on the battlefield in a suburb of Liège known as Vottem; the rebels prevailed.²¹ Englebert was able to regain his control over the urban Liégeois the following year, but only by facing and intimidating them with a huge army at the battle of Tourinne.²² He retained control throughout the rest of his reign, which ended in 1364, but only by making concessions to his subjects to prevent the recurrence of the events of 1346–47.

Again, Adolph and Englebert de la Marck, like Louis de Male in Flanders, should not be seen as anomalies, even in Liège, not to mention throughout the rest of the southern Low Countries. While the prince-episcopal successors of Englebert de la Marck, Jean d'Arkel (1364–78) and Arnold de Hornes (1378–90), faced no open confrontations, it was only because they chose to give some of the desired sovereignty to the Liège townspeople before open rebellions occurred and not because of a lack of dissatisfaction among their urban subjects. Indeed, so appeasing were these two prince-bishops that Henri Pirenne remarked that the townspeople of the prince-bishopric had 'acquired an irresistible supremacy.'²³

But that was to change in 1390 when John of Bavaria, the seventeen-year-old brother-in-law of John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy, was named Prince-Bishop of Liège. By 1394 the Liégeois had revolted against his, in the words of Richard Vaughan, 'vigorous if rash attempts to establish and maintain his authority.'²⁴ This rebellion was initially quelled, but it resumed in 1402 and continued to grow in the ensuing years. Eventually, John of Bavaria called on his Burgundian relative who, seeing the fight against the Liégeois as a means of establishing his own military skill in the face of growing tensions with the Armagnacs in France, in 1408 marched north with an impressive army, supported by an enormous gunpowder artillery train. The result was the Burgundians' violent attempt to relieve the

²¹ Lejeune, "Prinsbisdom Luik," 182–183. The battle of Vottem is discussed in DeVries, *Infantry Warfare*, 150–154; Gaier, *Art et organisation militaires*, 289–297; and Claude Gaier, *Grandes batailles de l'histoire Liégeoise au moyen âge* (Liège, 1980), 99–117.

²² Gaier, *Art et organisation militaires*, 298–306, and Gaier, *Grandes batailles*, 119–131.

²³ Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, II: 255.

²⁴ Richard Vaughan, *John the Fearless: The Growth of Burgundian Power* (London, 1966), 50.

siege of Maastricht, which was eventually accomplished by the equally bloody battle of Othée, where ultimately the forces of the Liège towns were defeated.²⁵

One would think that such a brutal defeat would be decisive in putting and keeping the Liégeois down. It did not: revolts occurred again in 1417, 1429–31, 1435–36, 1445, 1452, 1456–57, and 1461–62. Most of these, again, developed over the appointment of new, and more authoritative prince-bishops, backed as they always were by the dukes of Burgundy, and most, too, accomplished the guarantee of continued urban privileges for the Liégeois. Finally, in 1465, the Liégeois seemed to express the ultimate slight to the Burgundians by appointing their own 'governor,' Marc von Baden, to rule in place of Louis de Bourbon, the bishop who had the duke's support. The result was open and fierce warfare between the citizens of almost all of the Liégeois towns and the large armies of Burgundy and its allies. The war would last beyond the reign of Philip the Good (1419–67) into that of Charles the Bold (1467–77). The cruelty of this war seemed to know no bounds. Towns such as Bouvignes, Brusthem, Huy, Sint-Truiden, Tongeren, and Dinant, were besieged, bombarded, defeated, and sacked several times.²⁶ On one particular, infamous occasion, Charles the Bold decided to punish the citizens of Dinant for their rebellion by tying 800 of them back-to-back and then casting them into the Meuse River to drown.²⁷ Ultimately, in June 1468, after the Liégeois had suffered a savage battlefield loss at Brusthem,²⁸ Liège itself was attacked and captured. Still, before the year was out the Liégeois revolted yet again, with rebel armies (supported by the king of France) recapturing not only Liège but also Tongeren, whose fortifications had been slighted by the Burgundians. Once more, Charles returned to Liège, this time forcing its final

²⁵ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, 51–66; Édouard Gérard, *Analectes pour servir à l'histoire de la ville de Dinant* (Namur, 1901), 111–112; Gaier, *Art et organisation militaires*, 306–320; Gaier, *Grandes batailles*, 133–149; and Erich Wille, *Die Schlacht von Othée, 23 September 1408* (Berlin, 1908). The sources of this battle are most recently discussed in Hubert Carrier, 'Si vera est fama: Le retentissement de la bataille d'Othée dans la culture historique au XV^e siècle,' *Revue historique* 305 (2001): 639–670.

²⁶ Richard Vaughan, *Charles the Bold: The Last Valois Duke of Burgundy* (London, 1973), 11–40. See also Claude Gaier, 'Le rôle des armes à feu dans les batailles Liégeoises au XV^e siècle,' *Publications du Centre Européen d'Études Bourguignonnes (XIV^e–XVII^e s.)* 26 (1986): 34–36.

²⁷ Gérard, *Analectes*, 40.

²⁸ Gaier, *Art et organisation militaires*, 342–348, and Gaier, *Grandes batailles*, 163–178.

submission to him in October and November. As punishment, the large and beautiful town of Liège was almost leveled by the Burgundians, who systematically looted, burned, and demolished a large part of it.²⁹ Yet, even with such a seemingly decisive end, the spirit of rebellion had not been burned out of the Liégeois as they would revolt again in 1490; this time the townspeople were defeated at the battle of Zonhoven.³⁰

The county of Hainaut and duchy of Brabant do not seem to have been as interested in rebellion during the same period as their southern Low Countries' neighbors were. But not much should be made of this as the urban areas in those regions were not as developed as were the towns of Flanders and Liège. Moreover, at least in the case of the Brabant towns of Brussels and Louvain, when they did become more developed, both economically and politically, at the end of the fifteenth century, they too rebelled, as shown in the revolt of these towns against Maximilian of Austria in 1488–89. This rebellion, too, was brutally put down.³¹

In terms of political/military history, the question is: why would any of the towns in the southern Low Countries during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries want to rebel when their chance of gaining victory against those whom they were rebelling against was so remote? While it is true that most of the small regional revolts were put down with little military action, punishments were almost always meted out. And while it is true that there were victories at the battle of Courtrai—in which Flemish burghers defeated a large French force, gaining their effective sovereignty for a brief time,

²⁹ See Vaughan, *Charles the Bold*, 31–36.

³⁰ Gaier, *Art et organisation militaires*, 357–362, and Gaier, *Grandes batailles*, 205–221.

³¹ Bart Willems, 'Militaire organisatie en staatsvorming aan de vooravond van de Nieuwe Tijd: Een analyse van het conflict tussen Brabant en Maximiliaan van Oostenrijk (1488–1489),' *Jaarboek voor middeleeuwse geschiedenis* 1 (1998): 261–286. However, there were some small uprisings in the towns of these principalities, but they never escalated into larger rebellions such as those in the county of Flanders and the prince-bishopric of Liège. See, for example, Serge Boffa, 'Reflexions sur la revolte des metiers Bruxellois (22 juillet 1360),' *Archives et Bibliothèques de Belgique* 64 (2001): 163–185. For this article, I have not looked either at the rebellions of northern Low Countries towns, although they also exhibit some interesting and comparative case studies, as I have found in briefly researching the rebellions of the citizens of Staveren against their count, Willem, in 1345, and Utrecht, Guelders, and Deventer against Philip the Good in 1455.

1302–05—and the battle of Vottem in 1346—where the Liégeois won their independence for a year—almost every other time a sustained rebellion occurred in the southern Low Countries during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it was eventually met by significant and brutal military defeat. In 1302–05, it was the battle of Mons-en-Pévèle; in 1323–28 it was the battle of Cassel; in 1346–47 it was the battle of Tourinne; in 1379–85 it was the battle of Rosebeke; in 1406–08, it was the battle of Othée; in 1449–53 it was the battle of Brusthem and the sieges of Huy, Sint-Truiden, Tongeren, Dinant, and Liège; and in 1490 it was the battle of Zonhoven. In each of these engagements, the rebels were defeated and defeated harshly. Only in 1339–46 in the county of Flanders was there no military action by the party being rebelled against, and that was principally because the French king and his army were fighting the English in the Hundred Years War at the time.³²

The chance of military victory in these rebellions was therefore limited, especially in comparison with the chance of military defeat, and yet, southern Low Countries' urban rebels did not seem to fall into what I have called elsewhere 'a psychology of defeat.'³³ The 'psychology of defeat'—a defeat of the mind as well as the military, such that a state refuses to pursue warfare against a foe no matter what the justification—prevalent so frequently elsewhere in the late Middle Ages, did not seem to have persuaded future generations of southern Low Countries' rebels from trying again and again to gain their own sovereignty. This was quite unusual, and at the same time quite impressive and in need of extensive research. Think about it:

³² There are, of course, numerous studies on the Hundred Years War during this time. Perhaps the best may be Alfred H. Burne's *The Crecy War: A Military History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360* (London, 1955) and Clifford J. Rogers' *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360* (Woodbridge, 2000). Jonathan Sumption's *The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle* (Philadelphia, 1991), which also covers the same period, is fraught with errors and should be used with caution.

³³ I have used this to describe the situation in France between 1415 and 1429, before the rise of morale brought by the appearance of Joan of Arc: Kelly DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader* (Stroud, 1999), 8–30. See also Kelly DeVries, "God and Defeat in Medieval Warfare: Some Preliminary Thoughts," in *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History*, ed. Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon (Woodbridge, 1999), 87–97.

in spite of the destruction which necessarily followed the traipsing of armies throughout the region, both those of their own rebels and their opponents (all of these military campaigns and battles were fought in the southern Low Countries), despite the numbers of citizens in a limited male citizen base who lost their lives and livelihoods in these encounters, and despite the punishments which followed the defeats suffered by these towns, future rebellions *always* occurred.

Economically, there is little question as to the effect of these rebellions. The southern Low Countries' economy before the fourteenth century was strong and growing, especially in the urban areas. It should have remained strong and growing, but it did not. Economic punishments for rebellion aside (discussed below), the economies of the rebellious towns never came close to recovering between rebellions, let alone achieving their pre-fourteenth-century status.³⁴ Other evidence of economic disruption can also be found.

While statistics of death and destruction are difficult to come by for this period, a few earnest scholars have come up with some interesting details. Eric Thoen, for example, has provided these examples of the destruction caused by warfare in conjunction with southern Low Countries' urban rebellions of the late Middle Ages:

- 1) Before 1385, all the farms in the lands of Aalst, Oudenaarde and the Waas belonging to Sint-Pieter's Abbey in Ghent lay fallow for no more than one year. Following the 1379–85 rebellion, most stood fallow for as long as five years;
- 2) The abbey of Sint-Baaf in Ghent recorded no receipts at all from its land-holdings in the land of Waas following the 1492 military incursions into the area by Maximilian of Austria 'because nobody lived there.' Other figures show significant re-leasing of agricultural lands in Flanders following the same rebellion.³⁵

³⁴ See, as one example, Walter Prevenier, "Les perturbations dans les relations commerciales anglo-flamandes entre 1379 et 1407: Causes de désaccord et raisons d'une réconciliation," in *Économies et sociétés du moyen âge: mélanges Edouard Perroy*, ed. Edouard Perroy (Paris, 1972), 477–497.

³⁵ Erik Thoen, 'Oorlogen en platteland. Sociale en economische aspecten van militaire destructie in Vlaanderen tijdens de late middeleeuwen en de vroege moderne tijden,' *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 91 (1978): 363–378 (trans. 'Warfare and the Countryside: Social and Economic Aspects of the Military Destruction in Flanders during the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period,' *Acta Historiae Neerlandicae* 13 (1980): 25–39).

Then there is the Liège town of Poilvache, a thriving walled town, protected by a castle, with a prosperous economy and its own mint, which, as an ally of duke Philip the Good, virtually ceased to exist following its 1430 siege by the rebellious Prince-Bishop of Liège, Jean de Heynsbergh, and an estimated 30,000 man army of Liégeois, Dinantais, and Hutois. The devastation was so complete following this attack, that a short time later the town was almost completely abandoned.³⁶

Suffering a similar fate as Poilvache, during the period from 1430 to 1467, the larger, but equally well-protected town of Bouvignes, also allied with the Burgundian dukes, never recovered its vibrancy in the wake of numerous enemy Liège and Dinant attacks and gunpowder artillery bombardments.³⁷ Eventually, it would be assumed into the urban municipality of Dinant, its rival town across the Meuse River, a fact still resented by most Bouvignais even today.

Furthermore, the numbers of men lost in rebellious military encounters, while not definitely tallied, must have been significant. Indications are that losses at Mons-en-Pévèle, Cassel, Tourinne, Rosebeke, Othée, Gavere, and Brusthem were quite heavy. At Mons-en-Pévèle, for example, it is estimated that Flemish losses were at least 4,000.³⁸ At Cassel, there may have been perhaps as many 9,000 losses, mostly from Bruges, Ypres, and the countryside around Bruges.³⁹ At Tourinne, Rosebeke, Othée, Gavere, Brusthem, and Zonhoven losses ranged from 1,300 to 18,000.⁴⁰ The effect of such losses on the economic

³⁶ Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 323; Gérard, *Analectes*, 119–120; and Raoul Libois, Jacques Jeanmart, and Philippe Jaumin, *Houx (Yvoir) en zijn middeleeuws kasteel van Poilvache* (2nd ed., Everhailles-Yvoir, 1993), 17–18.

³⁷ See Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 59–61, 396–397; Vaughan, *Charles the Bold*, 3–4; Gaier, *Art et organisation militaires*, 324; Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, 257–258, 280; and Gérard, *Analectes*, 38–39.

³⁸ DeVries, *Infantry Warfare*, 43, n. 60.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 108, n. 47.

⁴⁰ For the battle of Tourinne see Gaier, *Art et organisation militaires*, 304; for Rosebeke see Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, 27, and Kelly DeVries, “Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in the Southern Low Countries during the Fourteenth Century: A Historiographical Comparison” (unpublished dissertation, University of Toronto, Centre for Medieval Studies, 1987), 342; for Othée see Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, 59; for Gavere see Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 330; for Brusthem see Vaughan, *Charles the Bold*, 20–21, and Gaier, *Art et organisation militaires*, 347; and for Zonhoven see *ibid.*, 361. It should also be noted that these estimations are from modern historians and are very conservative, with contemporary and near contemporary narrative sources tallying far larger figures. For example, tallies of Flemish dead at Mons-en-Pévèle in contemporary sources range from 9,000 to as high as 90,000, and at Cassel tallies range between 5,000 and 22,000.

earning-power of the towns and their inhabitants has never been calculated, but they must have been fairly major. These were not the poorest burghers fighting, but many of the most financially prosperous of the towns' citizens: guildsmen, shopkeepers, merchants, and traders.⁴¹

However, the effect of these battlefield losses, and the constant defeats of the urban rebellions and the punishments which followed can perhaps be seen in the comparative rising and declining population of major Low Countries towns during the last two centuries of the Middle Ages. While the towns of Antwerp, Brussels, Amsterdam, Leiden, and Utrecht, either not rebellious or only involved in a few small revolts, all grew significantly in population between 1300 and 1500—Antwerp from 10,000 to 45,000; Brussels from 25,000 to 35,000; Amsterdam from 1,000 to 12,000; Leiden from 3,000 to 14,000; and Utrecht from 5,500 to 15,000—the rebellious towns of Ghent, Bruges, and Liège either decreased in population—Ghent from 50,000 to 40,000 and Bruges from 35,000 to 30,000—or remained the same—Liège with 20,000 in 1400 also had an estimated 20,000 in 1500.⁴² While there may be no secure connection between the rebellions in these towns and their declining or stagnant population, it is hard to deny any influence when compared with the increasing population of other Low Countries' urban areas.

Finally, the harshness of the punishments accrued after each failed southern Low Countries' urban rebellion must be taken into consideration. The punishments for early rebellions were small and largely economic. For example, the penalties leveled on the Flemish towns after the 1302–05 rebellion were reparations and after the 1323–28 rebellion were reparations and land confiscations, although after the latter revolt, the mayor of Bruges, deemed to be one of the leaders in the rebellion, was taken to Paris and publically executed.⁴³ Yet,

⁴¹ Verbruggen, 'Vlaamse gemeentelegers.'

⁴² Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806* (Oxford, 1995), 114.

⁴³ On 1302–05 see Frantz Funck-Brentano, *Philippe le Bel et Flandre: Les origines de la guerre de cent ans* (Paris, 1896), 485–560; Joseph R. Strayer, *The Reign of Philip the Fair* (Princeton, N.J., 1980), 336–37; and Hans van Werveke, 'Les charges financières issues de traité d'Athis (1305),' *Revue du Nord* 22 (1950): 81–93. On 1323–28 see Henri Pirenne, *Le soulèvement de la Flandre maritime de 1323–1328* (Brussels, 1900); Jacques Mertens, 'Les confiscations dans la Chatellenie du Franc de Bruges après la bataille de Cassel,' *Bulletin de la commission royale d'histoire de Belgique* 134 (1968): 239–284; and Jacques Mertens, 'De economische en sociale toestand van de opstande-

as these rebellions continued in frequency and intensity throughout the fourteenth century, punishments given by the kings of France or dukes of Burgundy grew harsher. For example, as a result of the 1379–85 Flemish revolt, the rebellious towns were required to pull down their fortifications and to deliver chief rebels, not earlier killed, for imprisonment and execution, as well as pay reparations and land confiscations; for example, the Jacquemart clock hanging still in the tower of the Notre Dame Church in Dijon was taken to this capital of Burgundy as part of these reparations.⁴⁴ In addition, as a symbolic gesture of their victory, the Franco-Burgundians removed the more than 500 golden spurs which hung in the Cathedral of the Virgin at Courtrai, having been taken by the Flemings after their victory in the battle fought outside that town eighty years earlier.⁴⁵

Ultimately, starting in the early fifteenth century and lasting throughout the entire century, punishments for rebellion became less financial, more symbolically subjugating, and much more violent. Perhaps this was in recognition of the fact that earlier, more lenient punishments had been ineffective in halting the tendency of the southern Low Countries' towns to revolt; or perhaps it was simply that the policies of three final Valois Burgundian dukes—John the Fearless, Philip the Good, and Charles the Bold—were decidedly more violent in putting down rebellions than their predecessors.

Following the battle of Othée, which ended the Liège rebellion of 1406–08, the town of Liège was forced to surrender their charters of privileges, as well as 500 hostages, granted no new privileges to the town's inhabitants without ducal permission, made to abolish all

lingen uit het Brugse Vrije, wier goederen na de slag bij Cassel (1328) verbeurd verklaard werden,' *Revue Belge de philologie et d'histoire* 47 (1969): 1131–1153. The leadership of Bruges' mayor may have been more symbolic than real.

⁴⁴ Actually, the towns which surrendered following the 1382 defeat at Rosebeke suffered more due to their unconditional surrender than did the town of Ghent which held out until the conditional peace of Tournai which was concluded in 1385. See Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, 230–231; Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, 27–38; Angeline Van Oost, 'Sociale stratifikatie van de Gentse opstandelingen van 1379–1385: Een kritische benadering van konfiskatiedokumenten,' *Handelingen der Maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent* 29 (1975): 59–92; Joseph De Smet, 'De repressie te Brugge na de slag bij Westrozebeke, 1 dec. 1382–1 aug. 1384: Bijdrage tot de kennis van de sociaal-economische toestand van de Brugse bevolking,' *Annales de la société d'émulation de Bruges* 84 (1947), 71–118; and Joseph De Smet, 'De verbeurdverklaringen in het Brugse Vrije en in de smalle steden aldaar in de slag bij Westrozebeke (1381–1384),' *Annales de la société d'émulation de Bruges* 95 (1958): 115–136.

⁴⁵ Jean Froissart, *Chroniques*, in *Oeuvres de Froissart*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Bruxelles, 1870), XIII: 177–178.

guilds and confraternities, not allowed to hold assemblies, forced to grant free passage across the Meuse River to all ducal messengers and armies, made to accept the currencies of the dukes of Burgundy and Brabant, ordered to erect a chapel, with six priests, on the battlefield of Othée 'for the welfare of the souls of the slain,' and commanded to celebrate annual masses in every church of the principality of Liège on the anniversary of the battle. Besides, the Liégeois were to destroy the fortifications of Tongeren and Dinant, and to pay a reparation of 220,000 gold crowns.⁴⁶

After his victory at Gavere ended the 1449–53 Flemish revolt, Philip was advised that he should destroy the town of Ghent, the instigator of this rebellion; Philip refused, as the destruction of this town, the second largest in northern Europe, would have deprived him of an extremely large tax base. Still, penalties, numerous and detailed, were quite harsh: Ghent was to pay 350,000 gold riders (the largest single currency instituted by Philip); the two main gates of the town were to be slighted and a third gate walled up; some urban officers were excluded from the town's governance, while the ducal bailiff was to be given more responsibilities and power; the rights of non-resident burgesses were reduced; Ghent's jurisdiction over the rural countryside was controlled; the town's special political and economic status in the Burgundian realm was removed; and the town's *echevins* were to be chosen only from among the duke's supporters.⁴⁷

However, what was meted out in retaliation of the 1465–68 Liège rebellion must be recognized as the cruelest punishment that southern Low Countries' rebels received. The *Chronijk der landen van Overmaas en der aangrenzende gewesten* indicates that 'there remained no chalice, no book, no cassock, and no vestment' in any church following the sacking of the town. Supported by other narrative and non-narrative sources, the anonymous chronicler of this *Chronijk* compares Charles the Bold's army to that of the Ottoman Turks in their destruction, claiming that anyone encountered in the town was killed, some 30,000–40,000 according to most sources, a tally that is probably too high, but indicative of contemporary opinion. The town

⁴⁶ Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, 63–64.

⁴⁷ Pirenne, *Soulèvement de la Flandre maritime*, 338–339; Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 332–333; Nicholas, *Medieval Flanders*, 331–332; and Boone, *Gent en de Bourgondische hertogen*, 189–190.

center was gutted and most houses received some damage, if not complete destruction. Different quarters of Liège were assigned to different units of the Burgundian army, and all soldiers profited enormously from the collection of booty.⁴⁸ And, yet, twenty years later the Liégeois rebelled again.

Perhaps more significant—because they were meant to destroy the honor and self-worth of the rebels—were the symbolic punishments given to the defeated rebels. Peter Arnade has catalogued a number of these in relation to the defeat of the Flemish uprising of 1449–53: the debasement of the leading citizens, dressed only in their undergarments, kneeling in water before the city walls, barefoot and in a manner of supplication, begging for forgiveness and for their lives. The wearing of nooses—‘strapdragging,’ the nickname which Ghentenaars still carry—which the guild deans, aldermen, and captains were supposed to wear in this supplication, again demeaned those leading citizens after this rebellion and others, as did the surrender and ritual rending of guild and community banners.⁴⁹ Similar symbolic debasements followed after almost all Flemish rebellions. These punishments were in many ways much harsher than the slighting of fortifications, the payment of reparations, or even the execution of a few leading citizens because of their psychological connotation of subjugation and occupation.

These symbolic forms of debasement were perhaps not just intended to destroy the honor and self-confidence of the individuals and their towns participating in the rebellions. Coupled with these ritual debasements were royal, comital, prince-episcopal, or ducal displays meant to reduce any feelings of southern Low Countries' sovereignty. These included, among other events, celebrated and festive entries and visitations of ruling parties, public jousts, tournaments, and *pas d'armes* held in urban centers; regional administrative meetings of the Duke

⁴⁸ *Chronijk der landen van Overmaas en der aangrenzende gewesten*, ed. J. Habets, in *Publications de la société archéologique et historique dans le duché de Limbourg* 7 (1870): 27–30 (quote on p. 28). See also Vaughan, *Charles the Bold*, 32–37; Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, 286–289; and C. Thiry, ed., “Les poèmes de langue Française relatifs aux sacs de Dinant et de Liège,” in *Colloque Liège et Bourgogne au XV^e siècle, Liège et Bourgogne. Actes du colloque tenu à Liège les 28, 29 et 30 octobre 1968* (Liège, 1972), 101–127.

⁴⁹ Peter Arnade, ‘Crowds, Banners, and the Marketplace: Symbols of Defiance and Defeat during the Ghent War of 1452–1453,’ *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 24 (1994): 471–497.

of Burgundy held in these towns, and the meetings of the Order of the Golden Fleece in the southern Low Countries. All of these were meant to display the size, significance, pomp, circumstance and majesty of the sovereign state.⁵⁰

Several historians have remarked on the decline of the southern Low Countries during the first part of the early modern period. Most, however, associate this with the Revolt against Spain.⁵¹ But the urban rebellions of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries surely must be taken into account in determining the weakness of the southern Low Countries. Weakening the urban areas of Flanders and Liège with constant military defeats and increasing punishments, leading to economic problems and decreasing or stagnant population, began a southern Low Countries' decline which, until modern times, was not reversed.

⁵⁰ On the visitations and entries see Peter Arnade, *Realms of Ritual: Burgundian Ceremony and Civic Life in Late Medieval Ghent* (Ithaca, NY, 1996). On public jousts and tournaments see Évelyne van den Neste, *Tournois, joutes, pas d'armes dans les villes de Flandre à la fin du moyen âge (1300–1486)* (Paris, 1996). On the administrative visits of the Burgundian dukes see their biographies written by Richard Vaughan: *Philip the Bold, John the Fearless, Philip the Good, and Charles the Bold* (all cited above). And on the meetings of the Order of the Golden Fleece in the southern Low Countries, including its foundation in Bruges in 1430, see Blockmans and Prevenier, *The Promised Lands*, 74–75 (Bruges in 1430); Vaughan, *Philip the Good*, 120 (Ghent in 1445); Vaughan, *Charles the Bold*, 48 (Bruges in 1468) and 172–178 (Valenciennes in 1473); and *Vijftiende kapittel van de Orde van het Gulden Vlies in de Sint-Rombautskathedraal te Mechelen in 1491* (n.p., n.d.) (Mechelen in 1491).

⁵¹ This decline is especially apparent compared with the prosperity of the northern Low Countries. See, for example, Israel, *Dutch Republic*; Myron P. Gutmann, *War and Rural Life in the Early Modern Low Countries* (Princeton, N.J., 1980); and Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt*, 2nd ed. (Harmondsworth, 1985).

THE DISTORTED MESSAGES OF PEACE: CONTROLLED AND UNCONTROLLED REACTIONS TO PROPAGANDA IN THE BURGUNDIAN LOW COUNTRIES DURING THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY*

Elodie Lecuppre-Desjardin

The history of the duchy of Burgundy from Philip the Bold in 1384 to Charles the Bold, whose reign ended in 1477, is one of a continual quest by both the princes and their towns for the recognition of authority. Trying to establish order in their newly-gained towns, the dukes of Burgundy availed themselves of propaganda. This essay will clarify the mechanism of propaganda by studying official ceremonies, where princes and city-dwellers met each other in the middle of the town.

The task that the prince strove to accomplish was similar to that of a weaver. Just as the craftsman makes a fabric using different color threads and various materials, the prince had to transform a set of various human elements into a unified group of people, who could live together and thrive under his authority. I would like to take this weaving metaphor a little further. The desire for order, inherent in the idea of power in the Middle Ages, is the principal key to ceremonial meetings between the prince and his subjects. The etymological origin of the word ‘order’ is the Latin *ordire*, which means to cross the different threads that have been warped. In French, as in Latin and English, ‘to warp’ is to prepare material for weaving, but this verb also means to distort a mind, a judgment, a thought. Therefore, crossing the threads on the loom may also suggest sewing the first seeds of intrigue, plot and subversion in a figurative sense. This conceit allows me to introduce the general idea of this essay. Ceremonies could sometimes get out of hand, lead to unexpected developments, cause ‘uncontrolled reactions’ or, on the contrary, they could be used as a pretext for requests and demands either from the prince or his subjects, i.e., ‘controlled reactions.’ Some might say that subversion, plot or intrigue belong to the hidden

* This article was written within the framework of IUAP, V-10, “Urban Society in the Low Countries. Late Middle Ages–16th century.” I would like to thank Véronique Vareille and Susie Sutch for their help.

world of secrecy, silence, and obscurity, which is the complete opposite of what the public space where ceremonies take place is thought to suggest. However, it seems to me that public space expresses secret dissent in a whole range of signs and symbolic meanings. Occasions of feasts and gestures of goodwill may not have been as innocent as they seemed.

The episode of Charles the Bold's failed *Joyeuse Entrée* into Ghent on June 28, 1467 is indisputably the most famous event of this kind. Peter Arnade has already explored the topsy-turvy ceremony, stressing that 'entry rituals, far from static, could serve as forums of dissent.'¹ Indeed, one week after the death of his son Philip the Good, Charles, at the Ghentenaars' request, decided to make use of the incredible instrument of legitimization that the *Joyeuse Entrée* is.² The dukes of Burgundy used this traditional ceremony of enthronement to demonstrate their power by way of an abundance of luxury, and to seal a pact of mutual recognition with their people by exchanging oaths and employing a form of civic liturgy distilled by pageantry. Thus, on Sunday morning, Charles rode into Ghent, following the traditional model for the reception of a new sovereign. The celebration went off peacefully with the welcome by city officials and clerics, and the ceremonies in Saint Peter's monastery and the central church of Saint John. After it was publicly announced, as expected, that the town's privileges would be respected in exchange for its loyalty, there followed various entertainments.

Still, the day after Charles' arrival, the fiction of political unity between the prince and his people crumbled as the worshippers of Saint Lievin, a patron saint of the town, came back from Houtem into town. More than one third of the city-dwellers usually followed the holy relics from Saint Baafs' monastery to Houtem, a nearby village where the saint had been martyred in 658.³ We do not know

¹ Peter Arnade, 'Secular Charisma, Sacred Power: Rites of Rebellion in the Ghent Entry of 1467,' *Handelingen der maatschappij voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te Gent* 45 (1991): 69–94.

² Georges Chastellain, *Œuvres*, ed. K. de Lettenhove, 8 vols., (Bruxelles, 1863–1866), V, book VII, ch. 1, 249: "Et en effet, aucuns gantois estoient venus à bruges de par ladite ville de Gand, pour condoloir leur nouveau jeusne duc en sa tristeur, ensemble et pour le consoler, et pour luy faire la révérence, prians, avecques ce, qu'il luy plust venir visiter sa ville et ses bons humbles sujets, qui le tenoient et maintenir pour leur vray naturel prince et seigneur, sans autre recognoistre, lesquels luy feroient tout humble et dévôte révérence et cordiale réception."

³ For more details about the progress of this feast day, see M. Gachard, ed.,

if the city officials were aware that the two rituals would coincide. Georges Chastellain, the court chronicler, argued that the aldermen purposely chose this date in order to wreck Charles' entry.⁴ In fact, as Peter Arnade suggests, the clash between the two events may have been nothing but a blunder. The aldermen had certainly heard of the popular character of the procession that often degenerated into drinking bouts and violent acts, but they must have underestimated the power of this cult of identity. Even though they changed the date of the procession to Saturday, that is to say one day earlier than usual, so as not to mix up the two events, that measure was not sufficient to remove the insult.

The pilgrims' behavior invariably marred the procession to Houtem. The sun, the many stops in the country to bless some churches or chapels and, of course, to have a drink, the boisterous atmosphere of the fair of Houtem, all these factors played a part in unsettling the minds and sparking off troubles. An anonymous inhabitant of Lille observed that

The phenomenon was definitely strange for people who had never seen it before. It was a pilgrimage spurred on by curses and certainly not by devotion. And each year, people committed ten thousand sins, because of drinking, squabbles, murders, bawdiness, blasphemies, insults and so on . . .⁵

The procession was so real a menace that Charles V decided to abolish it in 1540.⁶ The 1467 riot certainly influenced his decision. It must be added that Charles the Bold was in great danger. Back in Ghent, on Monday 29, worshippers gathered on the *Vrijdagmarkt*, where oaths of mutual recognition had been taken the day before. They pulled down the House of the Cueillote, the name of a hated tax, and armed themselves.⁷ Their act was the sign of general

Relation des troubles de Gand sous Charles Quint (Bruxelles, 1846), 102–107, and C.L. Diericx, *Mémoires sur la ville de Gand* (Gand, 1815), II: 391–403.

⁴ Chastellain, *Œuvres*, V, book VII, ch. 3, 255.

⁵ *Relation des troubles de Gand*, 106: "Le mistere estoit bien estrange à ung qui ne l'avoit jamais veu. C'estoit ung pèlerinage et voiage plus de malédiction que de dévotion, et où que, chascun an, dix mil péchiez mortelz s'y faisoient et commectoient, tant par yronneries, débats, homicides, paillardies, blasphèmes, juremens exécrables et autres grans et péchiés et meschantés . . ."

⁶ Diericx, *Mémoires sur la ville*, 403: "Mais Charles Quint, considérant le mal comme incurable, supprima les deux confréries de Saint Liévin en 1540."

⁷ The 'cueillotes' were taxes which were imposed to Gent's people after the peace treaty of 1453. For more details about the tax structure of the town at that time, see M. Boone, "Le rêve d'un Etat urbain," in *Gand, apologie d'une ville rebelle*, ed. J. Decavaele (Anvers, 1983), 102–103.

discontent with tax exploitation as well as with the wheeling and dealing of some aldermen. Thus, according to more or less reliable sources, people rebelled against Charles, who was forced to agree to most of the rioters' demands. Of course, after he had left Ghent, on the first of July, and was back in complete safety in Brussels, the duke exacted an apology from the community of Ghent which had to pay dearly for their rashness.⁸

This unfortunate episode shows us that sacredness is perhaps the most efficient weapon to hold out against the centralizing will of the prince. It clearly demonstrates that shifts, once they careen out of control, can take a dangerous turn and result in an inversion of intentions and expectations. It is hard to say whether Saint Lievin's day was just a forum where anger could be voiced or rather a weapon to open hostilities. Peter Arnade tries to explain this armed rebellion by showing that:

The very nature of both the Joyous entry and the Lievin procession offered pilgrims suitable forums to air grievances; the former because it was a traditional vehicle to issue urban demands, the latter because its symbolic activity altered the usual social boundaries for its duration by mixing rich and poor, young and old, women and men together.⁹

I would like to insist on the power of relics and on the disturbances generated by threats which hung over the holy feast. Charles' father, Philip the Good, had adopted popular beliefs and folklore, as he perfectly understood that his astute gestures could narrow the cultural gap between him and his subjects. Thus, in making his arrival coincide with the common patron saint's feast, as he had done when he chose April 23, the feast day of Saint George, for his reconciliation with the Ghentenaars in 1458, in putting off his departure, or in bringing forward his arrival into some towns to honor civic or religious feasts with his presence, as for instance in Lille for the procession of Notre Dame de La Treille and the Epinette Tournament, or in Bruges for the procession of Holy Blood and the Great Foresterie, Philip the Good proved that religious matters could serve a policy of rapprochement provided the prince was there as a simple member

⁸ The chronology of the riot and its consequences are included with all their sources' references in Victor Fris, "La restriction de Gand (13 juillet 1468)," *Bulletijn van de Maatschappij voor Oudheidkunde en Geschiedenis te Gent* 1 (1923), 57–142.

⁹ Arnade, 'Secular Charisma,' 86.

of the audience.¹⁰ But a prince could not share top billing with a saint. That was a basic principle which Charles, unlike Philip, did not understand. The usurpation of urban space at the expense of the Holy Saint representative of the community of Ghent was not only felt as an insult but was considered a threat.

The worship of Saint Lievin had been created from scratch at the beginning of the eleventh century by the monks of Saint-Baafs.¹¹ Lievin was a sort of double of the Scot Libwinus. As Anne-Marie Helvétius has stressed, the invention of new saints' relics immediately followed by the writing of a *vita* is closely bound up with political issues.¹² Here, it was a question of rivalries between the two most important abbeys in Ghent, Saint Peter and Saint Baafs.¹³ Even if the written narrative claims that the cult of Saint Lievin had always been popular, the first sign of the procession appeared only in 1301 and the author of the *Annales Gandenses* already pointed out the violent nature of that event.¹⁴ The beginning of processions was usually

¹⁰ Philip the Good was present in 1448 and 1453 for the procession of Notre-Dame de la Treille. From 1421, he regularly attended the Grande Foresterie in Bruges and the Epinette Tournament in Lille.

¹¹ On the life of Saint Lievin, see: M. Gysseling and A.C.F. Koch, eds., *Diplomata Belgica ante annum millesimum centesimum scripta*, 140 (Bruxelles, 1950), 246–249; and Georg Waitz, Wilhelm Wattenbach et al., eds., *Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores* (MGH SS) (Frankfurt am Main, 1888), 15–2: 612–614. The first mention of him appears in 1007.

¹² See Anne-Marie Helvétius, “Les inventions de reliques en Gaule du Nord (XI^e–XIII^e siècles),” in *Les reliques: objets, cultes, symboles. Actes du colloque international de l'Université du Littoral-Côte d'Opale, Boulogne-sur-Mer, 4–6 septembre 1997*, ed. E. Bozoky and A.-M. Helvétius (Turnhout, 1999), 293–311.

¹³ As regards the opposition between the two abbeys, see: G. Declercq, “Heiligen, lekenabten en hervormers. De Gentse abdijen van Sint-Pieters and Sint-Baafs tijdens de Eerste Middeleeuwen (7de–12de eeuw),” in *Ganda en Blandinium. De Gentse abdijen van Sint-Pieters en Sint-Baafs*, ed. G. Declercq (Gand, 1997), 36–38.

¹⁴ F. Funck-Brentano, ed., *Annales Gandenses* (Paris, 1896), 15: “Circa finem Junii, in vigilia apostolorum Petri et Pauli, Gandenses sanctum Livinum in Hautem ferentes, cum hominibus ruralibus et aliis, festivitatem et dedicationem quamdam ibidem frequentantibus, discordare incipientes, ab eis vulnerati et male tractati sunt; erant enim de ista discordia improvisi. Quod factum ut communitas Gandensis cognovit, armata manu et cum signis bellicis exiens, villam campestrum de Hautem concremavit, multos ibidem vel occidit vel vulneravit, et gravia damna intulit monasterio sancti Bavonis” (entry of June, 28, 1301). The procession must have already existed, and probably dated back to the end of the previous century. The study of C. Tavernier-Vereecken about the popular names in Ghent from 1000 to 1253 has proved that the name of Lievin was rare before 1253 (only two mentions: Livikinus and Liebwinus): C. Tavernier-Vereecken, *Gentse naamkunde van ca 1000 tot 1253, een bijdrage tot de kennis van het oudste middelnederlands* (Bruxelles, 1968), 169. After that date, the name became very popular in Ghent and in Bruges: see Marc Boone and

connected with a large-scale movement of popular piety, where devotion was synonymous with the defense of the urban community. I think of Bruges with the procession of the Holy Blood, Brussels with its Ommegang, Arras and the cult of Notre-Dame des Ardents, Lille and Notre-Dame de la Treille or Valenciennes with Notre-Dame du Saint-Cordon. Relics could therefore be used to foster a sort of miraculous *virtus*, but also to flaunt a symbol of political identity. As the first counts of Flanders and the most powerful abbeys used relics as a political tool in the tenth and eleventh centuries, so town leaders at the end of the thirteenth century tried to monopolize this marvelous means of power to consolidate their community.¹⁵

As I have just stressed, a real world of rivalries revolved around the cult of relics: rivalries in terms of time, authorities, ornaments, and so on. In the case of the procession that took place on June 28, 1467, all these rivalries were activated. Thus there was the rivalry of time: the cyclical time of the procession which came round every year, on the one hand, as opposed to the linear time of the *Joyeuse Entrée* which celebrated a new reference point in the history of the town. Secondly, the rivalry of authorities or more exactly of powers since the power of the people, which was barely contained by the town's leaders, confronted princely authority. And then we can consider the rivalry between the ornaments displayed during the procession and those on the occasion of Charles entry. Indeed, the gems, the jewels, the lights which surrounded the reliquary had an eschatological meaning: they all foreshadowed Celestial Jerusalem. But if a profusion of lights could usually lead a dazzled crowd to confuse political and sacred matters when the duke was the only star, the same profusion in competition with the saint's light played a large part in outshining the prince's star.¹⁶

Meetings between princes and their subjects thus rested on a frail balance. Despite all the successful ceremonies organized by the court

Inge Schoups, "Jan, Johan en Alleman: voornaamgeving bij de gentse ambachtslieden (14de–15de eeuw), symptoom van een groepsbewustzijn?" in *Qui valet Ingenio, Liber amicorum Johan Decavele*, ed. Joris de Zutter (Gand, 1996), 39–62.

¹⁵ For the use of relics as an instrument of policy by the first counts of Flanders, see: Edina Bozoky, "La politique des reliques des premiers comtes de Flandre (fin du IX^e–fin du XI^e siècle)," in Bozoky and Helvétius, *Les reliques*, 271–292.

¹⁶ I have already emphasized the political use of light in: Elodie Lecuppre-Desjardin, "Les lumières de la ville: recherche sur l'utilisation de la lumière dans les cérémonies bourguignonnes (XIV^e–XV^e siècles)," *Revue Historique* 301/1 (1999): 23–43.

of Burgundy, we must not forget that behind every gesture of goodwill, behind every friendly show and every favor, ambiguous signs were hidden, which could spark off the crisis at any time. If history has only retained images of success or armed clashes from Burgundian ceremonies, I would now like to summon the evidence of underlying opposition between princes and their subjects which belongs to the realm of potential rather than actual history, but may interest students of power relations.

As I hope I have made clear, rivalries and their threat grew at the very heart of ceremonies such as the one I have discussed. Even the ceremony of reconciliation between Philip the Good and the inhabitants of Ghent five years after the battle of Gavere, on April 23, 1458, did not avoid the risk of equivocal messages. Recently, Gordon Kipling has looked anew into the many pageantries that contributed to the prince's progress in his town and that fashioned a real act of contrition.¹⁷ I have no time here to detail every scene which, with the help of David and Abigail, the Indulgence of Pompey toward Tigranes, the king of Armenia, or the return of the Prodigal Son, were intended to make people forget past turmoil and to ask forgiveness for their treachery. But, if all messages tried and managed to restore the civic links which bound together the prince and his city, in order to win back the duke's favor, the pride of the town could regularly be read between the lines of humility. Here are two examples. First, we know that the words of welcome outside the Waalpoort were pronounced in French by Mathys de Grootheere.¹⁸ But inside the town, even inside the very castle of the prince, most of the aldermen and the guilds' senior members used Pierre Bierman as their mouthpiece to welcome Philip the Good in Flemish.¹⁹ This use of the Flemish language is very significant since Ghentenaars had been forced to apologize in French after the humiliating defeat of Gavere in 1453.

The second example is the abundance of luxury flaunted by the town which could also be interpreted as an instrument of emphasis. If the subjects of pageantry were dedicated to the honor and indulgence

¹⁷ G. Kipling, *Enter the King: theatre, liturgy, and ritual in the medieval civic triumph* (Oxford, 1998).

¹⁸ See the speech in Emile Varenbergh, 'Fêtes données à Philippe le Bon et Isabelle de Portugal à Gand en 1457,' *Annales de la Société royale des Beaux-Arts et de Littérature de Gand* 12 (1869-1872): 1-36: 4.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 18.

of Philip the Good, the scenery was a real hymn to the power of the city. Admittedly, a prince's welcome requires a spectacle measuring up to his nobility. But we must distinguish between sympathy and *hubris*. Now, Ghent and its city-dwellers demonstrated such a generosity with lights, for example, that the original signs of submission were overwhelmed by those of civic pride. The city not only used more than sixteen thousand torches for the traditional processions and for the illumination of the ornamental façades of its buildings, but also stimulated its inhabitants by organizing a competition with prizes as a reward for the best decorations. Consequently, many houses were decorated with numerous lights and one burgher even covered his house with gold and silver.²⁰ This magnificence interpreted as a mirror of the power of the town can explain Philip the Good's attitude who, on the following Tuesday, decided to refuse a new floodlighting of the town. This decision was certainly not caused by the sole desire of sparing the town's resources, but it reflects the intention not to let the spectacle of the wealth of Ghent flourish once more. Here, the gilding of the feast enhanced the harmony between the duke and his town and displayed at the same time the vitality of a town which always had the means to consolidate its authority.²¹

Sometimes, the organizers of this kind of festivity did not hesitate to directly or indirectly reprimand their prince for his political actions. The program of pageantries was not always as innocent as it seemed. Thus, for his *Joyeuse Entrée* in Arras, on March 15, 1469, Charles the Bold was welcomed with pomp. All sorts of plays had been ordered by the aldermen to entertain the prince. Charles' qualities were honored, especially that of justice, but the excessive tax exacted by the new sovereign was also addressed with the episode of Rehoboam's council.²² The latter allusion could seem quite innocent to us, but when we know the biblical passage it refers to, it turns

²⁰ Jean Chartier, *Chronique de Charles VII*, ed. Vallet de Viriville (Paris, 1858), ch. 283: "Et au-dessus desdits draps (qui encourtinent les rues) eult torches cinq ou six sur chascun drap; ainsi sommés desdites torches, comprises celles qui furent devant les maisons et sur les bateaux decedens la riviere, de quinze à seize mille torches." (. . .) "Item en ladite ville y avoit un bourgeois qui avoit fait couvrir sa maison d'argent et dessous d'or, et devant icelle très grant quantité de torches et de lanternes."

²¹ For a more complete analysis, see E. Lecuppre-Desjardin, "Parcours festifs et enjeux de pouvoirs dans les villes des anciens Pays-Bas bourguignons au XV^e siècle," *Histoire Urbaine* 9 (2004): 29–45.

²² E. Lecesne, *Histoire d'Arras depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'en 1789*, 2 vols. (Arras, 1880), I, ch. X: 372.

out to be rather aggressive. As it had to do with that king who, after Solomon's death, ignored the Elders' advice and mistreated his people, thus leading them to insurrection, it did not necessarily read as a very peaceful message.²³

Some towns hesitated to approach the duke directly and would rather turn to his wife. On the 27th of March 1468, Charles came into Mons for his *Joyeuse Entrée*, and street theatres portrayed the relaxed rhythm of life in Hainaut with a scene entitled 'Le Jardin de Hainaut' (the small garden of Hainaut), with the character of Bacchus and the Holy Protectors Saint Vincent and Saint Waudru. But, when Charles' wife, Margaret of York, came to Mons for the first time, on November 15, 1470, pageantries in her honor were clearly less innocent than those of 1468. Biblical characters in turn played their part to convince the young duchess that she should be a good mediator between the town and her husband.²⁴ The example of Judith's trick as she murdered Holophern and saved her town, that of Abigail who managed to calm David's anger towards her husband, Nabal, and the allegory of *Sapience* (wisdom), were intended to beg Margaret for help. She must be the protector of the town and, in her turn, she must persuade her husband to be less uncompromising and hard. Admittedly, this kind of pageantry belonged to the classics of the rhetoric chambers and other local dramatic companies. But if these pageants were performed during processions as well as during official ceremonies, the combination of those topics, as in this case, was not entirely innocent. And if we had some doubts about the purpose of such a spectacle, the last play may provide us with further proof. Indeed, with the pageantry of Esther and Assuerus, the town recalled Esther approaching King Assuerus to save the Jewish people from slaughter. The story of Esther and Assuerus was certainly appreciated at the Burgundian court, but it was performed first and foremost for the allegory of happy marriage and not for its allusion to Purim.²⁵

When we manage to decipher the symbolic language that both ducal members and city-dwellers used to express their own claims, we find the first elements of dissent woven into the ceremony's very

²³ For the details of Roboam's story, see *Book of Kings*, I, 11, 43; 12.

²⁴ The program of the ceremony is given in Archive de l'Etat à Mons, Mons, "3^e registre aux procès verbaux du conseil de la ville," fol. 85–89.

²⁵ For the popularity of this Biblical episode at the end of the 15th century, see: Birgit Franke, *Assuerus und Esther am Burgunderhof. Zur Rezeption des Buches Esther in den Niederlanden (1450 bis 1530)* (Berlin, 1998).

fabric, to take up again the metaphor we started with. Through those examples of remarks insidiously included in an official ceremony of welcome and friendship, we can understand that opposition could take other forms than riot or rebellion. But rivalries and petitions are not the only elements which can constitute a stumbling block.

All the ducal ceremonies were designed to portray good order and good justice, which were the most essential qualities of good government. To infringe on the law was, therefore, to imperil the 'public cause' and to threaten the prince's authority. And yet, that is exactly what Valenciennes did in 1455, when the aldermen decided to organize a judicial duel.²⁶ Indeed, on May 19, 1455, Philip the Good and his son Charles, then the count of Charolais, went to Valenciennes with many noblemen to witness the fierce fight which pitted Matthieu Coquiel against Jacques Plouvier. Coquiel was a burgher of Tournay who had murdered Philippe du Gardin in that town. According to its privileges, Valenciennes could grant asylum to strangers who had committed hideous crimes. But the family of the victim could demand vengeance. And that is what Jacques Plouvier did in challenging the criminal to a duel placed under the jurisdiction of Valenciennes as well as of God. The town, as a matter of course, waited until Philip the Good returned from Germany to ask him for his authorization, and the aldermen invited the court to this judicial ceremony. But at a time when that kind of practice had been rejected by both political and religious authorities for at least two centuries, this decision of the town based on custom, appeared as an act of resistance to central authority.²⁷

The insult to the prince was twofold. Not only was the duke's power scorned, but the aristocratic way of life was made to look

²⁶ The sources of this episode are: Chastellain, *Œuvres*, III, 38–49; Matthieu d'Escouchy, *Chroniques de Mattheu d'Escouchy*, ed. G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, 2 vols. (Paris, 1863–1864), II: 297–305; Olivier de la Marche, *Mémoires*, ed. H. Beaune and J. d'Arbaumont, 4 vols. (Paris: 1883–1888), II, book 1, ch. 32: 402–406; "Annales de la ville de Valenciennes par Simon Leboucq," Bibliothèque Municipale de Valenciennes, ms. 672, (XVII^e siècle), fol. 181–200; "Histoire de la ville et comté de Valentiennes par Simon le Boucq," Bibliothèque Municipale de Cambrai, vol. I, ms. 1134, book 6, fol. 170v–171; Henri d'Outreman, *Histoire de la ville et comté de Vallentiennes* (Douai, 1634), I: 174, II: 335–340.

²⁷ On this subject, see the explanations of Claude Gauvard in: *'De Grace especial'. Crime, Etat et société en France à la fin du Moyen Age*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1991). She writes: "Dès lors aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles, l'histoire de ces formes de preuves devient celle d'une résistance aux ordres et celle d'un obscurantisme voué à l'échec" (I, 172).

ridiculous. Indeed the duel was a noble practice very much appreciated by the court of Burgundy. Its regulations were set down in two books, a copy of which could be found in Philip the Good's library.²⁸ The court chronicler, Olivier de la Marche, correctly understood the risks of this custom: he denounced the duel as an infringement of ducal justice.²⁹ Even if the duke and his court were welcomed as usual by one hundred and twenty burghers of the town with lights far beyond the city's gates, even if traditional donations of wine were given to him and to his son by the town, he did not rule the city.

The first sign of this role reversal may have been the use of the town's color in the welcoming procession. Everybody wore red clothes bearing the town's coat of arms, whereas the same city-dwellers adopted the neutrality of white clothes for the Joyeuse Entrée of Charles the Bold fifteen years later. Unlike a judicial duel organized in Arras on June 20, 1431, where the duke sat on a platform under which an altar and a Bible were placed, making him a sort of image of God on earth, Philip the Good witnessed the fighting, hidden from view by wooden railings.³⁰ The town, with the help of God, was the only authority in control of the situation. This fight was nothing more than an ordeal, and court chronicler Georges Chastellain emphasized the eerie atmosphere of the place. First, he noted that the loser-to-be, Matthieu Coquiel, was deathly pale when he took the oath on the Bible.³¹ Secondly, he claimed that the grease used to put on fighters' bodies melted on Jacotin's body, but not on Matthieu's. Thus, Matthieu was less sweaty and easier to catch. Chastellain did not explain that situation but he accepted it as a supernatural phenomenon. Perhaps, it was a trick of the court chronicler to feign that the authority of Philip the Good gave way to that of God and not to that of the town. In reality, only Valenciennes was in control of the situation. The former provost of the town himself, Nicolas

²⁸ This is *L'arbre des Batailles* by Honoré Bonet. Another *Arbre des Batailles* was written by Jean Villiers de L'Isle Adam, a lord of Philip the Good's court.

²⁹ De la Marche, *Mémoires*, II, book 1, ch. 32: 402–407.

³⁰ For the events of Arras: Archives Municipales d'Arras, BB7, fol. 54–56. Concerning the duke's place in Valenciennes, Simon Leboucq writes: "Et est a entendre que ledit seigneur duc regardoit ledit camp par une treille de bois, laissant la justice dudit camp accomplir selon les privileges de la ville et sans rien se mesler." "Annales de la ville de Valenciennes," fol. 179.

³¹ Chastellain, *Œuvres*, III, ch. IX, 46: "Mahienot qui pareillement jura et dist que l'autre estoit un faux mauvais menteur, et cela lui feroit cognoistre, et baisant le livre devint mort comme cendre et changea de couleur."

du Gardin, was in charge of urban security. And that duty was far from easy with nearly six thousand onlookers who invaded the town.³² As for the current provost, he had the honor of opening the duel on behalf of all the aldermen that were gathered.³³ The invisible duke was thus rejected, also proving that a prince must be seen to be obeyed. This is the reason why, after a horrible fight where both Jacotin and Matthieu committed acts of unprecedented violence, the intervention of Philip the Good was rejected. Indeed, when the duke decided to intercede with the magistrates of the town on Matthieu Coquiel's behalf since he was nearly dead, they asked him to let them do their duty. Thus, Jacotin Plouvier finished off the dying man and the aldermen climbed up to the balcony of the Town Hall and sentenced the loser. Matthieu Coquiel was hanged and strangled on the scaffold erected on the town's square.

Marcel Mauss described the duel as a 'total social phenomenon.' According to his model, the duel of Valenciennes was a counter-judiciary, political demonstration, a religious ritual with the reminder of an ordeal, and a sort of short-lived work of art if we are ready to admit the intense aesthetic value of a violent spectacle. Even with the court's presence, that ceremony held coercion and propaganda in check by resisting the official laws. However here as elsewhere, 'might is right' and Philip the Good, one year later, abolished the privilege of organizing duels. But the settlement of that crisis with the law was not enough. One year after this disgraceful ceremony, the duke decided to blot out this horrible spectacle from the minds of the residents of Valenciennes with a beautiful joust between two knights, Jehan de Wassenaire and Louis de Rebemetz. Common fighters gave way to noblemen and Philip the Good himself gave the signal for opening and bringing the clash to a close before any bloodshed could occur. At the same time, the court was no longer hidden from view by any wooden railings, but comfortably and prominently installed around the square. The humiliation was washed away and the good order was restored.

³² "Histoire de la ville et comté de Valenciennes par Simon Le Boucq," I, fol. 171: "Le nombre de regardans tant aux fenestres que par tout sur des sieges montoit a plus de six mil hommes, sans qu'il y eult aucun bruict ny murmure."

³³ D'Outreman, *Histoire de la ville*, 338–339: "jeta le gand, pour gage de bataille et cria trois fois: faites devoir."

The study of ceremonies (Joyous Entries, inaugural ceremonies, reconciliation ceremonies or judicial events) transposes the crucial question of political centralization and resistance in the cities of the Low Countries onto the field of symbols and rituals. Admittedly, violence arose out of urges, disagreements or feelings of attacks, but it became organized thanks to ritual gestures that consolidated and justified it. Ghent's pilgrims rushed to the *Vrijdagmarkt* and got hold of reliquary's fabrics to create new banners and demand justice. The people of Valenciennes organized a judicial duel to safeguard their interests. In the same way, the anger of the prince disappeared thanks to a ceremony worked out in order to restore calm and peace. But however obvious all these acts may appear, they remained ambiguous. This is the reason why the unofficial language is sometimes more meaningful than the official one for those interested in the construction of the Burgundian State. All these details encourage us not to reduce our appraisal of the relationships between urban and state powers to a clear-cut opposition between submission or rebellion. Subtle touches punctuate the dialogue between the many actors of the town and their prince. If propaganda is nowadays not easy to interpret, it was then not easy to handle either.³⁴

³⁴ For a complete study of political communication, see Elodie Lecuppre-Desjardin, *La ville des cérémonies. Essai sur la communication politique dans les villes des anciens Pays-Bas bourguignons* (Turnhout, 2004).

BEGGARS AND ICONOCLASTS: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ICONOCLASM ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS

Peter Arnade

Introduction: Order and Disorder

In late July, the air was heavy with anticipation of the August 8th Tuindag procession of the Virgin Mary in the great, old cloth city of Ypres in Flanders. As elsewhere in the southern Low Countries, the procession was a grand affair, commemorating a signal event in the city's history—in this instance, the staving off of an attack by soldiers from Ghent and England in 1383—and anticipating Assumption Day of the Virgin Mary, celebrated in the Catholic calendar on August 15.¹ The statue of the Virgin in a chapel of the Franciscan cloister was fashionably outfitted with damask, silk, and gold cloth and studded with pearls, diamonds, and other jewels before prominent lay and ecclesiastical officials carried her aloft through the jammed streets. To pious commemoration was joined summer revelry, music and drama, most notably. But on July 29, 1566, aldermen reluctantly postponed the procession and ordered most of the city gates closed in response to the growing militancy of Calvinist preachers and their followers outside the city walls.² Their countryside services had increased in number and swelled in attendance as

¹ See the collection of essays on the procession in Romain Vinckier, ed., *Ieper Tuindag: Zesde Eeuwfeest* (Ypres, 1983) and the older, but sometimes inaccurate work, Alphonse Vandenpeereboom, *Ypriana: Notices, Études, Notes et Documents sur Ypres*, vol. 5: *Tuindag et Notre Dame de Tuine* (Bruges, 1881). The name 'tuindag' comes from the Middle Dutch word *Thune*, a defensive structure. The procession thus honors the carrying of the statue of the virgin around the walls of Ypres during the 1383 siege. See Bernadette Rose, "O.L.-Vrouw van Tuin, een beeld uit het begin van de zestiende eeuw," in Vinckier, *Ieper Tuindag*, 188–189. My thanks for Walter Simons for clarifying the meaning of the Middle-Dutch term and its association with the procession for me.

² For the July 29th ordinance, see A.L. Diegerick, ed., *Documents du XVI^e siècle faisant suite à l'inventaire des chartes*, 4 vols. (Bruges, 1874–77), vol. 1, *Mémoire justificatif du magistrat d'Ypres*, 34–35.

people gathered to hear local preachers, most either apostate clergy or artisans bitten by evangelical fervor.

The aldermen were right to worry. Ypres was located slightly to the northeast of the hot zone of Calvinist agitation, Flanders' West Quarter, site of small towns and villages given over to the highly exploitative world of rural drapery production. There, rural and small-town weavers and other artisans, often working outside the protective cocoon of the guild system, soaked up the Calvinist message spilling across the border provinces of France with the same scrappy self-determination they used to earn their daily bread. By the early 1560s, despite an aggressive inquisitor bent on ferreting out the troublemakers, the Calvinists grew more confident in public, holding their rural sermons and marching on city streets to sing their psalms aloud. Fulminations against Catholic image worship were a standard part of the preachers' repertoire, echoed, of course, in the learned Calvinist treatises circulating in the Low Countries and elsewhere. No one on August 10th was thus caught unawares when a crowd, energized by a sermon delivered by the former hat-maker Sebastian Matte and his assistant, Jacob van Buzere, stormed the St. Laurentius chapel nearby Steenvoorde and smashed statues, paintings, and ecclesiastical implements.³ What was startling, however, was the speed with which iconoclasm spread through the towns and villages of the West Quarter, threatening, finally, Ypres and the other great cities of the southern Low Countries. Ypres redoubled its watch, closed its gates, and called for the help of a vacillating Count Egmont, all to no avail. On August 15th, Assumption Day, followers of Matte attacked the monasteries and chapels outside the city walls. The next day, with the help of locals, they slipped through the supposedly closed gates and wreaked their havoc in the city.⁴

In normal circumstances, Ypres would have celebrated its enormous Tuindag procession on August 8th, with citizens cheering a strictly choreographed procession of order and rank, featuring clergy, the elite political class, guild leaders and deputies, and the top lay and religious confraternities. From the procession's start, when the

³ M. Backhouse, *Beeldenstorm in het Westkwartier (1566–1568): Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van de godsdienststoebelen der Zuidelijke Nederlanden in de XVI^e eeuw*, Handelingen der Koninklijke Geschied- en Oudheidkundige Kring van Kortrijk, 38 (Kortrijk, 1971).

⁴ F. van de Putte, ed., *Cort verhael van 't ghonne binnen de stadt van Ypres, Société d'émulation de Bruges*, 2 (1844): 209–260.

Franciscans first carried the bedecked statue upon her litter out of their cloister, to its end point in front of the Great Cloth Hall, participants followed a prescribed itinerary guaranteed to maximize public recognition.⁵ Since the late fifteenth century, both the Brussels central government and local municipalities in the southern Low Countries had even passed ordinances aimed to cleanse processions like Tuindag of the stain of boisterousness, prohibiting bon-fires, unchecked behavior, the public carrying of arms, spontaneous music, and other elements that smacked of plebeian revelry. The goal was a purer and more tightly regulated religious event.⁶ In 1566, local officials got just the opposite. In lieu of a well-ordered train of pious devotees, Ypres fell victim to image destruction loaded with carnivalesque excess. In the cloister of Saint-Clara outside Ypres, the sisters later described to officials how a crowd of men and women stormed their nunnery 'zeer bij drancke waren,' on August 15th, Assumption Day proper. As they smashed statues and paintings, the iconoclasts ate, drank and sang psalms, raiding the refectory for food (eggs and preserves were mentioned), the kitchen for house ware, the sleeping quarters for bedding.⁷ In Sint-Pieterskerk inside the city, the candles used in the Tuindag procession were converted into a battering ram to break up images while small children beheaded statues with their fathers' hammers.⁸ Verbal threats and insults too were part of the violence. A Steven Chastelain, for example, was later banished by Yprian officials for having taunted a church warden that "in three days, workers and the poor will be as rich as the guild masters and the wealthy."⁹ In lieu of the social hierarchies so neatly displayed in the procession of the Virgin, Ypres was the world-turned-upside-down.

However various iconoclasm's causes, inversion became its signature rite in Ypres and elsewhere in the Netherlands. The southern

⁵ Vandenpeereboom, *Ypriana*, 5: 95–180.

⁶ On the regulation of festive behavior, see Hugo Soly, "Openbare feesten in Brabantse en Vlaamse steden, 16de–18de eeuw," *Het Openbaar initiatief van de gemeenten in België, Historische grondslagen, 11e Internationaal Colloquium*, Handelingen Gemeentekrediet van België. Historische uitgaven, no. 65 (1984), 617–618.

⁷ Guillaume des Marez, ed., 'Documents relatifs aux excès commis à Ypres par les iconoclastes (le 15 et 16 août 1566),' *Bulletin de la Commission royale d'histoire de Belgique* 7 (1897) and 89 (1925): 3–38, 96–127. For the examples cited, see vol. 7: 11–13.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 7: 20–22, 25.

⁹ A.L. Diegerick, ed., *Documents du XVI^e siècle*, 1: 214–215.

Low Countries had a rich fund of carnival celebrations, mock confraternities, and topsy-turvy rites that peppered the ritual calendar and buoyed public life.¹⁰ Not surprisingly, motifs from these cultural eddies found echo in iconoclastic riots, even though there had been legal attempts since the previous century to regulate better festive behavior. In this essay, I explore the iconoclasm of 1566 within the broader context of political culture of the Burgundian Netherlands, with an eye toward unraveling the connections between the religious riots, on the one hand, and their relationship to a broader and pre-Calvinist tradition of celebration and protest in the Low Countries, on the other hand. To destroy religious objects and materials, and to invade sacred spaces, was a radical act in and of itself.¹¹ But I believe that such acts also implicitly dislodged a system of cultural and political representation essential to civic and state authority in the Burgundian Netherlands, thus raising the significance of iconoclasm all the more. That system relied on the ritual use of the sacred to claim authority and to fix boundaries between competing social and political interests.¹² Political culture was saturated with sacred times, spaces, and objects, and the violence visited upon these same times, spaces, and objects thereby associated iconoclasm with unarticulated yet forceful political implications. I also examine the motif of inversion used by the iconoclasts' social superiors, the great nobles of the Netherlands, in their protest against the Brussels government.¹³ While the revolt of the nobility and that of the iconoclasts are typically understood as two separate affairs, I suggest that there was

¹⁰ Herman Pleij, *Het gilde van de blauwe schuit: Literatuur, volksfeest en burgermoraal in de late middeleeuwen* (Amsterdam, 1979). Paul Vandenbroeck, *Jheronimus Bosch: tussen volksleven en stadscultuur* (Berchem, 1987).

¹¹ A point forcefully made by Carlos M.N. Eire in his *War against the Idols: The Reformation of Worship from Erasmus to Calvin* (Cambridge, 1989).

¹² On Burgundian ritual, see Peter Arnade, *Realms of Ritual: Burgundian Ceremony and Civic Life in Late-Medieval Ghent* (Ithaca, NY, 1996), and Elodie Lecuppre-Desjardin, "The distorted messages of peace: controlled and uncontrolled reactions to propaganda in the Burgundian Netherlands," in this volume.

¹³ Henk van Nierop, 'A Beggars' Banquet: The Compromise of the Nobility and the Politics of Inversion,' *European History Quarterly* 21 (1991): 419–443. See also Magdi Tóth-Ubbens, *Verloren beelden van miserabele bedelaars* (Lochem, 1987) and Alastair Duke, "Dissent Propaganda and Political Organization at the Outbreak of the Revolt of the Netherlands," in *Reformation, Revolt and Civil War in France and the Netherlands, 1555–85*, ed. Philip Benedict et al. (Amsterdam, 1999): 115–132. The best description of the banquet is the account in Pontus Payen, *Mémoires*, ed. Alex. Henne, 2 vols (Bruxelles, 1860–61), 134–144.

shared ritual interplay—a parallelism that should help us better understand the relationship of ‘popular’ religious and political unrest to the constitutional protest of the grandee and middle nobility. In fact, iconoclasm helped to forge a parallelism between the elite beggars and the largely non-privileged iconoclasts in their otherwise divergent political strategies. ‘Vive les Gueux’ went the cry of many beeldenstormers as they desecrated images, thereby intertwining their political destiny with their noble superiors, and making a claim about the sacred that was at the same time an act of political obligation.

Inversions

As iconoclasm spread from the West Quarter of Flanders across the south into the northern provinces of the Netherlands, the senior nobility of the Council of State in Brussels, and their much larger cohort of junior seigneurs, scrambled to distance themselves from the taint of religious violence, property damage, and heresy. Even the openly Calvinist nobility, those drawn from the middle ranks without governmental positions, exculpated themselves from the violence, blaming the corrupt Catholic clergy, the poor, the will of God—or all three, as in the apology penned by the Calvinist propagandist Marnix of St. Aldegonde.¹⁴

But if largely innocent of the actual plotting of violence, the nobility were no strangers to symbols of protest that employed inversion rituals and the shrewd use of religious time. On Friday April 5, 1566, a grand retinue of some two hundred lords, the majority of a loose coalition of mid-level nobles who opposed tough heresy laws, the Inquisition, and encroachment upon their traditional privileges, gathered to present a petition before Margaret of Parma at the Burgundian palace in Brussels. Stylishly dressed, the men marched in a double column. The group opted for maximum public display, mimicking the solemnity and grandeur of such great processions as Corpus Christi or perhaps the processional entry of a duke or king. But for all privileged braggadocio the noblemen sought to project,

¹⁴ Philips van Marnix van St. Aldegonde, *Vraye Narration et apologie des choses passées au Pays-Bas, touchant le Fait de la Religion en l'an 1566*, in *Philips van Marnix van St. Aldegonde: godsdienstige en kerkelijke geschriften*, ed. J.J. van Toorenenbergen ('s-Gravenhage, 1871–91), vol. 1.

they chose Philip of Bailleul, an obscure and physically handicapped nobleman from Artois in lieu of their charismatic leader, Hendrik of Brederode, to lead the procession.¹⁵ At the chamber room of the Council of State, Margaret of Parma and her senior advisors, including Orange himself, heard the impassioned but careful plea to suspend the Inquisition and moderate heresy laws read by Brederode, after which he and all the other assembled noblemen gestured the 'caracole' before filing out of the Palace. It was at this moment that the chronicler Jacob van Wesenbeke claimed that Charles, Count of Berlaymont, uttered the dismissive remark to the Regent not to be frightened by a group of beggars.¹⁶

The name stuck. And with reason, since the procession itself was orchestrated with built-in opposites purposely at tension with one another: the fashionable display of several hundred privileged men bespoke power, but the grand retinue was led by a relatively unknown and obviously crippled noble, a reference to physical limitations and dependence, perhaps even to the lame who begged on the public streets. The petition itself was reverent to the king and regent, professing loyalty, but seared in its denouncement of the Inquisition. The noblemen professed peace, but genuflected the 'caracole,' a military dance step from Hainault, before the Regent, ambiguous in its meaning either as an act of reverence or gesture of defiance.¹⁷

The term beggars thus fitted handily, even if uttered as a put-down; it parodied the noblemen's privilege by reference to their social opposites—a combination they had already invoked in the procession itself. At a grand banquet the Monday after the procession at the palace of the Count of Culemborg to celebrate the Regent's temporary suspension of the heresy laws and the Inquisition, the energized confederates celebrated a night of drink and cheer. Buoyed by drink, Hendrik of Brederode stood up to urge his fellow celebrants to adopt the sobriquet Beggars as a badge of self-identification. Henk van Nierop has mined Pontus Payen's account of the banquet

¹⁵ H.A. Enno van Gelder, "Ballieul, Bronkhorst, Brederode," in his *Van beeldenstorm tot pacificatie: acht opstellen over de Nederlandse revolutie der zestiende eeuw* (Amsterdam, 1964), 41. Van Nierop, 'Beggars' Banquet,' 426.

¹⁶ C. Rahlenbeck, ed., *Mémoires de Jacques de Wesenbeke* (Bruxelles, 1859), 189. For an astute analysis, and for the scholarly debate over the etymology of the name 'gueux' see Van Nierop, 'Beggars' Banquet,' 419, esp. note 4.

¹⁷ Charles Paillard, *Huit mois de la vie d'un peuple: Les Pays-Bas du premier janvier au premier septembre 1566* (Bruxelles, 1877), 80, note 1 for the caracole.

to emphasize that the carnivalesque dinner—with its toasts, oaths, and brandishing of beggars' wallets and wooden begging bowls from which to drink—created a symbolic reservoir for the Compromise. The revelers brilliantly employed stock festive tropes borrowed from the real and imagined practices of mendicants, on the one hand, and beggars, lepers, and other outcasts, on the other hand.¹⁸ The banquet riotously inaugurated a fraternal organization that mimicked royal and urban lay solidarities, none less important than the elite Order of the Golden Fleece to which none of these mid-level nobles belonged. In lieu of the symbols of the lamb, the Beggars sported a medallion bearing the image of Philip II on one side, and a pair of clasped hands and a beggar's wallet on the other side, with the inscription: "Faithful to the king to the point of beggary." The medallion was worn as a ribbon around the neck—much like the one for the Order of the Golden Fleece—along with a Mendicant-like grey cloak, a begging bowl hung off the belt, and hats studded with miniature begging bowls and pilgrim bottles. Reports in Antwerp even told of women with beggar earrings and a steady traffic in miniature bowls and medallions.¹⁹

As van Nierop has made clear, the Beggars parodied well-known royal and clerical signs and symbols. At the heart of their mockery was the playful tension, first displayed during the April 5th procession and then ratcheted up at the banquet, between expressions of fidelity to the king and a political posture that simultaneously mocked religious practice—voluntary poverty and its abuses—and claimed allegiance to social outcasts, the indigent and the disabled, who had been under new centralized poor laws since at least the 1520s. In a letter to Phillip II dated April 2, 1566, Margaret of Parma expressed vexation about the Beggars' double entendre: were they good vassals playfully expressing their loyalty to the king or serious trouble-makers claiming allegiance to the 'malheureux'?²⁰ That ambiguity,

¹⁸ Van Nierop, 'Beggars' Banquet,' with the emphasis upon the banquet itself, and the creation of the mock Order of Beggars. See also Tóth-Ubbens, *Verloren beelden*, with a more general interest in policies and images of leprosy. While her work has good information, the precise connection to the larger subject is not fully exploited.

¹⁹ Van Nierop, 'A Beggars' Banquet,' 422, with the relevant primary sources. See also Duke, 'Dissent Propaganda,' who traces symbolic propaganda back to the League to oust Granvelle in 1562.

²⁰ This matter is discussed in Tóth-Ubbens, *Verloren beelden*, 46. For the April 3rd

of course, was the very point, the polysemic ritual that allowed the Beggars to imagine, even scheme, revolt while professing allegiance. It was sharpened even more by the timing of these events. The Beggars' April 5th petition to Margaret of Parma, their April 8th banquet, their donning of a livery, their marketing of signs and symbols—all this was accomplished in festive merriment around the week-end of Palm Sunday, the culmination of Lent. The solemnity and grandeur of the Friday procession and the abandon of the Monday night cheer, both made positive reference to the closing of the Lenten season and subverted its rigor.

The Compromise presented their petition to suspend the activities of the Inquisition to Margaret of Parma the Friday before Palm Sunday, popular in the Low Countries as the Feast Day of Our Lady of Seven Sorrows. Not only were confraternities dedicated to this veneration scattered throughout the cities of the Netherlands; the cult had been vigorously promoted by none other than the Dominicans—beggars and inquisitors par excellence—and patronized by the court.²¹ In general, the popularity of Our Lady of Seven Sorrows was part of a broader set of devotions to the Virgin, most of which received outright royal support and patronage—of processions, of chapels, of images. This association between court and Madonna could not have been lost upon the Compromise. Their petition on the feast day of Our Lady of Seven Sorrows thus carried the same double meaning as their fraternal order and its paraphernalia, professing reverence and suggesting its transgression. Their opponents, the loyalist nobles and court officials, more unambiguously seized upon the Virgin Mary to lead the visual counter-attack. The particular veneration chosen was Our Lady of Halle, featured on a silver pilgrimage medallion bearing the image of Christ as Salvador Mundi that the Duke of Aerschot and other royalists wore

letter, see L.P. Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays Bas* (Bruxelles, 1848), 1: 408: "Ils se sont donné le nom de gueux et on ne sait encore ce qu'ils veulent dire par la, sinon que gueux signifie proprement un vaurien, un vagabond. Quelques-uns disent qu'on l'attribue au nom qu'ils veulent prendre des Goths: d'après d'autres, cela signifie qu'ils soutiendront leurs prétentions en servant sa Majesté, quoiqu'ils dussent en venir par la à porter la besace au cou, comme des malheureux."

²¹ G. Celis, *Volkskundige kalender voor het Vlaamsche land* (Gent, 1990), 28–29. See also, G. Verhoeven, *Devotie en Negotie: Delft als bedevaartplaats in de late middeleeuwen* (Amsterdam, 1992), 43–50.

pinned in their hats. Our Lady of Halle, a small chapel not far from Brussels, housed the relics of St. Elizabeth of Hungary that had been left to St. Martin's church by the Countess of Holland in 1267. Halle also boasted a miracle-working Virgin Mary.²² The chapel became an established pilgrimage site closely allied with Burgundian patronage in the fifteenth century. It was even tapped as a resource in ducal politics. After the famous Ghent War of 1452–53, the victorious Philip the Good had the confiscated banners of Ghent's rebellious guilds seized in a great humiliation ceremony, then put on display at Halle as royal booty.²³ The Halle medallion particularized Virgin and Christ as localized embodiments of royal religion and royal space.

The campaign waged by the Grandee nobles and the Compromise against the Inquisition and royal incursions into the jealously guarded domains of law and politics featured master symbolists on both sides. Spaces, times, and images deepened and broadened what otherwise was a paper war over law and politics. Neither the great nobles of the Council of State nor the middle level nobility dared to openly embrace overt radicalism; their political and propertied interests dissuaded them from too much risk taking. There were many Protestants among them, as well as Erasmian Catholics loyal to the Church but suspicious of the Brussels administration of Philip II. But rare was someone with a direct hand in the events of August, though in the aftermath of the iconoclastic riots the royalists tried to pin the violence on the Compromise, or underground Calvinist consistories found throughout the cities of the Low Countries. Great social, economic, and political gulfs separated those who petitioned Margaret of Parma and formed the Beggars' confraternity and those who stormed church, chapel and covenant in August and September. Yet a parallelism between the two sets of players was struck through the medium of social action—acts of inversion both reverent and transgressive. The beggars fronted inversion as symbol par excellence,

²² Tóth-Ubbens, *Verloren beelden*, 39–40. On Halle, see the great Low Countries humanist Justus Lipsius's treatise *Diva Virgo Hallensis* (Antwerp, 1616), translated in Dutch by Albert van Oosterwijck, *J. Lipsius Heylighe Maghet van Halle. Hare weldaden ende Miraculen ghetrouwelijck ende ordentelijck uutgeschreven* (Delft, 1605).

²³ Peter Arnade, 'Crowds, Banners and the Marketplace: Symbols of Defiance and Defeat during the Ghent War, 1452–53,' *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 24 (Fall 1994): 471–497.

toyed with images of outcasts and mendicants, and wisely seized upon and subtly reworked religious time. In response, their royalist opponents exulted more vigorously in the image of the Virgin Mary, zeroing in on a particular veneration with links to Burgundian authority. Politics and religion, both in writing and in public deed, were so deeply enmeshed by the spring of 1566 as to make any clean separation between the two improbable, if not wrong.

Historiography

Despite the symbolic link between Beggars and iconoclasts in the Netherlands, scholarship on the iconoclasm of 1566 has bracketed it off from the constitutional quarrels in Brussels and examined the religious riots through bifurcated lenses. Economic, social, and political historians of the troubles have understood the *beeldenstorm* to be about many things: grain shortages, labor woes, a troubled drapery industry, a general economic downturn, a disgruntled lumpenproletariat egged on by the hope of a better life and the promise of money to do the dirty work of image breaking. If religion was the riots' vehicle, the rioters' goals were decidedly this-worldly.²⁴ And yet to historians of the Reformation, iconoclasm was a religious affair *tout court*. To a group of historians that include Joseph Scheerder and Johan Decavele among others, iconoclasm was Calvinist theology in action, a chapter in a religious story of church, state, belief, and Reformation.²⁵

²⁴ Eric Kuttner's 1941 *Het Hongerjaar*, published posthumously in Dutch in 1949, is the core Marxist interpretation of Low Countries iconoclasm to which all subsequent historians have responded. Any casual glance of the book uncovers its high octane Marxism, the product of a young German intellectual and anti-Fascist activist who perished during the Holocaust. His work, however polemical, follows a respectable tradition of interpretation associated with Pirenne and a cadre of social and economic historians who followed his scholarly footsteps. In "Une crise industrielle au XVI siècle: la draperie urbaine et la nouvelle draperie de Flandre," in his *Histoire économique de l'Occident médiéval* (Paris, 1951), Pirenne saw a direct relationship between iconoclasm in Flanders and the proletarianization of the Flemish drapery workers. For similar interpretations, see also Emile Coornaert, *Un centre industriel d'autrefois: la draperie-sayetterie d'Hondschoote, XIV-XVII siècles* (Paris, 1930); and Herman van der Wee, 'The Economy as a Factor in the Start of the Revolt of the Netherlands,' *Acta Historiae Neerlandica* 5 (1971): 52-67.

²⁵ J.D. Scheerder, *De Beeldenstorm*, 2nd ed. (Harlem, 1978), who squarely dismisses

Both schools of scholarship about iconoclasm—the economic and social historians and the Reformation scholars—are not so divided between materialist and idealist explanations that they fail to overlap. One area of consensus among scholars is the degree to which iconoclasm blind-sided, and thus transformed, the political and legal square-offs between the Brussels grandees and Philip II's government. Yet scholars from both camps have assigned the actual acts of image-breaking sideshow status. The turmoil happened; it was dramatic—lots of *sturm und drang*. But it ended without the deep, fratricidal blood spilling of neighboring France.²⁶ The Compromise nobles politely explained their innocence, everyone blamed the poor, and the high constitutional debates and power politics—the real stuff of the Revolt of the Netherlands—moved forward. True, there were Calvinist uprisings, military mobilization, and fighting in Flanders and other areas of the south, but these maneuvers fizzled by spring of 1567. As dramatic as iconoclasm was, it was ultimately containable. In fact to most Reformation scholars, image breaking was simply the sermons of the ministers and preachers translated into deeds. The acts are fairly transparent because they in fact do not bear original, even primary, meaning. For the larger school of economic and social historians, these acts stand for something else: palimpsests of nitty-gritty social facts and problems. So no matter what camp historians of Netherlands iconoclasm belong to, interest is focused on causes and consequences, less so on the acts of violence.

As strongly polarized as the established historiography has been, work has emerged that borrows from these schools yet advances in different directions. Art historian David Freedberg, for example, paid close attention to how images were disfigured and why; more

social interpretation and argues strongly for the importance of theology. His compact survey of iconoclasm is still the most invaluable overview. See also Johan Decavele, 'De reformatorische beweging te Axel en Hulst (1556–1566),' *Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 22 (1968–69): 1–42, who is more subtle in his analysis, but strongly leans towards religious currents based largely on his magisterial *De Dageraad van de Reformatie in Vlaanderen (1520–1565)*, 2 vols (Brussel, 1975). For a good, though dated, debate among proponents of both schools, see M. Dierickx, 'Beeldenstorm in de Nederlanden in 1566,' *Streven* 19 (1966): 1040–1048.

²⁶ Phyllis Mack Crew, *Calvinist Preaching and Iconoclasm in the Netherlands: 1544–1569* (Cambridge, 1978), esp. 20–38. On comparisons with France, see Henk van Nierop, "Similar Problems, Different Outcomes: The Revolt of the Netherlands and the Wars of Religion in France," in *A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in European Perspective*, ed. K. Davids and J. Lucassen (Cambridge, 1995), 26–56, esp. 40–42 on iconoclasm.

generally, he has explored the implications of iconoclasm and image criticism upon Reformation and Baroque Netherlandish art.²⁷ Recent historians of the Wonder Year such as Guido Marnef, Alastair Duke, and Henk van Nierop have blended prosopography with politics and culture, eschewed monocausality, and offered finely tuned and subtle studies.²⁸ Still, the heyday of studies of the *beeldenstorm* was the 1970s, a period that capped a steady stream of articles and books that stretched back to Pirenne and his heirs. Over this body of work towered the great nineteenth and early twentieth-century debates over the Dutch Revolt. Were the *voorspel* and the *beeldenstorm* expressions of incipient nation building, of Calvinist theology, of social tensions, of political ambitions, of economic interests? Historians dissected these issues into discrete domains of experience and set them up as competing causes to be weighed against one another in a vertical hierarchy. Debates about iconoclasm were anchored around old issues—was iconoclasm a spontaneous moment or pre-planned?—and traditional social scientific categories.²⁹ No wonder, then, that the literature fell off after the late 1970s, just as in other areas of Reformation studies new cultural and social analysis was recasting our understanding of the same phenomena.³⁰ The most pertinent question had been repeatedly posed, the answers all worked out.

²⁷ David Freedberg, *Iconoclasm and Painting in the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1566–1609* (New York, 1988); his interest in the behavior of iconoclasts—as opposed to the study of image criticism—was developed later, and is best discerned in *The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response* (Chicago, 1989).

²⁸ Guido Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation: Underground Protestantism in a Commercial Metropolis, 1550–1577*, trans. J.C. Grayson (Baltimore, Md., 1996); and his “The Towns and the Revolt,” in Graham Darby, ed., *The Origin and the Development of the Dutch Revolt* (London, 2001), 84–106; Alastair Duke, “De Calvinisten en de ‘paapse beeldendienst,’” in *Mensen van de nieuwe tijd: een liber amicorum voor A.Th. Van Deursen*, ed. M. Bruggeman et al. (Amsterdam, 1996), 29–45, one of the finest reappraisals of the Netherlands *beeldenstorm*; Henk van Nierop, *Beeldenstorm en burgerlijk verzet in Amsterdam, 1566–67* (Nijmegen, 1978), with a strong social analysis that the author has subsequently nuanced in later work; see, for example, “Similar Problems, Different Outcomes.”

²⁹ For a recent historiography of the Dutch Revolt, see Henk van Nierop, ‘De troon van Alva: Over de interpretatie van de Nederlandse Opstand,’ *Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 110 (1995): 205–33. Another handy literature review is furnished by Backhouse, *Beeldenstorm en bosgeuzen*, esp. 11–14.

³⁰ See, for example, Denis Crouzet, *Les Guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion, vers 1525–vers 1610*, 2 vols. (Seysse, 1990); Olivier Christian, *Un révolution symbolique: L'iconoclisme huguenot et la reconstruction catholique* (Paris, 1991); the essays collected in Martin Warnke, ed., *Bildersturm: Die Zerstörung des Kunstwerks*

In the last two decades, scholars of the Swiss and German iconoclasm of the 1520s looked to anthropology to shed new light on religious violence and image destruction. Two very important works, Robert Scribner's essays on ritual and the Reformation and Lee Palmer Wandel's book on iconoclasm in Zurich, Strasbourg, and Basel, have immeasurably advanced our appreciation of the cultural deposits embedded in iconoclasm.³¹ Further, their work has zeroed in on the importance of attention to the acts and their perpetrators. For Scribner, iconoclasm is best understood less as indiscriminate destruction than as a series of ritualized movements, acts to be deciphered by employing an anthropological model of desacralization. Palmer Wandel pushes us to appreciate space and time, and to see iconoclasts as actors forging an authentic lay theology rather than a mere translation of the words of preachers. Both are chary of older economic and social readings, and clean divisions between elite and 'popular' religion.³² In Palmer Wandel's words, images, statues, altars, and liturgical items to iconoclasts were more than 'social and political arrangements'; they were places to test and contest the immanence of God.³³

The great contribution of this work on German and Swiss iconoclasm has been to endow iconoclasm with plural meaning, and to

(Frankfurt a. M., 1988); Margaret Aston, *England's Iconoclasts*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1988); Eamon Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400–1580* (New Haven, Conn., 1992), and most important, Lee Palmer Wandel, *Voracious Idols and Violent Hands: Iconoclasm in Zurich, Strasbourg and Basel* (Cambridge, 1994).

³¹ Robert Scribner, *Popular Culture and Popular Movements in Reformation Germany* (London, 1987); Palmer Wandel, *Voracious Idols*.

³² For a good and early discussion of 'the people' and early modern religion, see Natalie Zemon Davis, "From 'Popular Religion' to Religious Cultures," in *Reformation Europe: A Guide to Research*, ed. Steven Ozment (St. Louis, 1982): 321–341 and Thomas A. Brady, 'Peoples' Religions in Reformation Europe,' *The Historical Journal* 24 (1991): 173–182.

³³ Palmer Wandel, *Voracious Idols*, 51. This caution that social and political readings of iconoclasm are dangerously reductionist is developed in a pugnacious essay by John Bossy, "Unrethinking the Sixteenth-Century Wars of Religion," in *Belief in History: Innovative Approaches to European and American Religion*, ed. Thomas Kselman (Notre Dame, Ind., 1991): 267–285. In it, Bossy condemns as a failure the 'sociological' interpretation à la Durkheim of the sixteenth-century wars of religion. Pointing to Natalie Davis's "Rites of Violence" as the Ur-Text of the cultural school, he takes to task a school of historians who all too easily have reduced the sacred to the social, and the social to contemporary sociology. Davis understood the dangers of such presentism, but others in her camp fumbled Bossy says, and burdened their work with sociological explanations rooted in modern concerns that fail to explain adequately sixteenth century conceptions of religion and religious conflict.

mine the anthropology of religion, rather than institutional studies of church, state, and theology for scholarly guideposts. On the other hand, such work has had the perhaps unintentional effect of too much microhistory at the expense of larger registers of power—registers that shed light on the links between particular social groups and larger political interests and structures, such as regional authorities or even the state. When Scribner or Palmer Wandel write about the importance of space, objects, and rites, the social categories can sometimes play second fiddle to the cultural ones. Scribner, for example, has given us a compelling way to understand iconoclasm as so many ritual acts of desacralization. But the emphasis on collective desacralization has softened attention not only to the social forms and forces at work, but also to the very point that so-called desacralization *was* religious work aimed not so much to vitiate as to recast sacred space, time, and objects.

Religion, Political Culture and Image-Breaking

Attention to the role of the sacred, and practiced religion in specific, in the broader political culture of the Netherlands offers a way to move beyond the binary opposition between social and Reformation historians of the 1566 Wonder Year and allows for the use of anthropological insights generated by more recent scholarship on Reformation iconoclasm. Religion was so much iconoclasm's idiom that tracking the intersection of politics, social life and the sacred helps to untie the tangled knot of causes and consequences that gave image breaking so much force. Public religion saturated Low Countries urban and rural life as it calibrated its cultural and political rhythm. J.J. Woltjer argued recently that large-scale blood-letting was largely absent in 1566–67 because the Low Countries had a more internal, pietistic religious sensibility, less focused on the external and processional than in France, where contests over relics, objects, and veneration provoked much bloodshed on urban streets.³⁴ While there are differences in religious practice between the Burgundian Netherlands

³⁴ J.J. Woltjer, 'Geweld tijdens de godsdienstoorlogen in Frankrijk en in de Nederlanden. Een vergelijking,' *Trajecta. Tijdschrift voor de geschiedenis van het katholiek leven in de Nederlanden* (1994): 281–296.

and elsewhere, public religion, to borrow a phrase from Foucault, was an ‘especially dense transfer’ point for relations of power in the Burgundian/Habsburg Netherlands—and staunchly external to boot. This point, of course, holds for elsewhere in Europe, but takes on a distinct color in the Netherlands because of the particular configuration of politics and culture and because of the relative ‘newness’ of the Burgundian Netherlands as a composite political entity.³⁵ In the process of state-building in the fifteenth century, the Burgundian dukes honed a ritual system of public relations that, on the one hand, created powerful court-sponsored ceremony and, on the other hand, deftly inserted itself with attention to time and space into urban political networks.³⁶ Religion was part and parcel of their urban strategy. Given the dense urban tissue that was the Burgundian Netherlands, urban sacred practices had both intra-urban and inter-urban purposes. Not confined to the walls of a particular city, the sacred was intertwined with the spaces and times of other sites, urban and courtly. Flanders, for example, boasted devotional practices that were structured relationally. The worship of Notre Dame in Tournai, for example, involved an annual procession in September to honor her that featured delegates from the major cities of the county and region.³⁷ They brought their status, their honor, and their gifts during a sacred time in which much jockeying over status was at play; the duke of Burgundy, as *primus inter pares*, even contributed an annual dress. Notre Dame bore the material referents, therefore, of the key political brokers.³⁸ Our Lady was of paramount importance to the dukes as it was to the confraternities of respected men in the various cities. Ducal association with the urban sacred had the twin purpose of legitimating their authority and asserting their primacy in the status show.

The well-know procession of St. Anthony—a figure long venerated in the Low Countries—is a concrete example of the importance of

³⁵ On state formation, see Wim Blockmans and Walter Prevenier, *The Promised Lands: The Low Countries under Burgundian Rule, 1369–1530*, trans. Elizabeth Fackelman and ed., Edward Peters (Philadelphia, 1999).

³⁶ Arnade, *Realms of Ritual*, and idem, ‘City, Court and Public Ritual in the Late-Medieval Burgundian Netherlands,’ *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29: 2 (Fall 1997): 296–314.

³⁷ Jean Dumoulin and Jacques Pycke, eds., *La grande procession de Tournai* (Tournai, 1992).

³⁸ Alfred Cauchie, *La grande procession de Tournai* (Louvain, Paris, 1889).

the sacred as the space of exchange and circulation. While the sculpted image was housed at a monastery at Bailleul—and revered for its curative features—it was circulated throughout Flanders, and even ‘rented’ contractually by different lay groups. Such was the case in Ghent; contracts in the aldermen’s registers allowed the use of the Anthony image by local confraternities in different parish churches.³⁹ Images and venerations were shot through with the secular stuff of status, display, politics and commodity. Sacred places likewise sanctified high politics. In fact, the most prestigious confraternity of all—the court’s Order of the Golden Fleece—regularly used central parish churches of important cities like Antwerp, Ghent, and Valenciennes to hold its members’ chapter meetings.⁴⁰ Nor in heated moments of political turmoil were the dukes of Burgundy shy about overt assertions of the sacred. The dukes were willing to raze churches, confiscate relics, commission perpetual masses, even force proud citizens on their knees as religious penitents to flex their political muscle in Bruges in 1440, and Ghent in 1453 and 1540.⁴¹

If the larger school of economic and social historians erred in arguing that iconoclasm was economic and political interests masquerading as religion, it is equally wrong to write politics out of iconoclasm. Jonathan Israel’s position in *The Dutch Republic* that iconoclasm was no social revolt since rioters did not attack political targets such as town halls, tax centers, and belfries typifies a position on which scholars as different as Scheerder and Mack Crew concur.⁴² While it is, of course, important to attend to distinctions between secular and sacred locales, political hot zones were by no means confined to one at the expense of the other. Iconoclasts were not carrying out a revolt explicitly about political grievances, but neither were they shy about seizing upon collective symbols and behaviors that were, in part, political. Theirs was religious work that confounded the already porous boundaries between the sacred and the profane. The astute Ghent chronicler Marcus van Vaernewijck

³⁹ Arnade, *Realms of Ritual*, 58.

⁴⁰ Françoise de Gruben, *Les Chapitres de la Toison d’Or à l’époque Bourguignonne: 1430–77* (Louvain, 1997).

⁴¹ In general, see Marc Boone, ‘Urban Space and Political Conflict in Late Medieval Flanders,’ *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 32: 4 (Spring 2002): 621–640; Arnade, ‘Crowds, Banners and the Marketplace.’

⁴² Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness and Fall, 1477–1806* (Oxford, 1995), 148; Crew, *Calvinist Preaching and Iconoclasm*; Scheerder, *De Beeldenstorm*.

commented with amazement that iconoclasts had more reservations about attacking princely symbols than symbols of god.⁴³ He knew the latter to be of a higher order, but as an inhabitant of the Burgundian theater state, he also knew that princes relied on the sacred to ratchet up their honor and status.

If the elite Beggars crafted a public profile by seizing upon the ritual and iconographic power of inversion motifs, it was a point not lost upon the far less privileged rural and townsfolk attracted to Reformed religion and unhappy with the general course of political and religious events. However much the nobility decried iconoclasm—and there is meager evidence, despite royal suspicion to the contrary, that they were involved in its planning in any sustained way—the image breakers of the late summer of 1566 seemed inexorably drawn to their cause, frequently uttering ‘Vive les Gueux’ as an exclamation of empathy. In some instances this parallelism was pure and direct. One Mathieu Bart, a day laborer in the small village of Lavantie south of Flanders, was fined for shouting his support of the beggars while recarving the beard of an unidentified male saint in their style.⁴⁴ Children in Ghent taunted statues of the saints and holy family, threatening them with public beheading if they did not exclaim ‘Vive les Gueux!’⁴⁵ These acts of iconoclasm mixed political identification with ludic rambunctiousness, both adult and adolescent. More frequently, it was the form and manner of inversion that mattered the most. Examples include the ritual disfiguring of saint’s images; urinating into baptismal fonts; turning sacred objects into children’s toys: playing footfall with the chalice and Eucharist; hurling taunts and invectives at parish priests: and attacking the sepulchers of local officials.⁴⁶ If the actions were limited to these alone,

⁴³ Marcus van Vaernewijck, *Van die Beroerliche tijden in die Nederlanden en voornamelijk in Ghendt, 1566–68*, Maatschappij der Vlaamsche Bibliophilen, 4e reeks, nr. 1., ed. Ferd. Vanderhaeghen, 5 vols. (Gent, 1872), 1: 143.

⁴⁴ Ed. de Coussemaker, *Troubles religieux du xvi^e siècle dans la Flandre Maritime 1560–70. Documents originaux*, 4 vols. (Bruges, 1876), 2: 246.

⁴⁵ Van Vaernewijck, *Van die Beroerliche tijden*, 1: 110.

⁴⁶ For a sampling of such acts, see de Coussemaker, *Troubles religieux*, 2: 246, for children playing with broken images; vol. 3, for exposing the ‘rears’ of statues in Bergues; 2: 84, for playing football in Aire; Van Vaernewijck, *Van die Beroerliche tijden*, 1: 109–110, for gouging out the eyes of paintings and statues; 1: 188, for urinating in holy basins and baptismal fonts in Flanders’ Westkwartier; and Gérard Moreau, *Histoire du Protestantisme à Tournai jusqu’à la veille de la Révolution des Pays-Bas* (Paris, 1962), 132 for one example of the attack upon the sepulcher of a hated local seneschal.

it would be accurate to say they borrowed almost exclusively from carnival and charivari, and from the festive organizations to be found in every Low Countries city. Observers certainly thought so, including the anonymous sister from 's-Hertogenbosch who, walled up in her cloister from the 'wild beasts,' thought the whole night of iconoclasm one big *kermis*.⁴⁷

But equally compelling, and indebted to a broader tradition of collective protest, are the behaviors intended to express mastery over important urban spaces and ecclesiastical privileges. The repertoire was varied, but repeatedly featured psalm-singing on streets and marketplaces, even, as in Ypres, in front of the upper alderman's house; the sacking and looting of monastic houses and cloisters; the burning of books and charters, as at Donghere outside Ghent; stealing of provisions including bed linens and clothes; and the ransacking of refectories for food and drink, most frequently, beer, eggs, and butter.⁴⁸ In Ghent's Dominican convent, iconoclasts drank beer out of chalices as they smeared butter on the walls and shredded sacred books to litter the Leie River so dramatically that it looked like fresh snow had fallen.⁴⁹ Working in small groups of several dozen, armed with work tools, singing as they paraded through the streets, iconoclasts everywhere mirrored the political and cultural style of insurrectory movements as they joined ribald acts to assertions over public space. Ghent's case is particularly telling because in social background and formal behavior the iconoclasts mirrored the infamous 'Creeschers' (poor day laborers) who had brought the city to utter defeat under Charles V in 1539. The 1539 revolt had even witnessed select acts of iconoclasm, as in Oudenaarde, and attacks upon ecclesiastical property, as in Ghent.⁵⁰ But parallels abound

⁴⁷ H. van Alfen, ed., *Kroniek eener kloosterzuster van het voormalig bossche klooster "Mariënborg" over de troebelen te 's-Hertogenbosch e.e. in de jaren 1566-75* ('s-Hertogenbosch, 1931), 6.

⁴⁸ On psalm-singing, especially prevalent in Calvinist strongholds such as Tournai and Valenciennes, see C. Rahlenbeck, 'Les chanteries de Valenciennes,' *Bulletin de la Commission de l'Histoire des Eglises Wallones* 3 (1888): 121-159. For the case of Ypres, see F. van der Putte "Cort Verhael," 2: 214; for the attack upon the abbey of Donghere, see Van Vaernewijck, *Van die Beroerlicke tijden*, 1: 139; Des Marez, "Documents relatifs," 7: esp. 10-11.

⁴⁹ Van Vaernewijck, *Van die Beroerlicke tijden*, 1: 113-15.

⁵⁰ Peter Arnade, "Privileges and the Political Imagination in the Ghent Revolt of 1539," in *Charles V in Context: the Making of a European Identity*, ed. Marc Boone and Marysa Demoor (Ghent, Brussels, 2003).

everywhere. In the cathedral city of Tournai, iconoclasts disinterred and ritually disfigured the corpse of a particularly hated local official, Pierre de Werchin, who had tortured and publicly executed a Calvinist iconoclast in 1554. In Flanders West Quarter, priests were attacked and images hung, with eyes and noses hacked off, in an area that had been a hotbed of anti-clericalism during the peasants' revolt of the early fourteenth century.⁵¹

One point often overlooked in the literature on iconoclasm is the way, at least for the Low Countries, patterns of male labor shaped the manner and methods of destruction.⁵² This is important lest iconoclasm be simply understood as one extraordinary set of acts—Carnival rites—grafted upon another—sacred violence—with neither rooted in the rhythms and expectations of daily life. The prosaic world of work, sociability, and politics found echo in iconoclasm. Despite chroniclers' reports of women, the iconoclasts recorded in legal documents were largely men, and overwhelmingly day laborers or artisans.⁵³ They typically worked in bands of a few dozen, and wielded the picks, hammers, knives and other tools of their various trades.⁵⁴ In many ways, the bands suggest a ritual mimicking of the ateliers where many of these men had employment, and of the fraternal organizations they supported in everything from size of groupings to tools and comportments. Some were even paid, doing their work as wage laborers.⁵⁵ And not to forget, iconoclasm was hard physical work. Iconoclasts turned their work tools upon sacred objects, drank and ate as they sweated heavily, and even, as in the case of the small West Quarter town of Merville, retreated to a tavern for cheer after their labor.⁵⁶ At Cassel, an iconoclast stole money from a chapel,

⁵¹ Gérard Moreau, *Histoire du Protestantisme à Tournai*, 132. For anti-clericalism in the Westkwartier, see William H. TeBrake, *A Plague of Insurrection: Popular Politics and Peasant Revolt in Flanders, 1323–1328* (Philadelphia, 1993), esp. 117.

⁵² On masculinity and the Reformation, see Lyndal Roper, *Oedipus and the Devil: Witchcraft, Sexuality and Religion in Early Modern Europe* (London, 1994).

⁵³ For sample prosopographies, see M. Delmotte, 'Het Calvinisme in de verschillende bevolkingslagen te Gent (1566–1567),' *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 76 (1963): 158–163; Backhouse, *Beeldenstorm en Bosgeuzen* for the West Quarter; H.F. van Nierop, *Beeldenstorm en burgerlijk verzet in Amsterdam, 1566–67* (Nijmegen, 1978) for Amsterdam; and Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation*, 89.

⁵⁴ One of the fullest descriptions of their clustering in small groups is in Van Vaerenwijck, *Van die Beroerliche tijden*, 1: 137–38.

⁵⁵ Most notoriously, in Antwerp: Scheerder, *Beeldenstorm*, 37–42, but also in the Westkwartier, Backhouse, *Beeldenstorm en Bosgeuzen*, 97–98.

⁵⁶ Cousse-maker, *Troubles religieux du XVI^e siècle*, 2: 303.

then used it to buy drinks at a tavern with an explanation that ‘saints don’t eat and drink.’⁵⁷ If women did participate in iconoclasm—as documented in places like Ypres—their role was typically described as stealing provisions for their household: linens, foods, pots and so forth.⁵⁸ Men did the pushing, pulling, and smashing, buoyed by drink. Both men and women underscored the wastefulness of provisioning mute images and statues and well-fed clerics by redirecting material goods to their physical and domestic needs.⁵⁹ Men fed their stomachs in carnivalesque indulgence of beer, bread, butter, and cheese; women carted off provisions for the kitchen and bedroom.

Both in actions undertaken and images attacked, iconoclasm was gendered work. As the case of Ypres has already indicated, much energy was expended attacking images and spaces of devotion to Our Lady (Onze-Lieve-Vrouwe). Male iconoclasts’ actions were shot through with elements of artisanal masculinity at a time when a rocky economy and broad changes in the textile industries buffeted their world of work and labor.⁶⁰ Perhaps significant too is that fact that for the end of the fifteenth century and much of the first half of the sixteenth century the Low Countries had been ruled by women rulers or regents in the name of a non-resident prince or emperor: Mary of Burgundy (1477–82), Margaret of Austria (1506–15 and 1517–30), Mary of Hungary (1530–55), and Margaret of Parma (1559–1567).⁶¹ There is some evidence, however meager, from times of urban protest that working men found this woman-on-top model disquieting, particularly when these women were stand-ins for non-resident princes. During the revolt of Ghent in 1539, one of the leaders was heard to rally support with the cry that Mary of Hungary should be removed and put in a cloister.⁶² A Brussels’ satire dated during the Wonder Year put in Charles V’s mouth a regret that he let Mary of Hungary rule as regent, and a broadsheet posted in Brussels in the spring of 1566 mocked Margaret of Parma as a weak

⁵⁷ Ibid., 2: 123.

⁵⁸ Van Alfen, *Kroniek eener kloosterzuster*, 3.

⁵⁹ Palmer Wandel, *Voracious Idols*, esp. the material on Zurich, 53–101.

⁶⁰ Catharina Lis and Hugo Soly, eds., *Werken volgens de regels. Ambachten in Brabant en Vlaanderen, 1500–1800* (Brussel, 1994).

⁶¹ For the political chronology, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 21–34, 55–74.

⁶² Stadsarchief Gent, no. 214, *Boek van Criminele Zaken*, fols. 228–66, *Quahier van den oorcondscepe angaende den troublen ende emotien 1539*, fol. 233r.

woman of illegitimate birth.⁶³ The much denounced ‘canaille’ were working men who acted upon sacred images and objects much the way their peers behaved during political revolts: they came armed, they marched, they sang, they gathered on marketplaces, they guffawed, they demanded food and drink, they taunted, they performed mock executions, and they burned and looted.

If space and behavior are variables that help us better understand the meaning of iconoclasm, time matters all the more. Iconoclasm broke loose in mid-August, the first incident occurring on August 10th in Steenvoorde in the West Quarter. The troubles peaked around Assumption Day, with Our Lady as centerpiece, particularly in the important cities of Ypres and Antwerp that boasted important ecclesiastical institutions and Our Lady devotions.⁶⁴ As we have already seen with the annual Tuindag procession in Ypres, devotions to Our Lady in Tournai, Antwerp and elsewhere, however varied, shared elaborate processions and liturgies to showcase civic and regional hierarchies.⁶⁵ The various corporate bodies, both lay and ecclesiastical, divvied up into so many queues to pay tribute to local Our Ladies in processions punctuated by sacred theater.⁶⁶ These were celebrations of enormous ecclesiastical importance and civic importance, with every sequence of the processions reading like a who’s who of a given locale.

Much as in the case in Ypres, the violence visited upon the statue housed in the great chapel of Our Lady in the Onze-Lieve-Vrouwekerk in Antwerp captures the iconoclasts’ sensitivity to time and social privilege. This Virgin, the chapel dedicated to her, the parish church

⁶³ “Advertissement d’Outretombe donné par Charles Quint à son fils Philippe II” in A. Thion, ‘Analyse et extraits de documents relatifs à l’histoire des Pays-Bas au XVI^e siècle,’ *Bulletin de la Commission Royale d’Histoire* 77 (1908): 57–58; L.P. Gachard, ed., *Correspondance de Philippe II sur les affaires des Pays-Bas* (Bruxelles, 1848), 1: 451.

⁶⁴ A precise chronology is provided in Scheerder, *De Beeldenstorm*.

⁶⁵ On Antwerp, see Roland A.E. Op de Beeck, *De Gilde van Onze-Lieve-Vrouwe-Lof in de Kathedraal van Antwerpen* (Antwerpen, 1978) for an introduction, but also W.H. Vroom, *De Onze-Lieve-Vrouwekerk te Antwerpen: de financiering van de bouw tot de beeldenstorm* (Antwerp, 1983). On Ypres, see Paul Trio and Walter Simons, “Achtergronden bij het ontstaan van de tuindagprocessie: bronnen en situering,” in Vinckier, *Ieper Tuindag*, 107–128, for devotion of Our Lady and the annual Tuindag procession.

⁶⁶ Fl. Prins, ‘De Antwerpsche Ommeganck op den vooravond van de Beeldenstormerij,’ in *Mededeelingen van de Koninklijke Vlaamsche Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Künsten van België, klasse der letteren* (1946): 5–21, for the all-important example of Antwerp.

in which she was housed, and the Onze-Lieve-Vrouwe-Lofgilde dedicated to honor her all bespoke elite privilege. The great church dominated Antwerp's religious life, and until 1477, monopolized parochial rights over the city, boasting a highly educated but often absentee chapter of canons, scores of chantry priests, and seventy heavily used and well patronized altars by the mid-sixteenth century.⁶⁷ Boasting a central location, an amazing buzz of religious life, and a legally private domain (the Immunity) teeming with markets, the church centered Catholic expression in this city of merchants and workers. Its ritual calendar was correspondingly busy.⁶⁸ August 19th, the first Sunday following Assumption day, witnessed one of the highlights of the liturgical year: the great Onze-Lieve-Vrouwe procession. In 1566, with the air heavy with the possibility of religious violence, organizers held the celebration under tighter security. The choice of a program by the city's rhetoricians—*tableaux vivants* which bespoke a troubled time of discord—was as allegorically heavy-handed as it was accurate.⁶⁹ As the prince of Orange watched the great parade of the city's political, ecclesiastical, and guild elites, insults were hurled at the Virgin by Protestant sympathizers hidden in the overflowing crowd of on-lookers. Worried by these public invectives, members of the confraternity returned the statue to her chapel on Tuesday August 20th rather having the Our Lady remain on public display in the church as was customary for the Octave following the procession.⁷⁰ Hours later, when devotees attempted prayers to the Virgin at Vespers, Calvinists stormed the great parish church and set about their task of destruction.

If the choice of Onze-Lieve-Vrouwe as target was obvious, it was not necessarily predetermined. Antwerp was thick with many popular cults and veneration, most noticeably Onze Lieve Vrouwe op 't Staatken, the miracle worker whose popularity reached its zenith in the late fifteenth century.⁷¹ While Onze-Lieve Vrouwe op 't Staatken

⁶⁷ Vroom, *De Onze-Lieve-Vrouwekerk*.

⁶⁸ For a brief discussion of religious ritual in Antwerp in general, see Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation*, 55.

⁶⁹ Leo de Burbure, *De Antwerpsche Ommegangen in de XIV^e en XV^e eeuw naar gelijktijdige handschriften* (Antwerpen, 1878). Prins, 'De Antwerpse Ommeganck.'

⁷⁰ Rob. van Roosbroeck, ed., *De Kroniek van Godevaert van Haecht over de troebelen van 1565 tot 1574 te Antwerpen en elders* (Antwerpen, 1929), 1: 96–101 on the procession, its troubles, and the iconoclasm that followed.

⁷¹ L. Phillipen, 'Le culte de Notre-Dame Op 'T Stocken,' *Annales de la société d'archéologie de Belgique* 7: 2 (1924): 204–230.

was attacked, she was neither the trigger for the riots nor the target of the iconoclasts' wrath. The vituperation of the iconoclasts was given over to the other Onze-Lieve-Vrouwe, the Our Lady of the Assumption Day procession. The insults mouthed during her Assumption procession, followed by her ritual dismemberment—first beheaded, then her arms hacked off—shortly thereafter in the Onze-Lieve-Vrouwekerk, violently punctured a peak time when sacred and secular status meshed. Gender—and female images in specific—was emphatically at play. The Calvinist writer Philip Marnix of St. Aldegonde even decried religious images as dangerously feminizing: alluring in beauty, painted up like prostitutes: “Against the commandment of God, they (Catholics) have erected a multitude of beautiful images, paintings, and statues gilded and dressed up in the manner of whores from a brothel.”⁷²

The crowd that pillaged the Onze-Lieve-Vrouwekerk was mixed sex, but the physical work was done by male day laborers and artisans armed with their work tools.⁷³ Having insulted the image of Onze-Lieve-Vrouwe in procession, they began their destruction with an initial *coup de foudre* against the chapel that housed the statue. But they did more, including taunting the elderly lady who sat adjacent to the chapel to sell candles and other small devotional items to worshippers. In procession, in chapel, even as sellers of small liturgical items—women and female religious images were mocked and attacked by riotous artisans who obviously drew their behavior from the world of male solidarities and collectivities. They were attacking Our Lady as symbol of Catholic idolatry, the sacred and gendered charge around which elite time and space coalesced. Is it any surprise, then, that in the Restoration period in 1587 under Alexander Farnese the statue of Brabo proudly displayed in Antwerp's city hall was replaced by a Counter-Reformation style Our Lady?⁷⁴ In re-Catholicized Spanish Antwerp, what iconoclasts had denounced as idolatrous and feminized now displaced the mythological male foundational hero as triumphant sign of civic greatness and sovereign authority.

⁷² J.J. van Toorenenbergen, ed., *Philips van Marnix van St. Aldegonde: godsdienstige en kerkelijke geschriften*, 1: 76.

⁷³ For a prosopography of the Antwerp iconoclasts, see Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation*, 89.

⁷⁴ Jan van der Stock, ed., *Antwerp: Story of a Metropolis, 16th–17th centuries* (Gent, 1993), 243.

Conclusion

If attention to the Wonder Year has been substantial, historians remain far from fully understanding the complex tangle of causes and the scatter-shot consequences of the iconoclastic riots of late summer and early fall 1566. Contemporaries, both Spanish and Netherlandish, dismissed iconoclasts contemptuously, eager for their own reasons to categorize the image breakers as rebellious rabble. The Regent Margaret of Parma lambasted them as enemies of god, king, and land.⁷⁵ Early historians of the troubles such as Jacques de Wesenbeke labeled them ‘jeunes, garçons, et canaille’—a social classification that later historians would adopt.⁷⁶ The distinguished chronicler of Netherlandish painters, Carel van Mander spoke of them contemptuously as ‘raging, irrational, demented, art-hating, savage and rebellious.’⁷⁷ Whatever their differences, these contemporary observers categorized iconoclasts in the same sociological niche—a crowd of blasphemous, scrofulous low-life. Recent scholars of Low Countries iconoclasm have patiently waded through legal documents to clear out these polemical categories with sociological refinement. But the weight of their respective schools—social history or Reformation studies—has resulted in emphasis upon motives external to, but not wholly separate from, image breaking itself (such as economic hardship or learned Calvinist theology). Many iconoclasts were poor, many felt the pinch of hard economic times, and many more were driven by Reformed convictions; no historian can fail to see the obvious but complicated interplay between Reformed sentiment and social and economic conditions. But the focus on this interplay alone has diverted attention away from the acts of iconoclasm, and their larger cultural significance. In this essay, I have suggested deciphering iconoclasm by attention to its various behaviors and their relationship to a larger public culture where sacred times, spaces, and objects leveraged authority, be it municipal, state, or ecclesiastical. The late medieval Burgundian state that arose with such astonishing rapidity

⁷⁵ J.S. Theissen, ed., *Correspondence Française de Marguerite d'Autriche, Duchesse de Parme avec Philippe II* (Utrecht, 1925), 153.

⁷⁶ For a good discussion of these sociological categories employed by chroniclers and early historians of the Time of Troubles, see Duke, “De Calvinisten en de ‘Paapse Beeldendienst,’” 29–30, and the sources listed in the footnotes.

⁷⁷ Freedberg, *Iconoclasm and Painting*, 121.

gained a public profile through spectacles rich in sacred iconography and through a masterful patronage of key religious institutions and worships. The elite cadre of nobles who butted heads in the 1560s against Spanish legal and religious policy in the Netherlands knew the power of the state's public relations—and its vulnerability. Their choreographed protests in the spring of 1566 mixed ribald humor, carnivalesque inversion, anti-clerical parody, social satire, and hardball politics. As they drew up eloquent formal briefs against the hated placards, they seized upon well-tested cultural props, mastering the procession and invoking sacred times and images. The iconoclasts in Flanders' West Quarter we have seen might have been far removed from these events in Brussels and other large cities. But they set off a chain reaction whose participants laid claim to this politics of inversion. 'Vive les Gueux' was no empty slogan. It articulated, most directly, Reformed sentiment. But it also, I assume, meant precisely what it said. The rioters, after all, be they young or old, male or female, rural villager or urban Calvinist, shared with the Beggars a grasp of just how powerful a cultural motif inversion was in the political and religious makeup of the sixteenth century Low Countries.

CONFESSIONAL CLEANSING: WHY AMSTERDAM DID NOT JOIN THE REVOLT (1572–1578)

Henk Van Nierop

On November 23, 1577 a small military force under the captains Helling and Ruychaver undertook an attack on the city of Amsterdam.¹ The soldiers captured the Haarlemmer gate in the west and killed all the guards. Yelling bloodcurdling battle-cries such as: “*Hear, hear, the town is us!*” and “*Kill, kill! We’ll kill the monks, priests and beguines!*,” they then rushed to the Dam square where, then as now, the town hall was situated. Yet the brave burghers of Amsterdam and the troops commissioned by the city quickly grabbed their weapons and in a bloody skirmish succeeded in throwing the invaders out. The manly role played by Amsterdam’s women merits attention. Like true Amazons they dragged artillery to the Haarlemmer sluice near the gate and inflicted heavy damage on the enemy.²

Many similar stories of suffering and courage could be, and indeed have been told about the early years of the Dutch Revolt, its so-called ‘heroic’ phase, including the role of women who so valiantly battled with the menfolk on the walls of Haarlem, Alkmaar and Leiden. Yet the outstanding feature about this particular episode is that it was the loyalist and Catholic inhabitants of Amsterdam who defended their home town against the Calvinist rebels under William of Orange. Why did the population of Amsterdam remain true to Church and King while almost all other towns joined the Revolt?

In the spring and early summer of 1572 a revolt had broken out in the towns of Holland and Zeeland against the government of Philip II’s governor in the Netherlands, the duke of Alba. The exact

¹ J. ter Gouw, *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam* (7 vols., Amsterdam, 1879–1893), VII: 235–244. I.H. van Eeghen, ed., *Dagboek van Broeder Wouter Jacobsz (Gualtherus Jacobi Masius) Prior van Stein. Amsterdam 1572–1578 en Montfoort 1578–1579*, 2 vols. (Groningen, 1959–1960), 685–688. This chapter is based on Henk van Nierop, *Het foute Amsterdam. Rede uitgesproken bij de aanvaarding van het ambt van hoogleraar in de Nieuwe Geschiedenis aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op vrijdag 13 oktober 2000* (Amsterdam, 2000).

² Ter Gouw, *Geschiedenis*, VII: 686. P. Famianus Strada, *De thien eerste boecken der Nederlandsche oorloge* (Rotterdam, 1655), 670.

reasons underlying the various urban revolts are still anything but clear. The motives of the insurgents and the responses of the urban magistrates, the role of the tiny minority of Calvinists and the attitude of the 'silent majority' of the urban population remain insufficiently studied. Only in the towns of Vlissingen and Enkhuizen were the revolts more or less spontaneous. The other towns rebelled under a combination of external military pressure exerted by the Sea Beggars and the active plotting by a minority of discontented sailors, artisans and returned exiles within their walls. Only two major towns remained loyal to Alba's government, Middelburg in Zeeland and Amsterdam in Holland. This chapter will focus on the counter-revolutionary part played by Amsterdam. It will be argued that the exceptional position of the town was due to the skillful way its governing elite handled the crisis. Another conclusion will be that the magistrates' pro-government policies found broad support among Amsterdam's common population, as the episode referred to above suggests.

Patriotic Historians

Few historians have tried to provide an answer to the question as to why Holland's largest city took a path divergent from the other ones. An early exception is Johannes Isacius Pontanus in his *History of the City of Amsterdam*, first published in Latin in 1611.³ Pontanus suggested that the town remained pro-Catholic due to the presence of a large number of fugitive priests and other clerics who had been expelled by the Sea Beggars from the other towns and villages in Holland and had found a safe haven in Amsterdam. It is easy to see that Pontanus confused causes and consequences. The clergy only fled to Amsterdam *because* it had remained loyal to Church and King and they certainly did not prevent the town from joining the Revolt by seeking refuge in it.

After Pontanus Amsterdam's numerous town chroniclers from Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft to Jan Wagenaar wrote countless pages about the events of the Revolt, but none of them specifically addressed the

³ Johannes Isacius Pontanus, *Rerum et urbis amstelodamensium historia* (Amsterdam, 1611). A Dutch translation was published in 1614: Johannes Isacius Pontanus, *Beschrijvinghe der seer wijt beroemde coop-stadt Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1614), 87.

issue of the motives of the magistrates for their exceptional attitude.⁴ Only during the last quarter of the nineteenth century did Jan ter Gouw explicitly tackle this problem in the seventh and last volume of his *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam*.⁵

According to Ter Gouw the population of Amsterdam was not less revolutionary-minded (*geusgezind*) than the inhabitants of the other towns in Holland. Yet it was the magistrates who kept the city at the side of the Spanish against the will of the common citizens. How did they perform this feat? Ter Gouw argues that after the crushing of the Anabaptist uprising in 1535 a new group of magistrates, the so-called 'sincere and Catholic party,' had come to power, ousting the previous ruling faction who had pursued a tolerant policy towards the Reformation movement. It was, however, not their loyalty to the Catholic Church that motivated the magistrates to keep the town at the side of the Spanish, but ordinary factionalism. Ter Gouw's key witness in this argument was the rector of the *Oude Kerk*, Joost Buyck, who in his memoirs dubbed the magistrates 'lukewarm Catholics' who hoped 'to remain comfortably in power' by supporting the government.⁶ They did so mainly because their position was threatened by an opposition faction. In 1564 a group of prominent merchants and entrepreneurs, many of them related to the group of magistrates thrown out in 1538, addressed the government in Brussels with various complaints about the economic and financial maladministration by the ruling faction and about its extreme cliquishness. Many members of this group of *Doleanten* (as the dissatisfied citizens were called) shortly afterwards joined the Calvinist movement of the *Wonderjaar* (*annus mirabilis*) 1566–1567 and provided its leadership. After the restoration of law and order in 1567 most of them were

⁴ P.C. Hooft, *Neederlandsche hystorien, sedert de ooverdraght der heerschappyye van kaizar Karel den Vijfden, op kooning Philips zynen zoon* (Amsterdam, 1642). Olfert Dapper, *Historische beschryving der stadt Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1663). Filips von Zesen, *Beschreibung der Stadt Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1664). Casparus Commelin, *Beschrijvinge van Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1693). Jan Wagenaar, *Amsterdam in zyne opkomst, aanwas, geschiedenissen*, 3 vols. (Amsterdam, 1760–1767).

⁵ Ter Gouw, *Geschiedenis*, VII: 39–47. Historians after ter Gouw have contented themselves with reproducing his analysis. Cf. Hajo Brugmans, *Geschiedenis van Amsterdam*, 6 vols., 6th ed. by I.J. Brugmans (Utrecht, 1972–1973), II: 93; and R.B. Evenhuis, *Ook dat was Amsterdam*, 5 vols. (Amsterdam, 1965–1978), I: 78–79. Amsterdam's most recent chronicler does not discuss the issue: Geert Mak, *Een kleine geschiedenis van Amsterdam* (Amsterdam and Antwerpen, 1995).

⁶ Quoted in Ter Gouw, *Geschiedenis*, VII: 44.

banished or fled on their own account. The ruling faction subsequently feared that this group of Protestant exiles might rise to power if the town should join the Revolt.

That, of course, is exactly what eventually happened in 1578. Ter Gouw thus anachronistically explained the attitude of the ruling elite from the outcome of the conflict. His explanation is based on the theory, universally accepted in his time, that the Revolt was a spontaneous popular uprising, a 'nationalist' reflex against Spanish domination. The revolt of the towns of Holland and Zeeland was self-explanatory; it was the *failure* of the population of Amsterdam to free itself from its shackles that stood in need of explanation.

During the 1930s Pieter Geyl revised this traditional view by pointing out that the Revolt was not a spontaneous rising at all. According to Geyl the towns of Holland and Zeeland were conquered by military power, against the will of the majority of the inhabitants, and subsequently forcefully 'protestantized'.⁷ Juliaan Woltjer in his 1975 inaugural lecture has added nuances to Geyl's rather straightforward explanation by stressing internal factors in the towns. The towns could have defended themselves successfully against the Sea Beggars had they wished to do so, but precisely the will to resist was lacking. The towns, confronted by the dilemma between the billeting of the highly unpopular government troops or an occupation by Beggar soldiers—only slightly less odious—opted for the latter.⁸ Woltjer discerned an inverse relation between the attitude taken by a town in the *annus mirabilis* 1566 and the stance it adopted six years later. Towns that had remained quiet in 1566 were inclined in 1572 to opt for the side of the insurgents; whereas towns where the Calvinists had been particularly active tended to prefer order and stability and hence remained loyal to the government. This hypothesis was designed to explain the difference in timing between Flanders and Brabant on the one hand and Holland and Zeeland on the other hand, but it can also illuminate the attitude of Amsterdam, where in 1566 the disturbances had been particularly severe.⁹

⁷ Pieter Geyl, *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse stam*, 6 vols., 3rd ed. (Amsterdam and Antwerpen, 1961–1962), I: 277. Pieter Geyl, *Studies en strijdschriften. Bundel aangeboden aan de schrijver bij zijn aftreden als hoogleraar aan de Rijksuniversiteit van Utrecht* (Groningen, 1958), 37.

⁸ J.J. Woltjer, *Kleine oorzaken, grote gevolgen* (inaugural address, Leiden, 1975), 8–9.

⁹ J.J. Woltjer, *Tussen vrijheidsstrijd en burgeroorlog. Over de Nederlandse Opstand 1555–1580* (Amsterdam, 1994), 59.

More recently James Tracy has suggested that the loyalist and pro-Catholic attitude of Amsterdam's ruling elite between 1538 and 1578 be regarded as a 'premature Counter-Reformation,' a rare example where prominent laymen, not clergy, took the initiative to defend the old religion. He does not, however, confront the question as to why Amsterdam in this respect was different from the other towns, nor the question of the response of Amsterdam's population.¹⁰

Why Did the Towns Revolt?

If one takes a closer look at the changing of sides that took place in the other Holland towns in 1572, it appears that the loyalist and pro-Catholic stance of Amsterdam's governing elite was less exceptional than it might seem at first sight. Up to 1572, the oligarchic urban elites of all towns were heavily dependent on support from the Brussels government. If anything, their dependence had increased after the arrival of the duke of Alba in 1567. In the spring of 1572 *all* magistrates were loyal to Church and King. It is not difficult to understand why they were not particularly eager to join an extremely hazardous enterprise by returned exiles, unemployed sailors and fishermen, and bloodthirsty pirates (*Watergeuzen* or Sea Beggars). Yet in most cases the magistrates did not succeed in keeping the rebels out, and their failure almost without exception cost them their jobs. With the evicted Catholic clergy, they formed the party of the *Glippers* ('Sneakers'), who as refugees in Amsterdam and other loyal cities waited in vain for the victory of the Spanish army. The burgomasters of Amsterdam by contrast managed to preserve their town for the government. The proper question to ask is why the magistrates of Amsterdam were successful in resisting the rebels, while their colleagues elsewhere failed.

To answer this question I shall construct a simple model of the variables affecting the changing of sides by the Holland towns, and subsequently apply this model to the situation in Amsterdam. The many particular local circumstances that caused changing sides to be different in each individual town will be glossed over.¹¹ There

¹⁰ James D. Tracy, 'A Premature Counter-Reformation: The Dirkist Government of Amsterdam, 1538–1578,' *Journal of Religious History* 13 (1989): 150–167.

¹¹ The revolts in Gouda, Dordrecht, Leiden and Delft in J.C. Boogman, 'De

were, however, two variables that were valid for *all* towns in the Netherlands in 1572 and hence cannot predict whether a town opted for the Revolt or not: the economic crisis and the unpopularity of the Alba's regime. These will be discussed first.

To begin with, a series of wet summers, floods and crop failures caused widespread unemployment and poverty.¹² What made the situation worse was that many merchants and skilled craftsmen had fled the country and that Sea Beggars were looting merchant shipping and the towns and villages in North Holland and Friesland. The impoverished craftsmen, fishermen and sailors did not blame the pirates for their misery; they blamed Alba and his government. They were prepared, more so than the well-to-do sections of the urban citizens, to risk hazardous adventures that might in the short run better their fate. The slump affected all provinces, but perhaps the maritime northern and western provinces were hardest hit. Amsterdam in any case suffered as much as did the other towns of Holland.

The aversion against the regime of the duke of Alba and the Spanish army he had brought to the Low Countries was universal.¹³ The troops were quartered in the towns and billeted on the hapless citizens; they behaved like an occupation force in enemy territory. The government's chronic inability to pay its soldiers placed a heavy financial burden on the towns. Alba's fiscal measures also contributed to making him tremendously unpopular. In the spring of 1572 he made preparations for levying the long-postponed Tenth Penny Tax on sales of movables but the outbreak of the Revolt prevented its implementation. There is, however, no indication that the revulsion against the new taxes was more acute in towns that were to join

overgang van Gouda, Dordrecht, Leiden en Delft in de zomer van het jaar 1572,' *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 57 (1942): 81–112. See also C.C., Hibben, *Gouda in Revolt: Particularism and Pacifism in the Revolt of the Netherlands* (Utrecht, 1983), 29–66; Rotterdam in H. ten Boom, *De reformatie in Rotterdam 1530–1585* (s.l., 1987) 135–139; Haarlem in Joke Spaans, *Haarlem na de Reformatie. Stedelijke cultuur en kerkelijk leven, 1577–1620* (Den Haag, 1989), 40–42; the towns in North-Holland in Henk van Nierop, *Het verraad van het Noorderkwartier. Oorlog, terreur en recht in de Nederlandse Opstand* (Amsterdam, 1999), 63–83.

¹² J.C.A. de Meij, *De watergeuzen en de Nederlanden 1568–1572* (Amsterdam and London, 1972), 299–306.

¹³ Gustaaf Janssens, *Brabant in het verweer. Loyale oppositie tegen Spanje's bewind in de Nederlanden van Alba tot Farnese 1567–1578* (Kortrijk-Heule, 1989), 186–203; and William S. Maltby, *Alba: A Biography of Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Third Duke of Alba 1507–1582* (Berkeley, Cal., 1983), 138–158.

the Revolt than in towns that were to remain loyal. If economic and political problems caused misery and discontent in *all* towns of the Low Countries and if these by themselves can not explain why a particular town opted for or against the Revolt, what, then, were the variables that did determine whether or not a town opened its gates for the rebels?

Military pressure exerted by the rebel forces was perhaps the most crucial factor. Towns only joined the Revolt after Beggar troops had appeared before their gates or under the threat of their imminent arrival. The only exceptions to this rule were the cases of Vlissingen and Enkhuizen, where more or less spontaneous revolts broke out, triggering the events in other towns.¹⁴ Military pressure was crucial not only in Holland and Zeeland but also in the other provinces. In Friesland, Sneek, Bolsward and Franeker only defected to the side of the rebels after Beggar troops had appeared. In Overijssel, Zutphen, Zwolle, Kampen and a number of smaller towns opened their gates for William of Orange's brother-in-law, count Hendrik van den Bergh. In Brabant, Weert, Diest, Tienen, Louvain, Nivelles and Dendermonde allowed William of Orange's army to enter, while Mons in Hainault opened its gates for his brother Louis of Nassau. Valenciennes let itself be occupied by a small force of French Huguenots and Netherlandish exiles.¹⁵

The second variable, closely connected to the first, consists in the absence of a garrison of government troops or at least the possibility of moving one in rapidly. Only towns that were not garrisoned defected to the rebels. In the spring and early summer of 1572 the *tercio*, or regiment, of Lombardy was quartered in Rotterdam, Schiedam and Delfshaven. These towns changed sides in favor of the insurgents only after Alba had moved these troops south to assist in the relief of Mons. Similarly, the nearby town of Delft only allowed the Beggars to enter after the *tercio* was removed. Muiden and Weesp, small border towns just east of Amsterdam, had been provided with a garrison only just in time by Alba's lieutenant or *stadhouder* in Holland, Count Bossu; it is not a coincidence that they remained

¹⁴ On the more spontaneous revolts in Vlissingen and Enkhuizen see Van Nierop, *Het verraad*, 65, 72–75 with reference to sources.

¹⁵ Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt* (London 1977), 135–136 and 139. J.J. Woltjer, *Friesland in hervormingstijd* (Leiden, 1962), 214–226.

loyal to the government.¹⁶ The town of Utrecht served as a central military depot, with in 1572 no less than eight companies of government troops being billeted on the inhabitants. It was consequently never threatened and remained loyal until it was forced in 1577 to join the Pacification of Ghent. In Friesland the Beggars left Leeuwarden, Stavoren and Harlingen unscathed—towns with blockhouses manned by government troops—but they did enter the towns that had no garrison.¹⁷

Thirdly, the role of the civic militias.¹⁸ The *schutterijen* were in the absence of a government garrison the only armed force that could have prevented the Beggars from entering a town. The militiamen did not particularly favor the Calvinists or the Sea Beggars, but in many towns they refused to act against their fellow citizens or protect loyalist magistrates. Enkhuizen declared in favor of the Revolt after the militias had refused to protect the burgomasters against an angry crowd. In Hoorn the militias together with the headmen of the craft guilds and the town council formed a 'Broad Council' (*Brede Raad*) that finally decided to allow the Beggars to enter the town. The militias of Gouda and Dordrecht, too, played a key role in this decision. In Haarlem the militias in December 1572 staged a military coup. The militiamen prepared for the defense of the town behind the backs of Haarlem's burgomasters who were at that time in Amsterdam negotiating with the Spanish commander about the surrender of the town. Yet the significance of the militias was not purely a military matter. In the absence of any form of popular representation, for example through the craft guilds, the militias pretended to represent the body of the citizenry whenever the burgomasters appeared to identify too much with the government in Brussels.

Finally, returned exiles were instrumental in fomenting rebellions in their home towns. During the crisis many exiles, previously banished by Alba and the Council of Troubles, returned home. We know little about their activities. Yet we do know that in many towns

¹⁶ J. van Vloten, *Nederlands Opstand tegen Spanje in zijne eerste wording, ontwikkeling en verderen voortgang*, 2 vols. (Haarlem, 1858–1869), I: 28.

¹⁷ Pieter Christiaensz. Bor, *Oorsprongk, begin en vervolg der Nederlandsche oorlogen*, 4 vols. (Amsterdam, 1679–1684), I: 357–361. De Meij, *De watergeuzen*, 227–228.

¹⁸ Paul Knevel, *Burgers in het geweer. De schutterijen in Holland, 1550–1700* (Hilversum, 1994), 82–91. J.C. Grayson, 'The Civic Militia in the County of Holland, 1560–81: Politics and Public Order in the Dutch Revolt,' *Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, 95 (1980): 35–63.

they played a key role in the decision to open the gates for the rebel troops. As exiles they were strongly committed to bringing their home town on the side of the Revolt. As Calvinists they were equally strongly motivated to reform its religion. They formed only a tiny minority but they were exerting a disproportional amount of influence in an unstable situation.¹⁹ Only a small part of the population favored joining the Revolt, whilst another minority was in favor of garrisoning the town with government forces. A modest push sufficed during the crisis to make the balance tip to the side of the rebels. After a town had switched sides, it was often the returned exiles who became members of the newly elected Orangist magistracy.

Amsterdam during the Revolt

Let us now try to apply this simple—perhaps oversimplified—model to the situation in Amsterdam. Military pressure was certainly applied. The rebel commander Lumey besieged the town in August 1572.²⁰ He had failed to bring artillery with him, partly because he counted on adherents within the town to open the gates as had been the case in the other towns of Holland and Zeeland. Yet inside help did not materialize. The town defended itself gallantly and Lumey had to withdraw. Military pressure, however, remained heavy. In August 1575 some fifty rebel soldiers were smuggled into the town hidden in barges under a cargo of peat.²¹ The conspiracy failed; sixteen soldiers were arrested and put to death after a summary trial. The significant point is that it was not the authorities but loyal common citizens of Amsterdam who captured the intruders and delivered them to the sheriff. It is also significant that the interrogation of the soldiers, despite the liberal application of torture, did not bring to light that inhabitants of Amsterdam were involved in the plot.

The attack by captains Helling and Ruychaver in November 1577 with which this chapter began is another instance highlighting the continuing military pressure on the town. In this case, too, the sheriff found no traitors within the city walls. We may therefore

¹⁹ In Friesland by contrast returned exiles failed to play a significant role in the revolts of the towns. Woltjer, *Friesland*, 221.

²⁰ Ter Gouw, *Geschiedenis*, VII: 48–62.

²¹ *Ibid.*, VII: 143–145.

safely conclude that as far as military pressure is concerned there was no difference between Amsterdam and the other towns of Holland and Zeeland.

Secondly, Amsterdam resented taking in a garrison as much as did the other towns. During the long hot summer of 1572 *stadhouder* Bossu repeatedly and forcibly demanded that Amsterdam take in a garrison of government forces, but to no avail.²² In June the burgomasters, against the will of the *stadhouder*, levied two companies of town soldiers. The citizens did not fear these troops as they did foreign mercenaries; they were recruited from Amsterdam's own population and bound by an oath to the burgomasters. Only in August during the siege by Lumey did the burgomasters permit the hurried entering of four companies of Walloon infantry from Bossu's regiment to assist them with the defense of the town.²³ Thus Amsterdam from August 1572 onwards was indeed burdened with a military occupation. The presence of the government troops, therefore, could explain Amsterdam's loyalty from that point onwards. It does *not*, however, explain why the town chose to remain loyal to the government during the months *before* August 1572, when one town after another declared its allegiance to the Revolt. In addition, the garrison did not stay long. One year later, in August 1573, Amsterdam provided a large sum of money to the government 'on the condition' that the town remain devoid of foreign troops.²⁴ The garrison must have left a few months later and the town must have depended again on its own soldiers. Apparently Amsterdam remained loyal to Church and King without being forced to do so by the presence of a garrison.

Yet on account of the third point, the role of the civic militias, the situation in Amsterdam was different from that in other towns.²⁵ The militias had played a significant role during the iconoclastic riots of 1566 and 1567. The Brussels government regarded their role as treacherous. The militia companies had refused in February 1567 to pledge a new oath of loyalty to the government. Consequently, they were disarmed and disbanded. When it refused to take in a garrison

²² Ibid., VII: 17, 21, 23, 25, 28.

²³ Ibid., VII: 55, 56, 58.

²⁴ Ibid., VII: 102. Cf. 37: in October 1574, one of the burgomasters feared that foreign troops would 'again' be quartered on the town.

²⁵ Ibid., VI: 145, 148, 150, 221; VII: 21, 27.

in the spring of 1572, Amsterdam was permitted to re-erect the militia companies, but chose to refrain from doing so. The burgomasters preferred to depend on the soldiers they had commissioned themselves, regarding these professionals as more reliable than the militiamen, who might pretend to represent the citizenry and thereby form an alternative focus of loyalty.

Finally, Amsterdam was different from the other towns as far as the presence of returned exiles is concerned. The burgomasters in May 1572 issued a decree prescribing the death penalty for exiles who hazarded to appear within the jurisdiction of the town. Informers were to be rewarded with a fee of fifty guilders. In contrast to what was the case in other towns the new decree was rigorously enforced. After Alba's successor Luis de Requesens had issued a general pardon in 1574, Amsterdam even requested and obtained dispensation from this measure.²⁶ Amsterdam's tougher stance towards returning exiles must have been due to the pre-1567 faction strife, as Jan ter Gouw has suggested.

In conclusion, it appears that Amsterdam differed hardly or not at all from the other towns as far as military factors were concerned. It had nevertheless succeeded in preventing the rise of internal unrest among the militiamen and returned exiles. This crucial difference may very well have been responsible for the divergent course taken by the town. Military pressure on the town was as acute as it had been on the other towns, but the magistrates had successfully suppressed the rise of an alternative focus of loyalty.

The Response of Amsterdam's Population

This argument, however, leaves one question unanswered. Why did Amsterdam's population accept this policy? Were they, as Jan ter Gouw believed, as revolutionary-minded as the population of the other Holland towns? Or did the population support the policies of their rulers?

Everything points to the fact that during the war years Amsterdam's burgomasters could count on broad, indeed enthusiastic support among the population. The citizens' loyalty is clearly evident from

²⁶ Ibid., VII: 21, 125.

their resistance to military pressure. Not only did the inhabitants repeatedly fend off enemy attacks but they were also frequently engaged in military operations against the rebels elsewhere in Holland. Wouter Jacobszoon, a refugee friar from Gouda, in his diary gives a fascinating and at times horrifying image of daily life in Amsterdam during the civil war. He describes how the population rejoiced in the successes of the Spanish army and how it feared a victory of the rebels. He also testifies how Catholic devotion revived. Large groups of barefooted believers, including a large number of women, flocked to the chapel where the so-called miracle of Amsterdam was venerated. The holy sacrament was carried around the streets—sometimes as often as three times per week—‘by innumerable people,’ also barefooted.²⁷

The loyalist and pro-Catholic attitude of the population of Amsterdam is not self-evident. Only a few years earlier, in 1566, the town had constituted the center of the Calvinist Reformation movement in Holland. Thousands of inhabitants had visited the open air preaching, while as many as one thousand citizens had joined Holy Supper, celebrated in Calvinist fashion for the first time in December 1566. They thereby indicated that they did not only sympathize with the new Reformed Church but that they wished actively to participate in it. In February 1567, during an armed insurrection against the town authorities, the party of the Reformed had mustered as many as eight to nine thousand armed men against only two thousand who were willing to defend the burgomasters.²⁸ Evidently, the balance of power had changed completely in a period of five years. What had happened?

It was the policy adopted by the magistrates that was primarily responsible for this shift. They combined a strict security policy designed to expel all suspect elements from the town with a traditional medieval policy designed to foster the loyalty of the remaining citizens and tie them closer to the city and its magistrates. Their policy was thus two-fold, pushing out anyone who was not to be trusted, while at the same time fostering traditional values for those who wished to stay behind. The result was a clear-cut division of the population between reliable Catholics and potential traitors.

²⁷ *Dagboek*, 57, 264.

²⁸ Ter Gouw, *Geschiedenis*, VII: 138.

Let us first take a closer look at the push-factor. The burgomasters took great pains to banish all suspect elements away and to ensure that they stayed out. Since the arrival of the duke of Alba some two hundred inhabitants of Amsterdam were sentenced for their part in the troubles of 1566 and 1567.²⁹ A few of them were executed but the majority were exiled. Yet the number of inhabitants who fled the town must have been significantly larger. In 1575 the burgomasters complained that as much as one third of the houses were empty.³⁰ This was the case despite the fact that the town was filled with Catholic refugees from rebel territory.

The registers of by-laws (*keurboeken*) document the obsessive but apparently effective security policy pursued by the Amsterdam magistracy.³¹ Whoever had carried arms against the magistrates in 1566–1567 had to show a certificate of remittance and swear a new oath of allegiance or leave at once. All apprentices of fifteen years and older must swear an oath of allegiance or depart, while their masters had to stand surety. Beggars, hawkers, tinkers, cobblers and similar idle and unsavory elements who could not produce proof of their citizenship were expelled. The authorities displayed great suspicion towards the many war refugees pouring in from the countryside and the other Holland towns. Those seeking political asylum in Amsterdam had to produce a testimonial of good behavior issued by the parish priest or the civil authorities of their last place of residence. Those who failed to come up with such an attestation had to leave forthwith. Even the poor inhabitants of the houses outside the town walls that had been burned, wrecked, and looted by Lumey during his short and unsuccessful siege, were not welcome. Only after producing a valid attestation of their good name and fame were they allowed to settle in town. Whoever lived in town without being a full citizen (*poorter*) had to report to two specially appointed commissioners and swear an oath of fidelity to the burgomasters. Innkeepers had to report the names of lodgers to the authorities or face a stiff fine. The magistrates strictly saw to the implementation of these measures

²⁹ Ibid., VI: 206, 245, 246. Henk van Nierop, *Beeldenstorm en burgerlijk verzet in Amsterdam 1566–1567* (Nijmegen, 1978), 69–70.

³⁰ Ter Gouw, *Geschiedenis*, VII: 138.

³¹ Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Archief Burgemeesters, inv. nr. 5020–10 (Keurboek G), fols. 59 vo.–76; Archief Vroedschap, inv. nr. 5026–2 (Vroedschapsresoluties), fols. 215 vo.–223 vo.

by means of large-scale house searches. The tocsin signaled that all inhabitants had to stay in until the visitations had ended.

The positive side of their policy was that the magistrates succeeded in attaching those who had remained behind closer to the town. They did so by pursuing a traditional policy aimed at the preservation and extension of the privileges and the independence of the town. Amsterdam had, for example, stronger than other towns resisted the introduction of the Tenth Penny Tax. The *Hof van Holland*, the highest court of justice of the province, duly sentenced Amsterdam to pay a steep fine of 25,000 guilders, after which appeal to the Great Council in Mechelen (Malines) was denied.³² It was a bitter pill to swallow, but it prevented the population from reproaching their magistrates for not championing the interests of the town. In other towns such as Dordrecht and Gouda the burgomasters had been much less steadfast in their opposition against the new taxes. As a consequence the citizens mistrusted their own magistrates and failed to resist the Beggar troops when they appeared at their gates.³³

The Amsterdam town government earned even more credit for its resistance against the building of a citadel. Alba had wanted to build such a stronghold as a punishment for the town's recalcitrant attitude during the troubles of 1566–1567. The castle and the soldiers quartered in it should prevent a repetition of the events. Alba, likewise, had ordered the construction of a stronghold in Antwerp, the notorious Spaniards' Castle. Yet the Amsterdam magistrates succeeded in evading this humiliation by paying the considerable sum of 200,000 guilders.³⁴ Similarly, the burgomasters enhanced their reputation with the population by stubbornly resisting the quartering of a Spanish garrison. The two companies of town soldiers on which they relied were recruited from amongst their own citizens and had been appointed against the express will of Bossu.

A comparison with the situation in Enkhuizen makes it clear how much the population in both towns resented the billeting of foreign troops and to what extent the attitude of the urban magistrates could be decisive in a town's choice for or against the Revolt.³⁵ In Enkhuizen

³² Ter Gouw, *Geschiedenis*, VI: 385–386.

³³ Boogman, 'De overgang,' 85–87. Hibben, *Gouda*, 35–45.

³⁴ Ter Gouw, *Geschiedenis*, VI: 359–367; Wagenaar, *Amsterdam*, I: 320–321, 336 (Appendix B). Guido Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation: Underground Protestantism in a Commercial Metropolis 1550–1577* (Baltimore, Md., 1996), 157.

³⁵ Van Nierop, *Het verraad*, 80.

a spontaneous revolt broke out in May 1572, when the population suspected the magistrates of planning the quartering of foreign soldiers in the town. The soldiers in question were on board of a number of warships that were being equipped in Enkhuizen's roadstead to reconquer the town of Brill, recently captured by the Sea Beggars. The burgomasters were unable to regain the trust of the population; they were thrown out of office, and the town declared its allegiance to the prince of Orange.

While these events were unfolding another squadron of warships was being equipped for the same purpose in the harbor of Amsterdam. Here, too, the inhabitants feared that the soldiers on board of the government ships might overwhelm the city. Yet the response of Amsterdam's burgomasters was entirely different from that of their Enkhuizen colleagues. They firmly forbade the soldiers to set foot in the town. They thus convinced the inhabitants that they could trust them. The town government apparently stood for the preservation of urban independence. Under these circumstances the population was willing to defend the city against William of Orange's rebel troops.

The town government had yet another well-tried method for gaining the allegiance of the population. The burgomasters requested from Alba a number of special legal and economic privileges as a reward for their loyal support in the struggle against the rebels. The government did in fact grant some of these, such as the extension of the urban jurisdiction to an area one mile outside its previous boundaries.³⁶

Finally, the common suffering during the war must have added to the solidarity among the population. During a period of six years Amsterdam was experiencing what amounted to a state of siege. The rebels closed Amsterdam's harbor by sinking vessels loaded with rubble taken from demolished churches and monasteries; they sent fire ships to the ships moored in the Amsterdam harbor and they repeatedly bombarded the town with their artillery causing many casualties and heavy damage. They effectively cut off Amsterdam's shipping routes. The economic blockade caused poverty, hunger and plague among Amsterdam's population.

³⁶ Ter Gouw, *Geschiedenis*, VII: 85, 117, 118, 121, 133, 135; Wagenaar, *Amsterdam*, I: 332–333, 339 (Appendix D).

Confessional Cleansing

One may well question the value of a policy aimed at the preservation of urban freedom and independence if it comes at the price of the ruthless expulsion of a large part of the population. Yet one should consider that such draconian measures were far from exceptional in sixteenth century Europe. Ever since Martin Luther had inaugurated the Reformation, the ideal of civic unity had come under increasing pressure. Hence secular authorities experimented with various means to restore the unity of the civil and the sacred communities. One of these means was the use of the Inquisition, or criminal prosecution of religious dissidents. This method had been successful in Spain but in the Low Countries it failed for a variety of reasons, such as the massive scale of the heresy problem and the importance of decentralized legal institutions.

An alternative means for European rulers to restore unity was the implementation of a policy of religious tolerance. The authorities in this case attempted to create legal conditions under which Catholics and Protestants could live in peace. This was the policy the French government tried to implement since 1562; it was also the policy pursued by William of Orange in the Low Countries. In both countries this policy turned out to be a disaster. In France, toleration was hugely unpopular with the Catholic majority; and the Bartholomew Massacre (24 August 1572) marked the provisional end of experiments with toleration. In the Netherlands William of Orange's repeated appeals to his partisans to respect Church property and the bodily integrity of Catholic clerics also remained a dead letter.

A third solution to the problem was more successful. One could call this a policy of 'confessional cleansing' or the territorial sorting out of the population according to religion. The principle was at the root of the Peace of Augsburg which in 1555 divided the Holy Roman Empire in Catholic and Lutheran territories. In a later phase of the Dutch Revolt the Spanish governor, the prince of Parma, Alexander Farnese, was to practice the same policy. Protestants were allowed to emigrate from territories under Spanish control, after which the Counter Reformation was successfully launched. If the exodus of Protestants guaranteed the exclusive Catholic character of the Southern Netherlands, conversely the Protestant character of the Dutch Republic was enhanced by the influx of refugees from the South.

As we have seen, 'religious cleansing' was the solution practiced by Amsterdam's burgomasters. The Orangist rebel towns of Holland and Zeeland were to some extent similarly purged during the war years 1572–1576. A stream of refugees left the towns, often on their own account, but sometimes forcefully expelled by the new authorities. In December 1572, for example, the Orangist town government of Hoorn ordered a group of 'half suspect' citizens to renew their citizen's oath. Those who refused were expelled.³⁷ Most of the Catholic exiles settled in Amsterdam, thus strengthening its profound Catholic and loyalist character and increasing the support for the policies of its magistrates.

Amsterdam's Alteratie

For a period of six years, Amsterdam remained a staunchly Catholic and loyalist bulwark. That situation could not last. Yet when Amsterdam finally joined the Revolt in 1578 (the so-called *Alteratie*), it did not do so due to its internal dynamic but due to developments in the country at large. In November 1576 a number of loyalist provinces, united in the States General, had concluded a peace treaty with the rebellious provinces of Holland and Zeeland, the Pacification of Ghent.³⁸ The Pacification stipulated that loyalist towns situated in the rebellious provinces such as Amsterdam and Haarlem conclude a separate treaty with William of Orange and the States of Holland in order to join the Pacification. The Pacification conceded to such towns that they received satisfaction on a number of points, particularly in the delicate matter as to what religion be allowed and under what conditions. Amsterdam was the last town grudgingly to conclude a 'satisfaction treaty' on February 8, 1578.³⁹ It had procrastinated for a long time because the burgomasters had hoped that the new royal governor don John of Austria would defeat the rebels allied in the Pacification. The articles in Amsterdam's satisfaction treaty specified that the exiles be allowed to return and that

³⁷ Van Nierop, *Het verraad*, 194.

³⁸ J.J. Woltjer, "Het noorden en de Pacificatie van Gent," in *Opstand en Pacificatie in de Lage Landen. Bijdrage tot de studie van de Pacificatie van Gent. Verslagboek van het tweedaags colloquium bij de vierhonderdste verjaardag van de Pacificatie van Gent*, ed. M. Balde (Gent, 1976), 79–98.

³⁹ Gerritje Coops, *De opheffing der satisfactie van Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1919).

Amsterdam's civic militia companies be reinstalled. In addition, the companies of mercenaries serving the town government were to be put under the command of the States of Holland. The upshot was that the special conditions that made Amsterdam stand out from the other Holland towns—no militias and no returned exiles—ceased to exist. Amsterdam in February 1578 faced exactly the same conditions that had caused the other towns to join the Revolt in the summer of 1572: intense military pressure brought about by the Orangist troops, the absence of help from the royal government in Brussels, and the presence of both returned exiles and civic militias as an alternative focus of loyalty.

I shall not dwell on how Amsterdam shortly after the conclusion of the satisfaction treaty finally joined the Revolt as a result of the *Alteratie* of May 26, 1578. The *Alteratie* displayed the same basic pattern as the earlier revolts in the towns of Holland and Zeeland. It was certainly not brought about by a spontaneous revolt of the inhabitants of Amsterdam against their magistrates. The Catholic ruling elite was deposed by a combination of military pressure from outside, the absence of military support from governor don John, the absence of troops in the service of the town, and the insurrectionist activities of the militias and the returned Calvinist exiles.

The Catholic elite that ruled Amsterdam during the forty years between 1538 and 1578 has never been popular among historians. The main reason was that the latter allowed themselves to be guided by partisan prejudice and an anachronistic perspective. Some historians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example the prolific man of letters, historian and burgomaster's son Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft, were closely related to the Protestant elite who had replaced the Catholic faction. Nineteenth and twentieth century historians up to the 1960s regarded the Revolt as a struggle between Protestants and Catholics and between patriots and pro-Spanish traitors, between good guys and bad guys. They were not likely to display much understanding for the attitude of the pre-*Alteratie* magistrates. The population of Amsterdam between 1572 and 1578—that is, the majority of the population who had not been expelled—would certainly not have agreed with their verdict.

POWER BY CONSTRUCTION: WHICH CITIES WHERE?
PROBLEMS IN SIXTEENTH CENTURY TIMBER
SUPPLIES, SAWMILLS, AND LABOR¹

Elva Kathleen Lyon

Introduction

The ubiquitous presence of wooden structures, wooden transports, and wooden products in the Netherlands in the early sixteenth century made wood an integral but ordinary part of both the urban and the rural landscape.² However, historians of the early modern period tend to see the uses of timber in house construction with a perspective influenced by modern technology.³ This is in spite of the continued wide use of timber for construction in the Americas as well as in parts of northern Europe. This paper asks historians to rethink the practical everyday concerns about the supply of timber for routine construction in the early modern period, and to reconsider the sensitive points at which disaster, destruction, and reconstruction might affect that supply, especially for urban areas. In addition, this paper presents the relevant parts of what little is known about wood, wood processing, and the wood trade before, during, and just after the initial stages of the Dutch Revolt. Both the effect of the warfare of the Dutch Revolt and the rebuilding of cities after the Spanish occupation raise questions about urban wood demand, wood supply, the new scale of the mechanized processing technologies,

¹ This paper is condensed from a chapter in my dissertation “Invited Strangers: The Emergence and Transfer of Technology in Europe and the Americas, 1500 to 1750.” Space constraints do not allow for detailed citations in this essay. For general background material, refer to the works of J. de Vries, A. van der Woude, and N. Porsius. For more on sawmills, see principally J.M. Bos, H. Linde, and J.M. Stikvoort. All the above begin their emphasis with the seventeenth century.

² Wooden buildings could be substantial in size in European cities even before the sixteenth century. See Sir John Froissart, *Chronicles of England, France, Spain and the adjoining countries*, 2 vols. (London, 1803–1810).

³ See Brooke Hindle’s multiple publications for a perspective on pre-industrial wood use and his reference to a “wooden age” in conjunction with early American colonization.

and the labor issues caused by that mechanization. The future answers to the questions will have to address the urban issues of population, occupations, capital, merchant networks, and the physical environment of the city. The ultimate issue is the power of those who succeeded in maintaining or establishing control of the wood trade after the Spanish began to leave the most devastated cities. The power issue also raises questions regarding which cities profited from the wood trade, either as trading centers or as beneficiaries of the wood supply and expertise, and which cities lost economic and political power as the wood trade shifted in scale, location, and processing techniques.

Before the Dutch Revolt, the southern Netherlands enjoyed growth and prosperity on a grand scale, and Antwerp's circumstances serve to model the status quo for the use of timber in building construction before the war began.⁴ Antwerp experienced a building boom, attracting quantities of timber to the city, despite the fact, as Ludovico Guicciardini wrote in 1567, that the Low Countries had "no wood" but made "more furniture and more stacks of wood" than all the other places in Europe combined.⁵ In Antwerp between 1542 and 1568 the building trades produced new structures at the pace of 115 dwellings each year, twice the 66 buildings constructed annually in the city at the start of the century.⁶ In spite of steady construction, the housing demand in Antwerp was beyond what could be met by either the wood supply or the building trades, and in 1567 the demand drove Antwerp rental rates to peak values.⁷

This was the picture in growing cities in many parts of the Low Countries as religious persecution increased and the Dutch Revolt began: the demand for wood was high and there was a steady but inadequate supply. The extreme hardships of war during the Dutch Revolt produced wood shortages that reminded the populace of the painful necessity of the material for shelter, especially in cities. At

⁴ House construction in brick and the use of tiles for the roof did not decrease the use of timber. Houses increased in size and became more complex in layout and interior fittings, still requiring beams, framing, planking the roof, stairs, closet beds, and scaffolding.

⁵ As quoted in Carlo M. Cipolla, *Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1000–1700* (New York, 1994), 252.

⁶ Guido Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation: Underground Protestantism in a Commercial Metropolis, 1550–1577* (Baltimore, Md., 1996), 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*

the siege of Haarlem, the Spanish deforested the area near the Haarlemmermeer by building huts and burning fires, while in the besieged city itself wood disappeared from the wood market, the carpenter's shop, and the home. The Spanish occupation of inland river cities caused a blockade of wood supplies to downstream commercial centers participating in the revolt, further aggravating the situation.⁸

When the Holland cities began to free themselves from the Spanish presence, the depleted wood supply was replenished slowly. Competition for the wood must have been fierce. In Haarlem alone the Spanish depredations and a devastating fire in 1576 resulted in the destruction of over 450 dwellings, four times the number of homes built annually in Antwerp during its peak period of growth.⁹ The building rate and the commensurate consumption of house construction timber in the northern areas of the Low Countries placed a demand on the wood supply comparable to the demand for timber used in ship construction. In spite of this, the Dutch managed a full recovery, successfully entering their Golden Age well prepared with solidly rebuilt cities and an active ship construction industry. What circumstances made the rapid rate of recovery of the wood trade and the building industry possible? Certainly whoever had the capital, the skills, and the opportunity to accomplish such a recovery stood to benefit substantially both economically and politically with respect to construction in any one city.

Genesis and Genius

There has been little research into the Dutch wood trade prior to the proliferation of the wind-driven sawmills in the first half of the seventeenth century. By 1630 the North Holland region of the Zaanstreek near Amsterdam had more than fifty of these giant sawmills and had become the industrial center for milled timber production. Throughout Holland the wind-driven sawmills and other industrial

⁸ An increasing body of dendrochronological data not yet published shows timber coming from the uplands of the Rhine River before the Dutch Revolt.

⁹ Rebuilding took time, and although the Hof van Holland promised to reimburse the Haarlemmers for their losses, it would be many years before this pledge was fulfilled. See Samuel Ampzing, *Beschryvinge ende lof der stad Haerlem* (Haarlem, 1628).

mills on the same scale altered the landscape as well as the labor force.¹⁰ In a chain of cities along the western edge of Holland, the total number of industrial mills capable of processing wood easily exceeded the Zaanstreek total of 1630, challenging the usual tale of a Zaanstreek genesis for industrial timber production (Figure 1).¹¹

By the time the mills had proliferated to such a degree as to establish the Zaanstreek, they had been exported to France, Scotland, Scandinavia, and North America.¹² The scale of the wind-driven sawmills and other industrial mills, as well as the much later concentration of thousands of them in the Zaanstreek, has distracted researchers from the more intriguing question of the path leading to the development of these mills, especially with regard to cities. The usual explanatory device has been to invoke the spontaneous genius theory giving Cornelis Cornelisz. van Uitgeest credit for inventing the wind-driven sawmill sometime in the late 1580s or early 1590s. But as Marc Bloch has pointed out, one must take care not to confuse first appearance with causes.¹³ The spontaneous genius theory in the form of a humble Dutch farmer who became a technological innovator is not logical in the context of observed patterns of technological development, and for the historian it should be the context that matters. Both first appearance as genesis and innovation as genius over-simplify the gradual aspect of technological change.¹⁴

¹⁰ Donna R. Barnes, exhibition catalog *The Butcher, the Baker, the Candlestick Maker: Jan Luyken's Mirrors of Seventeenth Century Dutch Life*, Emily Lowe Gallery, 17 September–31 October 1995, Hofstra Museum, Hofstra University, Hempstead, N.Y., notes p. 124.

¹¹ Simon Hart, "De Zaanstreek en Oost-Zaandam in het bijzonder in het jaar 1731," *Geschrift en Getal*, Hollandse Studiën 9, Uitgave van de Historische Vereniging Holland (Dordrecht, 1976), 26–27 and my own research.

¹² January 1625 instructions to Verhulst to have Francois Fesaert build a wind-driven sawmill in New Netherland: Document C in A.J.F. Van Laer, trans. and ed., *Documents Relating to New Netherland: 1624–1626* (San Marino, Ca., 1924), 24. See also John Shaw, *Water Power in Scotland, 1550–1870* (Edinburgh, 1984), 95; and numerous other cases.

¹³ Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft* (Manchester, 1992), 24–29.

¹⁴ C.A. Lesger also expresses this concern regarding the popular attribution of the rise of the Norwegian wood trade to Reynier Ottsz. van Hinlopen in Hoorn in 1572. He points out that Jansma found Norwegian wood from Amsterdam in Dordrecht around 1550. See C.M. Lesger, *Hoorn als stedelijk knooppunt: Stedensystemen tijdens de late middeleeuwen en vroegmoderne tijd*, Hollandse Studiën, 26 (Hilversum, 1990): 97.

Historians of technology have stressed the gradual aspect of technological change.¹⁵ Gradual change usually accompanies technologies with more complex engineering problems, but often technologies are not part of the historical narrative where the technology itself might require considerable specialized knowledge. The set of premises used by historians in developing an historical narrative in such cases may be nothing more than broad assumptions or expert-sounding explanations that seem to make sense. Joel Mokyr summed up the situation succinctly when he pointed out that “theories of technological change based on geographic, political, religious, military, and scientific factors are typically easy to concoct and hard to reject.”¹⁶ With that caution in mind my emphasis in this essay is on the questions and the possibilities, not facile answers.

Studies of the origin, process, and consequences of technological innovation are fairly recent. They began in the 1950s, are described as a ‘natural history’ approach, and are interdisciplinary. Product innovation is treated as distinct from process innovation, innovations may be radical or incremental, they may diffuse slowly or transfer abruptly, but such innovations are endogenous to the socioeconomic system.¹⁷ Obviously, the emphasis has been on the economic aspects of the innovation in these approaches. By contrast, studies in the field of science, technology, and society expose the many faces of the developers of new technology, assess the impact on society, and reveal the role of the consumer of the technology.

As dear as Cornelis Cornelisz. van Uitgeest may be to the Dutch as the inventor of the wind-driven sawmill, even his biographer Simon Hart perceived the weaknesses in the argument. He seemed to think that Cornelis had married the technology. Hart researched the family connections and pointed out that Cornelis’s spouse was a grain miller’s daughter and that her brother was a partner in the mill. The modifications to the grain mill to create a sawmill may have existed before Cornelis married, and his patent on a portion of the mechanism may have been a necessary protection of his investment

¹⁵ See Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca, NY, 1989), 5–6, 27.

¹⁶ Joel Mokyr, *Twenty-five Centuries of Technological Change: An Historical Survey* (Chur, 1990), 4–5.

¹⁷ Rod Coombs, Paolo Saviotti, and Vivien Walsh, *Economics and Technological Change* (Totowa, N.J., 1987), 5–6. For another discussion, see George Basalla, *The Evolution of Technology* (Cambridge, 1988).

through his marriage.¹⁸ This hypothesis moves the development of the technology into the 1570s, the period of city rebuilding, requiring a closer examination of the wood sources, stockpiling areas, traders, shippers, sawmills, and building trades in the years when the Dutch provinces united.

Transporting and Processing Wood

The shortage of solid studies of the status of the wood, timber, and construction trades in the Low Countries prior to the Dutch Revolt requires a review of what little is known and what may be inferred from collateral evidence.¹⁹ Wood in Europe was harvested primarily from forest stands in areas with sufficient tree growth, a cold enough climate for snow, and an accessible, utilitarian water transport system. Large logs were not moved great distances over land, and trees could only be harvested easily in warm climates if the tree stands lined a sizeable stream or river. Some wood also came into the Low Countries from tropical areas in Africa and the Americas, but in more northern areas wood was a seasonal trade item harvested in the winter months when snowfall provided the slippery surface for sliding the logs and moving them by sled across short inland distances to the edge of the water transport system. The logs could not move to market until after both the spring thaw of the river ice and the subsidence of the spring floods.²⁰ The unprocessed logs or long squared-off blocks of wood were usually floated down a river in large, dangerous rafts that stopped along the way to deliver some of their load at urban wood markets.²¹ Unlike the seasonal trade in grain

¹⁸ Hart, "Cornelis Cornelisz. van Uitgeest en de oudste industriewindmolens in de Zaanstreek," in idem, *Geschrift en getal*, 105. Marrying the technology was a standard means of acquiring it in the early modern period. The much later Amsterdam guild entry list of wind-driven sawmillers shows the same marriage pattern.

¹⁹ See Charles P. Kindleberger, *World Economic Primacy: 1500–1990* (Oxford, 1996), 91, for wood provided to Italian ship construction sites, for Dutch sources, and for comments on the persistence of the fundamental harvesting and transport methods.

²⁰ This system remained the same well into the development of steam and fossil fuel power sources for heavy machinery. There are extant early moving pictures of the old method of wood harvesting and transport as practiced in the Adirondacks of New York State.

²¹ An excellent illustration of the old supply system as it existed around Wawel Castle in Krakow may be seen in Flavio Conti, *The Grand Tour: Homes of Kings* (New

and furs, the seasonal trade in wood possessed the special feature that it required itself to trade. That is, among other uses, wood required wooden ships, wooden docks, wood framed structures, and wooden sawmills.

Prior to the common use of sawmills, wood was processed into boards and planks by saw gangs using a saw mounted in a wooden frame, and in urban areas these sawyers enjoyed guild protection (Figure 2). Sawyers were young, largely unskilled, healthy and strong because the work required hours of hard labor, usually outdoors and under less than ideal conditions. Guild membership meant some protections and a small degree of respect, but the saw gangs, possibly rowdy at times, were more likely to evoke disdain and concern in the minds of the public.²² An effective mechanical device replaced the saw gang with animal power utilizing the horse mill model. Fitted with a single saw in one frame, the machinery of a one-horse mill operated at one horsepower, doing the work of two gangs of men where each saw gang did half a horsepower.²³ The animal power allowed the consistent application of a greater force to the saw blade, and gears controlled the speed of operation.

The power necessary to accomplish the task of sawing wood, particularly oak, presents the physics problem that it requires a greater force to overcome friction than to keep an object moving, and in the case of sawing wood, the force is a deliberate friction against the wood.²⁴ An increase in power is achieved either by increasing the force and/or by increasing the rate of applying the force.²⁵ This is not possible with the limitations of human power, and a higher level

York, 1978), 119. The picture shows the rafted wood, stockpiles, holding pond, and small pieces before the craft shops.

²² Barnes, *Butcher, Baker, Candlestick Maker*, 256–257. Sawyer gangs are not portrayed among the illustrations of occupations by Jost Amman (1568), Jan Joris Van Vliet (1635), Leonard Bramer (c. 1650), or Jan Luyken (1694), lending credence to the idea that this was an occupation with a low social status. By contrast, the English literature on the occupation of sawyers describes the labor in glowing terms well into the nineteenth century. See *The Book of Trades, or Library of the Useful Arts* (London, 1804).

²³ The smallest conversion value for manpower is one-tenth horsepower, but a man can sustain power at one-quarter horsepower. I have chosen to err on the conservative side of labor replacement by using one-quarter horsepower.

²⁴ For this reason Simon Hart's explanation of the rise of the Zaanstreek as the consequence of the presence of many small water-pumping mills seems unlikely.

²⁵ If the mechanical sawing of wood is done too rapidly, the friction causes the wood to burn.

of production could only be accomplished with a larger labor force. Mechanization improved the saw action itself, decreased the number of laborers—reducing the labor cost—and increased the rate of production.

The small animal-powered sawmills may have used saw frames with more than one blade mounted in them to saw two or more boards at a time. They also may have used multiple horses or oxen. Both options would greatly increase the rate of production of timber in periods of high demand or labor shortages. But it is unlikely that these devices operated in the Dutch cities prior to the Dutch Revolt due to the guild protection provided to the sawyers. Furthermore, even during labor shortages immediately following the lifting of Spanish control, animal power may have been scarce.

Both water and wind power were other means of mechanizing saws. Waterpower had been in use for sawmills since the Middle Ages and could be regulated at the water source to the water wheel.²⁶ Such a mill could use gears for rate control and for accomplishing several tasks. Multiple devices operating off one power source were common in horse mills and in water mills.²⁷ What the water-driven sawmill could achieve was little different from the horse mill, but its operating cost was lower because it did not require maintaining an animal. However, the initial outlay was greater, particularly for the vertically mounted waterwheel, and it required an expert for construction (Figure 3). The small water-driven mill with a horizontal wheel, common in Scandinavia, was less costly and often operated as a community facility.²⁸ Small sawmill components were easy to transport across distances and at least one was already in operation as an exported technology in Western Africa.²⁹ Unfortunately, especially in the Netherlands, waterpower was often unrealistic and wind power had the greatest potential.

²⁶ See Frances and Joseph Gies, *Cathedral, Forge, and Waterwheel: Technology and Invention in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1994), for a fairly detailed and non-Eurocentric discussion.

²⁷ See Jan Luyken, "De Grutter" in *Het Menselijk Bedrijf*.

²⁸ John Reynolds, *Windmills and Watermills*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1975). His chapter on horizontal mills (57–65) covers information through the end of the sixteenth century.

²⁹ John Thornton, *Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400–1800* (Cambridge, 1998), 33.

Wind power could be difficult to harness. Erratic breezes, puffs and squalls needed to be regulated to deliver a predictable rate of rotation to the main windshaft or axle. In wind-driven grain mills the sail area on the vanes helped to control the force of the wind. The rotational inertia of the vanes as well as the brake (a heavy gear mounted on the axle or main windshaft) and the weight and friction of the millstones were further controls. It was not a difficult task to add another gear for some other purpose in addition to turning the grindstone. But with large grain mills the usual rate of rotation of the stones could exceed two complete cycles per second.³⁰ Using gears to reduce this rate and adding other devices to convert rotational motion to reciprocating motion in a vertical plane required substantial sophistication in engineering thought and practice. The construction of mills dedicated to sawing wood may not have been as complex as the modifications required for mills to do multiple tasks (Figure 4).³¹

In the developmental stages of mills described above, the concept of multiple tasks (multi-tasking) offers possibilities for a gradual series of technological changes that led to the wind-driven sawmill on the scale seen later.³² Warfare in parts of the Netherlands in the 1570s may have allowed for the modification of mechanical devices to replace guild labor for sawing wood. The technological bottleneck in modifying the existing industrial or grain mills to become makeshift sawmills may have been the extra devices added to the system. Each additional gear or crankshaft was a new cost and a new source of trouble. Too many additions could interfere with mill operation by reducing the net amount of force delivered to the saw frame, the millstones, or other devices. Before the Dutch Revolt, simple modifications for multi-tasking may have developed and flourished outside the city walls in rural areas, small villages, on estates, or in large early industrial settings that included textile fulling mills.

³⁰ Reynolds, *Windmills and Watermills*, 44.

³¹ The illustration is a synthesis by Susan Thilmany using features from Hart, "Cornelis van Uitgeest," 110, and Peter Spier, *Of Dikes and Windmills* (Garden City, NY, 1969), 60.

³² Joel Mokyr has argued for the use of the Darwinian model for the evolution of a technology. See Joel Mokyr, "Evolution and technological change: a new metaphor for economic history?" in Robert Fox, ed., *Technological Change: Methods and Themes in the History of Technology* (Amsterdam, 1996), 63–84.

Changing the windmill orientation to face the wind direction was problematic in mills with multiple tasks utilizing both rotary and reciprocating motion. Both wind direction and the need for enough space meant that small post mills were not good candidates for certain multiple tasks or for conversion to sawmills. Even large skirted mills with caps that could rotate had a problem with the position of the crankshaft and rods relative to the axle or windshaft. For these reasons the floating mill, long in use in Europe, becomes an interesting subject for inquiry for the period following the Dutch Revolt.³³ It could be turned to face the wind, it could be floated to the location of logs, and it could be moved out of danger if the fortunes of war shifted.

Positioned to Profit

Any city with a considerable number of sizeable industrial and grain mills before the revolt was ideally prepared for a new role as an urban processor of wood to provide building timber after the revolt. The mill owner was well situated to take advantage of the reconstruction of a city, and he or she might have had the capital necessary to adapt the mill for multi-tasking. The mills were certainly available in the city in large numbers, since in many cases the mills outside the walls had been dismantled and brought inside in anticipation of a Spanish attack. Nine Leiden mills were disassembled and moved into the city in early 1574, and a mill from outside the city of Leiden was purchased later from Jonkheer Jan van der Does, Lord of Noortwijck, and also moved to the city.³⁴

The expertise to modify the mills or to bring about major construction conferred a degree of power on the holder of that expertise. Many of the same construction experts in the building trades who had escaped religious persecution by the Spanish in Antwerp and other southern cities had moved to Holland. The Anabaptist experts in the building trades in Antwerp declined to one fourth their relative distribution for crafts between the years 1550 and 1585, one of two crafts to exhibit such a dramatic change.³⁵ Meanwhile,

³³ Reynolds, *Windmills and Watermills*, 20.

³⁴ Karien Wentinck, *Rembrandt molenaarszoon* (Leiden, 1991), 13, 17–19.

³⁵ Marnef, *Antwerp in the Age of Reformation*, 190. Only potters declined as much.

the Protestant staple market in cloth with links between the continent and London was strengthened by a reformed church in London at Austin Friars. The London group had construction experts with Holland connections, men such as Lieven de Key, and large amounts of staple market capital.³⁶ Anabaptists were not welcome in England but they were in Haarlem. The London-Haarlem cloth connection overlapped with the timber and construction areas of expertise, an economic synergy that is worth additional investigation. Every industry in early modern Europe was part of a 'skills grouping' that was mutually beneficial, but the connections large scale contractors and architects enjoyed were extraordinary. Just as brewers connected with coopers, grain merchants, and coppersmiths, the carpenters and contractors joined with timber merchants, blacksmiths, sawmill owners, speculators in real estate, and those with capital looking for profitable investments.

After the formation of the United Provinces the old pattern of the wood trade was still in disarray due to the continuing Spanish occupation along the river systems up the Rhine and at other waterways. The Holland cities from Leiden to Alkmaar could not look to Dordrecht, Deventer, or Amsterdam for reliable help, forcing them to use other sources and to find new locations for pick-up and transport, for stockpiling, for converting the raw wood to timber, and for curing. Some cities such as Rotterdam clearly show the shift in timber sources, the increase of capital invested in large stockpiles, and the movement of local sawmills.³⁷ Indeed, the Holland cities along the western edge may have had little interest in returning to past practices since they had a unique opportunity to expand trade under circumstances of reduced regulation. The south to north orientation of the wood trade in these cities was later replaced by the west to east orientation of the more central and concentrated area of the Zaanstreek close to Amsterdam. The significant point here is that the south to north orientation persisted for over half a century, with some Zaanstreek communities less connected with each other than

³⁶ David M. Mitchell, "'It will be easy to make money': Merchant Strangers in London, 1580–1680," in *Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times: Merchants and Industrialists within the Orbit of the Dutch Staple Market*, Hollandse Historische Reeks, 24, ed. C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf (Den Haag, 1995).

³⁷ Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, notary Jacob Duythuysen, multiple entries, reflecting a shift from small scale timber transactions to sawmill shares and ownership, large transactions, and the involvement of Medemblik and Hoorn timber brokers.

with their respective urban south to north links.³⁸ More recent studies of wind-driven sawmills indicate that the list of mills as found in Simon Hart's work is not complete, and my personal research shows that the number of sawmills of any type in the south to north orientation is much larger than has been reported.³⁹

Before the Dutch Revolt, the trade in wood had been under the control of urban mercantile networks that were toppled by war and replaced by new religious and immigrant merchant networks capable of adapting rapidly to the altered circumstances. Marjolein 't Hart has contended that the politics of the Dutch during the Dutch Revolt "were determined by continuously changing coalitions of provinces, cities, and factions" rather than by a strong state or a national sentiment.⁴⁰ Warfare led to a market crisis as well as a political crisis, and the trade in wood was equally susceptible to "changing coalitions" of "factions," especially religious factional realignment or solidification.

The particular way in which a market crisis is resolved during a period of warfare may or may not be sustainable after the end of the war. In a few stable cities, there were merchant networks in the wood trade that survived the upheaval, continued to function through the revolt, and persisted after the formation of the United Provinces. One Roman Catholic wood merchant network in Amsterdam prospered during and after the Dutch Revolt. Its family connections, which guaranteed the continuing trade in wood, were indispensable given the need to have sufficient assets available through investors to act as a buffer against market fluctuations in order to protect the relatively small profit margin characteristic of the trade.⁴¹

³⁸ Lesger, *Hoorn als stedelijk knooppunt*. Lesger's network perspective covers the wood trade in Hoorn and the development of sawmills.

³⁹ My personal communication with researchers has turned up additional mills in both large and small communities in the south to north orientation, most before 1625.

⁴⁰ Marjolein 't Hart, *The making of a bourgeois state: War, politics and finance during the Dutch revolt* (Manchester, 1993), 6.

⁴¹ S.A.C. Dudok van Heel, "Twee figuren te veel: De familie Cat en hun memorietafel uit 1517," *Jaarboek van het Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie* 50 (1996): 199–223. The careful summaries of the family documents expose one group's Roman Catholic connections to the wood trade in Amsterdam before, during, and after the Dutch Revolt. Marriages merge wood merchants with goldsmiths, apothecaries, shippers, block makers, carpenters, and the medical profession. By 1578 a descendant of this family, the Roman Catholic Jan Claeszen Cat, was a burgomaster in Amsterdam.

The Spanish consumption of wood, principally for ships, may have been the reason there was a disproportionate number of Roman Catholics among the wood merchants and the men active in the related building trades after the cities in Holland had defeated the Spanish troops. Leiden, for example, expelled nearly as many Spanish loyalist wood merchants, brick manufacturers, and construction experts as it did priests, nuns, and others in service to the Catholic Church.⁴²

The persistent presence of Roman Catholics in the wood trade during the Dutch Revolt makes the Anabaptist migration of construction experts from Antwerp even more interesting. There must have been a point in time in each city when the separate issues of religious beliefs, capital resources, mill ownership, and construction needs were hotly contested by a variety of factions involved in the wood and construction trades. Those merchants already deeply involved in wood purchases and sales stood to gain from the increased demand caused by rebuilding. But there were two obstacles to the rapid accumulation of large stockpiles of wood following periods of conflict. There were the old habits of how the wood was purchased, and how it was held for market. The standard answer to purchasing problems and a small profit margin in the wood trade before the Revolt was to order in advance and then commit the wood order to small middlemen who stockpiled the wood against future demands and as a protection against price fluctuations.⁴³ Such middlemen existed before the Dutch Revolt, but the small stockpiles disappeared under Spanish attacks and sieges, possibly wiping out the financial investment of the middlemen and trapping merchants with obligations to pay suppliers. Only the cities wholly supportive of the Spanish and fully cooperating with them could expect the small stockpiles to be safe and the wood trade to continue, albeit on Spanish terms. Large stockpiles became possible only after the reduction of hostilities and the proliferation of large mechanized sawmills.

⁴² W.A. Fasel, 'De Leidse Glippers,' *Jaarboekje voor Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde van Leiden en Omstreken* 48 (1956): 68–78.

⁴³ William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York, 1991). In chapter four, "The Wealth of Nature: Lumber," Cronon discusses the development of the wood market for the building of Chicago and for the expansion of the American West.

Conclusions and Questions

To return to Joel Mokyr's concern regarding the apparent reasonableness of theories of technological change beyond those of an economical nature, several of the principal categories Mokyr mentioned shed light on the circumstances under which the evolution and proliferation of the wind-driven sawmill took place. There were military pressures, political alignments, religious overtones, and geographical conditions, any one of which could offer a plausible theory for the technological change. Simon Hart emphasized the geography, drawing principally on his familiarity with the documentary resources of Amsterdam and the Zaanstreek. The alternative north to south geography of western Holland at an earlier date needs to be explored further. C.A. Lesger focused on Hoorn, leaving out of his network theory of commercial interaction cities further south such as Haarlem, and stressing competition with Alkmaar and Amsterdam in his discussion of timber. Additionally, Hoorn was neither a devastated city nor a river city and located so far north as to be unrepresentative of the wood trade in the Low Countries in general.

The trade in wood before 1600 must be studied in the largest possible relevant context without regard to modern ideas of provincial or national boundaries and with special attention to "changing coalitions" of "factions" as discussed here. The largest geographical context requires noting the differences between the river rafting of timber and the changes effected by the successful and regular use of ships for timber transport across larger distances. In the period from the beginning of the Dutch Revolt through the early years of the establishment of the United Provinces, some Dutch cities such as Haarlem were so devastated and cut off from their usual networks of interaction that the problems of reconstruction resemble more the nineteenth century new construction patterns of the isolated cities of St. Louis or Chicago on the treeless American plains than the pattern of continued interaction and expansion enjoyed by cities such as Hoorn or Amsterdam earlier in the sixteenth century.⁴⁴ William Cronon stressed that Chicago triumphed over St. Louis in the battle for commercial centrality because it received its wood rapidly across a large body of water, not slowly down a river. That

⁴⁴ William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis*.

alone could not account for the rise of Chicago over St. Louis, since St. Louis was settled initially and had timber trade middlemen in place. What set Chicago apart was the appearance of major wood brokers who sorted the wood by quality and stockpiled on an enormous scale to avoid sudden losses.

The geography along with the large stockpiles compares effectively across time, but only after the regular use of large sawmills. Before that regular use, the circumstances of the timber trade were marked by the bottlenecks awaiting the sawmill technology. The role of the upheavals of the Dutch Revolt in facilitating the emergence of the wind-driven sawmill technology requires additional study. The immigrant entrepreneurs, the general increase in population after the Revolt, and the continuing staple market in cloth may all have contributed to the new pattern in the timber trade. The same elements that fed into other trade disputes during the Dutch Revolt affected the trade in wood, whether it was ships or river security, Baltic trade or trade on the Meuse, an alliance with England or an entrepot shifted to Emden. The capital available through the Dutch staple market in cloth may have played a decisive role both in rebuilding the city of Haarlem and in realigning the trade in wood, and that capital may have been provided by the major cloth merchants in the foreign community at Austin Friars Church in London. This theory gives considerable power to the cloth merchants, who would have been able to select which cities to rebuild, to decide who would do the rebuilding, and to choose what cities they would abandon in order to continue the cloth trade with less disruption.⁴⁵

During the Dutch Revolt the trade in wood was altered in some cities from the steady pre-war pattern of supplying, stockpiling, curing, processing, grading, and marketing. The sources of supply changed, different cities stockpiled, and the routes of transport shifted. Mechanical processing transformed the Dutch landscape after the Revolt and caused the disappearance of the majority of the sawyer labor force from the cities, contested by the sawyers' guild of Amsterdam as late

⁴⁵ The Haarlem-London network David Mitchell discussed had links to the Baltic trade in furs and wood through Peter Jacobs and Giles Van Brugh. One segment of the network through Seth Corszen included construction experts and was involved in the wood trade and real estate speculation in Haarlem, Hoorn, and Amsterdam. Over time this network gradually divested itself of properties held in the southern Netherlands.

as 1620.⁴⁶ After Amsterdam allowed the formation of a company of sawmill builders in 1630, the nearby Zaanstreek became firmly established as an industrial area, and the circumstances leading to substantive alterations in the wood trade ceased to exist.⁴⁷

Part of the question of who had what power in the wood trade lies with the problems of developing mechanical power during the process of technological innovation. The results of the development and use of large-scale sawmills on a regular basis were to increase production, reduce labor, create a new category of expertise, and to require more capital outlay to modify or build a mill. This form of early industrialization pushed the worker out of the picture, placed the technology beyond the reach of the average man, and conferred more power on those with financial and technological capital, with the result that very specific cities were the beneficiaries of those shifts in power.

⁴⁶ Hart, "De eerste houtzaagmolen te Amsterdam," 113.

⁴⁷ Ibid.




Fig. 1. In the late sixteenth century Holland was laced with waterways and dotted with inland bodies of water allowing the transport of timber and other materials. By 1630 more industrial mills had been built and operated in the cities along the western edge of Holland than had been constructed in the Zaanstreek (see text).




Fig. 2. The two sawyers worked together as a "gang" using a "gang saw". The saw blade was mounted in a wooden frame, a fundamental construction that did not change during mechanization.




Fig. 3. In this drawing five gang saws are mounted in one saw frame sliding in a guide. The lower edge of the saw frame is connected to a rod. In turn, the rod would be connected to the crankshaft of a vertically mounted water wheel. A ratchet moves the log carriage forward with each stroke of the saw frame. The five blades of this small sawmill do the work of ten men.




Fig. 4. The basic internal mechanism of a wind-driven sawmill are shown here simplified from more comprehensive drawings by Simon Hart and Peter Spier (see text). The gear from the windshaft (axle) is shown at the top meshing with the gear for the crankshaft. Rods attached to the crankshaft move up and down to raise and lower the saw frames. There are twelve blades attached to the frames in this sawmill allowing it to do the work of twenty-four men.

INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC POLICIES IN
HABSBURG HOLLAND: THE DECLINE OF GOUDA'S
BREWING INDUSTRY, 1510–1568*

Richard Yntema

This paper analyzes the role of institutions and government policies in the decline of Gouda's brewing industry in the first half of the sixteenth century. In Holland, town governments and Habsburg officials both had the power to enact legislation that could fundamentally shape local economic performance. Although the literature stresses the role of municipal governments in defending the town's economic interests and liberties against the authority, power, and ambition of Habsburg officials and policies before the Dutch Revolt,¹ the relationship is more complex. Town governments often invoked the power of central government officials to advance municipal economic interests and the town's vision of the common good of Holland or of the 'Netherlands.' So too, Habsburg officials kept a watchful eye over town officials since the interests of the town's residents varied greatly and it was an open question if the town officials were indeed promoting the 'common good' of the town's citizens or merely their own economic and political well-being and that of their families and allies.² The decline of Gouda's brewing industry demonstrates both the impact and the incentives, limits, and interdependence of local and central government officials in shaping economic policy and performance in Habsburg Holland.

Between 1520 and the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt in the 1560s, Gouda's brewing industry declined from Holland's largest and most

* I would like to thank Wayne te Brake and James Tracy for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

¹ See James D. Tracy, *A Financial Revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands: Renten and Renteniers in the County of Holland, 1515–1565* (Berkeley, Cal., 1984), 105.

² See J.J. Woltjer, 'Het conflict tussen Willem Baerdes en Hendrick Dirckszoon,' *Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 86 (1971): 178–199. For an overview of an inquiry into the composition and practices of municipal governments by the count of Holland in 1526, see Bart Ibelings, 'Economie en politiek in de Hollandse Stad: De informatie van 1526,' in *Ondernemers en bestuurders: Economie en politiek in de Noordelijke Nederlanden in de late Middeleeuwen en vroegmoderne tijd*, ed. Clé Lesger and Leo Noordegraaf (Amsterdam, 1999), 259–276.

renowned export brewing center into an industry that primarily served the local market. Historians have tended to view the loss of Gouda's export markets due to protective tariffs in the Southern Netherlands and the growth of the industry there as the most important reasons for the industry's decline. Given the close relation between the development of Gouda's brewing industry and the growth and then stagnation of the regional economy between 1470 and 1540, the question remains why Gouda's export brewing industry did not mirror the growth of the regional economy between 1540 and 1565.³ This question becomes all the more compelling given the growth of export brewing in Delft after 1540.⁴

Institutions and regulations played a decisive role in the decline of Gouda's brewing industry, especially the regulations enacted by the 'central government' in the 1540s. The institutional and regulatory history of Gouda's brewing industry is complex, with both formal and informal institutions influencing the industry's development.⁵ Before the Dutch Revolt, a variety of Habsburg and municipal bodies and officials played a role in regulating the brewing industry. Frequently conflicts took place between government officials about how the industry should be regulated. Even when regulations were enacted, often they were not enforced, especially before 1540, due to the opposition of many brewers as well as jurisdictional disputes between the town's *vroedschap* (council) and the town's *castelyn* (governor of the castle) and *schout* (sheriff). The town's brewers were, in fact, sharply divided about if, and how, the industry should be regulated. Some contemporary observers argued that the lack of regulation was the cause of the industry's decline, while others argued that the regulation that existed was to blame for the decline.

When Gouda's brewing industry began to decline in the late 1510s, Habsburg officials, or the central government, ordered Gouda's town

³ For trends in the regional economy, see Herman van der Wee, "Trade in the Southern Netherlands," in idem, *The Low Countries in the Early Modern World* (Brookfield, Vt., 1993), 87–114.

⁴ For the intervention of the count of Holland's administration in Delft and their concern about the governance of the town by the brewers who dominated the town government in the late 1540s and 1550s, see J.J. Woltjer, "Een Hollands stadsbestuur in het midden van de 16e eeuw: brouwers en bestuurders te Delft," in *De Nederlanden in de late middeleeuwen*, ed. D.E.H. de Boer and J.W. Marsilje (Utrecht, 1987), 261–279.

⁵ Locating the incentives that led historical actors to make political decisions that shaped economic performance is an aim of this paper. For the importance of such 'micro-history,' see the "Comment" by Anver Greif in *Frontiers of Development Economics: The Future in Perspective*, ed. Gerald M. Meier and Joseph E. Stiglitz (New York, 2000), 335–339.

government to take steps to better regulate and stimulate the industry's growth. In 1518, Habsburg officials enacted legislation instructing the town on how it was to regulate the brewing industry. As the region's economic growth slowed in the 1520s and 1530s, the town's *vroedschap* often failed to enact the regulations required by the central government since the regulations could not be agreed upon.⁶ Technological and institutional changes elsewhere in Holland that permitted greater economies of scale in brewing prompted much of the debate in Gouda. Both Gouda's brewers and government officials were sharply divided about whether or not to permit these change in Gouda and if such changes would serve the 'common good.' These debates were intertwined with another set of debates between the town's *castelyn* and *schout* and the town's *vroedschap* about the right to make and enforce law within the town and the extent to which the laws were fairly enforced. Uncertainty regarding the regulation of the industry and the enforcement of the law hindered the industry's development. The appeals by the *castelyn*, *schout*, and *vroedschap* to central government officials in the late 1530s, set the stage for the central government's decisive intervention in Gouda's brewing industry in the 1540s.

Regulations enacted by the count of Holland's administration in the 1540s were pivotal in the continued decline of Gouda's brewing industry. In an effort to counter the trend toward large-scale, 'monopolistic' brewing and promote the 'common good,' Habsburg officials enacted regulations that prevented Gouda's brewers from realizing economies of scale. Moreover, Gouda's *castelyn* and *schout* advocated and enforced the regulations, even though the rules under which Gouda's brewers brewed put them at a disadvantage in comparison to brewers in Delft. Gouda's town government vigorously petitioned Habsburg officials to be permitted to brew according to the same rules as brewers elsewhere in Holland, but to no avail. Consequently, Gouda's industry continued to decline during the 1540s, while Delft's brewing industry prospered and benefited from the upturn in the

⁶ The evidence presented below shows that contrary to the claims made by Pinkse, for most of the early sixteenth century Gouda's brewing industry was not strictly regulated. According to Pinkse, the strict 'system of ordinances' governing the brewing industry was one of the primary reasons for the industry's decline. As will be shown below, this only applies to the 1540s. See V.C.C.J. Pinkse, "Het Goudse kuitbier," in *Gouda zeven eeuwen stad: Hoofdstukken uit de geschiedenis van Gouda*, ed. A. Scheygrond (Gouda, 1972), 91–128.

regional economy that set in at that time. By the time the officials in Brussels enacted a short-lived uniform ordinance for Holland's brewing industry in 1550, Delft's brewers had consolidated their leadership position in Holland's brewing industry and Gouda's brewers had lost their dominant market position, a position they were unable to regain in afterwards.

I

In the early sixteenth century, Gouda was Holland's largest export brewing center and brewing dominated the local economy.⁷ With over 153 breweries in operation in the 1510s, the town exported beers to markets throughout Holland, Flanders, Brabant, and Zeeland—as well as France and England—and transported grains back from these regions to be processed by the town's brewers.⁸ Situated at the intersection of two rivers, the Holland IJssel and the Gouwe, Gouda had developed into a regional brewing center in the fourteenth century.⁹ Located along a water route through Holland that linked markets in Flanders and Brabant with trading partners to the North, Gouda was a place where tolls were levied and much of the town's prosperity resulted from the trade and transit of goods through the town sluices.¹⁰ Thus, Gouda's citizens and brewers had ready access to transport and shipping, not only for grains and other raw mate-

⁷ See *Informacie up den staet, faculteyt, ende gelegentheyt van de steden ende dorpen van Hollant en Vrieslant om daerna te reguleren de nyeuwe schiltale, gedaen in den jare MDXIV*, ed. R. Fruin (Leiden, 1866). For Gouda, 372–386, Delft 322–339, and Haarlem 6–17.

⁸ For the number of brewers in Gouda in 1515, see *Rechtsbronnen der Stad Gouda*, ed. L.M. Rollin Couquerque and A. Meerkamp van Embden ('s-Gravenhage, 1917), 292, note 3. There were 134 male brewers and 19 female brewers. In 1546 there were 100 brewers.

⁹ For a recent overview of Gouda's economy in this period, see Koen Goudriaan, "Gouda in de middeleeuwen," in *Gouda*, ed. Wim Denslagen (Zeist, 2001), 13–27.

¹⁰ For the early growth of Gouda's brewing industry see D.E.H. de Boer, *Graaf en Grafiek: sociale en economische ontwikkelingen in het middeleeuwse "Noordholland" tussen 1345 en 1415* (Leiden, 1978). For the growing importance of the trade routes through Gouda, see B. Ibelings, "De route "binnendunen". De scheepvaarroute langs de Goudse sluis en tol, de Wassenaerse Gouwesluis en de Spaarndammertol (13e tot 16e eeuw)," in *Vander Rekeninghe. Bijdragen aan het symposium over onderzoek en editieproblematiek van middeleeuws rekeningmateriaal*, ed. D.E.H. de Boer, J.W. Marsilje and J.G. Smit (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 1998), 221–255.

rials used in the brewing industry, but also for the distribution of the beers they brewed.¹¹

Gouda's brewers brewed a premium beer similar in style to the beer brewed in Hamburg.¹² In the early sixteenth century, Gouda's *keut* beer was a relatively expensive beer renowned for its richness and strength.¹³ According to a privilege granted Gouda's brewers by the Count of Holland in 1508, towns in Holland, Zeeland, and Flanders could not tax beer imported from Gouda higher than they taxed 'double beers' brewed in their town. As the name double beer suggests, in the hierarchy of richness and alcohol content, 'double beers' rank above regular, everyday beer and above the small beer much of the early modern population consumed.¹⁴ In a case before the Grote Raad of Mechelen, Middelburg's magistrates claimed in the early 1520 that "Gouda's *keut* beers are considered to be extraordinary, just like wine is considered to be extraordinary."¹⁵ Gouda's beers stood in a class above the everyday beers consumed by citizens, craftsmen, and servants or the small beer consumed by the poor.

Wars and invasions, currency instability and debasement, and high grain prices affected Gouda's and Holland's economy in the 1520s and 1530s. About 1520, the brewing industry in Gouda began to decline. Between 1520 and 1560, the *hopgeld* revenues show a declining trend. Production declined from approximately 340,000 barrels

¹¹ Gouda's brewers also had access to good brewing water and peat supplies from the surrounding countryside.

¹² In the late fourteenth century Gouda's brewers were regulated by an assize that had them brewing in the style of Hamburg. Regulations required Gouda's brewers to use barrels that were the size of barrels used by Hamburg's brewers. The displacement of Hamburg's beers in its traditional export markets was facilitated by the protective tariffs that were levied on Hamburg beer by the counts of Holland as they sought to promote local industries and increase their tax revenues.

¹³ Van Zanden argues that the attempt to halt decline of the brewing industry in Gouda through producing cheap '*kuitbeer*' was only partially successful in maintaining market share. See Jan Luiten van Zanden, "Holland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden in de periode 1500–1570: Divergerende ontwikkelingen of voortgaande economische integratie?," in *Studia Historica Oeconomica. Liber Amicorum Herman Van der Wee*, eds. A. Aerts, B. Henau, P. Janssens, and R. van Uytven (Leuven, 1993) 357–367: 364–65.

¹⁴ A copy of the privilege is contained in Algemeen Rijksarchief Brussels, Grote Raad van Mechelen (hereafter GRM), Dossier Beroepen 40, letter c.

¹⁵ See Richard J. Yntema, "Entrepreneurship and Technological Change in Holland's Brewing Industry, 1500–1580," in *Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Early Modern Times*, ed. C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf (Den Haag, 1995), 185–201: 188. Over the course of the sixteenth century, Gouda's *kuit* beer became a relatively weak beer and was less expensive than other beers. See R.W. Unger, *A History of Brewing in Holland, 900–1900: Economy, Technology, and the State* (Leiden, 2001), 125–30.

in 1518 and 1519 to less than 90,000 barrels in the late 1560s. The decline in output, however, was not consistent. There was a period of recovery in the mid-1530s, followed by a declining trend in 1540s. The decline in output in Gouda contrasts sharply with the increased production in Delft. While Gouda's brewers brewed more beer than Delft's brewers in 1510, fifty years later, Delft's brewers produced more beer. In the 1550s and 1560s, Delft's brewers brewed more than 500,000 barrels per year, while Gouda's brewers produced less than 125,000 barrels.¹⁶

In the literature, historians have cited several causes to explain the decline of Gouda's brewing industry. As contemporary observers and scholars since have noted, the protective tariffs levied on Gouda's beers and the construction and development of new breweries in areas where Gouda's brewers had traditionally exported their beers, especially in Flanders and Zeeland, contributed to the industry's decline.¹⁷ Yet, facing similar market conditions, Delft's brewing industry experienced remarkable growth between 1540 and 1570. The differing trajectories of the brewing industry in Gouda and Delft during this period suggests that institutions and circumstances specific to Gouda played an important role in the decline of Gouda's brewing industry.

¹⁶ See Pinkse, "Het Goudse kuitbier," 128 for estimates of Gouda's output between 1480 and 1580. According to Pinkse's estimates, in the 1550 Gouda's brewers' average annual production was about 125,000 barrels, and in the 1560s it was about 100,000 barrels.

¹⁷ For the most comprehensive arguments regarding the growth and decline of Gouda's brewing industry, albeit with many spurious claims, see Pinkse, "Het Goudse kuitbier." Pinkse models the industry's rise and decline, in part, in terms of changes in transport costs of inputs and output and protective tariffs. Jan Luiten van Zanden has compared the tax revenues from the *hophgeld* in Gouda to the general phases of economic growth for Antwerp discerned by Herman van der Wee. Van Zanden does not touch upon the institutional argument advanced in this paper in explaining the deviance between the decline of Gouda's brewing industry and the growth of the regional economy after 1540, instead he argues that the growth of the industry in Gouda's export markets accounts for Gouda's decline. See Van Zanden, "Holland en de Zuidelijke Nederlanden," 364–65. Richard Unger also examines the decline of Gouda's brewing industry. See Unger, 73–5. Also see F. Egmond, "De strijd om het dagelijks bier," in Lesger and Noordegraaf, *Ondernemers en bestuurders*, 153–191: 161.

The Governance of the Gouda and the Brewing Industry

The institutional structures governing Gouda's brewing industry in the sixteenth century had long histories by 1500. The town government and the Count of Holland both shaped the legislation governing the town's industry. The authority of the count and the town to regulate the industry stemmed from what sixteenth century townsmen called 'time immemorial.' The town had received the right to regulate the industry in charters granted the town dating from 1272.¹⁸ The Count's rights and interests in the industry were rooted in the Count's authority and power to rule. The Count also had the right to collect taxes on the industry, including the *gruitgeld* and *hopgeld* which stemmed from the regalian rights to the wilderness.¹⁹

Within Gouda, two officials upheld and represented the count's authority within the town: the *castelyn* and the *schout*.²⁰ Unlike other major cities in Holland, in Gouda there was a *castelyn* who had considerable power and authority within the town. The *castelyn* was the military head of the castle that protected the count's frontiers. Significantly, one of the *castelyn* sources of income in Gouda was that of farming the office of *schout*. The *castelyn* thus directly or indirectly could influence the *schout* who was a part the *gerecht* (the town's court) that enacted and enforced law in the town. The *castelyn*'s authority over the town was also more direct. In the 1540s, for example, officials in Brussels directly consulted the *castelyn* regarding the proper way to regulate the industry and followed his recommendation.

The *schout* upheld public order and enforced the law within the town and, as noted, in Gouda farmed his office from the *castelyn*. The *schout* was responsible for enforcing the town's ordinances and laws, while the *schepenen* pronounced justice. The *schout* earned income from the payment of fines he received when the *gerecht* found an

¹⁸ See Goudriaan, "Gouda in de middeleeuwen," 13–14.

¹⁹ The *gruitgeld* was a part of the Count's domains dating back to before the thirteenth century. It was originally a tax levied on ingredients (*gruit*) gathered in the wilderness to flavor beer. As the technology of brewing beer with hops developed in Holland in the early 1300s, brewers switched over to the use of hops instead of *gruit*; consequently, the count of Holland imposed a tax on the hops used by the brewers each time they brewed to compensate the loss of revenue from the *gruitgeld*. For the early history of these taxes, see G. Doorman, *De middeleeuwse brouwerij en de gruit* ('s-Gravenhage, 1955).

²⁰ For an introduction to Gouda's government see *Rechtsbronnen*, iii ff. Also see Matthieu Roest, "Het stadbestuur tussen 1350 en 1795," in Denslagen, *Gouda*, 78–82.

individual guilty. Thus, the *schout*'s financial self-interest was an incentive to see that the law was upheld. Since the *schout* represented the count in matters of justice, the *schout* could be especially influential with the central government since he could appeal directly to the count and his administrators for help and support in his work.

In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, Gouda's *vroedschap* also enacted ordinances and statutes governing the town, including the brewing industry.²¹ Thus, both the *gerecht* and the *vroedschap* had or claimed the right to write law in the town. Since the wealthiest brewers dominated the *vroedschap*, these brewers had a significant voice in the processes regulating the industry. In addition to the *vroedschap* and the *gerecht*, the *brouwerie* also regulated the brewing industry in the early 1500s.²² In the 1510s, it was only in cases of dispute that the town's *vroedschap* became involved in the process.²³ Unfortunately detailed records of the meetings of the membership of the *brouwerie* have not survived. During and after the mid-1520s, however, Gouda's *vroedschap* and *gerecht* played a direct role in the industry's regulation.

Gouda's burgomasters also had an especially influential voice in formulating the town's political and economic policies. Within the town, the burgomasters' positions and influence must have weighed heavily in the formulation of local policies. Beyond the towns' jurisdiction, the burgomasters played a critical role in representing the town's interests with the various supra-local institutions. The town's burgomasters traveled extensively on behalf of the town's brewing industry to have protective tariffs levied on Gouda beers lifted and to secure privileges for the town's brewers. The burgomasters also played a critical role in the negotiations between the town and the count's officials regarding the brewing industry.

For much of the first half of the sixteenth century, disputes and conflicts within Gouda between the different bodies empowered to

²¹ The right of the *vroedschap* to enact ordinances dated from the period before the town received its first charter in 1272. In the mid-1520s, the *vroedschap* affirmed its right to enact ordinances (*keuren*) governing the town. See *Rechtsbronnen*, xxiii–xxv.

²² In contrast to the aforementioned groups, the records of the *brouwerie* have been lost. It is questionable if the *brouwerie* and the Brewers Guild can be equated. It is likely that these were distinct organizations. Records for the Brewers Guild have also been lost.

²³ *Rechtsbronnen*, 505–6.

enact laws and carry out justice in the town significantly shaped the way in which the brewing industry operated and was governed. The governance of Gouda's brewing industry was in large measure shaped by the ongoing conflicts between the town's *vroedschap* and the *castelyn* and *schout*.²⁴ In the 1520s and 1530s, legislation governing Gouda's brewing industry often could not be agreed upon and when it was, it was often not enforced. As shown below, the juridical and political conflicts between the town's *castelyn* and the *schout*, on the one hand, and Gouda's town government, on the other, greatly influenced the governance of Gouda's brewing industry. These conflicts became all the more important since they intertwined with the fundamental conflicts between the town's brewers about how the industry should be regulated in the face of the technological and marketing changes that were transforming the brewing industry in the Low Countries.

The Counts of Holland also had a marked interest in Gouda and the town's brewing industry. Gouda was one of Holland's six major cities and a voting member of the States of Holland. In the early sixteenth century, the brewing industry generated substantial sources of income for count's domains in Gouda, including the *hopgeld*. To promote the prosperity of the town's brewing industry and to increase his domain revenues, the count's administration granted the town important privileges. For example, in 1508 and again in 1519, towns were prohibited from levying protective tariffs on beer brewed in Gouda.

These privileges were one of the foundations on which Gouda's export industry was based in the early sixteenth century. The count's administration could also intervene more directly in the town's industry. In 1518, for example, the officials in the count's Court of Holland enacted a privilege to reverse the decline in the count's tax revenues from Gouda's brewing industry. Yet, the interests of the count's administration in the town and the brewing industry were not merely

²⁴ According to Meerkamp van Embden, the causes of the disputes between the *castelyn* and the *vroedschap* are unknown: *Rechtsbronnen*, xxiv. These disputes apparently start in the 1520s and continue until 1540. See *Rechtsbronnen*, 573, footnote 1. There is no evidence about how the matter was resolved. The entries in Gouda's *Vroedschap* Resolutions are more extensive than the material published in the *Rechtsbronnen*.

financial: it also attempted to insure the governance in the town for the good of the community. As shown below, the privilege of 1518 played a pivotal role in the debates that unfolded in the town in the following decades about the governance of Gouda's brewing industry.

II

As Holland's economy began to grow in the 1490s, Gouda's brewing industry also entered a period of growth. Two of the most important regulations governing the industry were the assize that determined the quality of Gouda's beer and the ordinances governing the collection of the *hopgeld* that restricted Gouda's brewers to brewing 31 barrels of beer *stock sticx* per brew.²⁵ As long as these ordinances were enforced, along with a municipal ordinance limiting annual production, the laws governing the industry had far-reaching consequences for each individual brewer and the collective welfare of the town. When the regulations were agreed upon and enforced, the price and quality dimensions along which the town's brewers directly competed were relatively well defined. These regulations also prohibited brewers from expanding output and profiting from the economies of scale inherent in brewing; consequently, the town's output was distributed over a broader range of the town's brewers and there was a ceiling on the income a brewer could earn directly from brewing.

Detailed evidence about how the assize was set is lacking. Sporadic evidence in the town records, however, shows that the *vroedschap* and the *gerecht* set the assize between the 1490s and the early 1510s. For much of the 1510s, the assize appears to have been typically set by the town's *brouwerie*, made up primarily of brewers. Likewise, given the evidence available, it is not clear how strictly output restrictions were enforced in the town during this period of growth.

In early 1518, as the industry's output reached a turning point, the *vroedschap* suddenly stepped in and regulated the quality of the

²⁵ Throughout the paper, the barrels are barrels *stock sticx*. The assize for the brewers regulated the amount and types of grain to be used in brewing a specific length of beer, and often the price the beer could be sold for was also established. For regulations governing the brewing industry in 1515, see *Rechtsbronnen*, 292–5.

beer. The *vroedschap*'s action was a marked change in the industry's governance. Notably, the *vroedschap* increased the amount of grain specified by the headmen and representatives of the *brouwerie* to be used in brewing Gouda's beers, thus increasing the quality and the production costs of the town's beer.²⁶ This action was undoubtedly sparked by an investigation of Gouda's brewing industry undertaken by the Count of Nassau, stadhouder of Holland, and the President and Council of the Court van Holland.²⁷ The declining tax revenues earned on Gouda's beers had led these officials to intervene ordering the town government to improve the quality of Gouda's beers so that its market share would once again rise or to face serious repercussions.²⁸ Since the town government could not enact regulations governing the industry, the Count of Holland's administration enacted a privilege to this end to promote the town's welfare.

The 1518 privilege employed scathing language in condemning the self-seeking greed of the industry's leaders and the negligence of the town government in explaining the decline in tax revenues that had resulted from the 'disdain' for Gouda brewed beer.²⁹ According to the privilege, Gouda's beers were despised because of "the fault and shortcomings of the deans, headmen, and assayers (*keurmeesters*) who are elected according to the brewers' appetite, greed, and petition; and even though, once again, they should have respect and regard for the maintenance of the old by-laws, statutes, and ordinances of the aforesaid *brouwerie*, the deans, headmen, and assayers as shown above executed and discharged this very poorly, preferring instead their own gain and profit before the common welfare of the aforesaid city."³⁰

²⁶ Beginning in February of 1518, a number of *vroedschap* resolutions increase the amount of grain to be used by Gouda's. See *Rechtsbronnen*, 514 ff.

²⁷ A copy of the privilege is contained GRM, Dossier Beroepen 40, letter b.

²⁸ The privilege illustrates the integration of the Emperor's administration and its fiscal and economic aims. According to the privilege, the count had once earned substantial tax revenues on the beers brewed in Gouda that were sold in Brabant, Holland, Zeeland, and especially Flanders. Now, however, the accounts of the receiver general in Flanders showed that count's income from the taxes levied in Flanders on Gouda beer had greatly declined. According to the attorney general, the decline in tax revenues was due to the poor quality of the Gouda beer. Prior to remedying the situation, the *stadhouder*, the *raad van Holland* and the *rekenkamer van Holland* had fully informed themselves regarding the practices of Gouda's brewers. GRM, Dossier Beroepen, letter b.

²⁹ This evidence is also cited by Egmond, "Strijd om het dagelijks bier," 168–169.

³⁰ GRM, Dossier Beroepen, letter b.

In terms of modern regulatory theory, the brewers were alleged to have fully captured control of the industry with the compliance of the town government. Yet, the burgomasters, *schepenen*, and *vroedschap* were also responsible for the situation. They had been negligent in allowing and tolerating “the brewers to select their own deans, headmen, and assayers, who . . . [kept] an eye more on their own profit, and that of their friends’ and kinsmen’s, rather than on the profit and welfare our aforesaid city and community.”³¹

Thus, according to count’s administration, the town government’s actions and inaction harmed the “welfare and prosperity of the community” and the count’s “rights and domains.” By admonishing the town government for being negligent in performing their duties and upholding the common good, the count’s administration positioned itself as upholding the interests of the town and the good of the community against the self-seeking interest of corrupt town officials.

The privilege of 1518 prescribed far-reaching changes in the governance of the industry. Based on advice of the Count of Nassau, the president and members of the council, and the Chamber of Accounts in Holland, the burgomasters, *schepenen*, *raedt*, and other officers of Gouda were to take the oath of their office. Then, they were to require the current deans, headmen, and assayers of the *brouwerie* to take the oath of their office. Then, the *gerecht*, *schout*, and six or eight of the oldest and most notable men who had formerly brewed were to proceed to the election of new deans, headmen, and assayers. Once elected, the dean, headmen, and assayers were to make certain that the ordinances regulating the amount of grain used and the length of the beer that was brewed were enforced. If the privilege was not enforced, then they would be held individually accountable, and any fines they were sentenced to pay would have to come from their personal wealth, not from the city.

This law enacted by the central government in 1518 clearly demonstrates that the policing and prosperity of Gouda’s brewing industry was not simply a local matter. In enacting quality regulations to turn around the industry’s decline, the central government responded in part to its loss of tax revenue and to the demands placed on it by governments in the markets where Gouda beer was sold. As grain

³¹ GRM, Dossier Beroepen, letter b.

prices rose, real incomes declined and Gouda's brewers competed for market share by reducing the price of their beer through reducing the amount of grain they used. Consequently, there must have been a marked reduction of the quality of the beer as Gouda's brewers strove to cover their production and operating costs. Under such conditions, protests against the decline in the quality of the beer could be expected. Yet, the degree to which the decline in consumption was caused by a decline in quality or in consumer's real income cannot be answered from the available evidence.

As would be the case in later decades as well, the count's policies of requiring the brewers to improve the quality of the beer was a policy that sought to redistribute income from the brewers to consumers and the count. As the quality of Gouda's beer increased through the use of more grain, the brewer's production costs increased. Since the price at which Gouda's beers were sold was also fixed by the assize, consumers would have received better quality beer at that price. Given that the quality would have been higher, the consumption of Gouda beers would be expected to rise increasing the count's tax revenues in Gouda. Gouda's brewers naturally were opposed to such policies since they did not cover their costs and they could not be certain that they would recoup the losses as a future date.

The Count's renewal of Gouda's privileges forbidding other towns from levying protective tariffs on Gouda beer in 1519 is consistent with the privilege of 1518. Both privileges aimed at increasing the consumption of Gouda beer and the count's tax revenues. In the following decades, both privileges played an important role in the industry's history. Gouda's brewers and burgomasters consistently took town governments to court to have the protective tariffs levied on Gouda beer lifted. The privilege of 1518 played an important role in the debates about if and how the quality and reputation of Gouda's beer should be determined and whether or not the scale of firms should be permitted to increase.

III

Despite the provisions of the privilege of 1518, Gouda's *vroedschap* resolutions show that Gouda's brewers were no longer regulated by

an assize or by the content of the privilege in the mid-1520s.³² Between 1525 and 1529, the town government typically was divided and unable to establish and enforce an assize. The large number of brewers in the town—with different cost structures and differing strategies—facing the effects of war, currency debasement, rising grain prices, and competing in different market segments made it difficult to establish relatively uniform quality and price dimensions for Gouda's beer. The town's smaller brewers favored limits on production that would distribute a part of the town's production to them, while the town's larger brewers favored increasing the scale of production so they could better compete with brewers elsewhere. The resolution to this conflict between the brewers ultimately required a political solution. The juridical conflict that developed between the town government and the town's *castelyn* and *schout* complicated matters even more. Both the town government and the *schout* appealed to the count's administration to resolve the conflicts. As was the case with other legal disputes that were appealed to the central government, they served to further the authority of the central government.³³

On 1 August 1525, the burgomasters demonstrated to the *vroedschap*, "the great irregularities" in the brewing industry and the "harmful ordinance" that was held by "presumption" in the industry.³⁴ Consequently, the *vroedschap* minutes continued, it was of "great necessity" to remedy this and to make a new set of bylaws and "to execute the punishments so that the industry of the *brouwerie* may continue in good order." Subsequently, the *vroedschap* approved the making of a new bylaw and agreed "to enforce it, according to the charter [of 1518] granted this city by the Emperor." As was clearly the case in later *vroedschap* resolutions, the assize and limits on production were probably no longer being followed.

Despite its intentions, the *vroedschap* was unable to enact and enforce formal ordinances governing the quality of the beer brewed in Gouda for any length of time. Between 1525 and 1529, the *gerecht* and the *schout* repeatedly sought such regulation. The *vroedschap*, including many brewers, typically could not reach an agreement, in part since

³² For the enforcement of ordinance limiting the amount of beer brewed in 1519, see Egmond, "Strijd om het dagelijks bier," 170–171.

³³ See Hugo de Schepper, "*Belgium Nostrum*" 1500–1650: *Over Integratie en Desintegratie van het Nederland* (Antwerpen, 1987), 10–17.

³⁴ *Rechtsbronnen*, 546.

escalating grain and fuel prices complicated the process. In 1527, the *schout* threatened the *vroedschap* with the full force of the punishments contained in the privilege of 1518 if it did not enact an assize and limit production.³⁵ Thereupon, the *vroedschap* decided to present its case to the Chamber of Accounts (of the Court of Holland) in an effort to reach an agreement with that body and avoid any punishments included in the privilege. This effort was apparently unsuccessful and town officials planned an appeal to Habsburg authorities in Brussels.³⁶

The town's *vroedschap* resolutions in late 1527 place the conflict regarding the brewing industry in a larger dispute that had far-reaching consequences for the passage of laws in the town and the enforcement of justice. The *vroedschap* minutes of 13 November 1527 record that the *vroedschap* would review the bylaws (*keuren*) made by the *vroedschap* since the *schout* did not enforce them evenhandedly, presumably including those governing the brewing industry.³⁷ In order to make certain that "no one would be treated unfairly and that the city would be well policed," the *vroedschap* decided to review each of the bylaws it had made. Further, the *vroedschap* resolved to negotiate with the *castelyn* to resolve the issue. On 16 December 1527, the *vroedschap* resolved once again to attempt to reach an agreement with the town's *castelyn*, even going so far as to being willing to allow the Lord van Assendelft, the stadhouder of Holland, to arbitrate the dispute, hoping that the *castelyn* would do nothing to harm the city.³⁸ On 16 December the *castelyn* agreed to the foregoing, under various conditions, including that the fines would not be reduced in the *vroedschap* ordinances since he had farmed the office of *schout*.³⁹

This agreement must have been short-lived. On 12 July 1529, eight members of the *vroedschap* were chosen to meet with the *gerecht* to take-up the issues in the *brouwerie*. Two days later, they reported that there were many faults in the industry and that the *schout* neither enforced the industry's bylaws nor inspected the industry to insure compliance. Significantly, the *vroedschap* favored greater regulation in

³⁵ Ibid., 555.

³⁶ Ibid., 555–556.

³⁷ Ibid., 564.

³⁸ Ibid., 565.

³⁹ Ibid., 565.

the industry.⁴⁰ In their estimation, if the industry was not better regulated, it was destined to destruction. Unfortunately, the minutes do not record which bylaws were not enforced or the reasons stated orally at the meeting that favored the regulation of the industry. By a majority vote, the members of the *vroedschap* determined that the differences between the *gerecht* and the *schout* would be mended, and that a new bylaw (*keur*) for the *brouwerie* would be made that would be strictly enforced.⁴¹

In the 1530s, political, social, and economic controversies raging within the town continued to impact, and reflect, the industry's condition. Much of the debate in the industry in the mid-1530s centered on the desirability and effect of economies of scale in brewing on the industry and town.⁴² Testimony of Gouda's brewers shows the town's brewers thought brewing was subject to economies of scale. Yet, they were sharply divided about whether allowing larger-scale breweries to emerge was beneficial for the community. Did the entire community benefit from economies of scale in brewing, or did only individual brewers benefit? At the core of the debate were conflicting visions about what was that would be best for the town as whole or, put differently, what constituted the common good. Since Gouda's brewers competed in the regional beer market, the debates within the town also involved how Gouda's beers should be positioned in the market and to what extent Gouda's brewers would be able to compete if the scale of production was not increased.

In 1535 some of the town's brewers were questioned by the *schout* about whether or not the amount of beer the brewers brewed at one time should be increased from 31 barrels to 41 barrels, an increase of some 32 percent. The reactions of 50 of Gouda's citizens who wanted the town's brewers to continue to brew 31 barrels is included in the survey: 34 brewers (24 men and 10 women), seven former brewers, seven individuals not identified by occupation, and two members of the *vroedschap*.⁴³ The town's brewers were deeply divided about whether or not to increase the scale of production. One of the brewers testified that there were 56 brewers in the town who wanted to increase the scale of brewing to 41 barrels. Although

⁴⁰ Ibid., 571.

⁴¹ Ibid., 572–573.

⁴² Pinkse, “Het Goudse kuitbier,” 102–103.

⁴³ See Ibelings, “Economie,” 262–63.

the testimony of the brewers who favored the increase in scale is not included in the report, discussion and debate raged within the town about the appropriate scale of production. Several brewers testified that they continued to be in favor of brewing 31 barrels, even though other brewers, some of whom were in the *vroedschap*, had attempted to get them to vote to increase the scale of production.

Two years later, the debates surrounding increasing the scale of production come to the forefront again. On 27 April 1537, the brewers who marketed their beer in Dunkirk argued that they could not compete against the brewers from Delft.⁴⁴ They argued that to compete against the brewers from Delft, the scale of production in Gouda had to be increased to 41 barrels. They advocated increasing the amount of grain used in the larger brews so that the strength of the beer would remain the same. For unstated reasons, the *vroedschap*, largely made up of brewers, rejected their request. Brewers in all of Gouda's markets were clearly not equally well served by the enforcement of the existing limits.

On 14 November 1537, the *vroedschap* finally dealt with the fundamental question facing the town and the industry: would Gouda's brewers continue to brew 31 barrels or could they brew more at one time? The *vroedschap* had little choice but to address this issue because two members of the Court van Holland, Meester Reynier Brundt and Willem Goudt, had come to Gouda as a part of their investigation of Holland's brewing industry.⁴⁵ Since Gouda's *vroedschap* had not yet taken action, six members of the *vroedschap* who did not brew met with three members who brewed to recommend whether or not "it was more advantageous (*oірbaerlick*) for the city to brew more than 31 barrels or to remain at 31 barrels." By majority vote the nine decided that the town would remain with the "old limit" of 31 barrels, "since the same is the best and most advantageous for the industry, the city, and the [count's] domains."⁴⁶ Although we are not informed about the details of the discussion among the committee members, the complete *vroedschap* ratified this decision and presumably reported it to the Court of Holland.

In 1538 and 1539, conflicts continued between Gouda's *vroedschap* and the *castelyn*. Pressure on Gouda's town government to uphold

⁴⁴ *Rechtsbronnen*, 586.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

the town's laws was also increasing. In October of 1539, two burgomasters and eight members of the *vroedschap* were empowered to fine "all of the abuses and irregularities that took place in the city daily."⁴⁷ The *vroedschap* had thus taken the step of enforcing justice in Gouda, a task normally reserved for the *schout* and members of the *gerecht*. As brewers elsewhere in Holland continued to increase the scale or production, tensions in Gouda between the town's smaller and larger brewers also must have persisted. Finally, the town government had to take into account the interests of the Chamber of Accounts and of the count's administration in the payment of the *hopgeld* given the importance of their goodwill for the town, especially in matters of taxation.

The controversies and debates in Gouda's *vroedschap* in the 1520s and 1530s show that the bylaws governing the assize could not be agreed upon or enforced. Since the industry's bylaws were not strictly or consistently enforced, the industry did not decline in this period due to the strict system of regulations as suggested by Pinkse.⁴⁸ Gouda's brewers, instead, appear to have been free to brew the quality beer they wished or were compelled to by competition in the market. The lack of assize within the town suggests that brewers were not able to act as a cartel and raise profit margins on their beers. In fact, given the industry's declining market share it is possible that the brewers in the town might not have earned a positive rate of return for some period due to intense competition. Unfortunately, given the data available, it is not possible to determine if this was the case and if the informal practices and lack of regulation in industry contributed to its decline as argued by the *gerecht* and *vroedschap*.⁴⁹

The uncertainty regarding the enforcement of the laws and regulations governing the brewing industry also must have had a negative impact on the industry's growth. The conflicts between the town government and the town's *castelyn* and *schout* about the regulations governing the industry, and apparently uneven enforcement of the rules by the *schout*, made it difficult for entrepreneurs to calculate the rate of return on their investment. This created a disincentive for investment both for current brewers and prospective

⁴⁷ *Rechtsbronnen*, 587.

⁴⁸ Pinkse, "Het Goudse kuitbier," 121.

⁴⁹ *Rechtsbronnen*, 572.

brewers. The uneven enforcement of the law posed a serious difficulty for the industry and town from the *vroedschap's* perspective.

After decades of debate in Gouda regarding the scale of production, in 1539, the town government petitioned the central government in Brussels to establish a uniform limit on each brew (*pegel*) across all of Holland. Such a rule would have eliminated the competitive advantage Delft's brewers (and brewers elsewhere) realized by being able to brew larger volumes of beer at one time than Gouda's brewers; consequently, such a rule would improve the ability of Gouda's brewers to compete in the regional market and helped in stimulating the growth of Gouda's brewing industry.⁵⁰

IV

In August 1540, however, after receiving advice from the Chamber of Accounts in Holland, the central government decided not to grant Gouda's petition for a general ordinance regulating beer production on the same foot throughout Holland. Instead, the central government offered Gouda's brewers the option of either brewing 41 barrels with a maximum production of 75 brews per year or of continuing to brew 31 barrels per brew as they had. The central government thus was willing to increase the amount of beer brewed at one time specified in the collection of the *hopgeld*, provided that the brewers proportionally increase the taxes they paid. In either case, however, the central government required Gouda's brewers to brew a single quality beer according to an assize. Given this choice, two-thirds of the town's brewers voted to increase the amount brewed in the town to 41 barrels.⁵¹ This new rule or *octrooi ampliatie* would hold until a general ordinance was enacted for the brewing industry across Holland, an ordinance that was finally enacted in 1550.

In petitions presented to the central government in 1543 and 1546, Gouda's town government petitioned either to be allowed to brew according to the same conditions as brewers elsewhere in Holland or to have all of Holland's brewers constrained to brewing according to the same rules. Nonetheless, in 1543 and in 1546, the *octrooi*

⁵⁰ Oud Archief Gouda, 4271.

⁵¹ Oud Archief Gouda, 4271.

ampliatie of August 1540 that had been granted conditionally for three years was renewed.⁵² Consequently, for most of the 1540s, the legislation enacted by the central government in 1540 shaped both the ability of Gouda's brewers to compete in export markets and the industry's profitability.

The decline in the industry's output is mirrored in the declining receipts for the *hopgeld* in the 1540s. While the town's brewers produced about 275,000 barrels per year in 1540–1542, at the end of the decade, in 1547–1549, they averaged 190,000 barrels per year. Although the decline in production also had other causes, including tariffs and high grain prices, the regulatory restrictions imposed on the industry by the central government played an important role.

Contrary to Pinkse's claims, Gouda's burgomasters and *vroedschap* had a clear understanding of the circumstances contributing to the industry's decline and they did much more than stubbornly insist on maintaining the town's old privileges.⁵³ The town fathers repeatedly attempted to have protective tariffs on Gouda beer lifted. Moreover, as their repeated petitions show, Gouda's town fathers, many of whom were brewers, clearly recognized the dilemma the legislation enacted by the central government posed for Gouda's brewing industry: as long as the legislation required by the central government put the town's brewers at a disadvantage, the industry would continue to decline. Yet, due to the central administration's refusal to alter the conditions under which the *hopgeld* was collected in Gouda, the town's industry continued to labor at a disadvantage in comparison to towns like Delft and Leiden where the collection of the *hopgeld* was regulated differently.⁵⁴ Despite the impact on Gouda's brewing industry, the opposition of the town's *castelyn* to increasing the scale of production carried weight.

Evidence from 1546 provides a window into the debate between the town government and the town's *castelyn* regarding the desirability of limiting production to 41 barrels and 75 brews per year.⁵⁵ In their argument presented to officials in Brussels to change the industry's regulations, the town government placed the industry in

⁵² Oud Archief Gouda, 2647.

⁵³ Pinkse, "Het Goudse kuitbier," 122.

⁵⁴ In Delft, for example, the *hopgeld* was collected on a pro-rated basis for the barrels brewed in excess of 41 barrels.

⁵⁵ The following paragraphs are based on material in the Algemeen Rijksarchief Brussels, Papieren van Staat en Audiëntie, 1656/1.

its regional context: as long as brewers elsewhere brewed under more favorable legislation than Gouda's brewers, Gouda's industry would decline. The *castelyn*, on the other hand, argued that Gouda's brewers should continue to be limited to brewing 41 barrels because otherwise the town's 'common good' would be undermined: the rich brewers would take advantage of the poor brewers and the economies of scale would lead to the town's depopulation.

In their petition addressed to the Emperor, the burgomasters, *schepenen*, *raedt*, and *vroedschap* requested the *octrooi ampliatie* of 1540 be revoked because it did not benefit the city or the brewing industry. According to the town government, brewers in Delft, Leiden, and Rotterdam prospered, entering into new markets in Flanders, Zeeland, and Brabant, because they were not regulated like the brewers in Gouda; consequently, they could sell their beers more advantageously than Gouda's brewers. Delft's brewers had two important advantages. First, they could brew several kinds of beer from the same brew and, second, they could brew as much beer as they wished at one time. Although not detailed in the town's petition, the stated differences had far reaching consequences for the industries in the two towns. Delft's brewers had the flexibility to brew for different market segments during one production run, while Gouda's brewers only marketed their beers in one market segment. In other words, the market for Gouda's beers was much smaller than the market for Delft beers. Delft's brewers could also match their production runs to the expected demand for their products since they were not required to always brew 41 barrels. The ability to brew as much as they want to brew at one time also allowed Delft's brewers to benefit from economies of scale, giving them a considerable cost advantages over the brewers in Gouda.

While the *castelyn* agreed that there were economies of scale in brewing, the *castelyn* opposed permitting brewers to realize these. If the rich brewers' production were not limited, the brewers who only brewed 13 to 20 per year would go under. The effects on employment in the town would be even greater due to economies of scale in brewing. As the *castelyn* put it, since a "brewer brewing 41, 51, 61, and, yes, even 81 barrels in one brew needed just as many workers," the town's income and prosperity would be undermined by permitting large scale brewing. The poor brewers' coopers, millers, and all those employed by the brewer along with their families would be "forced" to leave the town. The *castelyn*, thus, advocated a system

of production with lower productivity and lower wages as a means of distributing employment and income over a larger part of the town's population. The *castelyn* also opposed allowing the council (*raedt*) and *vroedschap* to make the industry's bylaws. According to the *castelyn*, the richest brewers who were members of the *vroedschap* would then get all of the tavern-keepers (*tappers*) to be their clients. The result of this would be that the "poor brewers" would lose their clients and be forced out of business as concentration took place in the industry.

The *castelyn* thus argued that town's *vroedschap* was not promoting the common welfare of the town's brewers as a whole, but their own interests. The *castelyn*'s position on the matter fits well with the policy adopted by the count's administration to uphold the interests of the smaller and mid-sized brewers. As had been the case earlier in Gouda, the count's administration sided with the interests of *castelyn* and rejected the town government's request.

The renewal of the *octrooi ampliatie* of 1540 in 1543 and 1546 by the central government and its enforcement in Gouda by the town's *castelyn* and *schout* had important social and economic consequences for the town and brewing industry. The legislation was designed to keep smaller brewers independent longer and to counter the movement towards the formation of larger breweries, or the development of monopolies as contemporaries put it.⁵⁶ The laws limiting output were also probably partly aimed at countering the policies and influence of the town's wealthier brewers who controlled the town's *vroedschap*. To maintain its tax revenues, the Count's administration was also interested in upholding the stipulations included in the *hopgeld* and in collecting the tax revenues it needed. Thus, the social, political, and fiscal aims of Habsburg officials coincided.

The law of 1540 benefited Gouda's brewers since it permitted them to increase their scale of production from 31 to 41 barrels, thus reducing per barrel cost of brewing through savings on fuel, labor inputs, and other costs. Yet, in a comparative regional context, the *octrooi ampliatie* of August 1540 was of limited help to Gouda's brewers in competing in the regional market. The scale of production permitted in Gouda contrasts starkly with practices in other cities—in comparison to Gouda's limit of 75 brews, Delft's brewers could brew twice a week, or 104 times per year. If Delft's brewers

⁵⁶ For similar policies in Delft, see Woltjer, "Een Hollands stadsbestuur," 266.

produced 41 barrels, which was far below what they were reputed to brew, their annual output would have been 4,264 barrels, while production in Gouda was limited to 3,075 barrels, or about 72 percent of that permitted in Delft. For the large-scale brewers who competed in export markets this made a considerable difference. At the maximum outputs permitted, a brewer in Delft would have produced 1,189 more barrels (or 29 brews) per year more than a brewer in Gouda. If all the beer sold was double beer, according to earnings estimates from 1550, Delft's brewers would have earned 29 guilders more per year than his counterpart in Gouda, a substantial sum by contemporary standards.

Delft's brewers, however, brewed far in excess of the officially permitted 41 barrels per brew. While the *schout* of Gouda complained in 1546 that brewers there brewed as many as 50 barrels at one time, in Delft brewers were brewing in excess of 72 barrels at one time, reputedly even reaching 150 barrels. Thus, from the perspective of Gouda's town government, the legislation of 1540 undermined the town's brewers' ability to compete in the market. The law limiting production to 75 brews per year of 41 barrels entailed comparatively higher per unit production costs than faced by brewers elsewhere. The output limits in Gouda also entailed lower total revenue and profit for Gouda's brewers.

As the cost estimates made for brewing in Delft and Leiden in 1550 show, there were considerable economies of scale in brewing larger volumes of beer.⁵⁷ Doubling the scale of output from 36 to 72 barrels for beer sold at 15 *stuivers* the barrel increased a brewer's take of the total revenue by about 5 percent. Brewing 36 barrels yielded 56 *stuivers* in profit, while brewing 72 barrels yielded 164.5 *stuivers*, or 52.5 *stuivers* more than brewing two single batches. The results were similar when production increased from 53 to 106 barrels for beer sold at 12 *stuivers* the barrel. Although a part of the increased revenue a brewer could earn on paper would be transferred to consumers through increased competition between brewers, brewing at larger volumes increased profits.

The enforcement of production limits in Gouda limited the profits the town's brewers could earn. Lower profits must have had important consequences for the investment behavior of brewers in Gouda.

⁵⁷ Yntema, "Entrepreneurship," 199–201.

Most importantly, since earnings in Gouda were lower, Gouda's brewers were not able to reinvest earnings into their firms at the same rate as brewers in Delft.⁵⁸ Over time, the cumulative impact of Delft's brewers would mount as they reinvested their earnings in the construction of new or more efficient breweries. Further, they also could extend larger amounts of credit to customers to build up a tied trade. All of this worked to the comparative disadvantage of Gouda's brewers.

After years of petitioning the central government to institute an ordinance that would regulate the industry throughout Holland according to a single rule, on 18 January 1550 Charles V enacted a regulation limiting brewer throughout Holland to brewing 82 barrels per week.⁵⁹ Further, in the towns the *schout* and *gerecht* was to establish the assize for the beer and the quality of the beer was to be tested by sworn beer tasters. The ordinance attempted to reverse the trend toward large scale brewing that had emerged in Holland in the 1530s and 1540s. But, on 17 March 1552, the General Ordinance of 1550 was revoked due to opposition from the brewers and town governments of Delft, Leiden, and Amsterdam.

Throughout the 1550s, Gouda's brewing industry continued to lag, especially in comparison to brewers in Delft. In Delft, firm size and output continued to increase even though Habsburg officials limited the growth of firm size.⁶⁰ Through the 1550s and 1560s, Gouda's brewing industry gradually declined. Gouda's brewers apparently brewed beers that differed in price and quality from the beers brewed in Delft. It was first in the 1560s that they were allowed to brew the same quality beers as Delft's brewers, which suggests that Delft beers set the industry standard.⁶¹ After decades of declining output and reduced profits from brewing, Gouda's export brewing industry collapsed as the Dutch Revolt broke out. In the decades of the 1580s and 1590s, Delft's brewing industry continued to operate in export markets, whereas Gouda's brewing industry served the local market.

⁵⁸ The possibility that Gouda's brewers produced a specialized type of beer cannot be ignored. Nonetheless, the town's brewers lost market share throughout the period.

⁵⁹ For more details, see Yntema, "Entrepreneurship," 198.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ *Rechtsbronnen*, 374–377, 434–441, 445–451, 616, 617, and 622.

V

Between the late 1510s and the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt, institutions and practices in the brewing industry helped to bring about the decline of Gouda's brewing industry. Divergent views regarding the economic policies that would best promote Gouda's brewing industry and the fundamentally opposed economic interests of both government officials and the town's brewers led to a protracted period of economic, social, and juridical conflicts in the town. These conflicts became more pressing as institutional and technological changes worked to transform the brewing industry in Holland, further putting pressure on the ability of Gouda's brewers to compete in the regional market.

On the one hand, Gouda's smaller brewers tend to favor the enforcement of the regulations included in the privilege of 1518, including the establishment of an *assize* to guarantee the quality of the beer and the maintenance of the restriction on the amount of beer the town's brewers could produce. Since they could not compete with larger brewers who benefited from economies of scale, they favored such legislation to maintain their livelihoods and market share. The town's larger brewers with more resources, and who competed in markets with brewers elsewhere in Holland, opposed the enforcement of such regulations because they limited their ability to compete in export markets with export brewers elsewhere who benefited from economies of scale in production.

Gouda's smaller brewers were naturally allied with the *castelyn* and *schout*, who also were engaged in a conflict with the wealthy brewers who dominated the *vroedschap*. The juridical conflict between *castelyn* and *schout* and the *vroedschap* centered in part on the formulation of law, but also the enforcement of the law in the town and the income that was earned from enforcing the law. In their conflict with the *vroedschap*, the *castelyn* and *schout* appealed to Habsburg officials. The Chamber of Accounts in The Hague appears to have upheld the regulations stipulating the payment of the *hopgeld* that prohibited Gouda's brewers from increasing the scale of production. While the town government voted to uphold limiting production to 31 barrels per brew in 1537, it is clear that given the changes taking place in the regional brewing industry, Gouda's larger brewers could not compete under such conditions. Given the stance of *castelyn*, *schout*, and Chamber of Accounts, Gouda's town government

appealed to the central government in 1539 for a uniform law governing the industry throughout Holland.

In 1540, the central government rejected the town's petition and instead limited Gouda's brewers to brewing 41 barrels per brew and required them to brew according to an *assize*. From its vantage-point, the central government had worked to restore order and justice in a town that was deeply divided. Such laws were also consistent with the central government's aims to limit the growth of large-scale brewing and monopolies. Yet, the laws enacted by the central government were a fundamental cause of the decline of Gouda's brewing industry since Gouda's brewers brewed at higher per unit costs than brewers elsewhere in Holland. The rules enacted by the central government undercut the brewers' ability to compete with brewers elsewhere in Holland in export markets and undermined the incentives for brewers to invest in new, cost reducing technologies.

The efforts of the *castelyn* and the *schout* to limit the brewers' output in Gouda, as well as their enforcement of such ordinances, were fundamental in the decline of Gouda's brewing industry in the 1540s. In contrast, the *schout* in Delft did not rigidly enforce the ordinances limiting production making it possible for the brewers to increase the scale of production. Since the count's administration prohibited Gouda's brewers from paying the *hopgeld* on a pro-rated per basis as was the case in Delft, Gouda's brewers were not able to realize economies of scale in brewing. Although other factors were undoubtedly at work as well, the differences in the rules governing the brewing industry in Gouda and Delft helps to account for the relative decline of Gouda's brewing industry in the mid-sixteenth century.

VISIBLE POWER? TOWN HALLS AND POLITICAL VALUES

Joop de Jong

The Republic of the Seven United Provinces (1579–1795) still has a great appeal to the imagination both in the Netherlands and abroad. To a great extent, the image people have of the Republic has been based on its cities and its civic buildings. This is in contrast to France and England, for example, which have been renowned primarily for their palaces and castles, buildings which are often found outside the towns.¹ The author of a comprehensive study of town halls in France complains about the lack of interest in urban architecture in general and in town halls in particular among French historians and art historians.² And Robert Tittler, in his book on town halls and the English urban community, claims that efforts to analyze the importance of the built environment has been applied particularly to the countryside rather than the town.³ For visitors to the many historic cities in the Netherlands, however, town halls and churches, which are often close together on the same square, have functioned for centuries as the principal sites.⁴ And anyone who leafs through travel folders or examines tourist souvenirs, will see that historic town halls still possess great symbolic value. They apparently represent something ‘typically Dutch.’

Past and present historians have also wondered in what respects and to what extent the Dutch Republic was different, perhaps even unique.⁵ It is certain that the Republic, compared to most other

¹ A. Frank-Van Westrienen, *De Groote Tour. Tekening van de educatiereis der Nederlanders in de zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam, 1983).

² Jean-Marie Pérouse de Montclos, *Hôtels de ville de France. De la Curie romaine à la mairie républicaine, vingt siècles d'architecture municipale* (Paris, 2000), 7.

³ Robert Tittler, *Architecture and Power. The Town Hall and the English Urban Community c. 1500–1640* (Oxford, 1991), 2.

⁴ J. Baan, “Cultuurhistorisch toerisme” and P.H. Kersten, “Het historische stadhuis als ‘vertrekpunt’ bij de marketing van de historische omgeving,” in *Een machtig monument. 300 jaar stadhuis te Enkhuizen. Geschiedenis, monumenten en cultuurhistorisch toerisme* (Zeist, 1989), 39–44, 45–55.

⁵ Among others, see: J. Huizinga, *Nederland's beschaving in de zeventiende eeuw* (Haarlem,

states in Europe, was for a long time very prosperous, economically advanced and ruled by an atypical form of government.⁶ The Seven United Provinces were not a monarchy but a confederation with no strong central authority in which, moreover, the nobility was less prominent than the non-noble élites. Above all else, however, the Republic was a state of cities, ruled by collectives of elected members of the urban élites. Against this background this paper will examine what the construction, furnishing and decoration of town halls⁷ can tell us about the position of cities and city governments, about the image and self-image of the urban regents and about the power-relations and political ideals of the time, in short, about some aspects of the political culture in the cities of the Republic. I will highlight in particular some of the differences that were evident between the town halls of the provinces of Holland and Zeeland, on one hand, and the Generaliteitslanden (territories ruled directly by the Union), on the other.

The provinces of Holland and Zeeland can be considered as the cradle of the Revolt against the Spanish central authority which later led to the establishment of the Republic of the Seven United Provinces. The cities of Holland and Zeeland were the first to declare their support for William of Orange as stadhouder instead of Bossu, the appointee of Philip II. The town hall of Den Briel, which in 1572 became the first city to be captured from Philip's governor Alva, proudly adorned itself with a plaque proclaiming: *Libertatis Primitiae*,

1941); J.L. Price, *Culture and Society in the Dutch Republic during the 17th Century* (London 1974); S. Schama, *The Embarrassment of Riches. An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (London, 1987); and C.A. Davids, J. Lucassen and J.L. van Zanden, *De Nederlandse geschiedenis als afwijking van het algemeen menselijk patroon: een aanzet tot een programma van samenwerking* (Amsterdam, 1988).

⁶ Regarding the advanced economy in the Republic, see: Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, *Nederland 1500–1815. De eerste ronde van moderne economische groei* (Amsterdam, 1995).

⁷ This article is concerned with the town halls of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the condition they were in at the time. The principal source for this study was formed by the following sections from the unsurpassed series entitled *Geïllustreerde Beschrijving. De Nederlandse monumenten van geschiedenis en kunst*: De provincie Zuidholland, eerste stuk: Leiden en Westelijk Rijnland (Den Haag, 1944), De provincie Noordholland, eerste stuk: Waterland en omgeving (Den Haag, 1953) en tweede stuk: Westfriesland, Tessel en Wieringen (Den Haag, 1955), Voorne-Putten (Zwolle, 1992), De Alblasserwaard (Zwolle, 1992). Grateful use has also been made of the *Kunstreisboek voor Nederland* (Amsterdam, 1960) and the wholly revised sections of this work covering the provinces of Zuid-Holland (Weesp, 1985), Zeeland (Weesp, 1985) and Noord-Holland (Weesp, 1987).

'First Fruits of Freedom.' Holland and Zeeland can justifiably be seen as the dynamo behind the Revolt. They also made the greatest sacrifices for the war effort.

Holland was preeminent in demographic, economic, political, and, in the opinion of many, cultural terms as well. In 1700, for example, approximately 45 percent of the population of the Republic lived in the province of Holland, compared to about 7 percent for the much smaller Zeeland.⁸ Moreover, Holland was highly urbanized at a very early date. The urban pattern dates from the late Middle Ages and 40% of the population was already living in cities by the year 1525.⁹ By the middle of the seventeenth century, the twenty or so major cities in Holland were sheltering some 60 percent of the total population of the province, while nearly half of all the people in Zeeland lived in towns.

One indication of Holland's economic and financial power is formed by the contributions from this province to the Union or Generaliteit. While Holland formally paid 58% of all taxes, it actually financed an even greater portion of the government's expenditures via loans.¹⁰ The economic power naturally gave great weight to Holland's vote in the States General, all the more so since the provinces were to a considerable extent sovereign. This vote was in any case the vote of the cities of Holland, for while the cities had eighteen votes in the States of Holland, only one vote was reserved for the knighthood. In the States of Zeeland, this ratio was formally set at six to one.

The rather loose federal structure of the Republic and the individual provinces allowed the cities of Holland and Zeeland to enjoy a great degree of autonomy. As a result, the legislative, executive and judiciary powers of the city governments were quite extensive. The organizational form of urban government arose in the Middle Ages. As a rule, the city government consisted of a council of elders and a magistracy or tribunal. The council formed the center of

⁸ Population data for cities, provinces and the Republic have been taken from part 5 of the *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* (Haarlem, 1980), 123-139.

⁹ The term 'city' is not used here in its strict legal sense. All settlements with 2500 or more inhabitants and smaller communities which were traditionally considered as cities are included in determining the degree of urbanization.

¹⁰ J.M.F. Fritschy, *De patriotten en de financiën van de Bataafse Republiek. Hollands krediet en de smalle marges voor een nieuw beleid (1795-1801)* (Den Haag, 1988), 32-45. J. Aalbers, *De Republiek en de vrede van Europa* (Groningen, 1980), 1-25.

municipal politics. This board of 'city fathers' or 'wise men' was considered to represent the citizens and as such was expected to supervise and advise the magistracy. For this purpose, the council met approximately twice a month. In principle, council members were appointed for life and selected from the 'wisest, most respectable and richest' citizens.¹¹ In practice, many councils could usually select their members themselves, although this became more difficult under a (strong) *stadhouder*. In any case, the number of council members varied from city to city. Forty was the maximum, while councils with less than twenty members were relatively rare.

The magistracy was formed by the burgomasters, the magistrates, or aldermen, and the sheriff and was charged with legislation, the administration of justice and the actual government of the city. Day-to-day management of the city's affairs was the responsibility of the burgomasters, usually two to four in number, who, certainly in the larger cities, met virtually every day. The sheriff and the approximately seven magistrates were responsible for the administration of justice, which also took a great deal of time. As a rule, the burgomasters and magistrates were recruited from the council and continued to be members of that body. They rotated every one or two years. The council also had great influence on the appointment of the members of the magistracy. The members of the council and the magistracy were known as *regenten*.

As a result of the Revolt, the sphere of influence and workload of the city governments in Holland and Zeeland became considerably more extensive. The city regents were no longer responsible only for the ups and downs in their own city but shared joint responsibility for the situation in the province and the Republic. The cities of Holland and Zeeland, including the smaller cities, were thus represented either permanently or in turn within the various provincial or federal administrative bodies. Moreover, they were directly involved with the admiralties and the great trading companies. Membership on the city council, however, remained crucial for a regent, for there lay the basis of each man's prestige and power.

In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a number of developments led to changes in this venerable city government system. To begin with, a number of cities in Holland decided

¹¹ Cited in: D.J. Roorda, *Partij en Factie. De oproeren van 1672 in de steden van Holland en Zeeland, een krachtmeting tussen partijen en facties* (Groningen, 1961), 41.

to reduce the number of council members.¹² A smaller council meant more influence, prestige and income for the individual council members. It made government a more exclusive affair. In addition, the burgomasters were gradually expanding their power at the expense of the other regents. The council became subject to certain restraints. For example, the council could only meet when invited by the burgomasters to do so and some councils could only discuss matters which had been placed on the agenda by the burgomasters. The chairman, in any case, was always one of the burgomasters. Moreover, the council members were not given any documents themselves. Documents were read out to them by the pensionary or one of the other administrative officials. This sort of thing naturally led to irritation and frustration.

These developments were accompanied by increasingly frequent and more emphatic discussion regarding consuls (burgomasters and ex-burgomasters) and council members who had not (yet) attained this status. Influential, prestigious and lucrative offices were in principle reserved for those who had. These developments are frequently considered as elements in a process of aristocratization which had held the regents of the Republic in its grip since the second half of the seventeenth century.¹³ The increasingly oligarchic nature of government (less open to the outside and more internal influence for fewer regents) and the development of a more aristocratic life-style are mentioned as characteristics of this much-discussed process.

The Generaliteitslanden comprised areas of Brabant and Oppergelre which, while originally outside the Union of Utrecht (1579),

¹² This was effected in two waves, both during times when no *stadhouder* was in office. Most of the reductions took place between 1650 and 1661, particularly in the smaller cities. But the number of council members was also reduced in a few cities during the first decades of the eighteenth century.

¹³ See Roorda, *Partij en Factie*, 37–79. A more subtle version of the aristocratization thesis is argued by M.R. Prak, *Gezeten burgers. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Leiden 1700–1780* (Amsterdam/Dieren, 1985), L. Kooijmans, *Onder regenten. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Hoorn 1700–1780* (Amsterdam/Dieren, 1985) and J.J. de Jong, *Met goed fatsoen. De elite in een Hollandse stad, Gouda 1700–1780* (Amsterdam/Dieren, 1985); *Een deftig bestaan. Het dagelijks leven van regenten in de 17de en 18de eeuw* (Utrecht/Antwerpen, 1987) and 'Revolution, patriotism and the concept of changes in the culture and lifestyle of Dutch urban elites,' *History of European Ideas* 11 (1989). Their criticism is particularly focused on the alleged desire of the regents to imitate the nobility. In general, the political elites in Holland did not strive to attain noble status and large estates and their culture and life style were far from being completely Frenchified.

had eventually become part of it, usually as a result of conquests.¹⁴ These areas were not sovereign and thus had no right to represent themselves. They were in fact governed from The Hague, where the most important bodies of the Union or Generaliteit had their seats.

In comparison with Holland, the Generaliteitslanden had few inhabitants and few cities. The degree of urbanization varied between 20 and 30 percent and the only cities of any real size were Maastricht and Den Bosch.¹⁵ The countryside, on the other hand, was densely populated. Although the Generaliteitslanden were not sovereign, cities like Den Bosch and Maastricht had considerable influence on their regions.¹⁶ Moreover, the local regents in the cities of the Generaliteitslanden enjoyed virtually the same powers as their colleagues in Holland and Zeeland and the city governments were organized along similar lines.¹⁷ The major difference, a crucial one for the local élites, lay in the supreme authority of the Estates General, which meant that they could not function with the same autonomy as magistrates elsewhere in the Republic.

The religious persuasion of the inhabitants of Republican Brabant and the Republican areas of Limburg represented another significant difference with Holland and Zeeland. While the majority of the population of the Republic, including Holland and definitely Zeeland, was not Roman Catholic, most of the inhabitants of the Generaliteitslanden were adherents of the Church of Rome. Roman Catholicism, however, was only tolerated at best and, particularly in the seventeenth century, Catholics were considered to be untrustworthy and politically suspect as well. Not only did they follow the wrong religion, there were plenty of examples of cities ruled by Catholics which had allied themselves with Spain against the Republic. Participation

¹⁴ S.J. Fockema Andreae, *De Nederlandse staat onder de republiek* (Amsterdam, 1969).

¹⁵ In 1675, Den Bosch and Maastricht each had between 10,000 and 15,000 residents. In the eighteenth century, the population of Maastricht increased to nearly 18,000. In any case, the province of Holland had ten cities with more inhabitants than Den Bosch and Maastricht in 1675. For example, the population of Amsterdam in that year amounted to some 200,000.

¹⁶ Fockema Andreae, *De Nederlandse staat*, 76–79.

¹⁷ Maastricht was very unusual in this respect. The city had what amounted to a double government: two sheriffs, double the number of burgomasters, magistrates, council members and officials. While they frequently met jointly, separate meetings were also held on a regular basis. This form of organization resulted from the fact that dominion over the city was shared between the Diocese of Liège and the Republic.

in city government, therefore, was formally barred to Catholics. The Protestant regents in the South were thus less representative of the urban elites and the extent to which the population in these areas felt involved with and part of the Republic is rather questionable.¹⁸

Having sketched the background of the cities in which the town halls studied were or are located, it is now time for a closer look at the buildings and their histories themselves. Based on construction and renovation data, the following can be concluded. After the middle of the seventeenth century, completely new construction became rather rare, occurring in only two of the eighteen cities with voting rights in Holland (Enkhuizen, 1686–1688 and Edam, 1737–38), nowhere in Zeeland and in the Generaliteitslanden only in Maastricht (1659–1664). The history of most town halls can thus be traced back further, and many of them were constructed even before the Republic. This in itself is not surprising because the cities began to develop in the Middle Ages and town halls were built on a large scale in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. During the first half of the seventeenth century, however, the level of construction activities, particularly in the cities of Holland, was remarkably great. New town halls were built, others were drastically renovated. Renovations for the purpose of expansion and beautification also took place during later periods, particularly in the 1680s and '90s and the 1770s and '80s.

Interpreting these data, however, is no easy task, for there were a good many reasons for building or renovating town halls: fire, decay, lack of space or inadequate serviceability. The latter aspect did not necessarily have to do with the working conditions of the secretaries or treasurers. More significant as far as this article is concerned were functions related to what Peter Burke described as 'the attempt to transmit social and political values,' a notion which will return later.¹⁹

The fact that so much construction and renovation went on in the first half of the seventeenth century can be explained by a combination of population growth and the increased number of governmental tasks as a consequence of the Revolt. Later, many

¹⁸ This question also arose in the early years of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, when the split with Belgium stirred up discussion as to whether Limburg should opt to become part of the Netherlands or not.

¹⁹ Burke, *The Fabrication of Louis XIV* (New Haven, 1992), 4.

cities were confronted with stagnation or even decline. In such a situation, both the need and the financial resources for a larger and costly new town hall were generally lacking. The construction of the Enkhuizen town hall, for example, cost nearly 80,000 guilders, more than all municipal expenditures together in a normal year.²⁰

In addition, there may be another possible explanation for the decrease in construction activity. The British diplomat Sir William Temple, ambassador in The Hague from 1667 to 1680, noted in his *Observations upon the United Provinces* that the public buildings in the cities of the Republic in his time were in a very well-kept and handsome state and that everyone contributed to them willingly and took great pleasure in them, seeming to regard them in much the same manner as people in other countries viewed family possessions or personal inheritances.²¹ All citizens were proud of them! The Dutch art sociologist Bram Kempers detected a similar attitude in the merchants and bankers who governed the equally young city state of Siena from around 1280 onwards. They were not driven by the desire for 'individual ostentation' but for 'joint patronage,' the 'collective city patronage' which brought with it authority and prestige.²² Civic pride is also an important element in the central thesis of Robert Tittler's book on English town halls. Explaining the overall peak in building and rebuilding of the 1570s and another peak in the 1610s he writes that "the design to construct, renovate, or convert a town hall often came about not of any particular desire for ostentation at a time of surplus building capital, or necessarily even at a time of prosperity, but rather out of a need to symbolize a particular administrative reality at a crucial stage of urban political rather than economic activity."²³ There are many indications that

²⁰ Regarding this town hall and its history, see: *Een machtig monument*, particularly 13–32. About Enkhuizen: R. Willemsen, *Enkhuizen tijdens de Republiek. Een economisch-historisch onderzoek naar stad en samenleving van de 16e tot de 19e eeuw* (Hilversum, 1988). By 1690, Enkhuizen had approximately 15,000 inhabitants. Guicciardini suggested the round sum of 100,000 crowns as the building cost of the town hall of The Hague (1564–1565).

²¹ D.J. Roorda, *Ambassadeur in de Lage Landen, William Temple. Observations upon the United Provinces* (Haarlem, 1978), 116.

²² B. Kempers, *Kunst, macht en mecenaat. Het beroep van schilder in sociale verhoudingen 1250–1600* (Amsterdam, 1987). See in particular the section of Chapter 2 entitled "Het stadhuis, centrum van macht en mecenaat."

²³ Tittler, *Architecture and Power*, 22.

the public domain or, in modern terms, the collective sector was relatively highly developed in the cities of the Netherlands at an early date. The term 'commonwealth,' for example, was frequently employed—and not merely rhetorically—to designate city, province and Union.²⁴

The decrease in construction after the middle of the seventeenth century can thus also be taken as a sign of diminishing willingness to invest in collective prestige, of the assumption or adoption of a more individualistic attitude, such as Temple had previously noted in other countries. There may also be a connection here with the changed relationships between city governments and citizens and among the regents themselves. There are indications that the distance between town hall and citizen had become somewhat greater.²⁵ For example, the complaint that the general interest was becoming more and more subordinate to group or even private interests was heard with increasing frequency.²⁶ The process of aristocratization referred to earlier also and perhaps even primarily expressed itself on the individual level, in the life-styles of individual regents. In this respect, it can also be remarked that the differences and distances also increased within the regent patriciate.²⁷

Another striking aspect of the history of these buildings is that less construction and renovation took place during the periods when no stadhouder was in office (1650–1672 and 1702–1747) than during the years when the regents were obliged to share power with a

²⁴ Thus, C. Schmidt in *Om de eer van de familie. Het geslacht Teding van Berkhout, 1500–1900* (Amsterdam, 1986), 60, quotes a regent who stated in 1665 that the regents had only been given the use of power by God "... to serve the peace and prosperity of the common people..." and not for their "... private profits..." More than a century later, the patriotic burgomaster Van de Spiegel of Goes declared that the goal of government was "... to lead civil society to the procurement of the greatest happiness..." Cited in J.G. Lamoree et al., 'De ideologie van een stadregering. Het 18e-eeuwse allegorische decoratieprogramma van het Goese stadhuis,' in *Bulletin KNOB* 83 (1984): 183–222.

²⁵ One such indication is formed by the stairways and landings incorporated in many later renovations. Both features made the way taken by citizens to reach the city government more 'impressive.'

²⁶ Roorda, *Partij en Factie*.

²⁷ Among others, see: De Jong, *Met goed fatsoen* and *Een deftig bestaan*; Kooijmans, *Onder regenten*; and Prak, *Gezeten burgers*. Not only did factional conflict divide the town councils internally, it also led to regular shifts in power in the cities. It is partly for this reason, most likely, that group portraits of regents are relatively rare. The growing polarization between consular and non-consular council members in the eighteenth century did not stimulate the desire to be immortalized as a group.

stadhouder. Thus, one function served by the construction or embellishment of city halls may also have been to emphasize the prestige and power of cities and city governments against the stadhouder and his following. In *The Baroque Town Hall of Amsterdam*, Katherine Fremantle frequently uses the word rivalry to describe the relation between the stadhouder and the town.²⁸ Similar relations have been found in early modern towns in France and England. For example in France, where the towns had lost most of their powers to the king, local interest in building or rebuilding town halls was rather weak. Royal intervention was often responsible for construction and embellishment, however not to express the power and prestige of the town and its government, but the submission of municipal power to royal power.²⁹

The manner in which town halls were arranged and decorated also provides information about the relationships and ideals in the city politics of the time. The rooms which were used more or less exclusively by the regents, such as the chambers of the council, magistrate and burgomasters, were located as a rule on the more dignified first floor. Most citizens never came further than the ground floor, which was used for clearly public functions, such as the tribunal.³⁰

The phenomenon of the separate burgomasters' chamber is quite revealing. They were rare up to the middle of the seventeenth century, with one of the earliest examples being that of Schiedam in 1647. In town halls built or renovated later, however, a separate room for the burgomasters was the rule. In itself, this already represents a reflection of the changed position of the burgomasters within the city governments.³¹ The expansion of the influence of the burgomasters or consuls was partly made possible by the long period following 1650 during which there was no definite power higher than the city governments. The most powerful lords could thus go more or less their own way, also with respect to the (re-)furnishing of town halls.

²⁸ Katherine Fremantle, *The Baroque Town Hall of Amsterdam*. Utrechtse kunst-historische studiën IV (Utrecht, 1959), 27.

²⁹ Pérouse de Montclos, *Hôtels de ville de France*, 57, 58.

³⁰ In many cities, the weighing house and/or meat market which was still present in the town hall was removed in the course of the seventeenth century. Apparently, such functions were no longer considered appropriate at the seat of city government.

³¹ As far as I know 'almost royal mayor's' chairs, raised for instance, as described by Robert Tittler, were not to be found in town halls in the Dutch Republic. Probably because most English town governments had just one mayor while Dutch towns were governed by two or more burgomasters.

In any case, it is a mistake to think that sobriety held sway in the Republic and that decorations in government buildings were consequently scarce. Actually, town halls were usually rather richly decorated. In this regard, a distinction can be made between decorations relating to the administration of justice, one of the main functions of city government, and those based on other themes. In both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, most of the non-justiciary decoration schemes consist of combinations of symbols and allegories drawn from both classical mythology and history and the Old Testament. Schemes based entirely on classical or Christian elements were rare. In this area, there is no real difference between the town halls in Holland and Zeeland and those in the Generaliteitslanden. In any case, decorations based on Biblical themes were most prominent in the cities of Zeeland, a province which also had the reputation of being more orthodox in its Calvinism than certain cities in Holland.³²

Which themes were the most prevalent? First place seems to belong to the Old Testament story of Moses and the people of Israel. No subject was more popular than the tale of the wise leader who, with God's help, freed his people from slavery under Pharaoh and brought them to the promised land. A good deal has been written about the tendency to compare or even identify the Republic with Israel and to cast the Spanish oppressor in the role of Pharaoh.³³ The justice and wisdom of Solomon formed another Old Testament theme, which was not confined to the tribunal.

Opportunities for comparison, identification and instruction were also provided by classical history, as can be seen from the very frequent (and thus revealing) references to the Roman Republic.³⁴ Adaptations of the famous abbreviation S.P.Q.R. (*Senatus Populus Que Romanus*), for example, were to be found on or in town halls in Enkhuizen, Goes, Haarlem, Rotterdam and other cities.³⁵ In this

³² M. van der Bijl, *Idee en Interest. Voorgeschiedenis, verloop en achtergronden van de politieke twisten in Zeeland en vooral in Middelburg tussen 1702 en 1715* (Groningen, 1981).

³³ For example, see C. Huisman, *Neerlands Israel: het natiebesef der traditioneel-gereformeerden in de achttiende eeuw* (Dordrecht, 1983).

³⁴ An informative source in this respect is H.E. Phaff, *Raadhuis-spreuken. Spreuken en bouwopdrachten van Nederlandse raadhuisen* (Den Haag, 1983).

³⁵ For obvious reasons adaptations of S.P.Q.R. were very rare in England and France. On the other hand, S.P.Q.T. could be read above the entrance gate of the town hall of the city republic Zurich which was built in 1694–1698. Wim Blockmans, *Geschiedenis van de macht in Europa. Volkeren, Markten, Staten* (Antwerpen, 1997), 293.

respect, there was a definite difference with the Generaliteitslanden, where the regents, to judge from the decorations they selected, appeared to be less 'Republican.' Of course, they also had different relations with the *res publica* than did the residents and rulers of the cities in Holland and Zeeland. For obvious reasons, none of the town halls studied displayed allegories from the Roman Empire. After all, the emperors were absolute monarchs who had subjected and subordinated the senate (the council) and consuls (the burgomasters) to their caprices, and who like most contemporary kings and princes did not distinguish between the public domain and private property.

The Batavians, who formed part of both Roman Antiquity and the Netherlands' own remote past, were also remarkably absent. Among the few remembrances of the revolt against Roman dominion by these freedom-loving distant ancestors were a number of paintings in the Amsterdam town hall. When this theme did become popular in the late eighteenth century, it was apparently too late for it to be incorporated in town hall decorations.³⁶

To a certain extent, the decorations in burgomasters' chambers had their own special themes, perfectly tailored to the political convictions of the worthy burgomasters themselves. They were particularly fond of an episode from the history of the Roman Republic described in Livy XXIV: 44.³⁷ The principal characters are a father and son, Quintus Fabius Maximus. The father, ex-consul and victorious general, dismounts from his horse and bows before his son, the consul, who had demanded it. The central theme in this story is the conflict between 'consular and paternal authority.'³⁸ Vondel in a verse written below the painting of Jan Lievens representing this story in the Amsterdam burgomasters' chamber, adds another related message to this story.³⁹ The honor and dignity of the city recognizes

³⁶ I. Schöffer, "The Batavian myth during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries," in: J.S. Bromley and E.H. Kossmann, eds., *Britain and the Netherlands V* (Den Haag, 1975), 78–101. The Batavian theme was highly charged politically. The Patriots used it to put the politics and life-style of non-Patriot regents and the *stadhouder's* court in an unfavorable, un-Dutch light. The Patriots finally got the chance to put their political ideals (partially) into practice during the Batavian Republic (1795–1806). I.L. Leeb, *The ideological origins of the Batavian revolution. History and politics in the Dutch republic 1747–1800* (Den Haag, 1973); De Jong, 'Revolution, patriotism and Dutch urban elites,' 637–644.

³⁷ In Amsterdam since 1656, in Middelburg since 1672 and in Enkhuizen since 1707, thus in each case during a period when no *stadhouder* ruled.

³⁸ W.S. Unger, *De monumenten van Middelburg* (Maastricht, 1943), 27.

³⁹ Fremantle, *The Baroque Town Hall of Amsterdam*, 67.

no obligations due to birth. So a statesman honors the office which is laid on him. In the Roman Republic, the power of the consuls (the burgomasters) also appeared to be the strongest. In Enkhuizen this allegorical representation of the eminence of burgomasters was entitled 'The Heights of Power.' Most likely, this allegory can also be seen as a warning to the stadhouders, who were generally in command of the army and liked to be seen as the fathers of the country.

The burgomasters of Enkhuizen were particularly keen on knowing and making known who the boss was. From 1707 onwards, the walls of their council chamber were completely covered by four large paintings of scenes from classical Rome by Romeyn de Hooghe.⁴⁰ The themes of these paintings were: 'the honors, offices and powers of the ancient Roman Burgomasters in the city'; 'the eminent and awe-inspiring proceedings in the meetings for the commonwealth, the state and on the battlefield'; 'the free elections for Burgomasters . . .'; and 'assuming the office of Burgomaster with all due ceremony.'

In other places, the prestige and might of the burgomasters were generally somewhat less emphatically stressed. Allegories referring to good government and respectability and authority in general were found to be sufficient. In a number of town halls, the eye of justice looked down from the ceiling on the worthy burgomasters as well.

Another striking aspect of the phenomenon of burgomasters' chambers is the predominantly classical-historical nature of the selected pictures. The decorations in the rooms where the consuls met were considerably more inspired by Classical Antiquity than the rest of the town hall. The burgomasters were evidently quite taken with the polity of the Roman Republic. Perhaps Old Testament archetypes such as Moses and Solomon evoked too many associations with absolute monarchy and one-man rule.

The paintings hung in the new town hall at Edam around 1738 are revealing in this respect. Virtually all of them had an Old Testament subject, even in the burgomasters' chamber. One painting in the magistrates' chamber, for example, depicts the anointing of King Saul by Samuel, while the only painting in the burgomasters' chamber portrays King Joash and Athaliah (2 Kings 11). The theme of both canvases is thus the coming of a monarch. In this manner, the magistrate of Edam, a supporter of the House of Orange, appears to have anticipated the events of 1747, when a stadhouder

⁴⁰ J. Theunisz, *Het stadhuis te Enkhuizen (1686)* (Assen, 1927), 70–82.

was appointed in the province of Holland for the first time in many years.

Decorations related to justice were virtually always present, executed according to a pattern which had been more or less fixed since the Middle Ages and was also followed in town halls in Flanders and Northern Germany.⁴¹ Standard elements were: Justice, Reward and Punishment, the Eye of Justice and God the Final and Highest Judge. Less often, but still frequently, pictures portray the wisdom and incorruptibility of judges, the equality of all persons in the eyes of the law, and the importance of statute law. Here again, Old Testament heroes such as Moses and, above all, Solomon are presented as prime examples.⁴²

The town halls studied display a great degree of unanimity with respect to the more general traits that were found important in politics and government at the time. There is even a certain uniformity. Justice or righteousness was the most frequently depicted political virtue, even outside the magistrates' chamber or the tribunal.⁴³ In addition, images on the exteriors of town halls represented classical virtues such as moderation, harmony, truthfulness, sincerity, perseverance, prudence and vigilance. There is a striking correspondence with the political virtues depicted in the Palazzo Pubblico of Siena in 1338.⁴⁴

Sculptures and paintings stressing the importance of peace were also remarkably common, which is not so strange for a state which was militarily and economically vulnerable. The longing for territorial expansion was very rarely expressed. After all, war seldom meant profit, virtually always loss. In the view of the regents, conflicts, both internal and external, were to be avoided as much as possible. The regents from the front-line fortified city of Maastricht knew the misery of war from their own experience. The prince's chamber in the

⁴¹ Lamoree et al., 'De ideologie van een stadsregering'; S. Faber, J. Huysen and F. Lammertse, *Van Heeren, die hunn' stoel en kussen niet beschaemen. Het stadsbestuur van Amsterdam in de 17e en 18e eeuw* (Amsterdam, 1987).

⁴² This supports the conclusion of Lamoree et al., 'De ideologie van een stadregering,' 193.

⁴³ The earliest known examples of town hall decorations are found in the former Italian city states. They generally also refer to governmental ideals such as justice and the service of the common good. Lamoree et al., 'De ideologie van een stadsregering,' 191.

⁴⁴ Wisdom, peace, prudence, power, generosity, moderation and righteousness, as well as faith, hope and love. Kempers, *Kunst, macht en mecenaat*, 169.

town hall of that city was adorned with the maxim 'Potior pax mille triumphis' [Rather peace than a thousand victories]. In principle, arms were only resorted to when all other recourse had failed, for example when trade or territory was seriously in peril.

Another striking aspect in the decorative themes of town halls is the emphasis on consultation and persuasion rather than obedience, compulsion and open power politics. On the one hand, many decorations did refer to dominion and authority, for example with images of fasces or the sword. Yet on the other hand, in of all places the chamber of the burgomasters in Amsterdam, the seat of virtually the most powerful lords in the Republic, the following maxim can be read: 'Lene Consilium datis, Stet Capitolium Fulgens': Gentle government prolongs the glory of the council.⁴⁵ This was also understood as political wisdom in the capital of the province of Zeeland. In the eighteenth-century expansion of the Middelburg town hall, the attributes of Wisdom were depicted: "... the wise and prudent policy with which the citizens of Middelburg are ruled by a gentle government."⁴⁶

Some administrators complained about the 'irresoluteness and slowness' which so characterized the 'republic of persuasion,' particularly in times when they felt that forceful decisions needed to be taken.⁴⁷ Most regents, however, evidently saw primarily the benefits of consultation and persuasion, even if this sometimes took a good deal of time and usually resulted in compromises. Even under the most favorable circumstances, conflicts with the people or internal division threatened the positions of individual regents; in the worst case, the power of the regents as a whole was on the line. The inhabitants of the Republic simply happened to be "... inclined by nature towards moderate and gentle government..."⁴⁸ This was also valid for the relationships between individual regents, between cities and States and between States and States General. Moreover, the 'republic of persuasion' was definitely not faring badly! Prudentia and Temperantia were thus regarded as cardinal virtues in city government, and not merely in judicial affairs. This attitude was very clearly

⁴⁵ Faber et al., *Van Heeren*, 34.

⁴⁶ Lamoree et al., 'De ideologie van een stadsregering,' 219.

⁴⁷ Aalbers, *De Republiek*, 61.

⁴⁸ C.J. de Lange van Wijngaerden, *Geschiedenis der Heeren en beschrijving der stad van der Goude* (Den Haag, 1818), 2: 275.

expressed by the motto of the city of Venlo: 'Festina lente cauta fac omnia mente' [Make haste slowly, do everything with care].

Finally, the decorations reveal the trouble taken by the political élites to lengthen the antiquity of regent power, to legitimize it with the past and to show that, in principle, the *res publica* could count on God's support. The examples to be emulated were taken from the Old Testament, the Roman Republic and, to a lesser extent, their 'own' Batavian period. It would be interesting to investigate which of the models selected for comparison or identification found the greatest acceptance among the citizenry.

The town hall decorations in the Generaliteitslanden illustrate for the most part the same political views as those in Holland and Zeeland, certainly as far as the general values of government and justice are concerned. The decoration schemes in the town halls of Den Bosch and Maastricht, however, also contain elements which were typical for the position of these cities. For example, a painting in the town hall of Den Bosch depicts Brabant in the form of a young woman begging before the throne of the States General for admittance as an equal partner to the councils of the Seven Provinces. Friends and enemies alike were thus reminded of the political subordination of Republican Brabant. In the Maastricht town hall, which happens to be particularly rich in illustrations and maxims, decorations in the prince's chamber, the burgomasters' chamber and the council chamber refer to the bilateral lordship of the city. Neither of the two ruling bodies, the States General and the Diocese of Liège, could impose its will without the consent of the other, a situation which of course provided all kinds of possibilities for the local regents. The fact that there were such possibilities may explain why the administrators of Maastricht seem to have felt less subordinate than their *confrères* in Den Bosch.

In the town hall of Venlo, a city which only came under the authority of the States General following the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713), there are three paintings by Frans Everts (ca. 1613) which depict events from the city's past on the right side and appropriate stories from the Old Testament on the left.⁴⁹ As we have noted, it was also very common to use the Bible in this manner in Holland and Zeeland. A painting in the town hall of Leiden, for example, portrayed the crossing of the Red Sea. In Venlo, how-

⁴⁹ A.A.J.J. van Pinxteren, ed., *Pronkstukken Venlo 650 jaar stad* (Venlo, 1993), 150–154.

ever, God was on the other side. He had saved the people of Israel (the citizens of Venlo) from Pharaoh (the House of Orange) and preserved them from the Revolt. The fact that there are no indications that these paintings were removed in or after 1713 can be taken as evidence of the primacy which the regents of Venlo assigned to their own city.

For whom were the many imposing facades and decorations in the town halls primarily intended? The governed, the inhabitants of the city, were usually named as the principal target group. The intention was "... to fill the citizens who approach the magistrate with reverence and awe," to remind them of their place.⁵⁰ The seats of the city governments will surely have fulfilled this function as well. The Haarlem town hall, for example, displayed the warning: "Hanc sacram Themidis domum senatus sedem ne temerato civis umquam" [Let no citizen ever desecrate this holy abode of the law, this seat of city government].⁵¹ Many town halls were also quite impressive buildings by reason of their location, size, architecture and decor and, of course, the fact that they were the seats of the city's rulers.

Nonetheless, Peter Burke is correct in my opinion when he warns against seeing all this as nothing "but attempts to persuade."⁵² Not all pomp during the ancien régime was instrumental for power. In this context, Burke also cites Clifford Geertz' remark regarding the royal ritual of the nineteenth-century Balinese kings and princes, to the effect that this ritual was not an instrument, but an end in itself. "Power served pomp, not pomp power."⁵³ For the cities in the Republic, however, Geertz' statement amounts to an over-correction.

It is well to remind ourselves at this point that the city regents could not exercise any sort of absolute authority. While certainly powerful as a group, they were definitely not kings for whom, according to Peter Burke, "... there was no need to persuade the people ..." or "... to cultivate any voters."⁵⁴ Thus the question of legitimization was one thing for an absolute monarch but something else for city regents in a relatively young republic and, moreover, in a time which tended to mistrust the new rather than the old. The

⁵⁰ S.E. Minis and A.R.E. de Heer, *Een seer magnifiek Stadthuijs. Tien studies over de bouw en de inrichting van het stadhuis te Maastricht* (Delft, 1985), 36.

⁵¹ Phaff, *Raadhuis-spreuken*, 25.

⁵² Burke, *Louis XIV*, 5.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 201, 203.

regents, who owed their (non-hereditary) positions to elections and were expected to represent the burghers, took definite risks when they departed too greatly from the social and political standards and values of those burghers.

Sufficient support from the burghers, the *populus*, was essential, also with the possibility of insurgency among the common people or plebs in mind.⁵⁵ Moreover, the more or less structural rivalry among the regents made the risks of real or alleged misuse of power even greater. Against this background it was thus wise to try to persuade the inhabitants, in so far as necessary, of the propriety of the form of government in the cities and the justice of the manner in which government was effected by the regents.⁵⁶ Civic authority was made, not born. Foreign observers were also struck by the 'great extent' to which the councils took 'public opinion in their city into account'.⁵⁷

The images and maxims on the facades and the decorations on the ground floor in or leading to the rooms which were open to the public can thus be considered as visual aids in the attempt to retain the support of the townsfolk. Visual images "could break through the barrier to communication imposed by illiteracy."⁵⁸ The extent to which this was successful or even necessary is of course questionable. In fact, it is quite possible that the most important political values of the regents and the citizens were very similar.⁵⁹

But the exteriors and interiors of town halls were not only designed to impress the governed and remind them of their place. The precepts incorporated in town halls and town-hall decorations were also and perhaps equally intended for the lord regents themselves and for other cities and rulers as well. For the regents as a group of

⁵⁵ Since the regents had no troops, they had to rely on the support of the militia in case of insurrection. The militias were composed almost exclusively of burghers.

⁵⁶ In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 'justice' seems to have assumed the same sort of place in political debate as has the term 'democracy' in more recent times. Justice was the all-encompassing quality covering virtually every aspect of government. In 1747, for example, a political pamphlet with a long list of very divergent complaints and demands was published under the title: *Leer rechtvaardigheid betrachten en geen burgers te verachten* (Learn to practise justice, hold no citizen in contempt). De Jong, *Met goed fatsoen*, 65.

⁵⁷ For example, Sir William Temple. Roorda, *Ambassadeur*, 97.

⁵⁸ Burke, *Louis XIV*, 158.

⁵⁹ Thus the citizenry rarely threw in their lot for shorter or longer times with insurgent movements. R. Dekker, *Holland in beroering. Oproeren in de 17de en 18de eeuw* (Baarn, 1982). Neither did they formulate any real alternative program for city government. As a rule, criticism was confined to the manner in which (individual) regents exercised their offices.

administrators and judges, the selected images amounted to a constant warning and exhortation.⁶⁰ Even though there may have been no one higher than them here on earth, they too would eventually be judged by God.

Moreover, the arrangement and furnishings of town halls emphasized the mutuality of political relationships. They highlighted the internal rules of the game and the claims of individual regents not only with respect to the citizenry but towards the other regents as well (as in the case of the burgomasters, for example). In addition, town halls communicated the glory of the city to cities and city governments elsewhere. In at least one case (Amsterdam) this even amounted to a political statement addressed to the stadhouder and States General.

The fact that many town hall decorations were most likely intended for the regents themselves rather than the people can also be inferred from the themes of the illustrations and the rooms in which they were placed. They were not always located on the ground floor or in the public areas. In fact, the rooms which were more or less exclusively reserved for regents generally had the most decorations. Moreover, a considerable knowledge of Classical mythology and Antiquity was frequently necessary to grasp the message incorporated in the decorations. For this reason, they could probably only be recognized and understood by a majority of the regents and a (small) minority of the citizens. Only they had received enough Classical education to know the associations of classical gods, goddesses and heroes with moral qualities. And sometimes even their education was insufficient. For example, a town hall clerk in Gouda was assigned to provide the regents with a little guidebook to explain the iconography of the decorations which had been applied five years earlier.⁶¹ Decorations of this sort were thus far from being mass media. Knowledge of the Bible, of course, was much more widespread among the population.

In any case, some images were also susceptible to different interpretations. The message intended by the parties commissioning the

⁶⁰ A similar conclusion is drawn with regard to the decorations in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena. The frescos there were meant for the magistrates. For the the Netherlands, see: Lamoree, 'De ideologie van een stadsregering,' 191; and Elisabeth O. de Bièvre, *The Decoration of Town halls in the United Provinces: a study in Style and Iconography* (London, 1986), 20.

⁶¹ Friendly contribution from W.F. Denslagen. The regents in The Hague also required a written explanation from the artists. Lamoree, 'De ideologie van een stadsregering,' 198.

illustrations can be inferred from the location in which they were originally placed. A good example of this is the illustration of the Old Testament story of Jethro, who advised Moses to gather stalwart, god-fearing and reliable men to stand by him as the ruler and function as the leaders of the people. Among other places, this episode is illustrated in the council chamber of the Amsterdam town hall. The message addressed to the stadhouder may have been that God was no advocate of absolute rule. The councils could have read in it an exhortation to be good and pious and a reminder that they were above the people but subordinate to Moses (the burgomasters²). And the people could see that (god-fearing and reliable) rulers and leaders were a natural fact of life, a system which God Himself had chosen. For these and other reasons town halls had multiple layers of meaning.

The above analysis of the interiors and exteriors of town halls in the Republic enables me to make a comparison with the political presentation of Louis XIV, the Sun King, and to a lesser extent with municipal architecture in France. Unfortunately, it is not possible within the scope of this article to enter into a detailed investigation of the many interesting correspondences and differences in the content and form of the political images created in the Republic and in France. I will thus confine myself primarily to a comparison of the social and political values which were to be transmitted and the examples and images which were utilized for this purpose.

In France, as in most parts of Europe, the growing ascendancy of the monarchies over the towns reduced the need for the rulers to engage in a direct dialogue with their subjects. Royal influence on local affairs was substantial. Since 1692 positions in the French town governments were sold by the king. Royal approval was required to build or rebuild a town hall, and often the royal intendant took the initiative. The towns were often obliged to honor the king by erecting a statue of the king on a royal square in front of the town hall. As a result of these and other developments the French town halls lost "les signes, qui identifiaient les maisons communes (...) comme si l'on s'accommodait d'une certaine banalisation de l'édifice public."⁶²

Significantly different is the emphasis placed on 'the importance of reputation or glory for rulers and nobles.'⁶³ While a sense of this

⁶² Pérouse de Montclos, *Hôtels de ville de France*, 67.

⁶³ Burke, *Louis XIV*, 5.

importance did not entirely escape the bourgeois regents as a group, the cities of the Republic nonetheless lacked any sort of comparable conscious program for glorification of the government. And notwithstanding the fact that individual prestige and personal reputation were important for regents and may even have gained in importance in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the town halls studied display no symbolic constructions of individual glory, let alone majesty. A great difference is evident here between the highly collective and less hierarchical governmental culture in the Republic and the political culture of the French court, in which the powerful individual had a central role.

Wim Blockmans has argued that the chief function of Versailles was to attune the ideas and concepts of the French nobility to the goals and objectives of the monarchy.⁶⁴ Many town halls in the Republic had a similar function: to gear the ideas and values of the citizens to the objectives of the city government. According to Louis' panegyrists, however, every good thing which happened to France was due to his personal wisdom, prudence, courage and direction.⁶⁵ In the Republic, on the contrary, prosperity was seldom ascribed to the efforts of a single person. More important in this respect were the demeanor of government and people and the help of God.⁶⁶

A personality cult like that around Louis XIV was thus unimaginable in the Republic, although some members of the House of Orange did try a little to stimulate one. Burke refers to the irritation which this sort of thing provoked among the regents of Holland.⁶⁷ The regents were also quite reserved when it came to allowing themselves to be depicted in their capacity as magistrates or council members, whether individually or in a group. Visual images of regents are lacking in most town halls, while many of the countless family portraits in private homes are free of political associations. In a certain sense, regents maintained a clear separation between their public and private lives.

Furthermore, magnificence was certainly not the key word in the political culture of the cities that it was for Louis XIV.⁶⁸ The concept was certainly present in connection with town halls, but rarely

⁶⁴ Blockmans, *Geschiedenis van de macht*, 296.

⁶⁵ Burke, *Louis XIV*, 26.

⁶⁶ An interesting source in this respect are the texts of the public prayers which were read out annually.

⁶⁷ Burke, *Louis XIV*, 143, 169.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

in relation to persons. Thus, Pieter Post's creation in Maastricht was referred to as 'a very magnificent town hall.'⁶⁹ Like the town hall of Amsterdam, it made a real impression on the viewers. But it is highly doubtful whether either town hall had the same political function as did Versailles, for example, for the absolutist Sun King. And while the regents were certainly not averse to a little ceremony, they definitely did not see themselves as actors constantly desiring to star in a grandiose theater.⁷⁰

The bourgeois regents felt more comfortable with the concept of dignity. The 'calm dignity' of Spanish rulers thus caused them less resentment.⁷¹ Burke mentions gravity and sobriety as forming part of the cultural and political tradition of the Habsburgs.⁷² In this context, the style of rulership of the Austrian emperor Leopold I is also interesting: 'generally sober rather than splendid.'⁷³ 'Modest' was an adjective officially applied to him. Modesty was also a highly praised political quality in the towns of the Dutch Republic.⁷⁴

With regard to the Republic, Burke's conclusion that the modern cult of sincerity did not exist in the seventeenth century is also questionable.⁷⁵ As far as the regents and citizenry were concerned, the town hall decorations provide absolutely no support for the proposition that 'other values, like decorum, were considered more important.'⁷⁶ Virtues such as sincerity, integrity and piety were in fact often depicted. And political diatribes and pamphlets seldom confined themselves to playing the ball. The man was generally hit hard as well, in an attempt to denigrate his decorum, his decency and integrity.

⁶⁹ See note 52.

⁷⁰ Burke describes Versailles as a 'theatre state' where ritual in particular was viewed as a kind of drama which had to be staged in order to encourage obedience. *Louis XIV*, 7. For rituals connected with city government: Faber et al., *Van Heeren*, 77–80.

⁷¹ Burke, *Louis XIV*, 22.

⁷² According to Burke, the political style of the Habsburgs, an ancient and venerable family, had no need to be so lavish. Louis, on the other hand, would have wanted to compensate for the fairly recent date of his dynasty. *Louis XIV*, 184. The regents in the Republic evidently tried to lengthen the lineage of their government rather than compensate for it.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 175.

⁷⁴ Also interesting in this respect are the results of Hofstede's research into cultural differences. At the present time, Austria appears to be the culture with the smallest power distance! Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations* (London, 1991), 26.

⁷⁵ Burke, *Louis XIV*, 13. Burke is of course correct when he refers to the present attention given to the private lives of politicians. In this connection, see Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (New York, 1977).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

Another obvious difference had to do with war and conflict. There are virtually no references to the personal courage of regents on the battlefield, where, indeed, they were rarely to be found. In contrast, Mars and Victory were prominent in many French allegories.⁷⁷ The same is true for celebrations of war. Valor was evidently a political or moral value which was not much appreciated by burghers and their regents. The well-known stereotype of the Republic as a nation of merchants and clergymen with few martial aspirations thus appears to be confirmed.

It will therefore come as no surprise to learn that the Dutch regents, in contrast to Louis XIV, were generally not compared "to the gods and heroes of classical mythology, such as Apollo and Hercules."⁷⁸ The heathen god Apollo is entirely absent from the town halls studied, while the hero Hercules appears only sporadically.

Even the heroes of the past with whom Louis and the city administrators compared themselves differed greatly.⁷⁹ The only heroes they had in common were Justinian and Solomon. The regents did not identify themselves with Alexander or Augustus, nor did Louis identify himself with Moses. The king preferred the Roman Empire and the emperors, the regents the Roman Republic and its senators and consuls.

In conclusion, it can be stated that the town hall in the cities of the Republic formed the center and symbol of urban culture and city government. This was equally true for the town halls in Holland and Zeeland and those in the Generaliteitslanden. Town halls were a means of representation for the city as a whole, the city government, and groups within that government as well. Interiors and exteriors helped to express the social and political values enjoined by—and on—the political élite. The decoration schemes selected for this purpose consisted in the main of combinations of elements from Classical mythology and Antiquity (the Roman Republic in particular) and the biblical story of Moses and the people of Israel. In any case, there is almost no evidence for a shift from Biblical to classical themes in this respect.⁸⁰ Clearly, the decoration schemes of the eighteenth century were as much based on the Old Testament as those of the seventeenth century. Classical mythology was particularly reserved for the

⁷⁷ Ibid., 26, 72.

⁷⁸ Burke, *Louis XIV*, 6.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 35.

⁸⁰ Such a shift has been suggested by Unger (among others), *Monumenten*, 34.

judiciary, while classical history found favor primarily with the burgo-masters. Furthermore, Burke's remark about the rejection of classical mythology around 1680, linked with his observation that the representation became more directly than allegorically, finds no support in the town halls of the Republic.⁸¹ Neither do they prove the aristocratization thesis. Because the language and imagery used did not change that much, it is difficult to see a real transformation of the urban political élites. The regents as a whole remained a burgher-élite. The emergence of a separate burgomaster's chamber suggests however a growing distance between ordinary members of the political élites and the members with most power and prestige. The burgo-masters wanted to be seen not as aristocrats, but as patricians.

Justice was the most frequently depicted quality, even outside the domain of the judiciary. In this respect as well, no great regional differences occurred. The decor of the town halls studied suggests that city politics called for moderate, prudent and reasonable government, to be exercised by regents in pursuit of the most important goals: harmony, peace and prosperity. The administrators, of course, were expected to be pious and sincere. All this is in harmony with an ancient urban-republican political tradition, although the importance of biblical themes in Dutch town halls was much greater than in the civic buildings of the Italian city republics.⁸² And the same can be said about the Dutch emphasis on morality, especially incorruptibility. The outside of city halls, logically enough, was intended primarily for the outside world; the interior, with the possible exception of the tribunal, was meant more for the regents themselves. Both interior and exterior, however, expressed a good deal more than power alone.

⁸¹ Burke, *Louis XIV*, 130–131.

⁸² Blockmans, *Geschiedenis van de macht*, 291. Biblical themes were less often depicted in town halls in France and England as well.



Fig. 1. The town hall of Enkhuizen (1950). Copyright © Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg.



Fig. 2. The burgomasters' chamber of the Enkhuizen town hall with paintings by Romeyn de Hooghe (1976).
Copyright © Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg.



Fig. 3. The burgomasters' chamber of the Enkhuizen town hall with paintings by Romeyn de Hooghe (1976).
Copyright © Rijksdienst voor de Monumentenzorg.

STORIES ABOUT THE GALLOWS FIELD:
POWER AND LAUGHTER IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AMSTERDAM*

Angela Vanhaelen

In his *Natural History of Holland* of 1776, Johannes le Francq van Berkhey records that when the children of Amsterdam asked their parents where babies came from, the usual reply was ‘Oh, Mother has been to the Volewijk.’¹ According to this tale, mothers would make the short voyage across the Amsterdam harbor to the marshy land across the river IJ to pluck a new baby either from the children’s well, or from the special baby-bearing trees that grew there.² Such a scene is actually pictured in a late seventeenth-century comic catchpenny print that was marketed for children (fig. 1, scene 13).³ One of the small woodcut images of this print depicts a nuclear family: father, mother and baby, in a small boat steered by a man holding a lantern. Behind the boat loom the baby well and children’s trees. Viewed with knowledge of oral stories told about the origins of Amsterdam’s children, it seems that the couple has just picked up their baby and is making the voyage back into the city. Initially, therefore, this seems like a children’s story that was told to censor sexual explanations of reproduction: a local version of the stork or the cabbage patch.

* A previous version of this article was published in *Comic Print and Theatre in Early Modern Amsterdam: Gender, Childhood and the City* (Ashgate Publishing Co., 2003).

¹ Johannes le Francq van Berkhey, *Natuurlijke Historie van Holland*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam, 1776), 2: 1238. Quoted in P. Spierenburg, *The Spectacle of Suffering. Executions and the Evolution of Repression: From a Preindustrial Metropolis to the European Experience* (Cambridge, 1984), 97, 249.

² This folk tale is discussed in a number of sources. See D.J. van der Ven, *Ons Eigen Volk in het Feestlijk Jaar* (Kampen, 1915), 173; G.J. Boekennoogen, ‘Waar de Kinderen Vandaan Komen,’ *Volkskunde* XXIII (1912): 29–37; C. Koord, *Oude Amsterdamse Volksverhalen* (Maastricht, 1981), 151–152; and P. van Boheemen et al., eds., *Kent, en Versint. Eer datje Mint: Vrijen en Trouwen, 1500–1800* (Apeldoorn, 1989), 193.

³ On the role of catchpenny prints in seventeenth-century Dutch society, see Angela Vanhaelen, *Comic Print and Theatre in Early Modern Amsterdam. Gender, childhood and the city* (Burlington, Vt., 2003).

But let us look again. For this fairy tale has unexpected connections to the ways in which civic space was secured through the workings of justice. A sketch of this place, dated 1664 (fig. 2),⁴ serves to expose the bizarre and disturbing fact that Volewijk—the source of Amsterdam’s babies—was also the city’s gallows field. This jut of land at the marine entrance to the city was utilized to display the corpses of executed criminals.⁵ In the interaction between these two images, the children’s well becomes visually conflated with the gallows, and children’s trees can be recognized as wheels. With growing dismay, we can begin to decipher the elegant pictorial economy at work in the children’s print: these hanging bodies are both decomposing carcasses *and* new babies. With this comparison, a comforting tale turns into a nightmare in which the companionate family, sitting in the executioner’s boat, with their baby/corpse, is transformed into the living dead. Floating betwixt Amsterdam and the gallows field, they are neither here nor there, both coming and going in a watery passageway between the city and its outside. Like the dangling decomposing cadavers, the members of this family are matter in transition, with no solid ground beneath their feet.

The other scenes in this printed story also draw attention to the in-between status of this family. After their marriage ceremony, the couple, named Jan and Griet, begin to battle over household roles, and exchange pants and apron. Then they travel to Volewijk, and in the scenes that follow, the family returns to the home, where the husband lies in the childbed, while his wife has the upper hand, in which she holds a cudgel or whip (fig. 1). As the couple swaps domestic roles, normative gender divisions commingle.⁶ Travelling in their boat through a space-time of hybrid origins, Jan and Griet drift between seemingly essential categories such as birth and death, male and female, the city and its outside.

⁴ The sketch, in pen and gray pencil, is by Anthony van Borssom.

⁵ Amsterdam bought this land in 1618 in order to secure and deepen the entrance to its harbor. J. Wagenaar, *Amsterdam in zijn opkomst, aanwas, geschiedenissen, voorregten, koophandel, gebouwen, kerkenstaat, scholen, schutterijen, gilden en regeeringe*, 1767 (Alpen aan den Rijn and Amsterdam, 1971–1972), 3: 83. As Antonisz’s map evidences, this site was already being used as a gallows field at that time. Today, the site of the former gallows field is the corporate headquarters of Shell International.

⁶ On comic prints and theater plays about the stock characters, Jan and Griet, see Vanhaelen, *Comic Print and Theatre*, especially Chapter Three. In all other references that I found to the Volewijk voyage, husbands did not accompany women on this voyage. The effeminate Jan thus participates in a specifically feminine quest.

My essay does not attempt to search out the origins of this bizarre tale. Rather, I will examine evidence indicating some historically specific uses of the Volewijk story. I have found three cases in which images and anecdotes that linked the decaying corpse, the pregnant body, and the permeable maritime boundaries of Amsterdam were appropriated in contests about civic, group, and individual identity. In each case, the story of Volewijk's babies has the power to interrogate official representations that construct a coherent 'body politic.' Expunged from the city by the mechanisms of justice, the criminal corpse had crossed and thus created the civic boundary. Brought back in as a baby, it re-traverses and intrudes upon this frontier. The movement of criminal cadavers out of the city is paralleled by the passage of mothers who sail into Amsterdam with their new babies. The criss-crossing of these imaginary voyagers unsettles official attempts to fix civic identity. And repeatedly, just as the mystery and mess of decaying and reproductive bodies seems to effectively disrupt the notion of a coherent city, such imagery is expunged, replaced, or denied by official demarcations of the social body. Each repression in turn is answered by the re-emergence of this haunting imagery in different, sometimes unexpected, modes of representation. A distinctive pattern emerges: the appropriation of this story is followed by its repression, and then its reassertion. This seems to indicate how extremely troubling this imagery must have been to those who sought to control urban spaces and populations. Moreover, it provides surprising insights into the ways in which the residents of Amsterdam might have defined their city and themselves.

Volewijk consistently appeared in sixteenth and early seventeenth-century maps and views of Amsterdam, where it was almost always placed in the bottom right hand corner, just resting on the frame. The prototype for this spatial arrangement is Cornelis Anthonisz's bird's-eye view map (fig. 3).⁷ This panel painting of 1538 was commissioned by the civic government, and hung in the Amsterdam Town Hall. There, the objective truth-claims of cartography worked to legitimise the authority of civic leaders. For this map allowed city magistrates to look down on the territory that they governed. The

⁷ C. Armstrong, *The Moralizing Prints of Cornelis Anthonisz*. (Princeton, NJ, 1990), 12. See also David Landau and Peter Parshall, *The Renaissance Print, 1470–1550* (New Haven and London, 1994), 240–244; and *The Dutch Cityscape in the 17th Century and its Sources* (Amsterdam and Toronto, 1977), 69–71, 104.

pleasure of such a viewpoint is the illusion of being able to see the entire city without being part of it.⁸ Distanced from the noise, smell, and confusion of the everyday life of the streets, the impossible vantage point of a disembodied celestial eye actually frees the viewer from the limitations of corporeality. In this way, the painted fiction of a totalizing view of the city attempted to transform burgomasters into omniscient god-like figures, able to see the entire city from above while remaining within its confines.⁹

The inclusion of the gallows field at the bottom of the map served as a reminder that town oligarchs were also like gods in their power to punish. This authority was manifested in specific practices: the *ontsaggelijke plegtigheden*, or awesome ceremonies of capital punishment.¹⁰ These civic rituals occurred anywhere from one to four times per year, depending on the number of delinquents to be punished on the scaffold.¹¹ Sentencing formulas initiating ceremonies of public punishment declared that criminals condemned to execution were ‘children of death.’¹² In a purification ritual specific to Amsterdam, offenders were put to death in the Town Square. They were then expelled from the civic center to its border, and displayed at the harbor entrance. There, criminal cadavers were visible to those sailing in and out of Amsterdam as reminders of the power of its governors to eliminate transgressors from the civic community. Indeed, prisoners condemned to death were sentenced with the formulaic phrase, ‘These are things which cannot be tolerated in a city of law and have to be punished as an example to others.’¹³

Notably, only certain types of criminals were condemned to the infamy of exposure on Volewijk. The majority of those punished with death on the scaffold were from the lower classes. Of these, only the worst offenders were gibbeted after execution—murderers found guilty of crimes against the body, and, increasingly in the late seventeenth century, burglars convicted of offences against property.¹⁴

⁸ See Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. S. Rendall (Berkeley, 1984), 91–93.

⁹ De Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life*, 91–93; see also Tom Conley, *The Self-Made Map. Cartographic Writing in Early Modern France* (Minneapolis, 1996), 12.

¹⁰ Spierenburg, *Spectacle of Suffering*, 45.

¹¹ In the decade from 1671 to 1680, there were eighteen justice days; from 1681 to 1690, there were sixteen. Spierenburg, *Spectacle of Suffering*, 81–82.

¹² *Ibid.*, 47.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 55.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 153–158. Of the 390 people sentenced to death during the period 1650

The latter is significant to Amsterdam, for if Volewijk was a consistent feature of its maps, so was the city's harbor, filled with the masts of trading vessels. And so were its warehouses, which stored goods from around the globe. In this trading center, the severe repression of crimes against property rights was crucial.¹⁵

Thus it was the place of these decaying corpses to secure the maritime boundaries of a purified civic interior. Amsterdam's harbor was central to its identity as the hub of an immense trading empire. At the same time, it was a place where the city was most open to its outside. Built on a bog, Amsterdam had few natural resources, and thus was almost completely reliant on merchandise from elsewhere.¹⁶ In the harbor, peoples and goods from around the globe found their way into the city. These new and unfamiliar elements had the potential to jeopardise notions of impenetrable civic space. Displayed along Amsterdam's main shipping route, Volewijk's criminal corpses thus hung as grisly warnings to maritime traffic coming in and out of the busy harbor.¹⁷ There, they protected the city by reminding in-coming citizens and foreigners alike of the power of civic officials to punish violations against the bodies and the goods of Amsterdam's residents.

While the inclusion of the Volewijk on maps of the city served the same purpose, it also reveals some of the ambiguities of boundaries. For as the peninsula of Volewijk juts up from the bottom of the map, it implies the continuation of land into the space in front of the image where the viewer is standing (fig. 3). This curious spatial disjunction shatters the illusion of disembodied heights of power. It brings the beholder back down to earth: feet on the ground, looking at the city from the perspective of death. Positioned between the viewer and the work of art, the imagery of death frames the beholder's understanding of the representation, the world, and his or her place

to 1750, 219 were condemned to the further infamy of exposure at Volewijk. *Ibid.*, 58.

¹⁵ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977) 84–90.

¹⁶ Amsterdam's important role in the world economy is analyzed in Jonathan Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740* (Oxford, 1989).

¹⁷ Volewijk was not Amsterdam's only gallows field. Corpses also were hung outside the city gates. H.C. Jelgersma, *Galgebergen en galgevelden in West- en Midden-Nederland* (Zutphen, 1978), 41. Antonisz's map indicates that gibbeted bodies also were displayed along main land routes into the city.

in relation to both.¹⁸ Destroying the pretensions of an all-seeing eye, these dead bodies remind viewers of their own bodies—their transitory experience of a living city that gives lie to the stasis of the represented city.¹⁹ They also hint at that which exceeds power: not just past, but also future, crimes against society. And they indicate the final frontier of death, which inevitably destroys both the individual human body and the civic body. From their place of banishment, criminal cadavers graphically point to the limits of municipal authority.

From here, we can begin to understand the subversive humor at work in stories that tell of the return of these corpses as babies. From the magistrates' point of view, the criminal body had been mastered, put to death, and expelled from the city. But this is not the only story. If we shift position—to consider corporeal experience of the city on the level of its streets and canals instead of looking down at it from the sky—a very different picture emerges of the body that is about to stage a come-back voyage into Amsterdam as a baby. For the stories and beliefs that the residents of Amsterdam wove around the criminal corpse certainly do not mesh with the official story.

Jacob Bicker Raye, who attended many executions in Amsterdam, records a curious tale about Volewijk's dead in his journal entry of 17 December 1746.²⁰ On this day, a group of people gathered at Volewijk to watch the executioner and his assistants hang the body of the recently executed Hendrina Wouters upon the wheel. Suddenly, a grain regulator climbed onto another wheel. He then threw his arm around the putrid corpse of Abraham Mozes, alias Bram de Pijpeman. Turning to this cadaver—which had been decaying there for three and a half months—he said, 'Well comrade, how's it going so far? How goes the voyage?'²¹ As a result of this stunt, the grain regulator was reprimanded by the law, and, perhaps more seriously for him, from then on, his colleagues refused to work with him,

¹⁸ The ambiguities of this type of imagery are explored in W. Engel, *Mapping Mortality. The Persistence of Memory and Melancholy in Early Modern England* (Amherst, Mass., 1995), 131.

¹⁹ De Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life*, 91–95.

²⁰ F. Beijerinck and M.G. De Boer, eds., *Het Dagboek van Jacob Bicker Raye. 1732–1772* (Amsterdam, 1965), 135. See also Jelgersma, *Galgebergen en galgevelden*, 40–41.

²¹ 'Wel kameraad, hoe gaat het U al, hoe vaart gij?' Beijerinck and De Boer, *Dagboek van Raye*, 135.

because he had touched a criminal corpse and sat upon the wheel.

This short anecdote gives many insights into seventeenth and eighteenth-century attitudes towards Volewijk's dead. The way that the grain regulator addresses the corpse is especially intriguing: 'How's it going so far? How goes the voyage?' Bodies hung at Volewijk had no place in the urban community. While burial in a cemetery allowed the dead to remain at home within the city walls, bodies taken to the gallows field were condemned, in the poetic words of the sentencing formula, 'to be consumed by the air and the birds of the sky.'²² To be denied Christian burial rites and left for the birds was truly thought of as a fate worse than death. For not only was the corpse condemned to remain forever outside the community of the living, but it also was excluded from the world of the dead. Dangling in the air between heaven and earth, the homeless dead of Volewijk were doomed to a living death in which peace and repose were forever denied.²³

In fact, when the grain regulator addressed the corpse of Abraham Mozes as if he were still alive and voyaging towards death, this was in keeping with widespread beliefs about the semi-animate nature of the corpse.²⁴ Throughout Northern Europe in the early modern period there existed a belief that all corpses retained vestiges of previous identities until they had completely decayed. The process of death was thought to correspond to the amount of time it took a body to decompose: about one year. Its personal identity, or soul, did not die until all flesh had rotted from its bones. Indeed, it is striking how in Bicker Raye's journal entry, criminal remains are given names and even nicknames: Hendrina Wouters, and Abraham Mozes, alias Bram de Pijpman. The executioner and his assistants, and the grain regulator and his colleagues, on the other hand, remain anonymous. It is as if on Volewijk, the personhood of the dead was stronger than that of the living.

The strange half-life of the corpse endowed it with magical energy. The executioner sold fragments of this body: toes, skin, blood, as

²² Spierenburg, *Spectacle of Suffering*, 57.

²³ Jonathan Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned. Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture* (London, 1995), 22.

²⁴ K. Park, 'The Life of the Corpse,' *Journal of History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 50.1 (January 1995): 115. See also V. Traub, "Gendering Mortality in Early Modern Anatomies," *Feminist Readings of Early Modern Culture*, ed. V. Traub et al. (Cambridge, 1996), 47, and Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned*, 114–115.

curative remedies.²⁵ While it had positive healing powers, however, the in-between semi-animate status of the criminal corpse made it ambiguous, endowing it with potential for both good and evil. For these cadavers were the dangerous dead—hostile strangers who might try to reincorporate into the world of the living.²⁶ The story of the grain regulator indicates how physical contact with such a body was considered a taboo act that brought infamy upon the offender and resulted in exclusion from the life of the community.²⁷

Potent body parts dropped from criminal corpses into a pit beneath the gallows. We have already identified this pit as the children's well (figs. 1 and 2), where parents went to draw up babies. In this way, the rational power of magistrates to master the bodies of transgressors by putting them to death in rituals that restored order to the city was met with the powerful and potentially hostile presence of agitated corpses that stubbornly refused to die. Doomed never to rest, and possessing ambiguous powers, the deviant bodies and wills of children of death begin their voyage back into the city as children of life.

This uncanny journey calls up a spatial metaphor employed by Michel de Certeau to describe the complicated process of identity formation: "Within the frontiers, the alien is already there . . . a disquieting familiarity. It is as though delimitation itself were the bridge that opens the inside to its other."²⁸ Thus the trajectory of the criminal body from city center to border and back in again as a baby is not so much a cycle of life, death and rebirth as it is a restless back and forth. No sooner is the alien body jettisoned from civic identity, than it reappears, a disquieting familiarity within. No sooner are limits secured than they begin to decompose. It is as if the physical disintegration of the margins of the dead body threatens both

²⁵ Spierenburg, *Spectacle of Suffering*, 30; Park, "Life of the Corpse," 115–118. Midwives would have been among the clientele for these curative body bits, for women in labor sometimes wore belts of tanned human skin to help the birthing process. See Kathy Stuart, "The Executioner's Healing Touch: Health and Honor in Early Modern German Medical Practice," *Infinite Boundaries. Order, Disorder and Reorder in Early Modern German Culture*, ed. Max Reinhart (Kirksville, Missouri, 1998), 359, vol. 40 of *Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies*, gen. ed. R.A. Mentzer.

²⁶ A. Van Gennep, *The Rites of Passage*, trans. M. Vizedom and G. Caffee (London, 1960), 160–161.

²⁷ The infamous status of the executioner is detailed in Spierenburg, *Spectacle of Suffering*, 13–42.

²⁸ De Certeau, *Practice of Everyday Life*, 129.

the coherence of individual identity, and the boundaries of the city.

Perhaps on account of these ambiguities, by the late seventeenth century, Volewijk was increasingly eradicated from official representations of Amsterdam. This repression is especially noticeable within the genre of civic chronicles. The 1660s saw a flourishing of *beschrijvingen*, or descriptions, of the city of Amsterdam. These volumes detailed the histories of religious, charitable, professional, business and educational institutions, and included items such as lists of all past and present burgomasters and civic officials.²⁹ Containing numerous copperplate engravings, these large, leather-bound, gold-embossed depictions of civic wealth, power and piety were dedicated to and commissioned by city magistrates. Expensive and erudite, the civic histories seem to target readers and buyers from Amsterdam's elite.³⁰

In these works, Volewijk is included in images of the city as it used to be, but not in plans of proposed expansions. One of these works, Olfert Dapper's *Historical Description of the City of Amsterdam*, published in 1663, includes a number of double-page bird's-eye view maps of the city that serve to strikingly illustrate the changing place of Volewijk in civic identity.³¹ The first of these maps, between pages thirty-one and thirty-two, claims to picture the city 'as it was before the year 1400' (fig. 4). Conspicuous in the right foreground at the bottom of the right page, where even a reader who was quickly paging through the book would notice it, is the Volewijk. This view forcefully draws attention to the gallows field by emphasizing its size and prominence. Not only this, but Volewijk is peopled by over twenty figures (not including the dead); they view the gallows and stroll and fish along the shore.

In the next map of Amsterdam, between pages thirty-seven and thirty-eight, the reader finds a representation of the city 'with the

²⁹ There were about a half-dozen *beschrijvingen* published in this decade. See E. Haitma Mulier, "The Image of Amsterdam in 17th-century Descriptions," *Rome-Amsterdam. Two Growing Cities in Seventeenth-century Europe*, ed. P. van Kessel and E. Schulte (Amsterdam, 1997), 13–23, and E. Haitma Mulier, "Descriptions of Towns in the Seventeenth-Century Province of Holland," *The Public and the Private in Dutch Culture of the Golden Age*, ed. A.K. Wheelock, Jr and A. Seeff (Newark, 2000), 24–32.

³⁰ For example, former burgomaster Cornelis Witsen, whose public career is detailed in the book, commissioned Dapper's civic history. It seems that Witsen also provided Dapper with papers and documents, as the city archives were closed to the public. See J.H. van den Hoek Ostende, "Iets over de Auteur en Zijn Werk," in O. Dapper, *Historische Beschrijving der Stadt Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1975), n.p.

³¹ Olfert Dapper, *Historische Beschrijving der Stadt Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1663).

enlargement of the year 1482' (fig. 5). While Volewijk still features on the bottom right margin, it is only a fraction of the size that it was in the previous image. The number of dead has increased, while the living have decreased to five tiny figures who seem to have just stepped from a small boat. Moreover, the gallows field appears to be at a much greater distance from the city. It is as if its importance to the representation of Amsterdam is receding.

By the final map between pages forty-nine and fifty,³² 'A Neat Mapping Out of the Old and New Order of the City of Amsterdam' (fig. 6), which lays out proposed extensions to the city's new canals, Volewijk has not just shrunk, it has disappeared altogether. Readers could not have overlooked the absence of this place and its dead, consistent and expected features of views of Amsterdam until this point. Volewijk's corpses, potent reminders of the spatial and temporal limits of civic power, have gradually ebbed away until they are expunged entirely from plans surveying the city's future development. It seems that there was no place for the marginal messy disruptions of decaying cadavers in this neat and orderly conceptualization of the future city.³³ With this disappearance, the intended effect of a bird's-eye view can at last be experienced—viewers finally float free. No longer grounded by the tip of the gallows field, they take God's place in the sky as the entire city lays itself out below.

While Volewijk's bodies appear in representations of the city as it was in the past, they are noticeably absent from images of the future Amsterdam. This seems to indicate that a new identity was being formulated for the city. Thus it is significant that the civic histories do include other types of depictions of the watery space between Amsterdam and its outside. On the frontispieces of a number of these books, the Amsterdam Maid—a female personification of the city—is shown seated at the harbor entrance. Imagery of the Maid certainly was not new to representations of Amsterdam. However, in the context of books where Volewijk's corpses were pointedly

³² It is actually just at page forty-eight that the pagination of the book suddenly stops, so the map is located between two unnumbered pages. There are about ten unnumbered pages altogether, and then pagination recommences with page forty-nine. J. van den Hoek Ostende attributes this error to the publisher's haste to print the book.

³³ This is in keeping with Lefebvre's claims that the processes of state formation work to homogenize space by violently destroying differences. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith (Oxford, 1991), 372.

being pushed into the city's past, the placement of the Maid takes on heightened significance. It is as if she actually supplants and thus redefines this place of the dead.

The title print of Tobias van Domselaer's *Description of the City of Amsterdam* of 1665 (fig. 7) illustrates particularly well how the Maid's body displaces the Volewijk at the outskirts of the city.³⁴ Flanked by the male deities of the river and the sea, the Maid is enthroned on a water coach, which floats in front of the harbor and the city. Positioned at the harbor entrance, in the place of gibbeted criminal bodies, the Maid works to secure the boundaries of the city in a very different way. The body of the Amsterdam Maid is an allegory for the civic body. Indeed, in this representation, the boundaries of the Maid's body are made to correspond to the boundaries of the city. She is positioned directly in front of the wide opening of the Amstel River, which leads into the city center. Blocking this entrance, her body closes off and thus protects the city.

The use of a female body turns this into a sexual metaphor. The Maid's body is represented as inviolate: it is virginal, closed, and coherent. The XXX of Amsterdam's coat of arms, placed exactly between her spread knees, obstructs the sharp pointed objects held by the male figures surrounding her. Neptune's triton, Africa's tusk, Europe's baton, America's long string of pearls, and the river god's oar are all deflected. The Maid remains as secure and as impenetrable as the city. In contrast, images of the city 'as it was' (figs. 3 and 4) start to look grotesquely, yet unmistakably, vaginal—open to unpredictable flows of trade.

The contrast between these images exposes the dilemma of how to represent a city that was open to the flux of commerce, yet simultaneously closed and in control. Indeed, throughout the seventeenth century, controversies about the identity of Amsterdam converged on contradictions between state power and mercantile values. Political crises of 1650 and 1672 both came to a head as Amsterdam's merchant oligarchs, who sought to protect trade, opposed the military policies of the stadholder, or quasi-monarch of the Netherlands, who sought to protect the integrity of the state.³⁵ By the late seventeenth

³⁴ Tobias van Domselaer, *Beschryvinge van Amsterdam, haar eerste beginselen, oudtheydt, vergrootingen, gebouwen en geschiedenissen tot op den Jare 1665* (Amsterdam, 1665). Like Dapper's civic description, this book also was dedicated to the city's governors.

³⁵ In each case, Amsterdam's regents advocated peace treaties with the Republic's

century, as town oligarchs increasingly dominated the politics of the entire Dutch Republic, tensions about how to define Amsterdam—as hub of the Dutch trading empire, or as a center of government power—escalated.³⁶ Such conflicts were extremely difficult to reconcile for they converged on antithetical notions of time and space. As a point of transit in commerce, it was crucial that the merchant city remain open to sometimes chaotic, difficult to regulate, ever-changing flows of commodities, information, and people. The state, on the other hand, needed to represent itself as a solid, static and cohesive seat of power.³⁷

In the midst of struggles and contradictions between notions of a fertile, reproductive money-making trade center, and a stable and unchanging state floats the Amsterdam Maid. Her impossibly disembodied femininity smoothes the troubled waters of this identity crisis by providing a ground where the flux of trade and the homogeneity of government meet. For, as she hovers in the space between the city and its outside, the Maid works to mediate the uncertainty of the harbor, which both creates the city and opens it to the influx of alien peoples, ideas and merchandise. For this contained, classical woman is positioned, not as a mother, but as a guardian of bodies, goods and spaces. The four continents gather at her feet. Africa, Europe, America and Asia are all represented as small children who bestow the wealth of their regions in homage to Amsterdam. Notably, they do not enter the city. Rather, they deal with the Maid *outside* of the center in the ambiguous space between Amsterdam and what lay beyond it. Thus the city's dependence on its exterior is reversed, as its foreign trading partners are portrayed as infants who are reliant upon and subservient to the queenly Amsterdam. As she usurps the place of Volewijk's lively dead bodies, and displaces the maternal bodies of Amsterdam's mothers, who sailed this channel in search of babies, the Maid's body redefines the city's maritime boundaries.

enemies. Not only was peace more conducive to the smooth functioning of trade, but it also curtailed the powers of the stadholder, the Republic's military commander, whose court was at The Hague, the Republic's official center of government. J.L. Price, *Culture and Society in the Dutch Republic during the 17th Century* (London, 1974), 3–11, 26–29.

³⁶ Spierenburg, *Spectacle of Suffering*, 54.

³⁷ Elizabeth Grosz details the tensions between state power and commerce in her provocative essay, "Bodies-Cities," in: E. Grosz, *Space, Time and Perversion* (New York, 1995), 107.

However, imagery that brought criminal corpses and pregnant mothers together at the city's margins did not die off in the late seventeenth century. To the contrary, these ambiguous bodies persistently refused to be subdued, and their disruptive power was mobilised in the 1670s in a satirical booklet called *The Ten Pleasures of Marriage*.³⁸ In contrast to the costly, classical, civic chronicles commissioned by the elite, *The Ten Pleasures* is an inexpensive booklet illustrated with comic copper plate engravings.³⁹ This allowed it to be circulated to a broader spectrum of the population. It is unlikely that the three hundred and thirty-one pages of this two-volume work were directed at the lower classes, however. Presuming a literate audience familiar with political satire, the form of the work seems to indicate a middle-class audience. Moreover, this book probably was connected to a literary and political movement that appropriated visual traditions of farce in battles to keep the city open to trade, and to oppose the growing distance of the elite.⁴⁰

Playing with the notion that a harmonious family was the basis for an orderly state, *The Ten Pleasures* represents the disorderly domestic life of a merchant who is governed by his uncontrollable wife. The private life of this mismatched couple seems to serve as a chaotic manifestation of a society that was not well governed. Significantly, imagery of the Volewijk story figures largely in this book. Not only does it feature on the title page, but an engraving of this well-known tale also appears in chapter seven (fig. 8). Here, it accompanies an ironic description of the seventh pleasure of a marriage turned-upside-down: "... the seventh came rather unexpectedly, for the wife began to look so afraid, she moaned so, and groaned and cracked, so that it looked like she wanted to sail to the Volewijk for a baby."⁴¹ To assist her in this journey, she sends her hen-pecked husband to get the midwife. The midwife claims that she cannot tack, swing and

³⁸ Hippolytus de Vrye, *De Tien Vermakelikheden des Houweelyks*, 1683, ed. E.K. Grootes and Rob Winkelman (Amsterdam, 1988).

³⁹ Simon Schama, *The Embarrassment of Riches. An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age* (New York, 1987), 445.

⁴⁰ See the editor's epilogue to the 1988 edition: *Tien Vermakelikheden*, 115–116.

⁴¹ "... komt de sevende zeer onverwacht te voorschijn, want de vrouw begint zo bang te zien, zo te kreunen, te steunen en te kraken, dat het schijnt of ze naar de Volewijk om een Popje wil varen." *Tien Vermakelikheden*, 67. The reason that this birth is unexpectedly premature is because, in a typical farce scenario, the wife is having another man's child, and has duped her cuckolded husband into believing that it is his.

steer the boat on her own, and so a crew of the wife's female kin and neighbours is brought on board: the sisters, sisters-in-law, aunts, cousins and friends of the wife all join the expedition. Their voyage towards Volewijk, the place of death/birth is described as a difficult one:

But alas, [the husband] could see the little ladies' dejected faces as they looked at each other, as one began to pray and another to cry, for the little Volewijk's boat was drifting backwards and was completely buffeted by head winds and strong currents, yes, it was so off course that wife or child, and maybe both were done for.⁴²

This is the scene represented in the illustration. At the center of the image is the wife. The midwife, surrounded by female assistants, reaches under the woman's skirt as she helps to deliver the baby. In a smaller scene outside the window, five women are rowing a little boat towards the gallows. The scene of labor and the trip to Volewijk are pictured as the same event, graphically illustrating how the 'trip to Volewijk' worked as a vivid metaphor for the physical pain and danger of childbirth.

In the engraving, the connection between the gallows field and the womb as places of origins is made by the visual device of thick plumes of smoke, which run up the side of the image. Black smoke usually obscures, but in the case of a story where opposites are inverted, dark fumes may actually illuminate. They may shed some light on the bizarre link between decomposing and maternal bodies. The excessive smoke seems to come from a rag held up to the fire by a woman in the foreground. Possibly she is drying this cloth, and the evaporating dampness causes the smoke to rise. From here, we begin to speculate about how this rag got wet in the first place. This calls up the unrepresented mess of childbirth: blood, urine, feces—do these bodily secretions soak the cloth? With this, clouds of smoke begin to smell, attracting the attention of others in the room. Revulsion billows up to Volewijk's putrid carcasses.⁴³

⁴² "Maar helaas, hij ziet dat al de tronien der wijffes zeer bedrukt naar elkander kijken, dat de een begint te bidden en de ander te schreien, want het Volewijks schuitje drijft geheel ten achteren en krijgt gans tegenwind en -stroom, ja, het raakt zo uit de koers, dat vrouw of kind en misschien allebei om hals zullen raken." *Tien Vermakelikheden*, 70.

⁴³ My argument here is indebted to Julia Kristeva's definition of the 'abject' as that which falls away from the body, and thus disrupts the subject's necessary belief in its own integrity and stability. According to Kristeva, bodily excretions dissolve

Given the political agenda of *The Ten Pleasures*, the intent of this imagery was probably to re-articulate metaphors of the city as fertile and open to trade at a moment when its mercantile identity was threatened. It seems to mobilize the horror of decaying and pregnant bodies—transitional bodies lacking self-containment—to attack the closed boundaries of the civic body found in representations commissioned by Amsterdam's governing elite. However, such an assault has great potential to run out of control, and the intent was not to throw the body politic open to everyone. Thus, in keeping with Calvinist doctrines of original sin, these prints vividly convey the notion that all babies are born evil. And, in the tradition of Eve, the unchecked desires of the domineering wife are punished with the pain of childbirth. As this book appropriates the imagery of bodies that violated corporeal and civic margins to disrupt the increasing closure of the body politic, it also directs repulsion at women and children. By equating them with criminals, it maintains their exclusion from the public sphere.

Such imagery is not intrinsically misogynist, however. There is compelling evidence that this story was used by groups of women to fight against their exclusion from public life. In fact, the image of Volewijk was the emblem of the city's midwives, who hung the sign of Volewijk outside their doors as a way of advertising their skills to passers-by.⁴⁴ Although midwives' sign boards do not survive, based on printed images of the 'Volewijk voyage' (see fig. 8, for example), it seems likely that they depicted midwives and expectant mothers rowing to or from the gibbets and wheels. Thus the residents of Amsterdam would not only have been familiar with oral tales and references to the Volewijk voyage, but they also would have readily understood the associations of visual imagery that linked this place of death with the process of birth.

boundaries between the interior and exterior of the body, thus provoking feelings of disgust, even horror. In this engraving, the smoke that rises from the secretions of the pregnant body brings the eye to the border of the image, and so to the corpse, the horrific extreme of bodily waste. See *Powers of Horror. An Essay on Abjection*, trans. L. Roudiez (New York, 1982); Elizabeth Grosz has expanded upon Kristeva's theories in an important essay, "The Body of Signification," *Abjection, Melancholia and Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva*, ed. J. Fletcher and A. Benjamin (London, 1990), 80–103.

⁴⁴ J. van Lennep and J. ter Gouw, *De Uithangteekens in Verband met Geschiedenis en Volksleven Beschouwd* (Amsterdam, 1868), 1: 87–91. These boards are also mentioned in the important primary source on street signs, Jeroen Jeroense, *Koddige en Ernstige Opschriften op Luyffels, Wagens, Glazen, Uythang-borden, etc.* (Amsterdam, 1682), 126.

A series of regulations from Amsterdam's Medical College tells the tale of how the professionalization of objective medicine compelled the prohibition of midwifery practices in the late seventeenth century. These ordinances repeatedly dictated that only women approved by the College could hang street signs, with large and legible letters, which had to be stamped by the Inspectors and with the personal seal of Dr. Frederik Ruysch.⁴⁵ Large letters. No pictures. What emerges here is the erasure once again of an image of Volewijk.

Significantly, medicine's strategies of inclusion and exclusion become evident when we consider an official group portrait of 1683, painted by Jan van Neck, which depicts Doctor Frederik Ruysch and his colleagues (fig. 9).⁴⁶ These are the very men who decreed that every midwife bring her clearly lettered sign to the College for their stamp of approval. Thus it is intriguing to note that this group of doctors chose to have themselves portrayed in the act of dissecting a dead baby. The hands and faces of the anatomists form two concentric rings around the infant corpse, visually unifying these men into a cohesive social group. Indeed, they come together as a social body through their shared access to a body of knowledge—in this case, obstetrics.⁴⁷ It is early days yet in the history of modern medicine and this portrait still jars the viewer into recognizing the human sacrifices that scientific objectivity demands. At the right-hand edge of the painting is Dr. Ruysch's son Hendrik.⁴⁸ Holding the skeleton

⁴⁵ J. van Lennep and J. ter Gouw have reconstructed the history of the repression of the midwife's imagery of Volewijk in their study of seventeenth-century street signs. Van Lennep and Ter Gouw, *Uithangteekens*, 87–91.

⁴⁶ The tradition of the Amsterdam surgeon's guild to commission and display paintings of anatomy lessons is discussed in G. Schwartz, *Rembrandt: His Life, His Paintings*, (New York, 1985), 143–144. Van Neck's painting has been analyzed by Julie Hansen, 'Resurrecting Death: Anatomical Art in the Cabinet of Dr. Frederik Ruysch,' *Art Bulletin* 78 (December 1996): 663–679.

⁴⁷ Ruysch was the official supervisor of Amsterdam's midwives. One of Ruysch's colleagues, Dr. Hendrik van Roonhuysen, inventor of the obstetric lever, a forerunner to the forceps, became Amsterdam's official city obstetrician in 1648. He used this post to restrict the practices of the city's midwives. Links between this painting and the denigration of midwifery are discussed in Schama, *Embarrassment of Riches*, 526–527.

⁴⁸ This figure is identified as Hendrik in the records of the surgeon's guild. Hansen, 'Resurrecting Death,' 666. Jonathan Sawday observes that the history of medicine follows a patrilineal model. Although Ruysch's daughter Rachel was also involved in her father's studies, the notion that knowledge about the body is passed down from father to son certainly resonates with this portrait. See Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned*, 39–43.

of a child, yet dressed in the same sober costume as the doctors, he stands as an intermediary figure. He is caught between the anatomists and the other children in the painting, between the living and the dead, between the practitioners of medicine and the things that they examine.

Clearly, this model of medicine, which depended on the division of subjects and objects of knowledge, is quite different from the image of a small group of women collaboratively fighting death as they steer a small boat against strong winds and currents. One turns babies into corpses; the other, corpses into babies. When pictured on the midwives' street signs, the wisdom behind the curious conflation of the womb with the place of death outside of the city walls appears to lie in the ways that such a comparison allowed women to picture fears about the dangers and suffering of childbirth. Many women only made it halfway to Volewijk.⁴⁹ The return journey is thus a hopeful image. And, in contrast to the anatomist's portrait, such imagery vividly expresses the terrors of the body in pain, the fragmentation of the body divided against itself, and the profound mysteries of birth and death.

In fact, this official portrait was hung in the surgeon's guildhall—in the very room where midwives underwent examinations to be certified by the College.⁵⁰ Here, its message would have been seen and understood by the midwives themselves. Indeed, it is tempting to view this painting as an effort to legitimate new forms of knowledge about babies in response to traditional midwifery practices.⁵¹ For the model of social order that it depicts was one that actually did legislate that unsupervised midwives take themselves—and their street signs of Volewijk—out of the public domain.

Amsterdam's midwives, however, resisted such attempts to mandate their practices. A poem, said to be written by a midwife, incisively protests the suppression of the midwives' signboards. Published in 1682 in Jeroen Jeroense's *Droll and Ernest Inscriptions on Awnings, Wagons, Windows, Street Signs, etc.*, it reads:

⁴⁹ According to the *Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal* an assertive response to the question, 'Zie je de Volewijk wel?' or, 'Do you see the Volewijk?' indicated that a woman would survive the perils of the voyage. The etymology of the word 'Volewijk' is detailed in W. de Clerck, *Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal* (Leiden, 1986), 746–748.

⁵⁰ Hansen, "Resurrecting Death," 663.

⁵¹ Midwifery practices and contemporary attitudes about midwives are discussed in Schama, *Embarrassment of Riches*, 525–535.

Let the dissenters freely hang up the Volewijk . . . if they desire,
 I have never had another sign for my work, and I also will not
 Let myself be censured,
 When I'm out rowing, there are always all kinds of folk
 Waiting for me.
 I bring in as many children as a City Midwife.⁵²

As this poem indicates, to display a picture of Volewijk in the form of a signboard that did not say City Midwife, or bear the stamp of approval of the Medical College was a creative and clandestine reassertion of the practice of midwifery in the face of its restriction. While midwives probably used the sign of Volewijk long before the 1680s, in the context of these conflicts, tensions about the function of this imagery were intensified. The hanging of these boards in contempt of the College's ordinances thus emerges as a defense of the skill, specialized knowledge and legitimacy of midwives, known in Dutch as *vroedvrouwen*, or wise-women. Repeated attempts to legislate against such practices in turn indicate the continuous and troubling visibility of the signs that these women used to forge and maintain their own identities.

Thus the display of signboards of the gallows field in contempt of the College's ordinances can be seen as a clandestine reassertion of the legitimacy of midwifery in the face of its repression. We have already seen how the decaying bodily margins of corpses arrayed on the boundaries of the city called into question the integrity of individual and civic identity. Here, the decaying surfaces of the cadaver are linked with the burgeoning and permeable margins of the pregnant body. Containing a foetus that both is and is not distinct from it, the maternal body blurs yet produces one identity, one body, within another. Like the decomposing corpse, it is a body that lacks clear boundaries. Imaged on the watery edge of the city, such a body also has the power to call into question larger categories of thought. Indeed, the appropriation of the watery passageway between the city and its outside was particularly pertinent for a group who was losing its traditional place within the city. In opposition to the increasingly serious, masculine undertaking of medicine, therefore,

⁵² "Laat andere vrij de Volewijk . . . uithangen zooveel als zij willen,
 Ik heb ook nooit een ander bij mijn werk gehad, en ik laat mij ook niet bedillen,
 En als ik uit roeijen hen staan er gedurig alderhande volk op mijn vloer.
 Ik haal zo veel kinderen als een Stads-Vroemoer."
 Quoted from Jeroense by Van Lennep and Ter Gouw, *Uithangteekens*, I, 91.

these street signs make an incisive visual joke about the ambiguous powers of flawed, diverse and irrepressible bodies to disrupt the boundaries of knowledge and control. Giving lie to truth claims about the body, the imagery of Volewijk pictures the bodies of women, babies and criminals, not as static objects mastered by reason, but as persistent and irrepressible forces with the power to disrupt discourses that sought to produce unified and stable identities.

In conclusion, the three cases I have presented demonstrate how stories and imagery of these rebel bodies at the edge of the city were appropriated in particular conflicts. The first example analyses the potential of this story to disrupt the intended function of the gallows field in official maps and rites of punishment. The second case study explores how the imagery of Volewijk was repressed from official representations at a time when the merchant city was being eclipsed by the state in the late seventeenth century. At this time, the subversive potential of this story was taken up in satirical publications that attacked new notions of civic identity. The final example of the midwives' signboards indicates that such violent, misogynist imagery of the female body could even be taken up by groups of women to affirm their own practices. In each situation, the tale of Volewijk is appropriated and mobilized in historically specific conflicts about the identities of different groups. Thus, this material points to the significance of seemingly marginal forms of imagery. If one looks exclusively at the official maps, civic chronicles, and group portraits that were commissioned by the elite, only the sanctioned version of history emerges. However, when these official and ostensibly objective images are viewed together with more ephemeral types of imagery such as catchpenny prints, satirical booklets, and street signs, a different picture comes into view. These images point to other stories besides the official story. They indicate that the body politic was not a coherent construct born out of consensus, for they allow us to see how certain groups were forcefully excluded from power, and how they may have fought against this exclusion. In this way, the struggles among various forms of representation reveal a series of conflicts and negotiations among social groups. Thus, the peculiar image of a baby coming-into-being in the falling away of the decaying criminal corpse, in the cracking open of the burgeoning maternal body, and in a restless passage between the city and its outside offers surprising insights into early modern notions of civic power and identity.




Fig. 2. A. van Borssom, *Volewijk*, 1664. Copyright © Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.



Fig. 3. Cornelis Anthonisz, *Map of Amsterdam*, 1538. Amsterdams Historisch Museum.




Fig. 4. *Amsterdam. As it was before the year 1400*. Engraving, between pages 31 and 32 of O. Dapper, *Historische Beschrijving der Stadt Amsterdam* (Amsterdam; Jacob van Meurs, 1663). Leiden University Library. 1223 A 14 'Plate 1'.




Fig. 5. *Amsterdam, with the enlargement of the year 1482. Engraving, between pages 37 and 38 of O. Dapper, Historische Beschrijving der Stadt Amsterdam (Amsterdam: Jacob van Meurs, 1663). Leiden University Library. 1223 A 14 'Plate 2'.*




Fig. 6. *A Neat Mapping Out of the Old and New Order of the City of Amsterdam.* Engraving, between pages 49 and 50 of O. Dapper, *Historische Beschryving der Stadt Amsterdam* (Amsterdam: Jacob van Meurs, 1663). Leiden University Library. 1223 A 14 'Plate 4'.



Fig. 7. *Amsterdam Maid*. Engraved title print in Tobias van Domselaer, *Beschryvinge van Amsterdam, haar eerste beginselen, oudtheydt, vergrootingen, gebouwen en geschiedenissen tot op den Jare 1665* (Amsterdam: Marcus Willemsz Doornick, 1665). Gemeentearchief Amsterdam/Municipal Archives Amsterdam.



Fig. 8. *The Seventh Pleasure of Marriage*. Engraving illustrating chapter 7 of Hippolytus de Vrye, *De Tien Vermakelikheden des Houwelyks* (Amsterdam: Hieronymous Sweerts, 1683). Leiden University Library. 1120 F 58: 1 Pl. VII.



Fig. 9. Jan van Neck, *The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Frederik Ruysch*, 1683. Amsterdams Historisch Museum.

THE STRUGGLE OVER THE SABBATH IN PETRUS STUYVESANT'S NEW AMSTERDAM

Joyce D. Goodfriend

Chroniclers of New Amsterdam's history conventionally characterize Petrus Stuyvesant, New Netherland's last director-general, as the embodiment of intolerance, stressing his role as the architect of policies to expel Jews and Quakers and to deny Lutherans the right to worship in public. Quick to condemn this most effective of the Dutch colony's governors, they fail to consider the coherent vision at the root of his cultural initiatives. Stuyvesant's efforts to seal off the city from those whose religious views differed from the doctrines of the Reformed church stemmed not only from his conviction that Reformed Protestantism was the only true faith, but from a concern for the welfare of the diverse port society of New Amsterdam. Exponents of erroneous beliefs, in his view, were likely to precipitate disharmony in the city by fomenting disaffection among adherents of the Reformed church or, even, worse, by encouraging other groups of religious dissidents to strike out on their own. In either case, they imperiled the religious unity that, to Stuyvesant, formed the bulwark of communal order.

As a Christian leader and the son of a Reformed minister, Stuyvesant saw it as his duty to deal strictly with all who went against God's way. Curtailing the spread of heterodox ideas, whether in writing or at religious meetings, was an essential part of this obligation. Apprized that "now and then through diverse persons seditious & erroneous [books] writings and letters are brought in & dispersed among the Common people." Stuyvesant and his Council acted to prohibit "not only the importation of such printed or unprinted [books], writings or letters, but also the communicating or dispersing, [receiving], hiding of the same."¹ Even more dangerous than the circulation of subversive documents were people who assembled to hear false teachers.

¹ Edmund B. O'Callaghan, trans., *Laws and Ordinances of New Netherland, 1638-1674* (Albany, N.Y., 1868), 428-429.

To countenance their meetings, Stuyvesant believed, was to put the community at risk of incurring God's wrath.

Tolerating competing religions, according to Stuyvesant's line of reasoning, was akin to condoning other kinds of sins that endangered the community's spiritual and moral condition. Sectarians who espoused untrue beliefs were the moral equivalent of Sabbath breakers and blasphemers. Pronouncing it "our duty and also necessary that common and public sins such as drunkenness, profanation of the Lord's name and Sabbath, the public and common cursing even by children along the streets, the gatherings of sectarians and other disorderly groups, be countered and promptly prosecuted by the renewal of good regulations and laws," the director-general was, in essence, outlining a Calvinist platform for converting New Amsterdam into a society in which men and women saw the wisdom of living according to biblical precepts.² Conceiving of himself as the instrument for transforming New Amsterdam into such a Calvinist community, Stuyvesant developed a multifaceted program aimed at purifying the small port city. Excluding or endeavoring to coopt religious competitors was the most visible aspect of his policy, but, in point of fact, it was less critical than strengthening the local Reformed church and converting adherents in name only into sober, God-fearing Christians.

Almost immediately after arriving in New Amsterdam, Petrus Stuyvesant set about revitalizing the local Reformed congregation by providing it with a suitable building, regularizing church life, and installing an exemplary minister. Proclaiming that it was "highly desirable that the church begun in Fort Amsterdam be completed and made tight before the coming winter," Stuyvesant expedited construction by selecting churchwardens and endorsing a plan to "make a monthly collection from door to door."³ Creating a religious environment in which city dwellers could worship without distraction or distress was also a priority. This involved de-politicizing the pulpit by sanctioning the departure of Domine Everardus Bogardus, who had been embroiled in a feud with Stuyvesant's predecessor, Willem Kieft. Whoever was at fault (and each man had his partisans), the

² Charles T. Gehring, trans. and ed., *Council Minutes, 1655-1656* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1995), 133.

³ Arnold J.F. Van Laer, trans., Kenneth Scott and Kenn Stryker-Rodda, eds., *New York Historical Manuscripts Dutch*, 4 vols. (Baltimore, 1974), 4: 412, 467.

New Amsterdam congregation had been sundered. Critics of Kieft charged that between January 1644 and May 1647, he “has never wished to hear God’s word or to partake of Christian sacraments, doing every thing to keep from church all those who depended on him.” Moreover, “he permitted the officers and soldiers to perform all kinds of noisy plays during the sermon, near and around the church, rolling ninepins, bowling, dancing, singing, leaping, and other profane exercises.”⁴

Whether Domine Bogardus provoked these actions, as Kieft’s allies maintained and Bogardus’s supporters denied, the situation was intolerable to Stuyvesant. Determined to prevent members of the clergy from assuming a political role, Stuyvesant instructed Domine Johannes Backerus, the interim pastor, “not to read himself, or have read by any of the Church officers, from the pulpit or elsewhere in the Church, at the request of any of the Inhabitants, any writing, petition or proposal having relation to the municipal or general government.”⁵ When it looked as if New Amsterdam’s pulpit would become vacant, Stuyvesant persuaded Johannes Megapolensis, the long-time preacher at Rensselaerswijck, who was scheduled to leave the colony, to take up the duties as New Amsterdam’s minister, thereby assuring continuity in New Amsterdam’s church life. To lure the city’s non-Dutch inhabitants, Stuyvesant initiated a search for a bilingual Reformed minister that resulted in the appointment of Domine Samuel Drisius, characterized by the Dutch West India Company’s directors as capable of preaching in ‘[English and] Dutch and if necessary even in French.’⁶

Ameliorating the condition of New Amsterdam’s Reformed church and fostering a peaceful atmosphere in which people could worship uninterrupted by reminders of political strife would, Stuyvesant hoped, induce residents to overcome their alienation from church life and renew their ties to the congregation. Swelling the ranks of loyal churchgoers would bolster the church’s position in the city. The greater the number of men and women who could be won over to

⁴ “Broad Advice,” in Henry C. Murphy, trans., *Vertoogh van Nieu Nederland; and Breeiden raedt aende Vereenichde Nederlandsche provintien. Two rare tracts printed in 1649–1650. Relating to the administration of affairs in New Netherland* (New York, 1854), 155–156.

⁵ Edward T. Corwin, ed., *Ecclesiastical Records of the State of New York*, 7 vols. (Albany, 1901–1916), I: 233, 252.

⁶ Gerald Francis De Jong, ‘Dominie Johannes Megapolensis: Minister to New Netherland,’ *New-York Historical Society Quarterly*, 52 (1968): 7–47. Charles T. Gehring, trans. and ed., *Stuyvesant Correspondence 1647–1653* (Syracuse, N.Y., 2000), 156.

the congregation, the greater the likelihood that the Reformed church would become the true institutional center of the community. Broadening the appeal of the official church was crucial to Stuyvesant's recreation of New Amsterdam as a Calvinist society.

Religious uniformity was the centerpiece of Stuyvesant's plan, but it was necessarily complemented by strenuous efforts to change nominal adherents of the Reformed church into faithful and observant congregants. Remolding the behavior of the religiously indifferent was of paramount importance to Stuyvesant from the outset of his administration. In a variety of ways—expelling debauched individuals, curbing popular celebrations with pagan antecedents, and proclaiming days of fasting, prayer and thanksgiving—he worked to impose Calvinist morality on the populace, thereby bringing pressure on New Amsterdam's residents to embrace Reformed values.

Critical to Stuyvesant's project was his campaign to sacralize the Sabbath. Disturbed by the widespread profanation of the day of rest in New Amsterdam, he enacted a series of increasingly stringent laws that prohibited everything from fishing and hunting to trading with the Indians on Sundays. But his primary target was the town's ubiquitous taverns, where Europeans, Africans and Indians drank beer and brandy, engaged in their favorite pastimes, gambled and brawled. Outraged that taverns were abetting the desecration of the holiest day in the Protestant week, Stuyvesant exercised his considerable power to curtail Sunday revelry in New Amsterdam's drinking places. He encountered opposition to his program of Sabbath reform from both the patrons and the proprietors of these establishments, as well as from municipal leaders. Members of the community, skeptical of whether Stuyvesant had the right to dictate how they spent their Sundays, felt no compunction about disobeying the Sabbath laws. The burgomasters and schepens eventually concluded that Stuyvesant's strict Sabbath laws exceeded the limits of custom in the Netherlands. Tracing the Sabbath controversy in New Amsterdam allows us not only to comprehend the mainspring of Stuyvesant's oft-criticized actions, but also to begin to fathom the amalgam of popular beliefs and civic traditions that underlay resistance to the Calvinization of New Amsterdam.

Stuyvesant's efforts to mold New Amsterdam into an orthodox Protestant society proceeded on a number of fronts. Individuals who led immoral lives were subject to severe penalties and even deportation. Those who defiled their marriage vows and thus broke the

biblical commandment were anathema to Stuyvesant, who sanctioned their punishment. The sins committed by Anna Tschuys, a married woman, and Samuel Cromstock, a married man, were flagrant. Both confessed to adultery after witnesses testified that they saw them together late one night in August 1654 "along the Heeren Straet under the naked sky." Tschuys was "lying on her back against the clapboards with her skirts pulled up and her body bared; on top of her was Samuel Cromstock with his pants undone." Stuyvesant's council resolved that this crime required 'punishment according to the form and custom of our Fatherland.' The pair was to be placed in the pillory, each was to pay a fine; if they failed to pay, they were to be beaten with rods.⁸ The penalties stipulated by the Council for another adulterer, Gerrit Tides van Norden, trumpeter and household servant of director-general Stuyvesant, were even harsher. Van Norden had "deflowered and made pregnant a . . . young girl named Anna Thymens, one of [Stuyvesant's] maids" and thus was accused not only of adultery but of bringing "dishonor, scandal and shame to his master's house." He was to be 'severely beaten with rods' and he was also ordered to pay the enormous sum of 300 guilders for the expenses of the 'deflowered maid.'⁹

The determination of Stuyvesant's government to curb adulterous behavior in New Amsterdam was also manifest in the crackdown in 1654 on a group of married women who seemingly had no scruples about breaking their marriage vows. Complaints of their "bad behavior, . . . and dissolute life styles" reached the Council, which ordered the fiscal to "notify the aforesaid women and other consorts of theirs, passed by here unnamed for propriety's sake, that they either have to change their way of living," or prepare to leave the province. The fiscal was further ordered to "keep a close watch on the aforesaid women and their associates; and if during the night any other whores or whoremasters are found . . . they are to be apprehended along with the aforesaid women and brought before the director-general and council."¹⁰

Popular celebrations came under close scrutiny by Stuyvesant, who sought to foreclose opportunities for ordinary men and women to

⁸ Charles T. Gehring, trans. and ed., *New York Historical Manuscripts Dutch* (Baltimore, Md., 1983), 5: 172–173, 180–181.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 186, 196.

¹⁰ Gehring, *New York Historical Manuscripts Dutch*, 5: 137.

engage in uncontrolled revelry. On the last day of December in 1655, he issued an order forbidding "Firing of Guns, . . . Planting of May Poles, . . . [and] beating of Drums" on New Year's and May Days, all of which he believed would incite people to immoral behavior.¹¹ A similar motive lay behind his attempts to rid society of Shrove Tuesday celebrations.

In Europe, Protestant reformers had purged the Christian calendar of what they regarded as remnants of pagan festivities, but ordinary people in the Netherlands persisted in marking these holidays during the seventeenth century. Critics of director-general Kieft noted his presence at a 'shroving feast at the house of Jan Jansen Damen' in New Amsterdam in 1643.¹² But the most exuberant celebrations of the holiday were those of colonists of the lower ranks.

In 1654, several farmers' servants were interrogated by Stuyvesant and his Council for 'riding the goose,' a traditional recreation held on Bacchus Tuesday, the day before Lent. Perceived as flaunting authority, they were punished harshly and future celebrations were forbidden. Offended by the treatment of the servants, yet astute enough not to engage Stuyvesant in a dispute on the merits of Shrove Tuesday revels, New Amsterdam's Burgomasters and Schepens framed the issue as a jurisdictional one, asserting the independent power of the municipality in such cases. Nevertheless, they found a way to convey their opinion of the proceedings. While admitting that "it is considered completely frivolous, needless and disreputable by subjects and neighbors to celebrate such pagan and popish festivals and to introduce such bad customs into this country," they not so subtly pointed out that these customs "may be tolerated in some places of our fatherland or winked at."¹³ The strategy of apprising Stuyvesant that his edicts were at variance with practices in the Netherlands was one that New Amsterdam's leaders would resort to again in the case of the Sabbath.

When informed in 1655 that 'the country people intended "Riding the Goose" again as they did last year,' the Burgomasters dutifully declared the practice to be illegal.¹⁴ Still, Shrove Tuesday revels

¹¹ Berthold Fernow, ed., *The Records of New Amsterdam from 1653 to 1674*, 7 vols. (New York, 1897), 1: 420–421. The ordinance was renewed on December 28, 1656 and December 30, 1661. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, 254; vol. 3, 431.

¹² "Broad Advice," 146.

¹³ Gehring, *New York Historical Manuscripts Dutch*, 5: 119.

¹⁴ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 1: 286.

proved difficult to eradicate among the commonality. In February 1658, Stuyvesant refused permission to the farmers and their men in the vicinity of New Amsterdam to 'pull the goose.'¹⁵

Suppressing a variety of unsavory activities was one means to improve the morals of the community. Another was forcing men and women to pause in their daily round of activities to reflect on the cosmic meaning of their deeds by periodically announcing days of Fasting, Prayer and Thanksgiving. Auspicious events such as the achievement of peace between Spain and the Netherlands, England and the Netherlands, and the 1664 colonial peace treaty with the Esopus Indians were marked in Thanksgiving days.¹⁶ Impending dangers also were cause for the suspension of everyday routines. On August 25, 1655, Stuyvesant appointed 'a day of fasting and prayer to invoke the blessings of Almighty God' on the expedition against the Swedes.¹⁷

To emphasize the gravity of recent occurrences, Stuyvesant interpreted them in providential terms, frequently admonishing the colonists for their sins. Biblical rhetoric infused his call for a day of fasting and prayer after an Indian attack in 1656. Seeking to make the colonists comprehend the connection between their ungrateful abuse of their blessings and God's righteous chastisement of them, he told them that "we may justly cry aloud with the complaining Prophet—*Ah! How hath the Lord covered us with a cloud in his anger, and cast down from Heaven to the Earth the beauty of the land; the Lord has swallowed up all our habitations and hath not pitied; He hath thrown down our strongholds in his wrath; He hath drawn back His right hand when the Enemy came. . .*" To "draw down, in place of God's righteous punishment, His merciful favors and benefits," a "day of General Fast and Prayer" was necessary.¹⁸ In a 'proclamation of a day of Prayer which was read from the City Hall after the usual ringing of the bell' on January 21, 1658, Stuyvesant warned the people of New Amsterdam of the danger represented by the Quakers, intoning against this "new, unheard of, abominable Heresy, called QUAKERS; seeking to seduce many, yea, were it possible, even the true believers."¹⁹ These special

¹⁵ E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Calendar of Historical Manuscripts in the Office of the Secretary of State, Albany, New York*, 2 vols. (Albany, N.Y., 1865-1866), 1: 191.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 121, 139, 266.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 151.

¹⁸ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 2: 40-42.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 2: 346-347.

days on which work and games were forbidden and worship was mandated were intended by Stuyvesant to give the community an opportunity to contemplate the consequences of their actions through the collective ritual of fasting and prayer.²⁰

Regular observance of the Sabbath could also instill a sense of moral purpose in inhabitants. Sabbath reform became the focal point of Stuyvesant's efforts to turn New Amsterdam into an orthodox Protestant society. As a student at the University of Franeker in his native Friesland, Stuyvesant had almost certainly been exposed to the Sabbatarian ideas of the English Puritan minister William Ames, who served as rector of the university from 1626 to 1627 and published treatises on the Sabbath. Along the spectrum of ideas on the Sabbath in the early-seventeenth-century Netherlands, Ames's position, according to Keith Sprunger, was "the strictest one, holding that the Sabbath was of divine institution from Creation and that the Fourth Commandment was rooted in perpetual moral law."²¹ Though influential among Dutch Sabbatarians, the theories of Ames and his student Nathaniel Eaton, later the first president of Harvard College, were by no means universally endorsed by Dutch theologians or lay people. They were even opposed by Franeker students, who objected to Ames's attempts to "instill a stricter Sunday observance by prohibiting the customary student Sunday activities of buying, selling, and delivery of goods, especially beer and wine."²²

Familiar with the theological debate on the Sabbath in his homeland, Stuyvesant must also have received counsel on this issue from the clergymen in his colony.²³ Increasingly outraged at the profanation

²⁰ A brief discussion of New Netherland's fast days can be found in William De Loss Love, *The Fast and Thanksgiving Days of New England* (Boston, 1895). See also Firth Haring Fabend, 'Church and State, Hand in Hand: Compassionate Calvinism in New Netherland,' *de Halve Maen*, lxxv (Spring 2002), 6. On New England's fast days, see Richard P. Gildrie, 'The Ceremonial Puritan: Days of Humiliation and Thanksgiving,' *New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, 136 (1982), 3–16; and Horton Davies, *The Worship of the American Puritans, 1629–1730* (New York, 1990), 58–67.

²¹ Keith L. Sprunger, 'English and Dutch Sabbatarianism and the Development of Puritan Social Theology (1600–1660),' *Church History*, 51 (1982): 33.

²² *Ibid.*, 32–33.

²³ Winton Solberg asserts that Stuyvesant "seems to have avoided the views of Ames as well as of Gomarus, subscribing to the moderately strict Sabbatarianism of which Walaeus was a spokesman," but he does not provide a reference for his statement. Winton U. Solberg, *Redeem the Time: The Puritan Sabbath in America* (Cambridge, Ma., 1977), 207. Jaap Jacobs suggests that Stuyvesant's views on the Sabbath were influenced by New Netherland ministers, Samuel Drisius and Johannes

of this holy day in New Amsterdam, Stuyvesant became resolute in his desire to sanctify this day of rest and call a halt to the inappropriate activities in which townspeople customarily engaged. The intensity of Stuyvesant's desire to institute a Calvinist Sabbath in New Amsterdam can be measured in the succession of laws that he and his council enacted between 1647 and 1663.²⁴ During the first two decades of New Amsterdam's existence, authorities had made minimal effort to curb the excesses of tavern life. In 1638, an ordinance was passed whose purpose was to discourage immoderate drinking.²⁵ In 1641, a half-hearted attempt to restrict the operation of taverns on the Sabbath stipulated that 'no person shall attempt to tap Beer or any other Strong drink during Divine Service.'²⁶

In May 1647, having witnessed "the great wantonness in which some of our inhabitants indulge, in excessive drinking, quarreling, fighting and brawling even on the Lord's day of rest," Stuyvesant ordered that "no brewers, tapsters and innkeepers shall be allowed on . . . Sunday . . . before two o'clock if there is no sermon or otherwise before four o'clock in the afternoon, to offer, tap or serve any people wine, beer or strong spirits of any sort . . . except for travelers and daily boarders."²⁷

Dismayed that the Sabbath was 'still profaned and desecrated' in spite of former edicts, Stuyvesant issued a more sweeping ordinance in April 1648 that not only "forbid during divine service, all tapping, fishing, hunting, and other customary avocations, trading and business, either in houses, cellars, shops, ships, yachts, or in the streets and markets," but, with the minister's advice, "deemed it expedient that a sermon shall be preached from the Sacred Scriptures and the usual prayers and thanksgiving offered from this time forward in the afternoon as well as in the forenoon."²⁸

Although Stuyvesant "request[ed] and command[ed] all our officers, subjects and vassals to frequent and attend" these two church services,

Megapolensis, and the latter's son, Samuel Megapolensis, who had studied at Harvard and also with Voetius in Utrecht. Personal communication from Jaap Jacobs, March 3, 2002. On the Sabbath controversy in the Netherlands, see Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806* (Oxford, 1995), 662-664.

²⁴ For a discussion of these laws, see Solberg, *Redeem the Time*, 207-212.

²⁵ O'Callaghan, *Laws and Ordinances of New Netherland*, 12.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁷ Charles T. Gehring, trans. and ed., *Laws & Writs of Appeal 1647-1663* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1991), 7-8.

²⁸ Gehring, *New York Historical Manuscripts Dutch*, 4: 516-517.

it is uncertain how many townspeople acquiesced.²⁹ Attendance at the Reformed church had never been made compulsory, since the Dutch honored the principle of liberty of conscience. But the hope was that by opening the doors of the church to all of New Amsterdam's diverse peoples, men and women would be lured to worship. Reaching the many New Amsterdammers who placed a higher priority on indulging their earthly appetites than on preparing their souls for salvation proved an ongoing challenge.

Surely, Stuyvesant enjoyed support for his Sabbath reforms from some in New Amsterdam who saw themselves as committed Calvinists. But not all who confessed their faith and became members of the city's Reformed congregation fell into this category. Domine Backerus, who estimated that the New Amsterdam congregation contained 'about one hundred and seventy members' in 1648, declared that 'most of them are very ignorant in regard to true religion,' leaving us to conclude that in many cases allegiance to the church may have been nominal and interest in religion minimal.³⁰ Those who had been in New Amsterdam the longest may have been the most removed from religion, given Backerus's claim that "many of the older people are so far depraved, that they are now ashamed to learn anything good."³¹

Additional grounds for questioning the depth of the populace's religious knowledge emerge from the experience of Gijsbert van Imborch, who, in 1652, "brought here for the service of the commonality a certain quantity of printed books consisting of bibles, testaments and many other pious homilies, and whereas there was little or no demand for the aforesaid books," he was forced, three years later, to seek permission to dispose of the books through a lottery.³² Disinterest in the Bible was not universal in the New Amsterdam community. Jacob Kip attached great value to the Scriptures and

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Corwin, *Ecclesiastical Records*, 1: 236.

³¹ Ibid. Domine Bogardus's supporters claimed that the departure of Kieft and his allies from the church had a sanguine effect. "Notwithstanding all the uproar against God's church, the wise God has so specially directed, that whereas there were not, before his abandonment, more than seventy members from among the people, there were afterwards more than half as many added, and the members are so restrained by God's guidance, that less scandal has taken place than ever before." "Broad Advice," 157–158.

³² Gehring, *Council Minutes, 1655–1656*, 21–22; Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 1: 291.

was able to identify the markings in his Testament after it was stolen.³³ In another instance, a woman went to court to validate her legal title to a small Bible that Indians had taken and given to a girl captive, who, upon her return to New Amsterdam, claimed it as her own.³⁴ But the widespread indifference of residents to Van Imborch's sale of religious books, coupled with Backerus's indictment of church members, lends credence to Stuyvesant's 1649 observation that the New Amsterdam congregation was a 'feeble lukewarm, and fainthearted congregation.'³⁵

The reality of the Sabbath in New Amsterdam, then, reflected both the people's recognition of the central role of the Reformed church in the community and the tendency of many to relegate spiritual concerns to the margins of their lives. The impunity with which men and women in New Amsterdam violated the increasingly stringent Sabbath laws, coupled with the elaborate rationales they contrived for their behavior, suggest that popular beliefs diverged significantly from the orthodoxy of Stuyvesant and the clergy.

Reformed Protestants elevated the Sabbath above other days, insisting that it be observed as a day of rest. If New Amsterdam was to be a Reformed community, its rulers could not permit any resident to work on the Lord's Day. Custom dictated that people refrain from labor on Sundays and most seem to have done so, whether through habit or belief. But for some individuals, personal concerns outweighed traditional respect for the Sabbath. Jacob Stoffels, Ide van Vorst and other farmers were seen working on Sunday at harvest time.³⁶ Miller Jan de Wit, was fined for 'picking his mill stones on Sunday.'³⁷ In 1660, both Wessel Eversen and Albert Trompetter were brought before the city court for having sold fish on Sunday forenoon, morning.³⁸ Otte Gerrits and Jurriaen Jansen van Auwerwyck were cited for cutting wood on Sunday.³⁹ Romein Servein was 'found one Sunday riding with his car[t] on the strand.'⁴⁰ On another Sunday

³³ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 5: 196.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 1: 410, 411, 415; 2: 3, 8, 9.

³⁵ Corwin, *Ecclesiastical Records*, 1: 262.

³⁶ *Calendar of Historical Manuscripts*, 1: 252.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 241.

³⁸ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 3: 218.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 5: 3.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 3: 91.

during the sermon, Nicolaes van Holsteyn employed a cart that came passing by to remove tobacco from someone's house.⁴¹

Shooting game birds was also a cause for prosecution. Manuel Sandersen, a black man, was fined because 'his son had been found shooting pigeons in the woods on Manhattan island, on Sunday, contrary to law.'⁴² In 1659, a youth named Pieter van de Water, was summoned to Court for 'having shot at partridges and wounded [Hartman Wessels] near the Fort within this City' on the Sabbath.⁴³ When an officer attempted to arrest herdsman Jan Boeckholt for shooting pigeons on the Sabbath, he resisted.⁴⁴

In hopes that officials would be lenient in interpreting Sabbath regulations, some offered reasons why they were working on Sunday. Francois Allard explained that he cut wood 'to kindle the fire and to make it burn, as the children complained of the cold'⁴⁵ Albert Trompetter, found 'with an axe on his shoulder,' explained that 'he cut only a little stick for a bat for his child.'⁴⁶ Cartman Jan Meinderzen, accused of 'having stood and worked at his cart,' responded that 'he merely took a pin out of his cart through fear, that the boys should otherwise ride his cart to pieces.'⁴⁷ These men who performed labor on Sunday did not disavow the notion of the Sabbath as a day of rest, but argued that particular circumstances warranted an exemption from the rule.

Those who patronized New Amsterdam's drinking places on Sundays, as well as the tavernkeepers who served them, did not directly challenge the Calvinist conception of the Sabbath either, but the explanations they offered of their errant behavior leave little doubt that they chafed under the strict Sabbath laws.

Not unlike their compatriots in the homeland, New Amsterdammers were addicted to drink. This local propensity for alcohol was specifically linked to religious deficiencies by Domine Backerus, who reported that his congregants were "very ignorant in regard to religion and very much given to drink. To this they are led by the seventeen

⁴¹ Ibid., 1: 289.

⁴² O'Callaghan, *Calendar of Historical Manuscripts*, 1: 261.

⁴³ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, vol. 3, 80, 108.

⁴⁴ O'Callaghan, *Calendar of Historical Manuscripts*, 1: 262, 263.

⁴⁵ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 4: 342.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 4: 342-343.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 4: 342.

tap-houses here.”⁴⁸ Whether the ready availability of alcohol in New Amsterdam caused disaffection from religion or just exacerbated it, there is little doubt that Bible-based Calvinist culture had a formidable rival in tavern culture. As centers of sociability and relaxation, taverns played an essential role in this port society. “Nearly the just fourth of the city of New Amsterdam [in 1648] consists of brandy shops, tobacco or beer houses,” noted Stuyvesant, who differentiated between ‘decent taverns established and licensed for the use and accommodation of travelers, strangers, and inhabitants,’ ‘clandestine grogeries,’ and ‘ale-houses and tipping places.’⁴⁹

New Amsterdam’s taverns varied not only in size but in clientele, serving everyone from the well-to-do to transient seamen, servants, slaves and Indians. Men of standing in the community resorted to taverns for meals and drinks, sometimes accompanied by their wives. In 1644, surgeon Hans Kierstede along with three other men were ‘invited with their wives to the public tavern of Philip Gerritsen, innkeeper,’ where they were served supper.⁵⁰ In 1656, Dirck Claesen Braeck related that he “treated Nicholas Verleth, Corn[eliu]s Aertsen and Ide Van Vorst and their wives to a drink of beer, through friendship and good neighbourhood . . . as they did him many favours heretofore.”⁵¹

Transient seamen found places to quaff their favorite beverages as well. One ship captain, troubled that “the crew of his ship run around here in this city drinking considerably . . . and do no work” petitioned authorities to “warn all tavernkeepers not to tap for, entertain or give credit to his crew.”⁵² In February 1663, Englishman Joris Dopzen [George Dobson] was charged with “keeping a disorderly house and entertaining sailors, whereby the masters receive no service from them.”⁵³ Enslaved Africans also spent time at New Amsterdam’s taverns. Mattheu, a slave belonging to Cornelis Steenwyck, accompanied by Swan and Frans, also slaves, were found drinking brandy at Andries Joghensen’s house “in the afternoon during preaching” in 1662.⁵⁴

⁴⁸ Corwin, *Ecclesiastical Records*, 1: 236.

⁴⁹ Gehring, *New York Historical Manuscripts Dutch*, 4: 496–497.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 2, 205.

⁵¹ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 2: 131.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 2: 73.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 4: 205.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 4: 41–42, 45–46.

Despite numerous ordinances prohibiting the sale of alcohol to Indians, native Americans consistently gained access to local drinking places. On August 28, 1654, the director-general and council noted that 'many and diverse Indians are almost daily seen drunk and intoxicated within the city.'⁵⁵ Several New Amsterdam tavernkeepers were condemned for breaking these laws—Nicolaes Terhaer for 'tapping to the Indians on Sunday during sermon as well as at other times [1654],' Michel Taden for selling brandy to Indians [1656], and Lysbet Ackerman for having drawn beer for two Indians [1663].⁵⁶ Some tavernkeepers proved incorrigible, even after Stuyvesant had gone so far as to deport Sander Toursen and his wife for selling brandy to two Indians in 1656 and then compounding their offense by denying it.⁵⁷ Migiel Tades, who had been punished severely for his previous offense, was brought before the court again in July 1664 for 'having tapped on Sunday to twelve Indians.' In his defense, Tades explained that 'the Indians came drunk to his house and he tapped small beer for them, but no strong beer.'⁵⁸

New Amsterdam's denizens resorted to taverns not only to imbibe brandy or beer, but to join with friends in clubs. In 1654, authorities learned that there were 'drinking clubs on divers nights at the house of Jan Peck, with dancing and jumping and entertainment of disorderly people.'⁵⁹ Jan Rutgerzen was brought to Court in 1661 for 'having tapped and kept a club during the preaching and having discovered 5 [or] 6 persons there.'⁶⁰ At their favorite taverns, people amused themselves with games. In 1661, Hendrick Assuerus 'sold liquor to sundry persons, and permitted them to play at ninepins during divine service.'⁶¹ On a Sunday in 1663, there were found at Andries Joghimzen's house 'seven & eight persons bowling and two others sitting ticktacking or playing backgammon.'⁶²

From the beginning of his term as New Netherland's director-general, Stuyvesant viewed the dissoluteness of tavern life as symptomatic of the deviation of New Amsterdam's men and women from

⁵⁵ Gehring, *New York Historical Manuscripts Dutch*, V: 173.

⁵⁶ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 1: 208; 4: 320. O'Callaghan, *Calendar of Historical Manuscripts*, 1: 170, 171, 172, 176.

⁵⁷ Gehring, *Council Minutes, 1655-1656*, 294-295.

⁵⁸ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 5: 84-85.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 1: 255-256, 259, 261, 264, 272.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 3: 373.

⁶¹ O'Callaghan, *Calendar of Historical Manuscripts*, 1: 226.

⁶² Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 4: 264-265.

the path prescribed by the Bible. Those who haunted taverns were more prone to serious offenses. In 1654, a Sergeant in the employ of the Dutch West India Company was found 'gambling in the tavern during church service.'⁶³ Excessive alcohol consumption resulted in brawls such as the violent altercation between Symon Root and Peter Ebel in 'the great tavern on the island of Manhatans' in 1647 in which 'a piece of Symon Root's ear was cut off with a cutlass.'⁶⁴ On a Sunday in October 1657, Nicholas Velthuysen 'tapped to some persons at his house strong drink, whereby quarrels, trouble and difficulties, yea even fighting and wounds have arisen.'⁶⁵ In July 1658, [Andries] Vrydach, a mason, was sentenced 'for being intoxicated and fighting during divine service' while his likely opponent, Ralph Turner, a soldier from Lancashire, received less severe penalties for 'fighting on the Sabbath.'⁶⁶

Though many taverngoers might well have thought of themselves as practicing Christians, they did not embrace the exacting Calvinist standards Stuyvesant championed. To them, drinking and gaming were an integral part of everyday life. Proscribing these pleasures on the Sabbath was tantamount to depriving Dutch men and women of their rights. Circumventing the onerous Sabbath regulations was a means for local people to express their antipathy to the strict interpretation of the Sabbath Stuyvesant had codified in the laws of New Netherland. Their voices can be heard on rare occasions through the testimony of tavernkeepers. To defend herself from the charge that 'there were nine pins at her house last Sunday during preaching, and the can and the glass stood on the table,' Andries Rees's wife related that 'some came to her house, who said that Church was out, and that one had a pin and the other a bowl in the hand, but they did not play.'⁶⁷ The popular contention that drinking and gameplaying need only be curtailed during the exact hours of divine service on the Sabbath was more frequently articulated by the proprietors of drinking establishments. When the schout found "eight @ 10 persons playing at ninepins and two at backgammon and as many as fifteen @ sixteen persons, either bowling or drinking" at his tavern on a Sunday in 1663, Andries Rees admitted tapping on

⁶³ Gehring, *New York Historical Manuscripts Dutch*, 5: 183.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 4: 360.

⁶⁵ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 2: 296–297, 299–300.

⁶⁶ O'Callaghan, *Calendar of Historical Manuscripts*, 1: 198.

⁶⁷ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 3: 217.

Sunday, but said "it was full two hours after the afternoon's sermon preaching and he did no business during the week."⁶⁸ If conforming to the letter of the law was not a sufficient defense, then economic need was invoked.

At times, tavernkeepers resorted to splitting hairs to defend themselves. Hans Styn claimed that he served only strangers on Sunday.⁶⁹ After an officer came to his house 'in the morning before the preaching and found a man in the house and a glass with brandy in it' and 'reprov[ed him] for desecrating the Sabbath,' Salomon La Chair retorted that 'he had been on the watch and coming home in the morning he tapped a little drop for himself, of which some remained in the glass, and that he thereupon went to sleep.' To the officer's further charge that 'in the afternoon, he found a glass with beer or some thing else . . . in it,' La Chair responded that 'some beer remained in the glass, from what his children had asked for.'⁷⁰

To eliminate the technicalities that Sabbath violaters seized on to rationalize their conduct, Stuyvesant went on the offensive again in 1663, enacting a new Sabbath law that sacralized the entire day. Alleging that former laws had been 'misinterpreted and misconstrued' by some to mean that they 'applied to the maintaining and solemnizing only half the Sabbath,' the director-general ordered that 'not only a part, but the whole Sabbath shall be observed.' Everyone was warned that 'pending the Sabbath, from the rising to the setting of the sun no customary labor shall be performed much less any clubs kept.' By forbidding 'all unusual exercises, such as games, boat, cart or wagon racing, fishing, fowling, running, sailing, nutting or picking strawberries, trafficking with Indians or any like things, and amongst others all dissolute and licentious plays, riots, calling children out to the streets and highways,' Stuyvesant was literally compiling a catalogue of townspeople's amusements on Sunday afternoons.⁷¹

Even before Stuyvesant revised the Sabbath law in September 1663, city officials found ways to undercut his strict Sabbath policy. In June 1663, Court Messenger Claes van Elslandt the younger, accused by Stuyvesant of failing to warn the tavernkeepers and tapsters not to allow gaming on Sunday, answered that 'such may well

⁶⁸ Ibid., 4: 264.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 2: 53.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 3: 193.

⁷¹ Ibid., 4: 201–302.

be, but he had forgotten it, as he had many orders from his Honour.⁷² Van Elslandt's selective loss of memory can be interpreted as a sign of his distaste for the strict Sabbath rules.

To enforce the new regulations, Stuyvesant depended on Schout Pieter Tonneman, a Council member and kerckmaster, who zealously pursued tavernkeepers who violated not only the Sabbath law but the curfew which mandated no tapping after the Watch was set.⁷³ Clearly an unpopular figure among the townspeople, Tonneman also aroused the ire of the burgomasters and schepens, who at times rejected his recommendations for punishing offenders. They refused to fine Andries Rees, who had tapped on Sunday after the sermon, causing Tonneman to appeal their judgment.⁷⁴ They also excused Migiel Tades, the supplier of alcohol to the Indians, on his oath that he had not tapped during preaching.⁷⁵

In overriding Tonneman and exhibiting leniency toward violaters of the Sabbath law, the burgomasters and schepens were registering their displeasure at Stuyvesant's efforts to turn New Amsterdam into a Calvinist community. The outcome of these cases and others thwarted Stuyvesant's design. The strengthened Sabbath law of 1663 may well have been the director-general's method of curbing the discretionary power of the burgomasters. In any event, Stuyvesant's attempt to tighten the net on Sabbath violaters backfired. On September 15, 1663, the director-general transmitted the new Sabbath law to the city authorities with the usual instructions to have it publicly read from the stand in front of city hall, but they did not do so.⁷⁶ Six months later [March 1664], he sent the law again, and inquired why they had withheld it from the public. At this juncture, the burgomasters, noting that they had 'felt themselves [aggrieved] in some particulars,' articulated their disagreement with the content of the law. They had not communicated the law to the populace, they explained, because even though they 'judge[d] the observance thereof to be highly necessary, [they] should not dare to publish

⁷² Ibid., 4: 267.

⁷³ For Tonneman's offices, see O'Callaghan, *Calendar of Historical Manuscripts*, 1: 179, 181.

⁷⁴ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 4: 264, 268.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 4: 320.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 4: 301–302.

such a Placard as divers sections thereof are too severe and too much opposed to Dutch liberties.⁷⁷

Having, in essence, confronted Stuyvesant, the burgomasters stood their ground and refused to enforce the new law, delaying cases brought to the Court by schout Tonneman until the issue was resolved. In April 1664, they postponed judgment in three cases. Noting that 'the Placards dated 26th Octob 1656 and 15th Sept 1663 on the observance of the Sabbath contradict each other,' they resolved to speak to the director-general and Council on this subject. For good measure they raised what was obviously another grievance of the commonality, asking 'for what reason those, who reside beyond the Fresh Water are allowed to tap more on the Sabbath than the tavernkeepers of the city.'⁷⁸

Significantly, two of the cases that were postponed involved larger assemblies of Sunday drinkers than had ever before been prosecuted in New Amsterdam. Jan Schryver was charged with letting 20 persons drink in his house on Sunday afternoon, April 6, 1664, after the second sermon.⁷⁹ That same day, Schout Tonneman had found 22 persons drinking at the house of Hendrick Jansen Smitt.⁸⁰ New Amsterdam's residents, emboldened by the knowledge that the burgomasters disliked the restrictive Sabbath policy, openly defied Stuyvesant's new Sabbath law. Confident of popular support, the burgomasters prepared a petition to Stuyvesant in which they asserted that 'there are in the last placard some points in direct opposition to the custom of Holland.'⁸¹ Whether their request for a conference with Stuyvesant was ever granted is uncertain.

Though the conflict of opinion between the burgomasters and Stuyvesant on the Sabbath law was not resolved due to the English capture of New Netherland in September 1664, it is evident that director-general Stuyvesant, despite the power that derived from his office, could not prevail on the bulk of New Amsterdam's population to conform to Calvinist ideals of the Sabbath. Stuyvesant's larger ambition of imposing orthodoxy on New Amsterdam and transforming the city's nominally Reformed residents into model Calvinists

⁷⁷ Ibid., 5: 38–39.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 5: 46.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 5: 48.

⁸¹ Ibid., 5: 60.

failed for the same reason that better-known and more notable efforts to create truly reformed communities such as Calvin's Geneva and Theophilus Eaton's New Haven colony eventually foundered. In the words of Cornelia Hughes Dayton, "As adults within increasingly heterogeneous communities developed strategies that allowed them to worship as they pleased, no public leader, no matter how fervent, could hope to implement a program demanding rigorous behavioral change in any group larger than the members of a gathered church."⁸²

In the case of New Amsterdam, the burgomasters used their authority to decide cases and sentence offenders to broadcast their understanding that community standards should reflect more than the values of a minority of orthodox Calvinists. By introducing comparisons to the ways of the fatherland, they forcefully reminded Stuyvesant and his Council that in Holland the strict standards of the Reformed church were tempered by magistrates who espoused a more liberal conception of the Sabbath than did the predikants.

Stuyvesant's experiment in creating a Calvinist community at New Amsterdam never succeeded, not least because of the persistence of ordinary men and women in the conviction that a wide variety of activities could be pursued on the Sabbath. The few who committed flagrant violations of the Sabbath, such as the servant who "had on Sunday during divine service thrown [a distraught father's] little daughter on the bed . . . and had attempted to violate her" or the man who stuck a knife into Jacob Willemsen's shoulder as he was coming out of church at noon, clearly went beyond the bounds of community sentiment.⁸³ Most residents of New Amsterdam maintained links to the local church, if only as a place to marry and have their children baptized. What set them apart from Stuyvesant and his orthodox allies was their conception of sacred time. Stuyvesant believed that the Sabbath lasted 24 hours, but to them sacred time was confined to the few hours when the sermon was delivered. When accused of violating the Sabbath law, they underlined the fact that their activities took place 'after church was out' or 'after preaching.' In doing so, they not only conceded the legitimacy of sacred time

⁸² Cornelia Hughes Dayton, "Was There a Calvinist Type of Patriarchy? New Haven Colony Reconsidered in the Early Modern Context," in Christopher L. Tomlins and Bruce H. Mann, eds., *The Many Legalities of Early America* (Chapel Hill and London, 2001), 355.

⁸³ Fernow, *Records of New Amsterdam*, 1: 235–236, 321.

(however limited in scope), but validated the religious framework that structured their lives. Their opposition to strict Sabbath laws stemmed neither from hostility to the Reformed church as an institution nor from repudiation of the tenets of the Reformed faith, but rather from an unwillingness to be encumbered by the sober life style advocated by Stuyvesant.

Popular beliefs surrounding the Sabbath endured long after Stuyvesant surrendered the reins of government to the English in 1664. In August 1673, soon after the Netherlands recaptured the colony of New York from the English and renamed the city New Orange, the new Dutch rulers acted to restore strict Sabbath rules. Deploring the fact that “many of the inhabitants almost make it a custom, in place of observing the Sabbath, as it ought to be observed, to frequent the taverns more than on other days and to take their delight in illegal exercises,” they prohibited “from sunrise to sundown on Sunday all sorts of handicraft, trade and traffick, gaming, boat racing, or running with carts or wagons, fishing, fowling, running and picking nuts, strawberries, etc. all riotous racing, calling and shouting of children in the streets, together with all unlawful exercises and games, drunkenness, frequenting taverns or taphouses, dancing, cardplaying, ballplaying, rolling ninepins or bowls etc which is more in vogue on this than on any other day.”⁸⁴ New Orange’s inhabitants, most of whom had lived in Stuyvesant’s New Amsterdam, it seems, took a perverse delight in deliberately engaging in forbidden activities on the Sabbath. Perhaps this is sufficient testimony that Petrus Stuyvesant ultimately lost the battle over the Sabbath.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 6: 405.

‘THERE IS NO SERVICE HERE BUT MY SERVICE!’
MUNICIPAL ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE DOMESTIC
SERVANT BEHAVIOR IN EARLY MODERN HOLLAND

Marybeth Carlson

In 1715, on a damp Monday evening in November, Bernardus Smelt, who worked as a servant for the Rotterdam merchant Joan de Haas, asked for leave to go mail a letter. As he later explained to one of the other servants in the house, he had been sitting around idle the whole evening, so it seemed to be a reasonable request. De Haas, however, refused, and then asked him where the letter had to go. ‘To Deventer,’ replied Smelt. In that case, the merchant said, the post-wagon would not leave until the next day, so Smelt could deliver it then. But Smelt continued to argue. The letter was urgent. He wanted to send it via Amsterdam, which would put it in Deventer by Wednesday evening. As the other servants looked on, De Haas lost his temper. If the letter were posted on Tuesday, the merchant declared, it would be in Deventer on Thursday, only one night’s difference. He needed Smelt at home. The shop clerk was not to set one foot outside the house or he would regret it.

‘Shall I take care of your service and neglect mine?’ cried Smelt.

‘There is no service here but my service,’ De Haas informed him. Smelt left to deliver the letter anyway, and when he returned, he was refused entry to the house.¹

The difference between Bernardus Smelt’s view of his position and that held by the merchant De Haas spotlights the friction over the role of domestic servants in eighteenth-century Holland. Servants presented a singular challenge to urban elites’ efforts to ensure an orderly society. They worked outside of the control of any organization through which they could be supervised. Not only were most servants women, and hence, predisposed to disorderliness, but their labors were usually overseen by housewives, creating an entire domain

¹ Gemeentearchief (GA) Rotterdam. Oud notarieel archief (ONA), vol. 1985, fols. 889–94.

of untrustworthy females. And servants moved so frequently from household to household that their employers could not be relied upon to govern them effectively.

The cities of Holland met these challenges by attempting to legislate the terms of the employer-servant relationship through municipal laws, *dienstboden-reglementen* (servants' ordinances). To Joan de Haas and fellow householders, permitting servants like Bernardus Smelt, servants who did not recognize their dependent status, into the family circle posed a distinct threat. If domestics were no more than wage-earning strangers, what would prevent them from harming the children, seducing the master, stealing the silver, and afterwards slandering the whole family's reputation? However wealthy, however powerful these municipal elites were, in this sphere their authority needed reinforcement. By using city law to augment their position, servants' employers could not only fire an unsatisfactory domestic, not only make it difficult for an individual to obtain another place by refusing to provide a recommendation, but could have a servant fined or even jailed.

Servants' ordinances began to make their appearance in the Low Countries during the fourteenth century in the trading towns along the IJssel River. Eventually, servants' ordinances could be found from Flanders to Groningen. But it was in Holland that magistrates would write the most elaborate ordinances, revising them up to six times during the heyday of this form of regulation, from the 1590s to the 1760s. Each revision, up to about the 1730s, extended the range of behaviors which the ordinances tried to regulate. Not all towns chose to regulate the same behaviors, but some patterns developed: magistrates endeavored to ensure a reliable labor supply in the ordinances and they sought to protect employers from the malicious or careless acts of strangers brought into the intimacy of the family circle. Then, in the middle of the eighteenth century, more indirect methods of influencing servants came to prevail, and the servants' ordinances were simplified, although the punishments they threatened were never relaxed.²

² J.W. Bosch, 'Rechtshistorische aantekeningen betreffende de overeenkomst tot het huren van dienstpersoneel,' *Themis* 92 (1931): 335-418 and 93 (1932): 23-92 and 215-277.

The Earliest Servants' Ordinances

The first wave of servants' ordinances were limited to provisions ensuring that servants worked in the households where they had promised to work and that they stayed there through the entire period of time they had promised to work. In these years, the urban elites expected only obedience and hard work from their domestics.

These were broadly written statutes, intended to apply to as many types of wage laborers as possible, including domestic servants. The meaning of *dienstbode*, a word which came to designate a household servant, clearly was not so limited when the town of Delft passed its ordinance in 1557, intended to apply to "dienstboden who hire themselves in this town to work in brewing and also to [do] house-work."³ The servants' ordinances used several strategies to ensure that workers fulfilled their contracts. They could not change jobs, except for a few days at the beginning of May and November. This made it more difficult for someone to switch jobs in search of better wages or working conditions. Anyone who left a given household and tried quietly to pick up work in another house—or, for that matter, anyone who was fired—would have to explain why he or she was looking for work out of season. And since everyone who wanted to change jobs was on the market during the same two short periods every year, competition for any position was intensified. Meanwhile, employers could discharge servants at will.⁴

Servants' ordinances also tried to make it difficult for domestics to find new positions by targeting the informal networks through which news of available positions might spread. They did this by prohibiting anyone from bringing employers and servants together except close relatives of the principles and officially registered *besteesters* (go-betweens), who had taken an oath to uphold the town servants' ordinances. And some towns even regulated employers themselves, by fining anyone who hired someone who had promised to work elsewhere, or, worse yet, who attempted to 'debauch or suborn' someone from a job with a promise of better wages or better working conditions.⁵

³ Bosch, 'Rechtshistorische aantekeningen,' *Themis* 92: 375.

⁴ Bosch, 'Rechtshistorische aantekeningen,' *Themis* 93: 34–36.

⁵ The first town to forbid employers from luring away other families' servants was The Hague in 1608, followed by Rotterdam, Haarlem, Schiedam, Amsterdam, Leiden, Delft, and Gorinchem. *Ibid.*, 69–70.

The Servants' Ordinances Revised

During the seventeenth century, servants' ordinances became more elaborate. All the provisions ordering servants to work out their contracts became more meticulous in these ordinances and there was a growing emphasis on minimizing the harm that a vengeful or negligent maidservant could do to an employer. The Hague initiated the trend in 1608, followed by other towns in South Holland, and then by Amsterdam and then towns in North Holland. Two features distinguish these laws: First, they make distinctions between household servants on the one hand and other *ambachtsgesellen* (laborers) on the other. Domestic servants were specified in increasingly detailed lists, a process which ultimately reached its height in Rotterdam's 1719 ordinance governing the actions of "*knechten* (lackeys), maids, coachmen, gardeners and all those hired in anyone's private body or house or other service, whether or not the same have room and board at the home of their masters or mistresses or are hired with a living allowance or other condition."⁶ That the Rotterdam city fathers had come to conceive of domestic servants as belonging to a separate category of workers was made explicit in a separate 'private memo on the draft ordinance,' in which they explained that they had omitted the *ambachts-gesellen* because 'their service is of an entirely different nature.'⁷

Second, the seventeenth-century ordinances open with preambles declaring that the revisions had been made necessary by employers' complaints of servants' "stubbornness, incompetence, deception, disobedience, insolence, and other types of disorderliness committed daily by servants in this town"—to use Rotterdam's 1680 law as an example. The tone of the preambles suggests that employers had come to regard themselves as unable to wield authority over their domestics effectively. A new uneasiness about having potentially untrustworthy strangers in the home can be seen. In Rotterdam in 1680 and in Leiden in 1703, servants were commanded not to seek a new position under an alias. In 1682, Amsterdam ordered newly-hired servants to bring a written statement from their former employer

⁶ GA Rotterdam, Oud Stadsarchief, no. 510, fols. 293–340 (hereafter Rotterdam Ord. 1719), article I.

⁷ *Particuliere momorie op de geconcipeerde General ordonnantie*, quoted in: Bosch, 'Rechts-historische aantekeningen,' *Themis* 93: 26.

to their new one, a statement which was to affirm that the servant was available and that he or she had performed satisfactorily in their previous house. The oral testimony of the *besteedster* no longer sufficed to reassure employers regarding the honesty of the domestics they had hired.⁸

Another example which shows how distrustful employers had become of their domestics was Rotterdam's 1680 ordinance, which claimed that servants were feigning sickness in order to have a pretext to break their work agreements. The ordinance therefore empowered employers to bring in a *Doctor medicinae* to examine the servant. The cost of the examination was borne not by the employer but by the servant. If the physician found the servant to be truly sick, then the servant was to pay any expenses the employer incurred in finding a replacement. If found healthy, the servant could be jailed as punishment for her deceit.⁹

Two other patterns that emerge from the servants' ordinances are provisions suggesting that servants were seen as a potential threat to family status and provisions attempting to limit the threat that domestics could pose to a family's property. The servants' ordinances make it clear that employers feared the damage which domestics could do to an employer's community standing.¹⁰ By gossiping about matters a family would prefer to keep private or, worse yet, by lying about their employers, servants had the power to do serious damage to their employers' reputations. Domestics in Holland had ample opportunity to spread tales about the families for whom they worked. The notarial acts of Rotterdam, for example, describe servants passing a Sunday evening with acquaintances outside the town walls or confiding

⁸ *Nieuwe Keure, ende Ordonnantie, Tegen de Dienstboden namentlijk Koetsiers, Knechts, Dienstmeysens, Minnemoers, en Bakermoers, mitsgaders Arbeyders en Ambachts-gesellen* (1680). Pamphlet collection, University Library, University of Leiden, Petit no. 4517 (hereafter Rotterdam Ord. 1680). GA Leiden, stadsarchief 1574–1816, no. 27, "Nieuwe Keure ende Ordonnantie op de Dienst-Boden . . ." (hereafter Leiden Ord. 1703), article VI. *Handvesten; ofte privilegien ende octroyen; mitsgaders willekeuren, costuimen, ordonnantien, handeligen der stad Amstelredam* (Amsterdam, 1748–78), II: article I: "Van de dienstboden."

⁹ Rotterdam Ord. 1680, article XII. Many of the provisions of Rotterdam's servants' ordinance were simplified in 1719, but this one was retained. Leiden adopted a similar wording in revising its servants' ordinance in 1703 (Leiden Ord. 1703, article IX).

¹⁰ On the importance of ideas about honor and respectability in the Dutch Republic, see Herman Roodenburg, *Onder Censuur: De kerkelijke tucht in de gereformeerde gemeente van Amsterdam, 1587–1700* (Hilversum, 1990), 244–254.

in women friends about the unwelcome attentions of an employer's son.¹¹ Servants found additional opportunities to network outside their households when their employers' guests brought their own servants along on a visit, or when tradesmen came to the door to sell or deliver their goods.

Reacting to this, the Amsterdam magistracy tried to minimize the harm that domestic servants could do to the reputations of their employers, as well as the possibility that servants could cause discord in the families who employed them, by threatening servants who gossiped with a three month jail sentence. The law also ordered other servants in the house to inform on any of their co-workers who gossiped.¹²

Likewise, Amsterdam tried to protect class distinctions by enacting sumptuary laws forbidding servants from wearing silk, velvet, lace or any silver, gold, or gemstones, all because "no or little distinction between the clothing of ladies and of dienstboden can be seen."¹³ Other municipalities did not incorporate sumptuary regulation into their servants' ordinances, although maidservants certainly owned such items. Servants' probate inventories in Rotterdam usually contained at least one item of silk clothing and one or two pieces of silver jewelry; some inventories contain rather more.¹⁴

If servants inside and outside Amsterdam could afford such luxuries, the motives behind the Amsterdam ordinance deserve further explanation. The Amsterdam magistracy may have been more concerned with maintaining class distance than the governing groups in other towns. This is shown by the fact that Amsterdam was the first city in the province to prohibit sexual relations between maidservants and any member of their employers' families.¹⁵

While Amsterdam was exceptionally concerned with issues relating to class distance, across Holland, domestics were perceived as a threat to a family's physical property. Seventeenth century servants'

¹¹ GA Rotterdam, ONA 1544: 267–69; 1958: 311–314.

¹² *Handvesten der stad Amstelredam*, II: 450, article IV.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Marybeth Carlson, "Domestic Service in a Changing City Economy: Rotterdam 1680–1780" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1993), 134–148.

¹⁵ But Zeeland had already begun to threaten prosecution against servants who had intercourse with any member of their employers' families in a 1673 placard which applied to the entire province. See Marlies Jongejan, 'Dienstboden in de Zeeuwse steden 1650–1800,' *Spiegel Historiae* 19 (May 1984): 221; also Bosch, 'Rechtshistorische aantekeningen,' *Themis* 93: 86–87.

ordinances incorporated new strictures against *huisdiefstal* (domestic larceny), a domestic's theft of money or goods from his or her employer. Authorities in Rotterdam and Leiden ordered servants to open their trunks for inspection, should their employers want to make sure that any items missing from their houses were not hidden in those trunks.¹⁶ Rotterdam and Hoorn even defined as theft a servant's use of her employer's food and drink for entertaining family or friends. After Rotterdam enacted its 1719 ordinance, not only servants who raided their employers' pantries, but anyone who shared the provisions could be "physically punished at least with confinement for one month on bread and water without the right to appeal, or heavier according to the gravity of the case."¹⁷

In some cases of domestic larceny, the apparent theft was no theft at all, but a misunderstanding. Servants who frequently moved from household to household encountered different notions regarding the extent to which they were permitted to share in the family's food and drink. What was everyday practice in one house might be theft in another.

Servants themselves seemed to feel that a certain amount of 'borrowing' was a legitimate part of the job. In one case, Constantijn Huygens's *knecht*, Pieter, borrowed women's clothing for a masquerade, an event that Huygens commented on rather laconically in his diary. But during the following days, as the story of Pieter's masquerade made the rounds of his circle, Huygens discovered that some of his own clothing had gone into the costume. Presently, he took the trunk key—and later the key to his cellar—from Pieter, but refrained from 'scolding him for his fault.'¹⁸

Since some employers gave their servants clothing they no longer wanted, misunderstandings could also arise over the point at which actual ownership was transferred. One correspondent of the *Hollandsche Spectator* wrote that when he bid his servant to take several cast-offs

¹⁶ Rotterdam Ord. 1680, article XVIII. This provision was retained in Rotterdam's revised ordinance (Rotterdam Ord 1719, articles 28 and 29) and a nearly identical article was adopted by the city of Leiden (Leiden Ord. 1703, article 12).

¹⁷ Rotterdam Ord. 1719, Article I. The levels of domestic larceny were never high. There were only seventeen convictions for *huisdiefstal* in The Hague between 1698 and 1811. During the same period in Leiden, a town undergoing an economic depression, only 21 domestic servants were punished for theft.

¹⁸ Constantijn Huygens, *Journal van Constantijn Huygens den zoon*, Werken uitgegeven door het Historisch Genootschap te Utrecht, new series, number 25 (Utrecht, 1876–77), 5, 9, 10, and 11 January 1693.

to ‘an honestly needy man,’ the servant complained, “Would Mynheer not do better to give the man some money. After all, he knows best what he needs, and then he could buy what he would want for it.” Outraged, the employer asked if he needed his knecht’s permission to do someone good, to which the servant replied “Mynheer knows well, that which the gentlemen lay aside belongs to the knechten.” At that point, the writer fired the servant.¹⁹

Servants accused of theft were quick to use the provisions of the very laws that controlled them to defend their reputations. In one case that took place during the summer of 1778, a maidservant named Anna Blondoo was accused of theft by a widow whose house she had only recently left. When Blondoo was confronted by the widow’s daughter-in-law in front of her new employer, she offered to hand the keys to her suitcase and hamper over to a constable, as required by the city’s dienstboden-reglement.

But when a constable had been called in and presented the keys to the Widow Wilt herself, the latter backed off, saying, ‘I have nothing to do with the maid.’ Blondoo then carried the whole tale to the *schout*, who ordered the constable to go to the Widow Wilt and tell her in the name of the city council that the suitcases had to be examined. But confronted with this, the widow answered only, ‘That is not necessary.’ By this point, however, Blondoo was not about to let the matter rest. To protect her name, she asked her new employers to make a deposition describing the whole matter before a notary.²⁰ In an atmosphere that was so laden with suspicion regarding the dishonesty of domestics, Blondoo had to protect her reputation.

Employer Power and City Regulation

Historical literature on domestic servants in early modern Europe does mention servants’ ordinances in France and in some German cities, but no research has uncovered a situation where there was such continual revising of the ordinances, with the detailed attention to prohibiting so many kinds of undesirable behaviors that characterized the laws in Holland.²¹ Magistrates there appear to have been

¹⁹ *Hollandsche Spectator*, March 12, 1734.

²⁰ GA Rotterdam, ONA vol. 3297, fols. 549–552.

²¹ Cissie Fairchilds, *Domestic Enemies: Servants and Their Masters in Old Regime France*

exceptional in their attempts to regulate relations between servants and the families who employed them. What could have led to this?

Employers used the city servants' ordinances to reinforce their household authority. The job market for domestics in cities in Holland was strikingly volatile, permitting servants to move easily from one household to another in search of better working conditions or better wages.²² The frequent turnaround meant that employers were repeatedly faced with adjusting to the presence of strangers inside the family circle. Servants' ordinances represent an effort to control a situation that must often have seemed chaotic to families employing servants in urban Holland.

The effort to control servant behavior took a new direction in the course of the eighteenth century. The laws themselves were simplified. Amsterdam, for example, dropped the sumptuary and gossip articles from its 1758 ordinance, while keeping the articles on domestic larceny and sexual intercourse. The effort to use municipal power to regulate working conditions for domestics turned out to be a failed experiment, an ineffective means to a dubious end.

Why had the towns in Holland resorted to municipal regulation in the first place? Attempts to correlate the trajectory of the ordinances to secular economic trends must be rejected. Magistrates' actions in creating stricter or looser dienstboden-reglementen did not correspond to patterns of either economic growth or stagnation. Bosch has suggested that groups of towns in Holland formed what he terms legal circles, in which a few towns exerted a dominant influence over others in their orbit; in this view, the actions of a small number of town councils expanded gradually outward through other towns in their neighborhoods.²³ Bosch's explanation is unsatisfactory, however. In the first place, years elapse between the points when various towns, supposedly in the same legal circle, revise their ordinances. Apart

(Baltimore, MD, 1984), 157 and Merry E. Wiesner, "Having Her Own Smoke: Employment and Independence for Singlewomen in Germany, 1400–1750," in *Singlewomen in the European Past, 1250–1800*, ed. Judith M. Bennett and Amy M. Froide (Philadelphia, 1999), 199–202.

²² See, for example, GA Rotterdam, Familiearchief Huis ten Donck 304: Kasboek van Mr. R.F. van Staveren; also R.A.J. Grabandt, 'Aantekeningen bij het kasboek van mr. Jacob Adriaan baron du Tour,' *Leids Jaarboekje* 61 (1969): 151–152. Kooijmans also mentions the frequent turnover he encountered when researching the regents in Hoorn: Luc Kooijmans, *Onder regenten: de elite in een Hollandse stad, Hoorn 1700–1800* (Amsterdam/Diemen, 1985): 180.

²³ Bosch, 'Rechtshistorische aantekeningen,' *Themis* 92: 363–368.

from that, the legal circles argument begs the question: why did towns undertake this type of regulation in the first place?

All dienstboden-reglementen were probably the result of particularistic developments, specific to individual town politics, social circles, and personalities. Originating in a time when most wage earners were regarded as dependents, the first reglementen did not categorize domestics as a social group requiring special attention. When urban elites began to experience anxiety about the potential threat posed by strangers housed within their family circles, existing types of worker legislation were adapted to meet the new perceptions.

But the frequent revision and re-enactment of the servants' ordinances suggests that they rarely achieved the desired results. Eventually, urban elites in Holland gave up the effort and instead embarked on a campaign to convince domestic servants that it was in their own 'true interests' to become the faithful retainers which employers desired. This new direction, reflected in such books like *Christelyk Zeedenboek voor Domestiquen* (1787) and *De Pligten van Handwerks-lieden en Dienstboden* (1791), was part of the more widespread effort to civilize the masses. That effort has its own history, one which takes place outside the halls where the magistrates wrote the laws.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Peter Arnade is Professor of History at California State University San Marcos. He is the author of *Realms of Ritual: Burgundian Ceremony and Civic Life in Late-Medieval Ghent* (Ithaca, 1996), co-editor of the forthcoming *Private Conduct and Public Life in the Early Modern World* (Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Research Texts and Essays University of Toronto). He is currently working on a book manuscript entitled: "Beggars, Iconoclasts and Civic Patriots: The Political Culture of the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1566–85."

Wayne te Brake is Kempner Distinguished Professor of History and Associate Provost of Academic Affairs at Purchase College in the State University of New York. A graduate of the University of Michigan, he specializes in research on the Low Countries and has written broadly on the themes of revolution, contentious politics and religious co-existence in early modern Europe. Professor te Brake is the author *Regents and Rebels: The Revolutionary World of an Eighteenth Century Dutch City* (1989) and *Shaping History: Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500–1700* (1998) and co-editor of *Challenging Authority: The Historical Study of Contentious Politics* (1998).

Marybeth Carlson teaches European Social History at the University of Dayton in the United States. Previous publications on domestic servants in the Dutch Republic appeared in *Europe 1450–1789* (2004); *The Low Countries and the New World(s)* (2000); and *Women of the Golden Age* (1994).

Kelly DeVries holds a PhD in Medieval Studies and is Professor of History at Loyola College in Maryland, USA. He is the author or co-author of ten books and more than fifty articles on medieval military history and technology, including *Medieval Military Technology* (1992), *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology* (1996), *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader* (1999), *The Norwegian Invasion of England in 1066* (1999), *A Cumulative Bibliography of Medieval Military History and Technology* (2002, 2005), and (with Robert Douglas Smith) *The Artillery of the Dukes of Burgundy, 1363–1477* (2005).

Joyce D. Goodfriend, Professor of History at the University of Denver, holds degrees from Brown University and the University of California, Los Angeles. She is the author of *Before the Melting Pot: Society and Culture in Colonial New York City, 1664–1730* (1992) and the editor of *Revisiting New Netherland: Perspectives on Early Dutch America* (2005).

Joop de Jong has taught at the Universities of Utrecht, Rotterdam, and Leiden, and is since 1987 Associate Professor of Modern History at the University of Maastricht, The Netherlands. He has published a number of books on Dutch elites in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including *Met goed fatsoen. De elite in een Hollandse stad, 1700–1780* (1985), *Een deftig bestaan. Het dagelijks leven van regenten in de 17de en 18de eeuw* (1987), and *Eliteonderzoek: rijkdom, macht en status in het verleden* (1993). He has also published many articles on cultural heritage and cultural policy.

Wim Klooster is Associate Professor of History at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. A specialist of Atlantic history, he is the author of *The Dutch in the Americas, 1600–1800* (1997) and *Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648–1795* (1998), and co-editor of *The Atlantic World: Essays on Slavery, Migration and Imagination* (2005).

Elodie Lecuppre-Desjardin is Lecturer in Medieval History at the University of Lille III. She is the author of *La ville de cérémonies. Essai sur la communication politique dans les anciens Pays-Bas bourguignons* (2004) and co-editor of *Emotions in the Heart of the City (14th–16th Century)* (2005).

Elva Kathleen (Kathy) Lyon is completing her dissertation at Rutgers University in the history of technology focusing on early modern Europe and the Atlantic World. She received her master's degree in the field of Science, Technology and Society from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. She has several journal publications to her credit.

Henk van Nierop is Professor of Early Modern History at the University of Amsterdam and he is Academic Director of the Amsterdam Center for the Study of the Golden Age. He has published on the social, political and religious history of the Revolt of the Netherlands and the Dutch Golden Age. Among his books are *The Nobility of Holland: From Knights to Regents* (1993); with R. Po-Chia Hsia (eds.),

Calvinism and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age (2002), and *Het verraad van het Noorderkwartier: oorlog, terreur en recht in de Nederlandse Opstand* (1999).

Angela Vanhaelen is Assistant Professor of Art History at McGill University at Montreal, Canada. She is the author of *Comic Print and Theatre in Early Modern Amsterdam* (2003). She has also published articles on seventeenth-century Dutch visual culture in journals such as *The Art Bulletin*, *De Zeventiende Eeuw*, and *Res. Anthropology and Aesthetics*.

Jan de Vries teaches at the University of California at Berkeley, where he is Sidney Hillman Ehrman Professor of History and Economics and Vice Provost for Academic Affairs. He is the author of several books on European Economic History, including *European Urbanization, 1500–1800* (1984), and (with Ad van der Woude) *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815* (1997).

Richard Yntema received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1992 and is an Associate Professor at Otterbein College in Westerville, Ohio. He is currently completing a monograph on the growth and decline of Holland's brewing industry in the early modern era.

INDEX

- Aalst 38
 Alba, duke of 85, 90, 98–99
 Alkmaar 113, 116
 Ames, William 212
 Amstel River 187
 Amsterdam 1, 16, 24–25, 40, 85–102
 passim, 114, 116–18, 176–204 *passim*
 servants' ordinances 228–30, 233
 town hall 160, 163, 169, 179
 Amsterdam Maid 186–88
 Amsterdam Medical College 192, 194
 Anabaptists 112–13, 115
 uprising in 1535 87
 Antwerp 1, 12, 23–24, 40, 98, 104,
 112, 115
 aristocratization 153, 157
 Arnade, Peter 46–48
 d'Arkel, Jean 34
 Arras 50, 52, 55
 Artevelde, Jacob van 31
 Artevelde, Philip van 31
 Artois 16

 Backerus, Johannes 207, 214, 216
 Baden, Marc von 35
 Baltic Sea 16, 117n
 Batavia 20
 Batavians 160
 Beggars 64–67
 Benclux 16
 Bentheim 16
 Bergh, Hendrik van den 91
 Berlaymont, Charles, count of 64
 Bloch, Marc 106
 Blockmans, Wim 2, 169
 Bogardus, Everardus 206–07
 Bolsward 91
 Bossu, count Maximilien de Henin
 91, 94, 98, 150
 Bouvignes 35, 39
 Brabant 88, 90, 153–54, 164
 Braudel, Fernand 22–23
 Brazil 20
 Brederode, Hendrik of 64
 Brill 99, 150
 Bruges 28, 30, 39–40, 48, 50
 Brussels 36, 40, 50
 Brusthem 35, 37, 39

 Burgundy 2, 45–57 *passim*
 dukes of 35, 41–42, 44
 Burke, Peter 155, 169–71

 Capetown 22
 carnival 62, 70
 Cassel, battle of (1328) 31, 37, 39
 Certeau, Michel de 184
 charivari 76
 Charles the Bold 32, 35, 41, 45–47,
 52, 55
 Charles V 47
 Chastellain, Georges 47, 55
 Chicago School 13
 Ciney 33
 civic pride 156
 Cleves 16
 Coquiel, Matthieu 54–56
 Compromise 65–67, 69
 Cornelis Cornelisz. van Uitgeest
 106–07
 Council of State 63, 67
 Count of Holland 125, 127, 129
 Courtrai, battle of (1302) 30, 36–37

 Delfshaven 91
 Delft 91, 123–48 *passim*
 Den Briel (*see* Brill)
 Den Bosch 154
 town hall 164
 Dendermonde 91
 Deventer 113
 Diest 91
 Dinant 35, 37, 39, 42
 Does, Jonkheer Jan van der 112
 Doleanten 87
 domestic servants 225–34 *passim*
 Dordrecht 92, 98, 113
 Drisius, Samuel 207
 Duke, Alastair 70
 Dunkirk 16, 139

 East India Company, Dutch (VOC)
 16, 20–21
 Eaton, Nathaniel 212
 Edam
 town hall 161
 Egmont, Count 60

- Emden 16, 117
 Enkhuizen 86, 91–92, 98–99
 town hall 156, 159, 161
 exiles 86, 88–89, 91–93, 95, 101–102

 Farnese, Alexander 100
 Flanders 88
 county of 29–31, 37–38
 French 16
 West Quarter 60
 Fosse 33
 France 23, 149, 158, 168
 Franeker 91
 Franeker, University of 212
 Freedberg, David 69
 Friesland 90–92, 233

 Gavere, battle of (1453) 32, 39, 42, 51
 Generaliteitslanden 150, 153–55, 159, 164, 171
 Geneva 223
 Genoa 23
 Geyl, Pieter 88
 Ghent 30–32, 38, 40, 42, 46–49, 51–52, 67, 74–76, 78
 Goes
 town hall 159
 Gouda 92, 98, 123–48 *passim*
 Gouw, Jan ter 87–88, 95

 Haarlem 85, 92, 101, 105, 113, 116–17
 town hall 159, 165
 Habsburg government 67, 69, 85–87, 89–94, 98, 102, 123–25, 130, 134, 136, 141–43, 146, 148
 Hainaut 36, 53, 91
 Hanseatic League 29
 Harlingen 92
 Hart, Marjolein 't 114
 Hart, Simon 107, 114, 116
 Helvétius, Anne-Marie 49
 Heynsbergh, Jean de 39
 Holland 12, 86–87, 89–90, 95–96, 101–102
 States of 101–102, 151
 Holy Roman Empire 32, 34
 Hornes, Arnold de 34
 Hoorn 92, 101, 116
 servants' ordinance 231
 Houtem 46–47
 Hundred Years War 31, 37
 Huy 33, 35, 37

 iconoclasm 58–83 *passim*
 Imborch, Gijsbert van 214–15
 Inquisition 100
 Israel, Jonathan 74
 Italy 2, 28–29

 Johan-Maurits van Nassau-Siegen 20
 John of Austria 101
 John of Bavaria 34

 Kampen 91
 Kempers, Bram 156
 Kieft, Willem 206–207, 210, 214n
 Kip, Jacob 214
 Kipling, Gordon 51
 Kristeva, Julia 190–91n

 Laon 28
 Leeuwarden 92
 Leiden 40, 112–13, 115
 servants' ordinance 228, 231
 town hall 164
 Leopold I, Emperor of Austria 170
 Liège
 diocese 164
 prince-bishopric 29–30, 32
 town 33, 34, 36–37, 40–41
 Lievens, Jan 160
 Lille 48, 50
 Limburg 154
 Lisbon 23
 London 24–25, 113, 117
 Louis de Male, count 30, 34
 Louis of Nassau 91
 Louis XIV, king of France 168–69, 171
 Louvain 36, 91
 Lumey de la Marck, Count Guillaume 93–94, 97
 Luther, Martin 100

 Maastricht 35, 154–55, 162
 town hall 164, 169
 Marche, Olivier de la 55
 Marck, Adolph de la 33–34
 Marck, Englebert de la 33–34
 Margaret of Austria 78
 Margaret of Parma 63–67, 78, 82
 Margaret of York 53
 Marnef, Guido 70
 Mary of Burgundy 32, 78
 Mary of Hungary 78
 Mauritsstad 21
 Mauss, Marcel 56

- Maximilian of Austria 32, 36, 38
 Megapolensis, Johannes 207
 Merwick, Donna 21
 Meuse 35, 39, 42, 117
 Middelburg 86, 127
 town hall 163
 midwives 191, 193–95
 militias 92, 94–95, 102
 Mokyr, Joel 107, 111n, 116
 Mons 53, 91
 Mons-en-Pévèle, battle of (1304) 31, 37, 39
 Morgenthau, Hans 4
 Muiden 91

 Nancy, battle of (1477) 32
 Neck, Jan van 192
 Netherlandic World 2, 15–16, 19–20, 22, 25
 New Amsterdam 21, 205–24 *passim*
 New Haven 223
 New Netherland 21, 205–24 *passim*
 New Orange 224
 New York 24–25
 Nierop, Henk van 64–65, 70
 Nivelles 91
 Nord 16
 North Holland 90
 North Sea 16

 Old Testament 159, 161–62, 164, 167, 171–72
 Opper-Gelre 153
 Order of the Golden Fleece 44, 65, 74
 Othée, battle of (1408) 35, 37, 41–42
 Oudenaarde 38
 Overijssel 91

 Pacification of Ghent 92, 101
 Palmer Wendel, Lee 71–72
 Pays-de-Calais 16
 Peace of Augsburg (1555) 100
 Philip II 65
 Philip the Bold 45
 Philip the Fair 30
 Philip the Good 32, 35, 39, 41, 46, 48, 51–52, 54–56, 67
 Pirenne, Henri 13, 34, 70
 Plouvier, Jacques 54, 56
 Poilvache 39
 Pontanus, Johannes Isacius 86
 Portugal 23
 Post, Pieter 170

 Quakers 205, 211

 Recife 21
 revolts, urban 26–44 *passim*, 84–102 *passim*
 Robert of Artois 31
 Roman Catholicism 154
 Roman Empire 160, 171
 Roman Republic 159–61, 164, 171
 Rosebeke, battle of (1382) 31, 37, 39, 41n
 Rotterdam 1, 225, 228, 230
 servants' ordinances 228–29, 231
 town hall 159
 Ruysch, Frederik 192
 Ruysch, Hendrik 192

 St. Bartholomew Massacre 100
 Saint Lievin 46, 48–49
 sawmills 102–122 *passim*
 Schiedam
 town hall 158
 Scribner, Robert 71–72
 Sea Beggars 86, 88–90, 92, 99
 Siena 156, 162
 Sint-Truiden 33, 35, 37
 Sneek 91
 St. Aldegonde, Marnix of 81
 stadhouder 150, 152, 157–58, 161, 167
 States General 101, 163–64, 167–68
 Stavoren 92
 Stevin, Simon 21
 Stuyvesant, Petrus 205–24 *passim*
 Sweden 16

 taverns 208, 213, 217–19, 224
 Temple, Sir William 156–57
 The Hague
 servants' ordinance 228
 Thoen, Eric 38
 Tienen 91
 Tilly, Charles 2, 5, 22
 Tittler, Robert 149, 156, 158n
 Tongeren 33, 35, 37, 42
 Tonneman, Pieter 221–22
 Tourinne, battle of (1347) 34, 37, 39
 Tournay 54
 Tracy, James 89

 Union of Utrecht (1579) 153
 urbanization 12, 154
 Utrecht 40, 92

- Valenciennes 50, 54–57, 91
- Valois 33, 41
- Vaughan, Richard 34
- Venice 23
- Venlo 164
 - town hall 164
- Versailles 170
- Vezelay 28
- Virgin Mary 59, 66–68
- Vlissingen 86, 91
- Volewijk 176–204 *passim*
- Vondel, Joost van den 160
- Vottem, battle of (1346) 34, 37

- Waas 38
- War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13) 164
- Weber, Max 13, 22
- Weert 91
- Weesp 91

- West India Company, Dutch (WIC) 16–17, 20–21
- William of Jülich 31
- William of Orange 85, 91, 99–100, 102, 150
- Woltjer, J.J. 72, 88
- women (*see also* domestic servants, midwives) 96, 191–95, 209
 - as iconoclasts 61–65, 77–78
 - resistance against invasion 85

- Ypres 30, 39, 59–61, 76, 78–79

- Zaanstreek 105–106, 113, 118
- Zeeland 85, 88, 91, 93–94, 101, 150–52, 154–55, 159–60, 171
 - States of 151
- Zonhoven, battle of (1490) 36–37, 39
- Zutphen 91
- Zwolle 91

THE NORTHERN WORLD

NORTH EUROPE AND THE BALTIC C. 400-1700 AD
PEOPLES, ECONOMIES AND CULTURES

Editors

BARBARA CRAWFORD (St. Andrews)

DAVID KIRBY (London)

JON-VIDAR SIGURDSSON (Oslo)

INGVILD ØYE (Bergen)

RICHARD W. UNGER (Vancouver)

PRZEMYSŁAW URBANCZYK (Warsaw)

ISSN: 1569-1462

This series provides an opportunity for the publication of scholarly studies concerning the culture, economy and society of northern lands from the early medieval to the early modern period. The aims and scope are broad and scholarly contributions on a wide range of disciplines are included: all historical subjects, every branch of archaeology, saga studies, language topics including place-names, art history and architecture, sculpture and numismatics.

1. Schutz, H. *Tools, Weapons and Ornaments*. Germanic Material Culture in Pre-Carolingian Central Europe, 400-750. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12298 2
2. Biggs, D., S.D. Michalove and A. Compton Reeves (eds.). *Traditions and Transformations in late Medieval England*. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12341 5
3. Tielhof, M. van. *The 'Mother of all Trades'*. The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12546 9
4. Looijenga, T. *Texts & Contexts of the Oldest Runic Inscriptions*. 2003. ISBN 90 04 12396 2
5. Grosjean, A. *An Unofficial Alliance*. Scotland and Sweden 1569-1654. 2003. ISBN 90 04 13241 4
6. Tanner, H.J. *Families, Friends and Allies*. Boulogne and Politics in Northern France and England, c. 879-1160. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13243 0
7. Finlay, A. *Fagrskinna, A Catalogue of the Kings of Norway*. A Translation with Introduction and Notes. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13172 8
8. Biggs, D.L., S.D. Michalove and A. Compton Reeves (eds.). *Reputation and Representation in Fifteenth-Century Europe*. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13613 4
9. Etting, V. *Queen Margrete I (1353-1412) and the Founding of the Nordic Union*. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13652 5
10. Lockhart, P.D. *Frederik II and the Protestant Cause*. Denmark's Role in the Wars of Religion, 1559-1596. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13790 4
11. Williams, G. and P. Bibire. *Sagas, Saints and Settlements*. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13807 2

12. Duczko, W. *Viking Rus. Studies on the Presence of Scandinavians in Eastern Europe*. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13874 9
13. Kotilaine, J.T. *Russia's Foreign Trade and Economic Expansion in the Seventeenth Century*. Windows on the World. 2005. ISBN 90 04 13896 X
14. Harreld, D.J. *High Germans in the Low Countries*. German Merchants and Commerce in Golden Age Antwerp. 2004. ISBN 90 04 14104 9
15. Blomkvist, N. *The Discovery of the Baltic*. The Reception of a Catholic World-system in the European North (AD 1075-1225). 2005. ISBN 90 04 14122 7
16. Oram, R.D. (ed.). *The Reign of Alexander II, 1214-49*. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14206 1
17. Boulhosa, P.P. *Icelanders and the Kings of Norway*. Medieval Sagas and Legal Texts. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14516 8
18. Murdoch, S. *Network North*. Scottish Kin, Commercial and Covert Associations in Northern Europe, 1603-1746. 2006. ISBN 90 04 14664 4
19. Cook, B. and G. Williams (eds.). *Coinage and History in the North Sea World, c. AD 500-1250*. Essays in Honour of Marion Archibald. 2006. ISBN 90 04 14777 2
20. Cathcart, A. *Kinship and Clientage*. Highland Clanship 1451-1609. 2006. ISBN 90 04 15045 5
21. Isoaho, M. *The Image of Aleksandr Nevskiy in Medieval Russia*. Warrior and Saint. 2006. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15101 7, ISBN-10: 90 04 15101 X
22. Te Brake, W. and W. Klooster (eds.). *Power and the City in the Netherlandic World*. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15129-1, ISBN-10: 90-04-15129-X
23. Stewart, L.A.M. *Urban Politics and the British Civil Wars*. Edinburgh, 1617-53. 2006. ISBN-13: 978 90 04 15167 3, ISBN-10: 90 04 15167 2